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Disclaimer: This report captures the substance of discussions over two days, research studies and reflection papers. The views 
expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.

vThe World Food Programme (WFP) convened a two-day conference on 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies in June 2009, 
inviting United Nations officials, academics, thinkers and practitioners to join 
senior staff and country directors and consider how WFP can meet the needs 
of vulnerable communities in the shifting humanitarian context of conflicts and 
complex emergencies.
foreword
The	conference	was	organized	as	a	follow-up	to	WFP’s	2001	Food	Aid	in	Conflict	workshop,	
which	had	sparked	a	lively	internal	debate	as	to	how	WFP	responds	to	complex	emergencies	and	
was	an	important	step	in	shaping	WFP’s	policy	and	operations	in	difficult	environments .	
The	settings	in	which	WFP	operates	have	changed	significantly	since	2001 .	The	2009	
conference	was	therefore	a	valuable	opportunity	for	WFP	to	re-examine	strategies	for	reducing	
hunger	and	achieving	food	security	in	complex	emergencies .	It	also	provided	an	opportunity	to	
seek	guidance	on	operationalizing	the	tools	and	instruments	outlined	in	the	WFP	Strategic	Plan	
(2008–2011) .
The	conference	opened	on	24	June,	the	125th	anniversary	of	the	Battle	of	Solferino,	which	led	
to	the	founding	of	the	Red	Cross	and	Red	Crescent	movements	and	the	Geneva	Conventions .	This	
made	it	a	fitting	anniversary	for	humanitarian	actors	to	reflect	on	new	challenges	to	the	principles	
of	neutrality	and	impartiality	and	new	risks	to	their	safety	and	security .	Afghanistan,	Ethiopia,	
Pakistan	and	the	Sudan,	which	are	among	WFP’s	largest	and	best-funded	operations,	all	provide	
stark	examples	of	the	complexity	of	the	working	environments	in	which	humanitarian	actors	are	
engaged .	To	give	only	one	example,	WFP	worked	with	the	military	in	Pakistan	to	respond	to	the	
massive	earthquake	in	Kashmir	in	2005,	a	relationship	that	today	generates	serious	reflections	
about	the	perception	of	our	neutrality	as	we	work	in	the	country’s	war-affected	frontier	areas .
The	objectives	of	the	June	2009	conference	were	threefold:	
•	 	to	take	stock	of	trends	and	cutting-edge	theory	on	the	nature	of	conflict	and	
complex	emergencies;	
•	 	to	examine	humanitarian	responses	to	operational	and	programmatic	challenges	in	conflict	
settings;	and	
•	 	to	identify	strategies	for	WFP	and	the	humanitarian	community	for	enhancing	humanitarian	
action	and	advocacy .
A	series	of	presentations	in	the	first	part	of	the	conference	under	the	title	Overview	of	
Theory	and	Trends	was	followed	by	a	debate	about	the	implications	for	WFP’s	programming	
and	operations .	The	second	part	of	the	conference	—	Critical	Areas	of	Engagement	and	
Operational	Effectiveness	—	consisted	of	discussion	groups .	The	groups	discussing	critical	areas	
of	engagement	tackled	the	following	issues:	(i)	United	Nations	and	integrated	missions,	and	their	
impact	on	humanitarian	space;	(ii)	non-state	actors	and	security,	and	their	impact	on	humanitarian	
space;	and	(iii)	protection,	the	rights	agenda,	principled	humanitarian	action	and	advocacy .	
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The	groups	discussing	operational	effectiveness	focused	on:	(i)	understanding	and	reaching	
out	to	communities;	(ii)	planning,	preparedness	and	response	in	complex	emergencies;	and	(iii)	
programming	in	protracted	crises,	including	sustainability	issues	and	exit	strategies .	
In	preparation	for	the	conference,	WFP	commissioned	the	Humanitarian	Policy	Group	of	the	
Overseas	Development	Institute	to	conduct	a	literature	review	of	current	conflict	trends	and	the	
implications	for	WFP	programming .	External	experts	and	WFP	staff	also	conducted	a	review	of	
WFP’s	policies	and	programmes	in	protracted	crises	from	2000	to	2009,	and	carried	out	in-depth	
case	studies	of	WFP’s	operations	in	complex	emergencies .	These	documents	form	the	subsequent	
chapters	of	the	Report	of	the	Conference .	Please	note	that	views	expressed	in	this	report	do	not	
necessarily	reflect	the	official	position	of	WFP .
We	wish	to	express	our	gratitude	for	the	generous	funding	of	the	Institutional	Support	
Partnership	Grant	of	the	United	Kingdom	Department	for	International	Development,	which	made	
the	conference	and	the	case	studies	possible .	
Ramiro Lopes da Silva
 WFP Deputy Chief Operating Officer and Director of Emergencies
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1Executive Summary and Recommendations1
The conference on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies 
generated two days of rich discussions, culminating in a set of actionable steps 
and ways forward.1 This summary outlines the thematic debates and gives an 
overview of the main recommendations.2 
1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to 
individual participants. 
2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP. 
executive summary and Recommendations
1 The conference was held under Chatham House rules: the 
report therefore does not ascribe opinions or statements to 
individual participants.
2 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
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—	humanitarian,	developmental,	political	and	
human	rights	—	can	be	difficult	to	align	and	are	
sometimes	uncomfortably	squeezed	together	
in	an	integrated	agenda .	Several	participants	
argued	that	the	flexible	approach	adopted	by	
the	Secretary-General	of	“integration	when	fea-
sible”	or	“integration	when	desirable”	or	“inte-
gration	adapted	to	the	setting”	may	be	possible	
in	theory,	but	it	has	yet	to	be	implemented .	
Conference	participants	emphasized	that	
engagement	in	today’s	complex	emergencies,	
with	their	socio-political	and	cultural	dynam-
ics,	has	a	profound	impact	on	the	perceptions	
of	agencies	and	personnel	on	the	ground .	At	
the	same	time,	recipient	and	donor	states	have	
become	increasingly	sophisticated	in	creat-
ing	anti-humanitarian	space	by	manipulating	
humanitarian	personnel,	making	access	for	
humanitarian	groups	selective	and	controlling	
the	flow	of	information	to	humanitarian	actors	
and	the	media .	States	are	quick	to	subordinate	
humanitarian	agendas	to	political	agendas,	
for	example	in	the	now	partially	discredited	
“war	on	terror .”	And	on	the	humanitarian	side,	
agencies	are	often	too	willing	to	concede	on	
humanitarian	principles	or	muffle	their	advocacy	
to	ensure	continued	access	to	vulnerable	areas	
—	a	strategy	that	may	yield	immediate	benefits	
but	be	harmful	in	the	long	term .	
The	conference	also	focused	on	the	multi-
plication	of	humanitarian	assistance	actors .	An	
increase	in	western	and	non-western	donors	
The	increase	in	civil	conflicts	in	the	post-
Cold	War	era	has	led	to	a	dramatic	increase	
in	death	and	suffering	among	civilians .	This	
shift	in	the	profile	of	victims	of	war,	along	with	
the	expansion	of	peace-keeping	and	peace-
enforcement	operations,	has	brought	humani-
tarian	workers	out	from	the	periphery	and	into	
the	heart	of	conflicts .	The	dynamics	of	interna-
tional	intervention	around	the	world	shifted	in	
the	wake	of	9/11	and	the	ensuing	war	on	terror .	
One	outcome	of	this	shift	has	been	increased	
targeting	of	humanitarian	workers:	not	only	are	
humanitarian	actors	working	closer	to	conflicts	
—	they	are	now	being	intentionally	targeted	
and	the	humanitarian	space	is	consequently	
diminished .	A	consensus	emerged	during	the	
conference	that	humanitarian	actors	must	ap-
ply	more	innovative	thinking	and	approaches	
in	their	work	to	establish	a	wider	and	more	pre-
dictable	humanitarian	space .
In	the	context	of	these	changes,	the	new	
modes	of	engagement	of	the	United	Nations	
have	favoured	integrated	missions .	Although	
they	have	a	stabilization	purpose,	these	mis-
sions	pose	constraints	—	real	or	perceived	—	on	
humanitarian	agencies	in	areas	such	as	adapt-
ability,	neutrality	and	coherence	of	messaging .	
The	four-fold	objectives	of	the	United	Nations	
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and	major	organizations,	along	with	emerg-
ing	political	powers,	has	made	coordination	of	
common	messaging	more	complex .	It	has	also	
allowed	host	governments	to	benefit	by	playing	
groups	off	against	one	another .	And	the	fragil-
ity	of	some	states	in	complex	emergencies	has	
led	to	an	increase	in	negotiations	with	non-state	
actors,	which	further	reduces	consistency	of	
approach	and	demands	unique	strategies	to	
balance	various	interests .
A	number	of	major	recommendations	for	
WFP	emerged	during	the	conference:	
•	 Develop	guidance	on	delivering	humanitar-
ian	aid	in	politically	charged	environments,	
including	clarity	as	to	the	application	of	
humanitarian	principles .	WFP	should	take	
into	account	the	political	constraints	in	
each	of	its	complex	operations	and	strive	to	
define	the	minimum	acceptable	conditions	
for	its	interventions	and	develop	guidance	
to	help	country	offices	to	identify	the	range	
of	tools	available	—	from	negotiating	ac-
cess,	to	various	levels	of	advocacy,	to	with-
holding	assistance	—	to	ensure	that	such	
conditions	are	maintained .	
•	 Enhance	analytical	abilities	at	the	field	level	
to	understand	the	causes	behind	crises	and	
the	regional	and	local	contexts	in	which	
WFP	works .	Feedback	loops	—	in	particular	
utilizing	information	from	operations,	staff	
and	partners	—	should	be	used	to	keep	
the	context	analysis	current,	and	ensure	
clear	and	consistent	understanding	of	the	
dynamics	of	a	crisis,	the	actors	involved	and	
their	agenda .	Context	analysis	is	necessary	
to	shape	approaches	and	types	of	assist-
ance	in	the	event	of	sudden-onset	emer-
gencies;	it	becomes	even	more	crucial	in	
cases	of	persistent	conflict .
•	 	Reiterate	WFP’s	commitment	to	the	protec-
tion	of	its	beneficiaries	and	their	communi-
ties,	for	example	by	explaining	how	protec-
tion	relates	to	its	hunger	mandate	and	by	
defining	the	limits	of	its	potential	contribu-
tion	to	the	protection	of	civilians .	Develop	
best	practices	and	clear	guidance	on	ways	
to	institutionalize	protection	in	WFP’s	pro-
gramming,	for	example	by	giving	more	
training	to	staff	and	senior	management .	
•	 	Work	more	closely	with	national	non-gov-
ernmental	organizations,	community-based	
organizations	and	religious	leaders,	and	
encourage	them	to	take	part	in	program-
ming	and	decision-making .	Recognize	in	
practice	that	organizations	have	their	own	
capacities,	identities	and	flexibility,	and	re-
frain	from	building	them	into	the	image	of	
the	United	Nations	and	WFP .
•	 	Determine	the	degree	to	which	WFP	
prioritizes	participation	in	an	integrated	
approach,	because	such	participation	
can	impact	perceptions	of	neutrality	and	
independence .	WFP	should	consider	when	
and	how	it	might	be	appropriate	to	“de-
brand”	itself	from	United	Nations	or	other	
political	and	military	missions .	Reflect	
further	with	other	dual-mandate	partners	
on	the	extent	to	which	this	is	possible	for	
a	United	Nations	agency	and	how	it	might	
be	achieved .
•	 	Develop	a	broader	approach	to	program-
ming	that	involves	more	investment	in	
humanitarian	preparedness,	including	re-
sponse	to	climate	change .	
3Conference Report
Challenges of Humanitarian Action in Conflicts and  
Complex Emergencies3
3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. The 
themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the conference agenda on page 135. 
Trends in Conflict and  
Complex Emergencies4
The	conference	opened	with	a	session	on	
the	geo-politics	of	the	last	decade	and	the	ac-
companying	rapid	shifts	in	the	humanitarian	
context,	notably	in	complex	emergencies	and	
conflicts .	Today’s	internal	conflicts	are	mostly	
motivated	by	struggles	for	control	of	power	and	
resources	rather	than	the	more	historical	goals	
of	state-building	and	state	control	over	re-
sources .	With	more	and	more	civil	wars	relative	
to	international	wars,	the	number	of	internally	
displaced	people	has	significantly	increased;	
and	the	majority	of	deaths	in	these	new	wars	
are	civilian .
Humanitarian	assistance	will	continue	to	
be	shaped	by	civil	conflicts	among	a	prolifera-
tion	of	armed	groups .	Presenters	predicted	that	
insurgencies	—	groups	vying	for	the	support	
of	civilians	and	control	of	territory	—	and	their	
tactics,	which	include	the	burning	of	villages,	
forced	migration	and	terror	tactics	such	as	sui-
cide	bombing	—	will	become	more	common	in	
the	future,	particularly	in	fragile	states .	
New	drivers	of	conflict	such	as	climate	
change	are	also	likely	to	emerge .	The	interna-
tional	system	will	struggle	to	respond	to	more	
frequent	sudden-onset	emergencies	caused	
by	extreme	weather,	but	the	cumulative	effects	
of	climate	change	—	resource	scarcity	such	as	
4 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP. 
decreased	availability	of	water	for	agricultural	
production,	and	disease	and	mass	migration	
—	could	be	more	detrimental,	for	example	
through	kindling	or	exacerbating	conflicts,	even	
if	they	are	less	immediately	perceptible .	
The	consensus	among	the	presenters	was	
that	the	need	for	humanitarian	action	will	be	
greater	in	the	future	and	that	humanitarian	ac-
tors	will	need	to	be	better	prepared	for	the	
combination	of	conflict	and	natural	disaster	and	
the	increasing	complexity	of	conflict .	
Humanitarian Space and  
Humanitarian Action
The	changing	nature	of	conflicts	has	im-
mediate	repercussions	for	the	humanitarian	op-
erating	environment .	As	one	presenter	noted:	
“ . . .	gone	are	the	days	of	the	pristine	emergency	
such	as	the	famines	in	Ethiopia	and	Sudan	in	
the	mid	1980s:	we’re	now	in	what	one	could	call	
second-generation	emergencies	that	are	com-
plex	in	every	sense .”	
In	the	context	of	these	new	complex	
emergencies,	the	presentations	highlighted	
three	factors	that	have	contributed	to	the	
shrinking	of	humanitarian	space,	including:	i)	
the	sophisticated	strategies	of	governments	
and	rebel	groups	in	carving	out	anti-humani-
tarian	space;	ii)	the	subordination	of	humani-
tarian	activities	to	political	agendas;	and	iii)	
the	shortcomings	of	humanitarian	agencies	in	
defending	their	space .
States	and	rebel	groups	are	increasingly	
adept	at	manipulating	humanitarian	aid	by	con-
trolling	humanitarian	workers	and	the	flow	of	
3 This section summarizes the three thematic presentations 
of the conference and the plenary discussions that followed. 
The themes, presenters and panellists can be found in the 
conference agenda on page 135.
4 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
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information	by	giving	selective	access,	offering	
only	selected	bits	of	information	and	playing	
humanitarian	agencies	off	against	each	other .	
Presenters	argued	that	there	are	lessons	to	be	
learned	from	these	tactics,	for	example	those	
used	by	the	Government	of	Sudan	in	Darfur,	
and	from	Israel	and	the	United	States	as	to	how	
information	is	shaped .	
Humanitarian	assistance	is	also	at	times	
hijacked	by	political	and	security	agendas .	Gov-
ernments	have	used	the	rhetoric	of	the	“war	on	
terror”	to	gain	political	and	financial	support:	
for	example	Sri	Lanka	presented	its	actions	
against	the	Liberation	Tigers	of	Tamil	Eelam	as	
part	of	the	war	on	terror	and	also	claiming	its	
actions	were	in	defence	of	national	sovereignty .	
Governments	are	also	less	reliant	on	aid	from	
the	West:	Asian	countries,	China	in	particular	
and	increasingly	the	Gulf	states,	offer	alterna-
tive	economic	resources	without	the	ties	of	
traditional	donors,	which	include	calls	for	adher-
ence	to	humanitarian	principles .	
At	the	same	time	the	humanitarian	com-
munity	has	not	been	prepared	to	defend	its	
own	space,	making	it	easier	for	national	govern-
ments	to	stage-manage	the	system .	Even	in	
complex	conflict	environments,	humanitarian	
assistance	continues	to	be	approached	in	many	
cases	as	a	technical	problem	following	a	natural	
disaster	model	that	calculates	needs	and	short-
falls	—	but	neglects	their	socio-political	roots .	
Applying Humanitarian Principles: 
General and Operational Challenges
Humanitarian	actors	trying	to	apply	the	
principles	of	neutrality,	impartiality	and	inde-
pendence	and	to	defend	humanitarian	space	
confront	numerous	dilemmas .	At	the	broadest	
level,	the	morality	and	value	of	adhering	to	the	
principles	—	in	particular	a	“purist”	humanitar-
ian	approach	—	is	being	challenged,	especially	
in	the	context	of	“with-us-or-against-us”	rhetoric	
and	the	tactics	of	terrorism	and	anti-terrorism .
A	more	operational	and	persistent	di-
lemma	is	the	inner	tension	between	adhering	
to	humanitarian	principles	and	serving	the	hu-
manitarian	imperative,	particularly	in	relation	to	
access .	Agencies	are	confronted	with	different	
situations:	denial	of	access	when	not	perceived	
as	neutral,	as	in	Darfur;	compromising	neutrality	
and	impartiality	to	gain	access,	as	in	Sri	Lanka;	
and	trading	advocacy	for	access	in	dealing	with	
governments,	as	in	Myanmar .	
A	general	dilemma	identified	by	partici-
pants	arises	from	the	increasing	integration	of	
military	and	political	issues	and	aid	approaches	
in	the	United	Nations	under	its	integrated	mis-
sion	policy	and	in	the	policies	of	major	donor	
countries	and	organizations	such	as	the	North	
Atlantic	treaty	Organization	and	the	European	
Union .	Peace-building	and	nation-building	are	
by	nature	political	processes,	and	the	participa-
tion	of	humanitarian	actors	in	those	processes	
—	especially	United	Nations	organizations	and	
NGOs	with	dual	humanitarian	and	development	
mandates	—	can	according	to	some	jeopardize	
humanitarian	objectives .	The	question	was	also	
discussed	in	the	session	on	“One	UN”	and	inte-
gration,	covered	below .	
Applying Humanitarian Principles: 
Immediate and Operational Dilemmas
Aid	agencies	also	face	immediate	dilem-
mas	when	attempting	to	apply	a	human-rights	
or	protection	approach .	In	this	respect,	one	pre-
senter	argued	that	agencies	not	only	undermine	
their	neutrality	but	also	fail	to	act	disinterested-
ly	when	they	trade	advocacy	on	human	rights	or	
a	protection-centred	approach	in	exchange	for	
access,	which	can	bring	resources	and	visibility	
for	example .	This	sends	signals	of	unhealthy	
compromise	internationally	and	locally	and	
becomes	dangerous	for	humanitarian	actors .	It	
was	also	noted	that	lessons	are	learned	by	abu-
sive	actors,	often	more	quickly	than	by	humani-
tarian	groups .	Ultimately,	it	was	argued,	the	
humanitarian	community	needs	to	assess	the	
signals	it	is	sending	out	and	the	repercussions	
of	those	actions	on	future	negotiations .	One	
contributor	remarked	that	the	moral	authority	
of	agencies	has	weakened	as	a	result	of	failings	
to	defend	their	stated	principles;	this	includes	
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non-governmental	organizations	(NGOs)	and	
United	Nations	organizations	whose	agendas	
are	perceived	to	be	too	comfortably	aligned	
with	the	interests	of	major	donors .	
Others	positioned	the	value	of	neutrality	
for	agencies	at	a	global	level .	It	was	argued	
that	relief	agencies	must	think	beyond	analysis	
of	their	present	behaviour	in	a	given	country	
and	their	need	to	be	perceived	as	neutral	in	
that	context .	Agencies	should	adopt	a	more	
nuanced	understanding	of	how	they	are	linked	
to	and	associated	with	other	actors	and	events	
and	how	those	linkages	will	have	repercussions	
well	into	the	future	and	across	continents .	The	
invasion	of	Iraq,	for	example,	harmed	percep-
tions	of	the	West	and	those	associated	with	the	
West	and	their	legitimacy	by	creating	the	im-
pression	among	many	that	they	do	not	abide	by	
international	law .	
Other	participants	offered	a	more	utilitarian	
perspective	on	the	value	of	neutrality .	In	real-
ity,	humanitarian	principles	do	not	determine	
whether	humanitarian	actors	are	granted	access:	
the	key	factor	for	determining	humanitarian	
space	is	in	fact	a	humanitarian	actor’s	useful-
ness .	The	service	or	commodity	provided	by	the	
relief	agency	must	be	perceived	as	being	benefi-
cial	to	those	who	grant	access	or	control	bound-
aries:	these	include	medical	services	and	food	
for	combatants	and	their	families,	salaries,	provi-
sion	of	cars	or	taxis,	and	the	legitimacy	afforded	
to	governments	or	non-state	groups	with	whom	
negotiations	are	carried	out .	For	principles	to	be	
pursued,	relief	agencies	must	first	be	perceived	
as	useful	—	a	prerequisite	for	dialogue	with	
armed	groups	as	to	access .	The	challenge	is	to	
find	an	acceptable	compromise	between	the	
political	or	economic	interests	of	those	who	con-
trol	access	and	the	policies	of	delivery .	
Some	participants	asserted	that	humani-
tarian	principles	are	not	goals	in	themselves,	
but	rather	a	means	to	attain	safe	and	secure	
access	in	order	to	serve	the	greater	goal	of	the	
humanitarian	imperative .	In	view	of	this,	neutral-
ity	should	be	constantly	pursued;	but	failure	to	
achieve	it	fully	should	not	be	an	impediment	to	
action .	It	was	also	noted	that	it	is	unlikely	that	
the	objective	of	humanity	can	be	served	for	
long	in	a	conflict	context	without	the	principle	
of	neutrality .	
Perceptions of Humanitarian Workers
The	greater	numbers	of	attacks	on	hu-
manitarian	workers	in	recent	years	has	led	to	
greater	reliance	on	remote	implementation	of	
aid	through	local	contracts	while	United	Na-
tions	staff	remain	in	fortified	offices	or	housing	
complexes	or	in	neighbouring	countries .	This	
“bunkerization”	is	characterized	by	humanitar-
ian	actors	retreating	from	places	declared	risky	
by	the	United	Nations	Department	of	Safety	
and	Security .	As	a	result,	according	to	one	
presenter:	“ . . .	the	United	Nations	is	failing	in	its	
attempts	to	be	known .	But	likewise,	the	United	
Nations	is	failing	to	know	the	social	and	local	
environments	in	which	it	works .”	This	distance	
from	communities	may	also	be	contributing	
to	the	perception	in	some	insecure	countries	
that	the	United	Nations	is	too	much	associated	
with	a	Western	political	agenda .	Unfortunately,	
the	humanitarian	system	has	too	infrequently	
compensated	for	its	loss	of	staff	presence	with	
adequate	investment	in	enhancement	of	the	
capacities	of	its	local	partners	or	to	listening	to	
the	agendas	of	local	and	regional	actors .	
Some	participants	also	expressed	concern	
that	the	perception	of	humanitarian	workers	
is	suffering	as	a	result	of	their	association	with	
“coalition”	forces	and/or	United	Nations	inte-
grated	missions .	
One-UN and Integrated Missions 
Participants	revealed	a	wide	range	of	views	
on	and	understanding	of	United	Nations	in-
tegrated	missions .	According	to	a	number	of	
speakers,	political	agendas,	compromises	or	
agreements	supported	by	the	leadership	of	
a	United	Nations	mission	may	trump	needs-
based,	humanitarian	decision-making .	Accord-
ing	to	this	argument,	the	humanitarian	agenda	
often	loses	out	to	the	political	agenda,	neutral-
ity	is	compromised	and,	ultimately,	humanitar-
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ian	actors	have	less	access	and	are	less	effective	
in	delivering	aid	and	saving	lives .	Some	partici-
pants	argued	that	United	Nations	integrated	
missions	exemplify	this	subordination	of	the	
humanitarian	agenda;	others	countered	that	
integrated	missions	can	be	an	opportunity	to	
enhance	humanitarian	work,	and	that	harm	to	
the	humanitarian	agenda	as	a	result	of	United	
Nations	integrated	missions	is	exaggerated	or	
not	supported	by	evidence .	
There	was	some	disagreement	as	to	wheth-
er	the	United	Nations	Secretary-General’s	two	
guidance	notes	on	integrated	missions	tend	to	
advance	integration	as	a	goal	in	itself	rather	than	
as	a	means	to	an	end .	The	expulsion	of	aid	agen-
cies	from	the	Sudan	was	cited	as	an	example	
that	political	and	relief	objectives	are	not	always	
compatible .	The	United	Nations,	according	to	
this	argument,	has	four	basic	instruments	that	
it	can	bring	to	bear	in	a	complex	emergency:	
(i)	political/military;	(ii)	humanitarian;	(iii)	human	
rights,	and	truth	and	justice;	and	(iv)	develop-
ment .	It	was	stressed	that	although	there	are	ex-
amples	where	these	instruments	reinforce	each	
other	as	in	Sierra	Leone	and	Liberia,	they	some-
times	are	not	fully	complementary .	The	four	
components	are	in	a	very	unstable	relationship	
with	one	another,	especially	within	the	confines	
of	conflict .	It	was	therefore	argued	that	integra-
tion	should	not	be	an	overarching	goal	or	the	
default	setting,	but	rather	one	of	several	possi-
ble	configurations	that	should	be	considered .	
Moving	beyond	United	Nations	integration,	
one	participant	discussed	the	negative	impact	
of	the	coherence	agenda	more	generally,	cit-
ing	the	example	of	hearts-and-minds	tactics	in	
military	campaigns .	The	exchange	of	material	
or	relief	goods	for	information	and	political	
support	has,	according	to	this	argument,	en-
dangered	humanitarian	actors .	In	Afghanistan,	
for	example,	the	delivery	of	food	assistance	by	
some	foreign	military	forces	in	civilian	clothing	
has	blurred	the	lines	between	humanitarian	ac-
tors	and	the	military .	
Others	advocated	coherence,	arguing	that	
those	involved	in	aid,	politics,	trade,	diplomacy	
and	military	activities	should	work	towards	com-
mon	interests	of	peace,	stability	and	develop-
ment,	and	that	coherence	is	the	most	effective	
way	of	achieving	long-term	stability .	Recent	
United	Nations	reform	provides	an	opportunity	
for	agencies	such	as	WFP	to	benefit	from	being	
part	of	a	coherent	overall	United	Nations	strat-
egy	that	could	ultimately	increase	the	efficiency	
and	effectiveness	of	each	agency’s	assistance .	
Good	coordination	brings	with	it	coherent	divi-
sion	of	labour,	enhanced	information	flows	and	
sharing	of	lessons	learned	and	good	practices .	
There	was,	however,	some	scepticism	with	
regard	to	coherence	and	coordination .	Some	
participants	pointed	out	that	the	United	Nations	
has	a	tendency	to	create	mechanisms	for	the	
“coordination	of	coordination	bodies”	—	most	
recently	with	the	cluster	system .	The	useful	idea	
of	coordination	instead	becomes	a	fashionable	
buzzword,	duplication	of	roles	ensues	and,	in	
certain	cases,	a	collective	“de-responsibiliza-
tion”	is	the	final	outcome .	Integrated	missions	
also	present	difficult	challenges	in	terms	of	inter-
agency	communication	and	coordination .	
The	practice	of	absorbing	advocacy	for	hu-
man	rights	and	the	protection	of	civilians	into	
humanitarian	and	peacekeeping	agendas	was	
also	questioned .	Some	humanitarian	actors	be-
lieve	that	advocacy	for	human	rights	can	threat-
en	the	core	agenda	of	humanitarian	action	by	
closing	the	door	on	political	alliances	necessary	
for	access	and	delivery .	
The	need	for	better	evidence	as	to	the	im-
pact	of	integrated	missions	on	humanitarian	ac-
tion	was	noted,	as	was	the	need	for	better	com-
munication	to	dispel	existing	biases	and	false	
perceptions .	Operational	actors	urged	more	
accessible	decision-making	processes	at	United	
Nations	Headquarters	on	integrated	missions,	
including	greater	access	for	country	offices	of	
the	operational	agencies,	so	that	an	organiza-
tion	such	as	WFP	might	properly	integrate	its	
mission	with	New	York .	At	present,	the	United	
Nations	Secretariat	mission	processes	require	
a	degree	of	staff	commitment	that	operational	
agencies	have	trouble	maintaining,	especially	
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those	not	headquartered	in	New	York:	this	in	
turn	makes	it	difficult	to	bring	in	the	views	of	
operational	actors	on	the	ground .
Critical Areas of Engagement: 
Proposed Tools and Strategies 
in the Face of New Challenges 
— Breakout Sessions of the 
Conference
•	 Prioritizing	local	engagement .
•	 Applying	the	protection	lens .	
•	 	Engaging	state	and	non-state	actors	and	
the	humanitarian	principles .	
•	 Effective	recovery	programming .
Prioritizing Local Engagement
Because	of	its	financing	model,	the	absolute	
quantity	of	aid	that	WFP	can	deliver	has	over	the	
years	been	an	important	institutional	incentive .	
It	may	also	be	a	factor	in	WFP’s	decision	to	in-
vest	more	in	increasing	its	logistics	capacity	than	
its	programming	approaches	and	quality .	A	ma-
jority	of	participants	emphasized	the	drawbacks	
of	a	logistics-driven	approach	by	WFP,	which	has	
resulted	in	relatively	weak	analysis	of	the	context	
of	its	operations,	an	inability	to	reach	out	more	
to	communities	as	part	of	its	programming	proc-
ess	and	a	lack	of	understanding	of	the	linkages	
between	food	assistance	and	protection .	
NGOs	and	community-based	organizations	
are	essential	to	effective	WFP	programme	imple-
mentation	and	presence .	And	yet	across	differ-
ent	remote-management	modalities	in	complex	
emergencies,	WFP	has	not	invested	enough	in	
enhancing	the	capacities	of	its	partners .	Some	
participants	argued	that	insufficient	attention	
has	been	placed	on	the	agendas	of	local	actors	
and	partners .	This	knowledge	gap	limits	WFP’s	
understanding	of	how	assistance	is	perceived	
and	used	by	different	actors	on	the	ground .	
Much	of	the	discussion	during	this	session	
centred	on	the	opportunities	and	challenges	of	
partnering	with	Islamic	organizations	and	com-
munity	leaders .	Partnering	with	Islamic	organi-
zations	can	help	with	local	acceptance,	build	
the	capacity	of	the	organizations	and	enhance	
the	security	of	relief	workers .	However,	as	with	
all	partners,	a	nuanced	understanding	of	their	
political	agendas	and	their	capacity	to	ensure	
accountability	is	necessary .	
In	complex	settings	with	access	constraints,	
listening	and	reaching	out	with	local	coop-
erating	partners	is	especially	important	and	
can	yield	significant	benefits	for	humanitarian	
outcomes .	The	example	of	Cyclone	Nargis	in	
Myanmar	was	cited,	in	which	international	ac-
tors	faced	severe	access	constraints;	local	and	
national	actors,	however,	were	empowered	with	
international	resources	and	were	thereby	able	
to	deliver	adequate	assistance .	Local	partners	
are	often	brought	into	planning	processes	—	in	
part	to	demonstrate	transparency	—	but	these	
same	organizations	often	complain	of	“being	
used”	to	satisfy	minimal	donor	and	agency	poli-
cies .	Instead,	their	existing	strengths	should	be	
understood	and	deployed,	and	more	systematic	
efforts	should	be	made	to	increase	their	capac-
ity .	Efforts	to	enhance	the	capacities	of	local	
cooperating	partners	remain	predominantly	
un-coordinated .	
A	recurring	theme	of	the	session	on	local	
engagement	was	that	humanitarian	actors	can	
achieve	their	objectives	better	by	being	better	
listeners .	And	although	listening	well	has	long	
been	a	staple	of	standard	humanitarian	policy,	it	
nevertheless	still	requires	a	shift	in	organization-
al	culture	in	many	major	humanitarian	organiza-
tions .	An	important	component	of	a	“listening	
culture”	is	understanding	more	clearly	how		
humanitarian	actors	are	perceived	by	communi-
ties	and	adjusting	our	operations	and	assist-
ance	accordingly .	
Real	local	engagement	is	also	a	prerequi-
site	for	understanding	contexts	and	people’s	
vulnerabilities	and	coping	mechanisms,	and	is	a	
potentially	crucial	tool	in	ensuring	the	safety	of	
aid	workers .	
Applying a Protection Lens 
In	recent	years,	WFP	has	been	increasingly	
engaged	in	improving	its	capacity	to	contribute	
to	the	protection	of	civilians	in	the	context	of	its	
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food	assistance	programming .	The	nature	and	
dimensions	of	this	“protective	assistance”	was	
discussed .	There	was	a	general	consensus	that,	
at	a	minimum,	there	is	a	need	to	enhance	quali-
tative	programming	by	engaging	more	with	
communities	and	by	stressing	“do	no	harm”	
when	engaged	in	food	assistance .	There	was	
also	agreement	that	the	provision	of	food	can	
serve	as	significant	leverage	to	influence	actors	
positively	and	help	to	ensure	that	beneficiaries	
are	treated	in	a	safe	and	dignified	manner .	
It	was	suggested	that	a	protection	ap-
proach	for	an	assistance	agency	is	generally	
consistent	with	a	rights-based	approach	—	one	
that	advocates	for	the	realization	of	people’s	
rights	and	recognizes	and	tries	to	mitigate	
violations	and	threats	to	rights,	for	example	by	
helping	states	to	meet	their	obligations .	A	pro-
tection	approach	such	as	this,	integrated	into	
programming,	sends	clearer	messages	to	state	
and	non-state	actors,	thereby	shielding	people	
and	communities	from	abuses	more	effectively .	
Protection	activities	can	also	link	beneficiaries	
closer	to	agencies	and	help	to	establish	down-
wards	accountability	for	humanitarian	actors .
Conference	participants	concluded	that	a	
greater	effort	should	be	made	to	clarify	WFP’s	
role	in	protection	—	also	with	regard	to	the	pro-
tection-mandated	agencies	—	and	that	WFP’s	
potential	contributions	to	protection	as	well	as	
its	limitations	should	be	better	documented .	
Participants	also	suggested	that	a	clear	defini-
tion	of	protection	for	WFP	should	be	accompa-
nied	by	guidance	on	how	and	to	what	extent	a	
protection	approach	should	be	utilized	in	dif-
ferent	contexts .	Such	guidance	should	take	into	
account	the	risks	and	tensions	that	come	with	
engaging	in	protection	issues,	particularly	pos-
sible	consequences	for	access	and	staff	security,	
especially	national	staff .	Some	participants	also	
cautioned	against	re-inventing	tools	while	adopt-
ing	a	protection	lens;	rather	it	was	suggested	
that	existing	tools	such	as	participatory	methods	
be	merged	into	a	protection	approach .	There	
was	a	strong	recommendation	among	partici-
pants	that	WFP	should	continue	and	expand	its	
ongoing	training	programme	on	protection	and	
that	efforts	should	be	made	to	include	country	
directors,	other	field	managers	and	senior	Head-
quarters	staff .	Better	sensitization	on	the	ground	
should	also	be	accompanied	by	the	develop-
ment	of	clearer	guidance	on	how	to	institutional-
ize	protection	in	WFP’s	programming .
To	enhance	protection	in	programming,	a	
number	of	participants	proposed	the	idea	of	
forging	better	linkages	between	livelihoods	and	
protection	in	conflict	environments .	Comple-
mentary	livelihoods	and	protection	work	would	
mean	that	people’s	economic	vulnerabilities	
and	their	political	vulnerabilities	are	addressed .	
It	was	also	pointed	out	that	this	approach	would	
allow	WFP	to	operate	at	multiple	levels:	ad-
dressing	or	preventing	violations	that	affect	the	
protection	and	livelihoods	of	the	population	as	
well	as	responding	to	the	consequences	of	the	
violations	through	direct	assistance .	
Engaging State and Non-State Actors 
and the Humanitarian Principles 
Participants	discussed	the	ever-present	pro-
grammatic	tension	between	adhering	to	humani-
tarian	principles	and	serving	the	humanitarian	
imperative,	with	some	speculation	that	principles	
are	increasingly	being	compromised .	According	
to	WFP	participants	and	others,	WFP’s	actions	
in	this	dilemma	are	inconsistent:	humanitarian	
principles	tend	to	be	overruled	by	the	short-term	
humanitarian	imperative	of	food	delivery .	But	
important	exceptions	exist:	for	example	WFP’s	
work	to	maintain	a	position	of	neutrality	in	So-
malia	was	cited .	Several	of	the	senior	WFP	staff	
called	for	further	clarity	on	existing	policies	and	
programming	and	especially	on	the	extent	to	
which	principled	stances	taken	in	the	field	will	be	
supported	by	WFP	leaders	at	Headquarters .
A	sense	among	participants	of	increased	
instrumentalization	of	aid	by	state	and	non-
state	actors	highlights	the	need	to	understand	
and	employ	humanitarian	principles	in	advocacy	
and	negotiations .	It	is	necessary	to	identify	bot-
tom	lines	and	minimum	operational	standards	
in	negotiating	access,	because	failed	threats	to	
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withdraw	and	withhold	assistance	can	negative-
ly	impact	the	credibility	of	the	United	Nations .	
Better	understanding	of	the	spectrum	of	lever-
age	available	to	humanitarian	actors	will	further	
assist	in	negotiations .	
The	reality	of	WFP’s	work	makes	establish-
ing	and	sustaining	a	perception	of	neutrality	dif-
ficult,	for	example	in:	i)	transporting	food	over	
long	distances	through	insecure	areas,	which	
often	requires	an	armed	military	escort;	and	ii)	
WFP’s	dual	mandate	of	relief	and	development	
—	the	latter	links	WFP	with	government	objec-
tives	and	programmes .	
Non-WFP	participants	emphasized	the	
importance	of	WFP	engaging	on	issues	of	hu-
manitarian	principles,	stressing	its	strong	politi-
cal	leverage .	WFP	has	a	special	role	to	play	in	
taking	a	principled	approach,	given	its	size	and	
influence .	One	participant	stressed	that	it	mat-
ters	to	governments	if	WFP	is	“in	the	room,	or	
outside	the	room .”	
No	consensus	was	reached	as	to	whether	
or	not	WFP	should	distribute	food	where	
principles	such	as	impartiality	and	neutrality	
cannot	be	met .	Some	argued	that	this	should	
be	addressed	at	the	policy	level	to	determine	
the	extent	to	which	conditionality	can	be	used	
while	negotiating	access;	others	stressed	that	
a	uniform	policy	was	unlikely	to	be	practical .	
Participants	did	agree	that	the	decision	to	use	
WFP’s	leverage	to	push	for	principles	has	to	be	
context-specific;	they	also	agreed	that	it	mat-
ters	to	WFP’s	long-term	credibility	to	do	so	
when	appropriate .	It	was	also	noted	that	there	
are	institutional	drivers	such	as	the	tonnage-
based	approach	to	funding	that	make	it	difficult	
for	WFP	to	take	a	principled	stance .	
With	regard	to	United	Nations	integrated	
missions	and	humanitarian	principles,	some	
participants	felt	that	the	implementation	of	
integrated	missions	threatens	to	weaken	the	
added	value	that	United	Nations	humanitarian	
agencies	can	bring	to	a	volatile	situation,	and	
—	which	is	important	—	adversely	affect	the	
efficient	deployment	of	their	various	resources .	
Other	questions	were	raised	about	the	feasibili-
ty	of	humanitarian	agencies	simultaneously	pur-
suing	the	two	goals	of:	i)	working	as	effective	
members	of	integrated	missions;	and	ii)	enhanc-
ing	their	international	“brand”	as	principled	
humanitarian	actors,	for	example	by	reaffirming	
their	core	mandates .	
It	was	suggested	that	WFP	develop	a	more	
nuanced	approach	to	United	Nations	integra-
tion	and	educate	WFP	staff	more	fully	about	the	
objectives,	flexibility	and	options	in	a	United	
Nations	integrated	approach .	In	particular,	WFP	
should	consider	when	and	how	it	might	be	ap-
propriate	partially	to	“un-brand”	itself	from	
United	Nations	or	other	political	or	military	ac-
tors	and	reflect	further	with	other	dual-mandate	
partners	on	the	extent	to	which	this	is	possible	
for	a	United	Nations	agency .	
Effective Recovery Programming
Despite	success	in	averting	famine,	there	
are	still	major	weaknesses	in	emergency	op-
erations	and	in	recovery	strategies .	Current	
analyses	of	crises	tend	to	emphasize	the	mag-
nitude	of	a	crisis	but	do	not	always	consider	the	
causes	or	the	risks	associated	with	intervention .	
A	broader	programmatic	approach	informed	
by	power	and	wealth	realities	is	fundamental	to	
understanding	where	vulnerabilities	lie	and	why .	
Assessments	and	analysis	in	emergency,	
rapid-response	and	protracted	engagement	
need	to	be	improved,	but	there	were	also	sug-
gestions	that	WFP	should	carry	out	honest	
assessments	of	its	own	capabilities	and	to	be	
modest	in	its	recovery	programming	when	ap-
propriate .	Realistic	dialogue,	planning	and	col-
laboration	are	hindered	by	unrealistic	expecta-
tions	in	upstream	and	downstream	programmes	
—	early	warning	and	hand-overs	—	and	the	
characteristics	of	certain	programmatic	catego-
ries	such	as	an	assumption	of	recovery	being	
linear	and	a	lack	of	secure	medium-term	and	
longer-term	funding	in	the	protracted	relief	and	
recovery	operation	(PRRO)	category .
Contextual	analysis	of	needs	and	capacity	
is	best	understood	through	the	medium	of	re-
lationships .	Approaching	communities	without	
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an	agenda	and	listening	to	their	voices	are	an	
important	way	of	reaching	out .	Too	often,	hu-
manitarian	actors	are	quick	to	offer	solutions	or	
set	up	focus	groups	without	exploring	whether	
there	are	groups	or	local	capacities	already	in	
place .	This	approach	of	listening,	watching	and	
working	with	community	structures	enhances	
understanding	of	and	integration	with	local	
authority	and	the	development	of	common	
agendas	of	mutual	co-existence	between	lo-
cal	and	international	organizations .	To	some	
extent,	however,	United	Nations	staff	security	
restrictions	on	personnel	movements	curtail	
this	manner	of	interaction	with	communities	
and	make	it	difficult	to	develop	a	coherent	
understanding	of	local	dynamics	and	build	up	
longer-term	relationships .
Other	areas	for	improvement	were	high-
lighted	such	as:	i)	improved	targeting	in	transi-
tion	situations	in	order	to	continue	to	meet	
acute	needs	but	not	undermine	people’s	own	
recovery	mechanisms;	ii)	the	need	to	encourage	
the	process	of	state	ownership;	and	iii)	better	
monitoring	of	the	changing	role	of	local	authori-
ties	and	the	dynamics	of	local	power .	Another	
crucial	area	of	engagement	highlighted	as	a	
frequent	weakness	in	recovery	situations	is	suffi-
cient	and	medium-term	support	for	returning	or	
integrating	displaced	populations	while	taking	
the	needs	of	host	communities	into	account .	
In	conclusion,	it	was	recommended	by	the	
participants	that	WFP	review	its	programme	
categories,	the	PRRO	category	in	particular,	
because	they	rely	on	assumptions	that	do	not	
play	out	in	reality;	the	situation	in	eastern	areas	
of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	was	
cited	as	an	example .	In	particular,	WFP	needs	to	
re-think	hand-over	strategies	in	the	light	of	re-
alities	on	the	ground,	including	capacity,	rather	
than	be	pressured	by	donors	and	sometimes	by	
programme	governments	to	move	too	quickly	
from	relief	to	recovery .	Again,	it	was	recom-
mended	that	greater	investment	be	made	in	
context	analysis	and	that	recovery	interventions	
be	designed	that	address	underlying	socio-
political	dynamics .	
Recommendations for WFP Emerging 
from the Conference 
One	main	WFP	objective	in	hosting	the	
Conference	was	to	seek	recommendations	from	
its	partners	and	international	experts	for	the	
Programme’s	work	in	conflicts	and	complex	en-
vironments .	Participants	from	the	plenary	and	
various	breakout	sessions	were	asked	to	syn-
thesize	discussions	and	translate	the	talk	into	
tangible	future	actions	for	WFP .	The	resulting	
recommendations	are	summarized	below:	
•	 	Develop	guidance	on	delivering	humanitar-
ian	aid	in	politically	charged	environments,	
including	clarity	as	to	the	application	of	
humanitarian	principles .	WFP	should	take	
into	account	the	political	constraints	in	
each	of	its	complex	operations	and	strive	to	
define	the	minimum	acceptable	conditions	
for	its	interventions	and	develop	guidance	
to	help	country	offices	to	identify	the	range	
of	tools	available	—	from	negotiating	ac-
cess,	to	various	levels	of	advocacy,	to	with-
holding	assistance	—	to	ensure	that	such	
conditions	are	maintained .	
•	 	Enhance	analytical	abilities	at	the	field	level	
to	understand	the	causes	behind	crises	and	
the	regional	and	local	contexts	in	which	
WFP	works .	Feedback	loops	—	in	particular	
utilizing	information	from	operations,	staff	
and	partners	—	should	be	used	to	keep	
the	context	analysis	current,	and	ensure	
clear	and	consistent	understanding	of	the	
dynamics	of	a	crisis,	the	actors	involved	and	
their	agenda .	Context	analysis	is	necessary	
to	shape	approaches	and	types	of	assist-
ance	in	the	event	of	sudden-onset	emer-
gencies;	it	becomes	even	more	crucial	in	
cases	of	persistent	conflict .
•	 	Reiterate	WFP’s	commitment	to	the	protec-
tion	of	its	beneficiaries	and	their	communi-
ties,	for	example	by	explaining	how	protec-
tion	relates	to	its	hunger	mandate	and	by	
defining	the	limits	of	its	potential	contribu-
tion	to	the	protection	of	civilians .	Develop	
best	practices	and	clear	guidance	on	ways	
to	institutionalize	protection	in	WFP’s	pro-
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gramming,	for	example	by	giving	more	
training	to	staff	and	senior	management .	
•	 	Work	more	closely	with	national	non-gov-
ernmental	organizations,	community-based	
organizations	and	religious	leaders,	and	
encourage	them	to	take	part	in	program-
ming	and	decision-making .	Recognize	in	
practice	that	organizations	have	their	own	
capacities,	identities	and	flexibility,	and	re-
frain	from	building	them	into	the	image	of	
the	United	Nations	and	WFP .
•	 Determine	the	degree	to	which	WFP	pri-
oritizes	participation	in	an	integrated	ap-
proach,	because	such	participation	can	
impact	perceptions	of	neutrality	and	inde-
pendence .	WFP	should	consider	when	and	
how	it	might	be	appropriate	to	“de-brand”	
itself	from	United	Nations	or	other	political	
and	military	missions .	Reflect	further	with	
other	dual-mandate	partners	on	the	extent	
to	which	this	is	possible	for	a	United	Na-
tions	agency	and	how	it	might	be	achieved .
•	 Develop	a	broader	approach	to	program-
ming	that	involves	more	investment	in	
humanitarian	preparedness,	including	re-
sponse	to	climate	change .	
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WfP’s Work in Complex emergencies and on-Going 
Conflicts: a Discussion note 
The purpose of this note is to frame the debate on the World Food Programme’s 
strategic priorities and investments for more effective engagement in conflict situ-
ations. Drawing on a set of case studies on the role of WFP in complex humanitar-
ian crises,5 the note highlights some of the current problematic areas of opera-
tions and programming with a view to outlining the possible short and long-term 
consequences of WFP’s strategy.6
5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, 
needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, 
Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009. 
6 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
5 Thomas Gurtner and Catherine Bellamy consultants for WFP, 
drafted this note based on a literature review of WFP policies, 
needs assessments, targeting and key evaluation reports, and 
a set of reflection papers and research studies on Afghanistan, 
Sudan (Darfur), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, 
Somalia and Sri Lanka conducted in March to June 2009.
6 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
for	“delivery	first”	—	sometimes	at	the	expense	
of	neutrality	or	imparti lity	—	have	yet	to	be	
thoroughly	understood .	
Operationalizing Coordination. The	or-
ganization’s	leadership	in	the	logistics	cluster	
has	been	praised	by	NGOs	and	donors	as	an	
example	of	the	positive	benefits	of	effective	
coordination,	as	WFP	has	been	able	to	facilitate	
common	services	and	improve	delivery	condi-
tions	for	the	wider	humanitarian	system .	The	
same	cannot	be	said	of	coordination	within	
the	wider	conflict	management	system .	WFP’s	
strength	as	a	hands-on,	operational	agency	
has	not	always	melded	well	with	new	initiatives	
based	on	UN	integrated	missions	or	on	the	
“One	UN .”	Common	criticisms	by	WFP	staff	in-
clude	inefficiencies	in	coordination	mechanisms	
and,	more	importantly,	the	marginalization	of	
the	humanitarian	agenda	to	security	or	political	
concerns .	Formulating	strategies	to	negotiate	
for	the	prioritization	of	humanitarian	concerns	in	
these	settings	remains	a	continued	challenge	in	
many	of	WFP’s	operations .
Creating Relevant Programming. A	large	
field	presence	provides	WFP	with	the	oppor-
tunity	to	generate	humanitarian	space,	not	
only	for	its	own	operations	but	also	for	other	
agencies	in	the	delivery	of	aid	and	the	promo-
tion	of	rights	and	protection .	However,	the	
organization	continues	to	face	challenges	of	
WFP	faces	four	major	challenges	in	adapt-
ing	to	the	humanitari n	environment	of	the	21st	
century,	as	described	briefly	below:	
Adhering to the Humanitarian Principles. 
WFP	continues	to	maintain	a	reputation	for	pro-
fessionalism	and	rapid	delivery .	But	in	conflicts	
such	as	those	in	Sudan	and	Sri	Lanka,	WFP	is	
regularly	confronted	by	the	tension	between	
its	obligations	to	meet	urgent	humanitarian	
needs	and	its	commitment	to	adhere	to	the	
overall	principles	of	the	humanitarian	agenda,	
including	rights	and	protection .	A	familiar	pat-
tern	emerges	in	the	humanitarian	interventions	
in	which	WFP	is	a	major	actor:	arguments	for	
adhering	to	humanitarian	principles	are	con-
sistently	trumped	by	the	need	to	meet	the	
humanitarian	imperative,	to	provide	lifesaving	
aid	when	conflicts	erupt	into	violence .	Gradu-
ally,	the	principled	space	that	initially	did	exist	
for	WFP	and	other	humanitarian	actors	erodes	
overtime .	Throughout	the	evolution	of	the	con-
flicts,	WFP	is	frequently	hesitant,	and,	at	times,	
ill-equipped	to	punch	at	its	weight	and	strongly	
advocate .	The	ramifications	of	WFP’s	propensity	
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effectively	assessing	needs,	linking	assessment	
to	programming,	and	monitoring	the	outcomes	
of	activities .	Its	operations	also	risk	becoming	
static	in	the	context	of	recovery	and	relapsing	
conflicts,	underscoring	problems	in	defining	the	
vulnerable,	integrating	development	elements	
into	humanitarian	interventions,	and	generating	
livelihoods .	Shortcomings	in	understanding	the	
dynamics	of	the	conflict	and	the	local	and	na-
tional	players	further	contribute	to	the	problems	
of	developing	effective	programming	in	such	
complex	and	fragile	environments .	Further-
more,	in	these	situations,	WPF	must	often	im-
plement	remotely	through	partners	with	varying	
capacity	—	creating	considerable	challenges	for	
programme	quality	and	overall	accountability .	
Confronting Staff Security. WFP	can	
rapidly	reach	the	most	remote	and	turbulent	
places .	But	these	operations	put	the	staff	in	
risky	security	situations .	And	in	many	cases,	the	
risk	is	transferred	to	national	staff	or	implement-
ing	partners .	Capacity	deficiencies	of	the	UN	
Department	for	Security	and	Safety,	including	
problems	in	adapting	to	WFP’s	needs	in	the	
field,	have	been	regularly	noted	by	WFP	country	
offices .	WFP	itself	is	investing	heavily	in	staff	
security	—	including	through	the	deployment	of	
significant	numbers	of	international	and	national	
security	officers .	Despite	large	system-wide	and	
WFP	investments,	the	conditions	for	the	free	
and	safe	movement	of	staff	appear	to	be	wors-
ening	in	many	settings .
Despite	these	constraints,	WFP	is	experi-
menting	with	new	tools	under	its	recently	ap-
proved	strategic	plan,7	including	the	use	of	cash	
and	vouchers	and	the	introduction	of	new	nutri-
tion	products	in	humanitarian	settings .	Recent	in-
novations	in	leveraging	WFP’s	presence	and	field	
knowledge	to	contribute	to	protection	concerns	
demonstrates	how	principles	for	humanitarian	
assistance	can	be	translated	into	real,	if	modest,	
improvements	in	the	safety	and	dignity	of	affect-
ed	populations .	This,	in	turn,	is	enhancing	WFP’s	
7 WFP Strategic Plan (2008 — 2001). WFP/EB.A/2008/5-A/1/
Rev.1, 19 May 2008.
ability	to	engage	in	national	contexts	and	on	the	
international	stage	in	discussions	on	humanitar-
ian	principles	and	international	law,	including	
protection	strategies .	WFP	could	further	exploit	
its	deep	reach	into	the	field	for	the	benefit	of	
the	wider	humanitarian	system	through	more	
systematic	analysis	of	conflicts	in	real	time .	While	
WFP	could	continue	to	give	almost	exclusive	
priority	to	the	humanitarian	imperative,	it	could	
also	become	more	assertive	and	systematic	in	
orchestrating	advocacy	for	the	humanitarian	
principles	with	parties	to	the	conflict	and	national	
authorities,	the	UN	country	team	and	mission,	
and	with	the	Security	Council	and	donors .	
Humanitarian Principles
Continued	compromises	with	Governments	
such	as	Sudan	and	Sri	Lanka	have	placed	WFP	
in	an	untenable	situation .	The	reduced	set	of	
options	can	be	illustrated	by	the	expulsion	of	
the	NGOs	from	Darfur	in	March	2009 .	As	the	
humanitarian	community	continued	to	make	
concessions	in	its	dealings	with	the	Government	
of	Sudan,	it	is	not	clear	what	WFP’s	advocacy	at	
that	precise	moment	would	do	on	its	own	to	en-
sure	that	the	NGOs	continued	their	operations .	
Similarly,	while	WFP	is	highly	praised	for	ef-
ficiency	and	professionalism	in	Sri	Lanka,	it	has	
also	been	criticized	for	acting	as	an	implement-
ing	arm	of	the	government	—	to	the	detriment	
of	upholding	humanitarian	principles .
And	yet,	sidestepping	or	delaying	the	
promotion	of	humanitarian	principles	for	the	
sake	of	rapid	access	does	not	appear	to	always	
return	the	desired	results .	Several	of	those	
interviewed	in	Sri	Lanka	think	that	the	prioritisa-
tion	of	delivery	over	advocacy	ultimately	had	
adverse	affects	for	the	protection	of	target	
populations,	and	accomplished	little	to	enhance	
staff	security	or	even	the	ability	to	deliver	relief	
goods	and	services .	
While	WPF’s	relief	convoys	in	2008	were	
laudable	from	the	perspective	of	humanitar-
ian	access,	it	also	appears	that	the	Sri	Lankan	
Government	as	well	as	the	LTTE	used	this	as	
cover	for	military	manoeuvres .	The	Government	
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also	employed	a	variety	of	tactics	to	stall	or	
prohibit	humanitarian	practices .	It	used	visas,	
travel	permits,	compulsory	evacuations,	written	
agreements,	and	various	kinds	of	intimidation	
to	ensure	that	damaging	information	was	not	
leaked	through	the	activities	of	aid	agencies .	
The	Sri	Lankan	government	has	also	used	the	
broad	rubric	of	‘security	issues’	to	impose	very	
far-reaching	restrictions	on	the	medical	sup-
plies,	water	and	sanitation	and	food	that	have	
been	directed	at	the	Vanni	region .	
It	can	be	argued	that	in	Sri	Lanka,	advocacy	
was	most	crucial	at	an	early	stage .	For	exam-
ple,	pressure	to	ensure	IDPs’	rights	at	the	point	
when	the	scale	of	their	movements	was	rela-
tively	small	may	have	been	more	effective .	With	
a	mass	influx,	the	perception	of	‘humanitarian	
imperative’	may	make	advocacy	and	pressure	
on	protection	issues	more	difficult .	There	is	a	
strong	belief	that	concessions	to	the	Govern-
ment	on	various	humanitarian	principles	had	
emboldened	the	government	in	its	relationship	
with	the	humanitarian	community .	One	source	
said	the	humanitarian	community	had	been	re-
duced	to	begging	rather	than	negotiating .
It	is	not	clear	whether	the	Sri	Lankan	Gov-
ernment	was	subject	to	any	significant	con-
sequences	for	its	various	attempts	to	restrict	
humanitarian	space .	Aid	agencies’	were	reluc-
tant	to	speak	publicly	on	sensitive	issues	and	
withheld	the	results	of	nutritional	surveys .	They	
weakly	protested	the	ejection	of	aid	agencies	
from	the	Vanni	in	September	2008	and	Govern-
ment	shelling	and	aerial	bombardment	during	
the	intensified	military	push .	In	general,	aid	
agencies	—	whether	in	the	UN	system	or	NGOs	
—	appear	to	have	been	very	much	on	the	de-
fensive	in	a	context	where	any	action	could	eas-
ily	be	turned	against	them,	notably	in	a	media	
subject	to	significant	government	control .	
While	WFP	is	reluctant	for	the	various	fac-
tors	outlined	above	to	engage	in	what	some	
view	as	a	form	of	political	pressure,	there	are	
anecdotes	of	successful	advocacy	by	WFP .	Many	
are	purposefully	done	behind	closed	doors	and	
involve	personal	dynamics	and	decision-making	
processes,	making	documentation	difficult .	
However,	interviews	with	Country	Directors	
have	revealed	that	WFP	can	more	effectively	
utilise	its	weight	to	ensure	the	protection	of	
humanitarian	principles	and	access .	For	exam-
ple,	when	the	Government	of	Sudan	said	it	was	
to	shut	down	warehouses	of	NGOs	operating	
in	Darur,	WFP’s	threat	to	stop	delivery	of	food	
was	enough	to	reverse	their	course .	
The	strategy	of	advocating	for	humanitar-
ian	principles	is	not	an	easy	one:	it	can	require	
pushback	against	donors,	when	the	priority	
is	to	deliver	regardless	of	the	conditions,	and	
entails	effective	coordination	with	other	actors	
to	ensure	that	the	withholding	of	aid	gener-
ates	sufficient	weight .	The	Government	of	Sri	
Lanka	enjoyed	abundant	options	for	interna-
tional	support,	which	implies	that	advocacy	
on	the	humanitarian	front	would	have	been,	
on	its	own,	insufficient	and	so	would	require	
orchestration .	Exploitation	of	WFP’s	leverage	
in	securing	the	access	and	upholding	imparti-
ality	depends	in	part	on	the	leadership	of	the	
Country	Director,	and	his	or	her	relationships	
with	the	Government,	donors	or	other	parts	of	
the	UN	system .	
Coordination
WFP	has	been	able	to	generate	humani-
tarian	space	for	the	wider	humanitarian	system	
through	the	use	of	coordination	mechanisms	
in	several	ways .	WFP	operates	the	United	Na-
tions	Humanitarian	Air	Service	(UNHAS)	in	
many	conflict-ridden	countries .	In	the	context	
of	Sudan,	it	serves	100	destinations	(mostly	
in	Darfur)	and	provides	support	for	medical	
evacuations	and	relocations,	for	which	NGOs	
constitute	60	percent	of	users .	In	the	south-
central	zones	of	Somalia,	WFP	is	for	the	first	
time	establishing	five	medical	stabilization	
centers	that	will	provide	emergency	assistance	
as	a	common	service .	Donors	often	praise	
WFP’s	leadership	in	the	logistics	cluster	as	an	
innovative	method	for	effective	delivery	and	
for	engaging	NGOs	in	the	field .	Furthermore,	
WFP	and	humanitarian	actors	in	DRC	have	ral-
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lied	around	implementing	the	strategic	priori-
ties	of	the	Humanitarian	Action	Plan	(HAC) .	
WFP’s	experience	in	emergency	response	
coordination	with	other	parts	of	the	UN	system	
and	with	the	military	has	been	mixed,	however .	
The	WFP	country	team	stressed	the	positive	
cooperation	with	the	Haitian	military	during	the	
first	emergency	phase	of	the	floods	in	August	
and	September	2008 .	However,	humanitarian	
agencies	remain	weary	of	the	military’s	role	as	
operations	continue .	There	are	also	tensions	
between	MINUSTAH	and	the	UN	country	team	
—	including	WFP	—	on	the	ground,	and	a	lim-
ited	understanding	of	their	respective	roles	in	
supporting	Haiti	to	become	a	more	viable	state .	
In	the	DRC,	interviews	with	WFP	staff	in	the	field	
indicate	that	MONUC	has	told	WFP	where	to	
deliver	food	and	prioritized	transport	for	mili-
tary	personnel .	
In	some	instances,	WFP	disagrees	with	other	
parts	of	the	UN	system	on	the	humanitarian	
imperative .	In	Somalia,	WFP	has	continued	to	
directly	engage	with	authorities	on	the	ground,	
including	insurgent	groups	such	as	the	Al-
Shabaab,	to	assist	the	most	vulnerable .	WFP	be-
lieves	that	the	affiliation	with	the	UN-backed	TFG	
would	threaten	the	safety	and	security	of	staff,	as	
well	as	the	perception	of	humanitarian	neutrality .	
Conversely,	the	Special	Representative	of	
the	Secretary-General	(SRSG)	in	Somalia	has	
criticized	humanitarian	organizations,	and	pri-
marily	WFP,	for	undermining	political	objectives	
by	negotiating	for	humanitarian	access	with	
Islamic	insurgents,	and	charged	that	the	UNCT	
is	irresponsibly	‘funding	the	war’	through	high	
value	commodity	imports	and	logistics	con-
tracts .	Meanwhile,	shortcomings	in	coherence	
extend	to	headquarters .	The	Security	Council	
approved	the	Secretary-General’s	proposal	to	
establish	a	Joint	Planning	Unit	in	the	office	of	
the	SRSG	to	facilitate	effective	and	efficient	im-
plementation	of	the	integrated	strategy .	Over	
one	year	later,	the	Joint	Planning	Unit	has	still	
not	been	established	—	in	part	as	a	result	of	
scepticism	of	headquarters	understanding	of	
the	situation	on	the	ground .
Programming 
While	no	comprehensive	study	has	been	
completed,	there	is	also	anecdotal	evidence	
that	WFP	has	provided	a	protective	presence	
in	its	delivery	of	aid,	in	places	such	as	Myanmar	
and	Colombia. In	both	cases,	WFP	dedicated	
resources	to	protection,	either	through	the	form	
of	a	protection	officer	or	by	investing	in	under-
standing	the	local	social	networks	and		
coping	mechanisms .8
Programming	brings	with	it	its	own	set	of	
challenges .	On	the	one	hand,	WFP	continues	to	
struggle	to	ensure	that	food	gets	into	the	right	
hands	and	does	no	harm .	On	the	other	hand,	
WFP	is	attempting	to	integrate	humanitarian	
and	development	practices	in	order	to	manage	
complex	crises,	such	as	Haiti	and	the	DRC,	as	
the	conflicts	evolve .	As	a	2007	report	by	ODI	
concluded,	WFP’s	progress	in	initial	needs	as-
sessments	had	not	been	matched	in	the	lifespan	
of	projects	and	failed	to	integrate	a	wider	set	of	
response	options	beyond	food	aid .	“WFP	often	
lacks	the	necessary	information	to	predict	and	
gauge	the	evolution	of	a	food	crisis;	and	to	im-
plement	its	responses	in	a	way	that	is	sensitive	
to	changes	in	the	external	environment .”	
The	design	of	appropriate	humanitarian	
and	development	responses	in	DRC	requires	a	
nuanced	assessment	of	the	complex	overlaying	
of	acute	and	chronic	vulnerability .	DRC	is	char-
acterized	by	an	extraordinary	extent	of	chronic	
vulnerability,	evidenced	in	chronically	high	
levels	of	mortality,	morbidity	and	acute	malnu-
trition .	This	coupled	with	constant	exposure	to	
violent	insecurity	results	in	a	situation	where	
crisis	—	in	the	sense	of	a	dangerous	deviation	
from	the	norm	—	is	no	longer	an	adequate	
term .	Pockets	of	crisis	(or	‘emergencies’)	can	be	
identified	within	the	prevailing	norm .	Neither	
humanitarian	nor	development	approaches	as	
normally	understood	are	well	adapted	to	this	
kind	of	context .	This	also	raises	the	challenges	
8 James Darcy, Stephen Anderson and Nisar Majid A Review 
of the Links between Needs Assessment and Decision-Making 
in Response to Food Crises Study undertaken for the World 
Food Programme under the SENAC project, 2007. 
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of	programming	for	early	recovery	and	liveli-
hoods .	In	DRC,	sourcing	the	food	locally	would	
require	major	investment	in	transport	for	farm-
ers .	Constraints	on	WFP	activities	have	exclud-
ed	exploring	options,	such	as	cash	or	vouchers,	
beyond	the	delivery	of	food .
Haiti	is	in	a	situation	of	protracted	complex	
crisis	shaped	by	urban	violence,	natural	disas-
ters,	and	the	impact	of	the	global	economic	
crisis .	Following	the	April	2008	riots	caused	by	
high	food	prices,	WFP	scaled	up	its	operations	
to	reach	an	additional	1 .5	million	people	in	need	
of	food	assistance .	This	was	complemented	by	
an	emergency	operation	to	assist	up	to	800,000	
people	for	a	six-month	period	until	the	end	of	
April	2009,	in	response	to	the	three	consecutive	
hurricanes	and	the	tropical	storms	between	Au-
gust	and	September	2008 .	Interventions	in	Haiti	
are	now	aimed	at	food	insecure	populations	
and	disaster	preparedness	while	attempting	to	
support	the	longer-term	goals	of	rebuilding	of	
vital	economic	and	social	infrastructure .
In	addition	the	challenge	of	addressing	re-
lief	and	recovery,	WFP	continues	to	grapple	with	
ensuring	that	food	distribution	is	not	vulnerable	
to	political	manipulation	by	local	structures	and	
actors .	Experiences	in	targeting	and	registration	
illustrate	the	urgent	need	for	understanding	lo-
cal	dynamics .	For	example,	in	parts	of	Sudan,	
WFP	assistance	becomes	instrumental	in	shifting	
power	from	traditional	leaders	to	younger	lead-
ers,	without	much	community	support	—	further	
generating	problems	with	impartial	distribution .	
In	West	Darfur,	some	sheiks	held	200	to	300	
fraudulent	rations	cards	and	used	them	to	collect	
additional	food	to	sell	in	the	market .	In	Kalma	
camp,	the	largest	IDP	camp,	WFP	supplied	food	
to	160,000	beneficiaries;	but	in	a	surprise	head-
count	in	2005,	using	three	different	methodolo-
gies,	identified	only	90,000	beneficiaries .
Afghanistan	provides	another	example	of	
the	need	for	adequate	targeting .	Challenges	
arise	from	a	complex	mix	of	factors	related	to:	1)	
the	reliability	and	capacity	of	partners	and	the	
Government	at	all	levels	and	across	sectors;	2)	
the	set-up	of	Community	Development	Coun-
cils	and	their	ability	and	willingness	to	represent	
the	interests	and	needs	of	the	overall	community:	
and	3)	WFP’s	ability	to	exercise	quality	control	
over	the	whole	process,	from	assessment	to	
monitoring	and	evaluation,	thus	reducing	the	
potential	for	shortcomings .	Separate	considera-
tions	should	be	made	for	traditional	community	
structures	such	as	shuras and	jirgas,	which	can	
offer	a	higher	level	of	reliability	and	trustworthi-
ness .	In	fact,	while	governmental	bodies	gener-
ally	suffer	from	lack	of	capacity	and	widespread	
corruption,	these	bodies	still	uphold	the	interests	
of	the	communities	they	represent,	and	therefore	
are	“relatively”	less	subject	to	manipulation	and	
corruption .	This	again,	requires	rigorous	and	
consistent	understanding	of	local	dynamics	and	
structures .
With	security	constraints	and	limited	access,	
WFP	in	Afghanistan	must	rely	heavily	on	data	and	
analysis	provided	by	cooperating	partners .	WFP’s	
ability	to	exercise	quality	control	over	the	whole	
distribution	process,	from	assessment	to	moni-
toring	and	evaluation,	is	also	hindered .	Though	
this	is	happening	across	the	whole	spectrum	of	
WFP’s	activities,	WFP	staff	reported	more	dif-
ficulties	in	relation	to	general	food	distribution,	
mainly	due	to	magnitude	of	food	distributed	and	
number	of	beneficiaries	targeted .	In	Afghani-
stan,	WFP	has	taken	a	number	of	measures	since	
2007,	including	outsourcing	its	assessment	and	
monitoring	activities	in	UN	“no-go	areas”	to	a	
third	party	(international	private	organizations),	
to	minimize	these	risks	and	improve	the	overall	
management	of	projects	on	the	ground .
Ultimately,	WFP’s	capacity	to	effectively	
engage	authorities	and	the	international	system	
on	humanitarian	principles	may	endanger	pro-
gramming	objectives .	To	return	to	the	case	of	Sri	
Lanka,	protection	failures	included	civilian	casu-
alties	resulting	from	the	war;	the	internment	of	
hundreds	of	thousands	of	displaced	people;	and	
the	lack	of	clear	timelines	for	screening	or	reset-
tlement .	There	also	seemed	to	be	a	perceived	
lack	of	openness	about	the	inadequate	quantities	
of	food	reaching	the	north,	which	in	the	end	was	
problematic .	
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Staff Security
The	violent	targeting	of	white	cars	—	tradi-
tionally	associated	with	humanitarians	—	is	per-
haps	the	greatest	symbol	of	the	deteriorating	
shield	for	humanitarian	workers .	In	response,	
some	organizations	and	agencies	have	taken	to	
renting	cars	or	mini-buses	or	using	pink	cars .	In	
Afghanistan,	humanitarians	underline	the	differ-
ences	between	the	black	UN	(UNAMA	cars)	and	
blue	UN	(humanitarian	agencies’) .	At	the	same	
time,	incidents	of	the	military	using	white	vehi-
cles	to	manipulate	its	neutral	representation	for	
different	purposes	have	been	reported .	Beyond	
the	dilemma	of	the	popular	perception,	the	
shifting	humanitarian	environment	and	safety	
of	humanitarian	workers	raises	important	issues	
about	daily	operations,	coordination,	capaci-
ties,	and	principles	of	engagement .
WFP	has	implemented	a	variety	of	meas-
ures	to	address	such	security	constraints .	For	
example,	the	WFP	fleet	in	Darfur	is	equipped	
with	GPS,	enabling	each	vehicle	to	be	tracked	
in	real	time	for	more	effective	protection	of	the	
staff .	The	establishment	of	more	warehouses	
(and	in	different	locations)	in	Darfur	has	allowed	
WFP	to	pre-position	food	supply	equivalent	to	
three	to	four	months	of	projected	needs	and	
to	reduce	the	impact	of	pipeline	breaks .	In	Af-
ghanistan,	it	appears	that	the	call	of	the	SRSG	
not	to	attack	the	UN	has	seen	some	decrease	in	
attacks,	especially	against	WFP	convoys .	
In	response	to	the	murder	of	two	national	
staff	in	Somalia,	WFP	created	a	“Re-engage-
ment	Strategy”	with	local	authorities	at	the	
beginning	of	2009 .	Operations	in	south-central	
zones	were	halted	until	communities	could	pro-
vide	assurances	for	safe	and	secure	access .	WFP	
has	also	prioritized	outreach	to	the	Somali	com-
munity	to	explain	its	objectives,	garner	support,	
limit	potential	threats,	and	develop	a	network	of	
allies	with	community	elders .	
Serious	challenges	exist	within	the	co-
ordination	and	capacity	of	the	UN	system	to	
promote	the	safety	of	its	staff .	The	UN	Depart-
ment	for	Safety	and	Security	has	been	criti-
cized	for	not	being	context-specific	in	its	analy-
sis	and	judgment	of	security	measures,	and	
as	a	result	too	cautious .	UNDSS	is	also	short	
on	resources	and	capacity .	For	example,	tight	
security	guidelines	in	Haiti	prevent	WFP	from	
moving	as	freely	as	it	would	like .	At	times	WFP	
continues	to	rely	on	its	own	security	mecha-
nisms,	for	example	in	Somalia. 
At	times	WFP	staff	are	frustrated	by	the	
limitations	imposed	on	its	operational	capacity	
and	what	it	views	as	constraints	in	acting	as	part	
of	a	UN	country	team	or	integrated	mission .	
Common	criticisms	are	the	lack	of	payoff	for	
heavy	investments	in	time,	while	humanitar-
ian	priorities	and	WFP’s	voice	tend	to	lose	out	
in	the	Resident	Coordinator/UN	country	team	
structure .	As	mentioned	previously,	there	are	
also	disagreements	about	security	measures .	
Effective	security	and	programming	re-
quires	a	rigorous	understanding	of	the	back-
ground	and	evolution	of	the	conflicts	including	
the	political	dynamics	between	local	actors	
and	their	perceptions	of	WFP	and	aid	agencies .	
Contextual	understanding	and	analysis	remains	
a	gap	for	WFP .	The	violence	against	WFP	staff	
and	cooperating	partners	IOM	and	SC-US	
during	a	2005	re-registration	exercise	in	West	
Darfur	demonstrates	the	importance	of	under-
standing	community	structures	and	effective	
communication .	Initial	rumours	were	that	the	
registration	was	part	of	the	Government’s	at-
tempt	to	repatriate	IDPs,	and	local	leaders	who	
feared	losing	their	multiple	ration	cards	lashed	
out	against	the	staff .	
Another	serious	dilemma	is	the	security	
of	national	staff,	the	most	frequent	victims	of	
targeting .	Time	and	resource	constraints	often	
mean	that	little	is	invested	in	the	capacities	of	
national	staff,	so	that	when	internationals	with-
draw	the	security	infrastructure	left	behind	is	
seriously	impaired	—	further	endangering	the	
national	staff .	
The	targeting	of	humanitarian	actors	also	
raises	the	issue	of	what	some	argue	is	the	re-
lationship	between	the	deterioration	of	the	
security	of	staff	and	the	failure	to	rigorously	
adhere	to	humanitarian	principles .	For	example,	
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some	of	the	WFP	staff	in	Darfur	believe	that	the	
pressure	to	achieve	results	and	deliver	may	have	
ultimately	endangered	the	staff .	
Organizations	and	donor	countries	may	
have	the	capacity	to	generate	some	leverage	
in	shaping	the	action	of	national	and	local	au-
thorities,	which	could	ultimately	improve	the	
perceptions	of	humanitarian	work	and	the	se-
curity	conditions	for	humanitarian	workers .	Of	
course,	some	actors	will	target	an	international	
presence,	and	associated	national	staff,	regard-
less	of	the	approach	of	the	humanitarian	actors	
—	making	the	decision	of	when	to	deploy	and	
capacity	of	national	staff	all	the	more	crucial .	
Points for Further Discussion
Priorities and Investment
Consistent	analysis	could	promote	more	
effective	delivery	of	services	and	improve	the	
safety	of	the	staff .	Such	analysis	could	also	
provide	the	wider	humanitarian	system	with	
an	improved	understanding	of	the	conflict	and	
political	dynamics	as	they	evolve,	especially	as	
viewed	from	WFP’s	large	and	deep	field	pres-
ence	—	a	unique	perspective	in	many	situa-
tions .	The	challenge	is	to	strengthen	the	capaci-
ties	of	national	and	international	staff	and	to	
ensure	that	this	knowledge	is	captured	so	that	it	
informs	WFP’s	strategic	planning .	
Building	on	the	examples	of	creative	inno-
vations	in	programming	would	require	signifi-
cant	commitment	and	investment .	But	this	will	
also	hinge	on:	1)	the	capacity	of	WFP	to	assess	
needs	and	options	as	crises	evolve,	and	2)	how	
WFP	manages	the	challenge	of	adhering	to	hu-
manitarian	principles	while	negotiating	access	
and	meeting	the	humanitarian	imperative .	
While	each	complex	emergency	entails	a	
unique	set	of	circumstances	and	constraints,	
WFP	will	continue	to	be	pressured	by	benefi-
ciary	and	donor	Governments,	who	wish	to	
demonstrate	their	good	intentions	or	pursue	
their	political	objectives .	As	WFP	adapts	its	op-
erations	and	programming	to	meet	the	needs	
of	humanitarian	crises	in	the	21st	century,	the	
leadership	of	WFP	will	have	to	confront	the	
question	of	whether	its	present	staff,	practices	
and	systems	for	delivering	assistance	—	and	its	
strategy	for	balancing	principles	and	humanitar-
ian	needs	—	are	adequate	in	a	world	of	more	
complex	humanitarian	environments .	
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Trends In Conflict and Humanitarian assistance:
a Review of literature, Policy and Practice
Undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group, overseas Development Institute
Introduction
This paper represents a summary of a review of trends in conflict and humanitarian 
assistance undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI on behalf of the 
UN World Food Programme, in preparation for the conference “Humanitarian as-
sistance in conflict and complex emergencies” held in Rome, 24 -25th June 2009. 
The review was based primarily on literature and recent research, with a focus on 
humanitarian policy trends and implications.9
9The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
deadly;	and	that	both	trends	could	be	attributed	
in	large	part	to	successful	international	(particu-
larly	UN-led)	interventions .	This	analysis	is	open	
to	critique	on	a	number	of	grounds .	The	concept	
of	“civil	war”	is	ambiguous,	both	in	failing	to	take	
account	of	international	dimensions	of	conflict,	
and	in	failing	to	take	account	of	the	spectrum	of	
violent	instability	from	communal	violence	and	
widespread	banditry	to	full-scale	armed	conflict .	
Perhaps	most	significantly,	in	concentrating	on	
battlefield	deaths,	this	approach	fails	to	take	
account	(as	the	authors”	acknowledge)	of	both	
non-battlefield	deaths	and	the	indirect	effects	of	
conflict .	In	contexts	like	Cambodia,	Rwanda	and	
DR	Congo,	to	name	just	three,	this	is	highly	mis-
leading .	Here,	non-battlefield	casualties	and	the	
indirect	casualties	of	conflict	(particularly	through	
disease	and	malnutrition)	have	far	outweighed	
what	could	be	classed	as	battlefield	deaths .
Reliable	statistics	are	hard	to	come	by .	
Retrospective	mortality	surveys	such	as	those	
undertaken	on	behalf	of	IRC	in	DR	Congo	face	
problems	both	of	quantification	and	causal	at-
tribution .	The	results	nevertheless	confirm	the	
significance	of	indirect	effects	of	conflict	on	lev-
els	of	excess	mortality .
Another	way	of	looking	at	conflict	trends	is	
to	consider	the	nature	of	the	conflicts	that	are	
occurring	and	the	implications	for	civilians	and	
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The	review	focused	primarily	on	the	follow-
ing	topics:
•	 	General	trends	in	conflict	and	displacement
•	 Trends	in	international	engagement	in	con-
flict	&	protracted	crisis
•	 Operational	security	and	
“humanitarian	space”
•	 	Trends	in	finance	and	the	range	of	humani-
tarian	actors
•	 Emerging	threats	and	potential	causes	of	
future	conflict
The	main	points	arising	under	each	head-
ing	are	summarised	here .	For	fuller	analysis	and	
references	to	relevant	literature,	please	consult	
the	full	Review	paper .
General Trends in Conflict  
and Displacement
There	are	different	ways	of	approaching	the	
question	of	trends	in	conflict .	One	is	to	look	at	
the	numbers	involved .	The	2005	Human	Secu-
rity	Report	attempted	both	to	identify	trends	in	
battle	related	deaths,	and	to	correlate	this	with	
key	causal	factors .	In	broad	terms,	it	concluded	
that	the	incidence	of	civil	armed	conflicts	was	
in	a	downward	trend	since	the	early	1990s	(an	
80%	decline);	that	conflicts	were	becoming	less	
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for	humanitarian	interventions .	Commentators	
suggest	that	current	warfare	has	changed	and	
“new	wars”	no	longer	conform	to	the	warfare	
of	classical	modernity	in	which	there	were	clear	
distinctions	between	governments,	armies	and	
civilians	(Kaldor,	1999) .	It	is	argued	that	process-
es	of	globalisation	and	the	demise	in	cold	war	
patronage	have	weakened	state	authority,	con-
sequently	redefining	the	goals,	methods	and	
financing	of	warfare	(Ibid) .	State	incumbents	
and	other	strongmen	now	seek	self-preserva-
tion	and	the	accumulation	of	wealth	through	the	
trans-border	and	parallel	trade	(Duffield,	2001) .	
Terrorising	civilians	through	immiseration	and	
displacement	have	become	strategies	of	this	
new	mode	of	warfare	and	territorial	boundaries	
have	become	increasingly	meaningless	(Hoff-
man	and	Weiss,	2006) .	Civilians	rather	than	
military	now	suffer	the	greatest	causalities	(Ka-
ldor,	1999) .	These	“new	wars”	are	more	akin	to	
organised	crime,	in	which	warlords	and	state	
actors	engage	in	“the	violent	extraction	of	re-
sources	and	stripping	of	assets	as	a	commercial	
enterprise”	(De	Waal,	1997);	“a	continuation	of	
economics	by	other	means”	(Keen,	2000) .
This	analysis	has	important	policy	implica-
tions .	Traditional	humanitarianism	and	its	sole	
concern	for	alleviating	the	symptoms	of	crises	
is	construed	as	inadequate	in	confronting	the	
challenges	of	modern	conflicts	and	in	some	
circumstance	actually	creating	more	harm	than	
good .	The	“new	wars”	are	deemed	to	require	
more	comprehensive	solutions	than	the	simple	
provision	of	relief	(Hoffman	and	Weiss,	2006) .
Trends	in	conflict-related	displacement	
are	better	documented,	though	here	too	
there	are	problems	of	classification	—	includ-
ing	the	question	of	who	counts	as	forcibly	
displaced,	and	how	much	is	attributable	to	
conflict .	While	numbers	were	almost	certainly	
underreported	in	earlier	years,	the	upward	
trend	in	displacement	over	the	past	40-50	
years	is	striking	(see	figure	1) .	Within	this,	the	
most	obvious	trend	is	the	increase	in	numbers	
of	internally	displaced	persons	relative	to	
refugees .	That	ratio	has	changed	somewhat	
since	2003	with	the	exodus	from	Iraq	and	with	
significant	refugee	flows	elsewhere .	Neverthe-
less,	the	trend	is	marked .
There	appear	to	be	multiple	causal	fac-
tors	behind	this	trend .	Some	are	related	to	
changes	in	international	asylum	policy,	which	
has	become	increasingly	restrictive	in	both	
developed	and	developing	countries	(Collin-
son,	2009) .	Policies	of	“containment,”	“internal	
flight	options”	etc .	and	other	have	contributed	
Figure 1: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 1964–2003
Source: Philip Orchard, 2004
M
ill
io
ns
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
■ Displaced persons (total)
■ Internally displaced persons
■ Refugees
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 23
to	a	climate	in	which	internal	displacement	is	
deemed	by	international	policy	makers	prefer-
able	to	asylum,	despite	the	absence	of	effective	
means	of	protection .	UNHCR	has	now	been	
tasked	with	leading	efforts	to	protect	and	as-
sist	IDPs	but	acknowledges	that	it	is	struggling	
with	this	new	remit .	The	implications	for	other	
humanitarian	actors	are	considerable .	Reaching	
IDP	populations	is	often	problematic,	particular-
ly	where	they	are	dispersed	amongst	local	host	
populations .	Numbers	are	hard	to	determine,	
the	impact	on	local	communities	is	often	severe	
but	unquantified,	and	the	problem	spans	both	
rural	and	(increasingly)	urban	contexts .
General Trends in Humanitarian Funding
These	trends	should	be	set	against	trends	
in	official	funding	for	international	humanitarian	
assistance .	This	has	been	on	a	generally	upward	
curve	since	2000,	even	if	funding	for	Iraq	and	
Tsunami	are	discounted	(Figure	2	above	ex-
cludes	funding	for	these	two	crises) .
The	great	majority	of	this	increasing	hu-
manitarian	expenditure	is	accounted	for	by	
humanitarian	responses	in	protracted	conflict	
situations	or	complex	emergencies .	Almost	half	
of	all	expenditure	is	accounted	for	by	humani-
tarian	responses	in	Sudan,	Iraq	and	Afghani-
stan .	Overall,	the	available	figures	suggest	that	
between	70-80%	of	all	humanitarian	response	
expenditure	goes	towards	protracted,	conflict-
related	crises .
Trends in International 
Engagement in Conflict and 
Protracted Crisis Situations
The Search for Policy Coherence
Shifts	in	the	geopolitics	and	political	econ-
omy	of	conflicts	have	led	donor	governments	to	
pursue	new	modes	of	engagement	in	conflict	
and	crisis	contexts .	Trans-national	threats	such	
as	terrorism,	organised	crime,	illicit	markets	and	
weapons	proliferation	are	increasingly	seen	as	
linked	with	state	fragility	and	violent	conflicts .	
Attempts	at	managing	these	sources	of	instabil-
ity	have	given	renewed	impetus	to	a	“stabilisa-
tion”	agenda	among	Western	governments	
and,	increasingly,	within	the	UN,	based	on	a	
growing	consensus	that	there	is	a	need	to	go	
beyond	the	provision	of	relief	to	include	more	
robust	and	coherent	international	engagement	
in	such	contexts .	The	terrorist	attacks	of	9/11	
pushed	this	agenda	centre	stage .
Figure 2: General Trends in Humanitarian Funding
Source:	Abby	Stoddard .	Figures	compiled	from	OCHA	Financial	Tracking	Service	at	16	March	2009
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Development,	security	and	humanitarian	
action	are	increasingly	viewed	as	mutually	rein-
forcing	components	of	stabilization,	with	donor	
governments	pushing	“whole	of	government”	
approaches	—	variously	labelled	“3Ds”	(de-
fense,	development,	diplomacy),	“3Cs”	(coher-
ent,	coordinated,	complementary),	“integrated”	
or	’comprehensive”	approaches .	These	involve	
greater	cooperation	and	policy	coherence	
between	defence,	foreign	policy	and	develop-
ment	ministries	and	departments	(Hioyos	and	
Muggah,	2009)	and	have	led	to	the	creation	of	
new	offices	and	departments	designed	to	spe-
cifically	link	different	policy	spheres,	including	
humanitarian	assistance	(e .g .	in	the	US,	UK	and	
Canada) .	In	some	contexts,	these	changes	have	
led	to	increased	interaction	between	military/
security	and	civilian	actors	at	the	operational	
level .	In	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	for	example,	civil-
ian	and	military	actors	work	together	within	Pro-
vincial	Reconstruction	Teams	(PRTs)	to	provide	
relief	and	reconstruction	as	part	of	the	Western	
coalitions”	stabilization	and	counter-	
insurgency	efforts .
These	“integrated”	approaches	have	come	
in	for	particular	criticism	from	a	number	of	
humanitarian	agencies	for	the	threat	they	are	
argued	to	pose	to	the	impartiality	and	neutrality	
of	humanitarian	assistance,	and	the	risks	of	“in-
strumentalisation”	of	humanitarian	relief	in	sup-
port	political	objectives .	This	unease	reflects	a	
deeper	tension	between	mainstream	“relief	as-
sistance”	conducted	by	specialised	humanitar-
ian	institutions	and	the	involvement	of	political	
and	military	actors	or	intervention	in	efforts	to	
protect	or	assistance	outcomes .	The	protection	
failures	of	the	1990s	in	Somalia,	former	Yugosla-
via	and	the	Great	Lakes	exposed	the	limitations	
of	the	relief-focused	or	“assistance-first”	model	
of	humanitarian	action;	although	humanitarians	
remain	at	best	ambivalent	about	the	involve-
ment	of	others	in	the	humanitarian	agenda .	The	
need	to	“join	up”	political	and	humanitarian	
strategy	was	underlined	by	the	2000	Report of 
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(the	Brahimi	report)	which	proposed	the	estab-
lishment	of	“integrated”	UN	missions .	But	the	
tensions	involved	in	this	attempt	continue	to	
played	out	in	the	field .
A	great	deal	still	needs	to	be	done	to	work	
out	the	institutional	implications	of	the	search	
for	policy	coherence .	These	comprehensive	
approaches	consist	of	a	wide	array	of	interven-
tions	including	conflict	prevention,	counter-
insurgency,	counter-narcotics,	humanitarian	
assistance,	early	recovery,	peace-keeping,	
post-conflict	reconstruction,	state-building	and	
peace-building .	Considerable	problems	are	as-
sociated	with	setting	appropriate	strategic	and	
operational	objectives	and	sequencing	these,	
particularly	given	the	multiplicity	of	actors	and	
institutions	involved	and	competing	objectives,	
mandates	and	interests .	Policies	remain	torn	
between	narrow	definitions	of	security	interests,	
which	would	focus	action	on	combat	opera-
tions	against	direct	threats,	such	as	terrorist	
networks,	and	a	broader	definition	focused	on	
wider	stabilization	efforts,	including	human	se-
curity,	peacekeeping	and	state-building .
The	US,	UK,	Canada,	Australia	and	their	key	
allies	are	most	prepared	to	lead	enforcement	
action	in	areas	where	their	own	interests	are	
most	directly	at	stake,	usually	in	association	with	
a	key	regional	organization .	Yet	it	is	left	largely	
to	the	UN	and	regional	organisations	to	handle	
crisis	situations	of	lesser	strategic	importance	
and	to	lead	in	the	more	difficult	and	protracted	
business	of	“post-conflict”	recovery	and	recon-
struction .	The	consequence	is	an	inconsistent	
and	constantly	shifting	landscape	of	interna-
tional	stabilisation	engagement .
The UN, Integrated Missions and  
Peace Enforcement
The	integration	of	UN	missions,	the	crea-
tion	of	the	Peace-building	Commission	and	
Peace-building	Fund	and	the	drafting	of	a	new	
doctrine	for	UN	peacekeeping	operations	(the	
so-called	“Capstone	Doctrine’)	are	all	indicative	
of	a	strengthening	stabilization	agenda	within	
the	UN,	albeit	one	that	is	not	explicitly	labelled	
as	such .	Yet	the	nature	of	new	institutional	
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structures	to	support	the	UN’s	stabilization	en-
gagement	varies	significantly	according	to	the	
political	and	strategic	significance	and	nature	
of	the	contexts	concerned .	In	Iraq	and	Afghani-
stan,	the	UN	presence	has	been	very	closely	
integrated	with	the	coalition	forces,	and	NATO	
has	been	mandated	by	the	Security	Council	to	
undertake	peace-keeping	operations	on	behalf	
of	the	UN	(Donini	et	al,	2008) .	In	less	strategi-
cally	sensitive	contexts,	the	Security	Council	has	
shown	a	willingness	to	mandate	stabilization-
type	engagement,	but	Western	governments	
have	been	far	less	keen	to	contribute	militarily	
to	these	efforts .	DR	Congo	is	one	striking	exam-
ple	of	this .
Considerable	normative	and	operational	
uncertainty	and	inconsistency	surrounds	the	
UN’s	engagement	in	international	stabilization	
efforts .	Whereas	traditional	UN	peacekeeping	
rested	primarily	on	impartiality	and	consent	
(Chapter	VI	operations),	the	growing	involve-
ment	of	the	UN	in	complex	internal	conflicts	
since	the	Cold	War	has	meant	that	the	UN	is	
increasingly	acting	on	mandates	that	sit	closer	
to	Chapter	VII	“peace	enforcement,”	in	which	
its	neutrality	cannot	be	maintained .	Tensions	
surrounding	the	impartiality	of	both	humani-
tarian	assistance	and	UN	peacekeeping	have	
been	aggravated	by	a	serious	and	persistent	
lack	of	funding	and	capacity .	There	is	a	risk	of	
failure	in	eastern	DRC,	Darfur	and	elsewhere,	
with	key	problems	including	“overstretch”	and	
an	absence	of	international	consensus	to	sup-
port	the	UN’s	mandates	and	objectives	in	these	
contexts .	UN	SG	Kofi	Annan	warned	that	these	
operations	“will	stretch	to	the	limit	and	beyond	
the	capacity	of	the	United	Nations	to	respond .”
Pervasive	doubts	about	the	capacity	of	
the	UN	system	to	address	the	international	
stabilization	“caseload”	is	reflected	in	a	grow-
ing	international	emphasis	on	the	importance	
of	regional	responses	to	conflicts	and	associ-
ated	political	and	humanitarian	crises .	However,	
serious	questions	also	surround	the	capacities	
and	likely	effectiveness	of	regional	institutions	
in	pursuing	stabilization	objectives .	NATO	
lacks	the	legitimacy	and	political	leadership	
of	the	UN,	and	is	stretched	militarily .	In	Africa,	
increased	interest	in	pan-African	defence	
cooperation	has	centred	on	the	AU’s	2004	
Common	African	Security	and	Defence	Policy	
and	the	creation	of	an	African	Standby	Force .	
Since	2002,	the	AU	has	undertaken	a	number	
of	civilian	and	military	crisis	management	and	
peacekeeping	operations .	But	the	AU’s	mis-
sions	in	Darfur,	particularly,	have	highlighted	its	
limitations,	including	weak	mandates	and	forces	
too	small	and	ill-equipped	to	be	effective .	The	
record	of	ECOWAS	and	SADC	in	peacekeeping	
intervention	and	related	humanitarian	activity	
is	mixed	at	best .	Without	a	significant	increase	
in	troop	contributions	by	Western	states	to	UN	
and	regional	peacekeeping	operations,	AU	and	
other	regional	peacekeeping	will	continue	to	be	
hampered	by	insufficient	numbers	and	capaci-
ties	of	available	troops .
In	light	of	these	developments,	national	
counter-insurgency	campaigns,	such	as	those	
in	Pakistan,	Colombia	and	Sri	Lanka,	are	likely	
to	find	at	least	tacit	support	from	the	leading	
Western	powers,	particularly	where	it	chimes	
with	trans-national	security	agendas,	or	where	
these	powers	lack	political	leverage	with	the	re-
gimes	concerned .	In	doing	so,	they	face	domes-
tic	public	and	international	outcry	over	the	hu-
manitarian	consequences	on	the	ground	when	
these	become	particularly	acute	and	reach	the	
attention	of	the	international	media .
Evolving Civil-Military Relations
Related	to	the	trends	noted	above,	the	
military	is	increasingly	asked	to	go	beyond	its	
traditional	war	fighting	activities	and	engage	in	a	
range	of	tasks	linked	to	humanitarian	and	devel-
opment	goals	(Wheeler	&	Harmer,	2006) .	Various	
factors	lie	behind	this,	including	the	post-cold	
war	search	for	a	new	role	for	military	forces,	per-
ceived	shortcomings	in	deployable	civilian	ca-
pabilities,	evolving	counter-insurgency	doctrine	
and	association	of	the	new	“responsibility	to	pro-
tect”	doctrine	with	military	humanitarian	inter-
vention .	The	result	is	an	increase	in	the	number	
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of	contexts	and	agendas	where	military	and	civil	
institutions	(including	humanitarian	agencies)	
find	themselves	operating	alongside	each	other .
This	increasing	coexistence	is	also	due	to	
the	idea	that	civilian	agencies	are	limited	in	
their	ability	to	work	in	insecure	environments,	
and	that	the	military,	while	playing	a	significant	
role	in	creating	“humanitarian	space,”	need	
meanwhile	to	carry	out	non-military	activities,	
including	relief	provision .	This	has	led	to	a	trend	
in	which	militaries	are	increasingly	institutional-
ising	civilian	capacity,	with	civil-military	relations	
no	longer	viewed	as	the	poor	cousin	of	war	
fighting	but	an	integral	part	of	territorial	and	
population	control .
In	response	to	these	trends,	humanitarian	
actors	have	developed	a	series	of	guidelines	
to	manage	their	engagement	with	militaries,	
which	will	mainly	consist	of	information-sharing	
around	security	conditions	and	humanitarian	
operations .	Although	most	humanitarian	agen-
cies	recognise	the	importance	of	the	role	of	the	
military	in	humanitarian	contexts,	there	is	di-
vergence	around	how	agencies	should	engage	
with	such	institutions,	particularly	in	contexts	
where	there	the	military	is	an	active	belligerent .
There	has	also	been	an	increasing	inter-
face	between	humanitarian	agencies	and	the	
military	in	the	area	of	protection .	Protecting	the	
safety	and	dignity	of	conflict-affected	popula-
tions	has	long	been	a	humanitarian	concern,	but	
in	the	past	fifteen	years	there	has	been	a	rapid	
expansion	in	engagement	on	protection	by	hu-
manitarian	actors	(O’Callaghan	and	Pantuliano,	
2006) .	This	has	seen	a	growing	number	of	peace	
operations	with	mandates	for	civilian	protection;	
with	the	phrase	“protect	civilians	under	imminent	
threat	of	physical	violence”	becoming	an	integral	
element	of	almost	all	UN	mandated	peace	op-
erations	(Harald	Sande	Lie,	2008) .	Furthermore,	
the	Security	Council	has	become	increasingly	
willing	to	agree	to	the	use	of	force	under	Chapter	
VII	to	respond	to	human	rights	and	humanitarian	
crises .	While	some	commentators	indicate	that	
the	growing	engagement	of	peacekeepers	in	
protection	is	delivering	benefits	for	civilians	un-
der	threat	(Grono,	2006;	Holt,	2005),	there	are	
a	number	of	notable	cases	where	the	positive	
impact	has	been	limited	at	best	(DRC,	Darfur) .
While	such	forms	of	military	engagement	
may	be	welcomed	in	principle	by	humanitarian	
agencies	—	not	least	because	they	lack	the	
means	themselves	to	provide	physical	protec-
tion	—	the	engagement	of	humanitarian	ac-
tors	with	military	protection	(whether	through	
advocacy	of	active	coordination)	has	raised	
concerns	about	neutrality	(O’Callaghan,	2007) .	
This	is	particularly	true	in	situations	where	mili-
tary	actors	are	engaged	in	peace-enforcement	
and	other	explicitly	political	roles .	The	current	
collaboration	between	MONUC	and	the	gov-
ernment	of	DRC	in	counter-insurgency	opera-
tions	in	eastern	Congo	is	one	such	example .
Protection of Civilians and the 
Pursuit of Justice
The Responsibility to Protect
The	growing	trend	of	deployment	of	mili-
tary	forces	with	protection	mandates	reflects	
broader	shifts	in	thinking	about	protection	
in	the	political,	military	and	human	rights	
spheres .	The	1990s	was	a	decade	in	which	
external	military	intervention	for	human	pro-
tection	purposes	was	asserted	by	the	inter-
national	community,	in	particular	the	US	and	
UK,	to	justify	intervention	in	Somalia,	Bosnia	
and	Kosovo .	The	concept	of	“humanitarian	
intervention”	has	been	criticised	by	some	as	
a	threat	to	the	notion	of	state	sovereignty,	by	
others	as	a	dangerous	conflation	of	humanitar-
ian	and	political	agendas .	The	“Responsibil-
ity	to	Protect”	doctrine	turns	the	issue	on	
its	head,	placing	the	sovereign	state	at	the	
centre	but	insisting	on	sovereign responsibil-
ity to	protect	as	central	to	state	legitimacy .	
First	articulated	in	2001	(ICISS),	R2P	gained	
political	momentum	at	the	2005	UN	World	
Summit	where	governments	agreed	that	when	
a	state	“manifestly	fails”	in	its	responsibilities	
to	protect	civilians	from	genocide,	war	crimes,	
crimes	against	humanity	and	ethnic	cleansing,	
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the	international	community	must	take	action,	
including	collective	use	of	force	authorised	by	
the	Security	Council	under	Chapter	VII	(World	
Summit	Outcome	Document) .	While	some	
argue	that	the	recognition	of	R2P	and	its	subse-
quent	endorsement	by	the	UN	Security	Council	
has	meant	that	the	concept	has	become	an	
emergent	international	norm .	Others	claim	that	
the	debate	has	shifted	from	whether	there	is	a	
right	to	intervene	to	the nature	of	the	interven-
tion	(Wheeler,	2005;	Grono,2006) .
Amid	the	various	debates	about	the	in-
terpretation	of	the	R2P	doctrine,	its	status	and	
legal	foundations,	perhaps	the	most	serious	
challenge	it	faces	is	to	overcome	the	unwilling-
ness	of	states	to	expend	military	or	political	
capital	to	address	mass	human	rights	abuses	
in	other	countries .	Darfur,	Zimbabwe	and	Sri	
Lanka	(amongst	other	situations)	demonstrate	
that	the	challenges	to	it	becoming	established	
practice .	Yet	the	UN	Secretary	General	Ban	Ki	
Moon	has	stressed	that	he	will	spare	“no	effort	
to	operationalize	the	responsibility	to	protect”	
and	in	early	2009	issued	a	report	aimed	at	pro-
viding	doctrinal,	policy	and	institutional	life	to	
the	doctrine .
Human Rights and Protection: Balancing 
Peace, Security and Justice
The	1990s	was	marked	by	a	re-energising	of	
the	human	rights	movement,	which	led	to	a	raft	
of	new	international	instruments	and	“soft	law”	
such	as	the	IDP	Guiding	Principles .	These	nor-
mative	developments	have	been	underpinned	
by	the	operational	expansion	of	human	rights	
actors	in	conflict	settings,	most	particularly	
the	expansion	of	OHCHR,	which	is	increas-
ingly	present	and	active	in	conflict	contexts .	
The	Security	Council	has	become	more	active	
in	the	establishment	of	international	account-
ability	mechanisms	such	as	the	ad	hoc	tribunals	
for	Rwanda	and	the	former	Yugoslavia,	but	the	
most	significant	development	was	the	establish-
ment	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	
to	prosecute	those	responsible	for	war	crimes,	
crimes	against	humanity	and	genocide .
The	ICC	has	a	global	mandate,	yet	its	ac-
tivities	to	date	have	concentrated	on	African	
countries	—	stirring	African	sensitivities	about	
sovereignty,	as	well	as	charges	of	hypocrisy	that	
the	actions	of	Western	governments	in	Iraq	and	
Afghanistan	are	not	subject	to	the	same	level	of	
accountability .	The	Court	can	only	investigate	
crimes	committed	after	the	Rome	Statute	took	
effect	in	2002,	hence	the	court	has	been	drawn	
into	contexts	where	conflicts	are	still	active,	or	
barely	concluded	(Waddell	and	Clark,	2008)	
and	conflict	mediators	are	concerned	that	this	
reduces	options	for	conflict	resolution .	Ten-
sion	between	justice	and	peace	has	become	all	
too	evident	in	the	context	of	northern	Uganda	
and	Sudan	(Flint	and	de	Waal,	2009;	Hovil	and	
Lomo,	2005) .	Concerns	that	the	activities	of	the	
ICC	may	affect	ongoing	humanitarian	access	in	
conflict	settings	has	led	the	ICRC	to	assert	its	
immunity	against	provision	of	testimony	and	
MSF	to	issue	statements	to	the	press	indicating	
non-cooperation	with	the	Court	(DuBois,	2009) .	
This	tension	was	all	too	evident	when	an	arrest	
warrant	was	issued	for	President	Omar	al-Bashir	
of	Sudan,	following	which	15	international	and	
national	organisations	were	expelled	from	
northern	Sudan	or	closed	on	grounds	of	alleged	
cooperation	with	the	ICC .	HPG	researchers	sug-
gest	that	the	expulsions	are	not	only	detrimen-
tal	to	the	needs	and	protection	of	communities	
in	conflict-affected	areas	of	Sudan’s	north,	but	
may	also	have	implications	for	the	multiple	
peace	processes	in	the	country	(Pantuliano	et	
al) .	It	is	still	too	early	in	the	Court’s	jurisdiction	
to	know	whether	concerns	regarding	its	impact	
on	conflict	are	outweighed	by	accountability	
and	deterrence .
Protection in Humanitarian Practice: 
Expansion and Specialisation
Among	humanitarian	agencies	there	is	
increasing	recognition	that	protection	is	a	core	
component	of	humanitarian	action .	An	increas-
ing	number	and	diversity	of	international	and	
national	agencies	are	now	engaging	in	protec-
tion,	joining	the	cadre	of	agencies	with	specific	
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mandates	to	protect	(ICRC,	UNHCR,	UNICEF	
and	OHCHR) .	Protection	is	now	one	of	the	11	
“Clusters”	that	coordinate	specialised	humani-
tarian	action	globally	and	in	the	field .	The	result	
of	this	increased	activity	has	been	the	develop-
ment	of	new	approaches	and	technical	capaci-
ties,	much	of	it	from	the	non-mandated	actors	
working	at	community	level	(O’Callaghan	and	
Pantuliano,	2007) .
This	rapid	growth	in	thinking	and	practice	
is	not	without	its	difficulties .	Alarms	have	been	
repeatedly	raised	about	the	“internationalisa-
tion”	of	the	protection	agenda	with	humanitar-
ians	substituting	for	more	robust	and	effective	
action,	as	a	consequence	of	both	transferral	of	
responsibilities	by	other	actors	and	exaggerat-
ed	claims	by	humanitarians	(DuBois,	2009;	Pan-
tuliano	and	O’Callaghan,	2006;	Aeschilmann,	
2005) .	There	has	been	criticism	of	the	quality	of	
protection	work,	including	the	deployment	of	
inexperienced	staff,	breaches	of	confidential-
ity	of	affected	populations	and	inconsistent	
knowledge	and	application	of	relevant	laws	
(Bonwick	2006;	Pantuliano	and	O’Callaghan,	
2006) .	Finally,	there	have	been	concerns	that	
there	has	been	an	imbalance	of	attention	to	
some	issues	(such	as	IDPs)	to	the	detriment	of	
others .	Despite	the	expansion	of	interest,	refu-
gee	protection	and	its	core	tenets	(asylum, non-
refoulement)	seem	largely	to	have	slipped	off	
the	humanitarian	agenda .
Various	initiatives	are	underway	to	address	
some	of	the	challenges	outlined	above	and	to	
further	develop	the	sector,	including	efforts	
to	develop	standards	in	protection .	There	are	
also	some	lines	of	research	and	thinking	about	
protection .	One	of	these	concerns	the	link-
ages	between	protection	and	livelihoods .	This	
work	is	premised	on	the	understanding	that	
the	threats	that	people	face	to	their	protection	
and	livelihoods	are	frequently	interrelated .	The	
direct	targeting	of	civilian	populations	and	their	
assets	is	often	a	deliberate	war	tactic .	Violence	
has	major	implications	for	people’s	livelihoods	
because	it	can	disrupt	basic	services,	limit	ac-
cess	to	employment,	markets	and	farms,	and	
even	undermine	social	networks	(Jaspars	et	
al,	2006) .	Protection	and	livelihoods	are	also	
connected	in	the	way	people	respond	to	these	
risks .	Research	by	HPG	in	Darfur,	Chechnya,	Sri	
Lanka	and	the	occupied	Palestinian	territories	
(oPt)	shows	that	people	carefully	calibrate	
costs	to	their	safety	and	dignity	against	their	
economic	status	(Jaspars	and	O’Callaghan,	
2008;	O’Callaghan	et	al,	2009) .
Humanitarian and Development 
Interventions in Protracted Crises
Protracted Crisis
The	available	figures	suggest	that	some-
where	between	70-80%	of	all	humanitarian	re-
sponse	expenditure	goes	towards	protracted	
crises;	that	is,	to	situations	of	protracted	hu-
manitarian	concern	typically	involving	a	com-
bination	of	violent	political	instability,	forced	
displacement	and	human	rights	abuse,	and	
weak	or	absent	governance	and	service	provi-
sion .	The	fact	that	so	much	of	humanitarian	
expenditure	occurs	in	such	contexts	raises	
fundamental	questions	about	the	proper	
role	of	humanitarian	assistance	in	relation	to	
other	“fragile	states”	agendas,	particularly	
with	regard	to	development .	Relief	assistance	
often	provides	an	(inadequate)	substitute	for	
welfare	safety	nets,	providing	patchy	access	
to	the	most	basic	requirements	for	health	and	
subsistence .	Much	of	the	policy	concern	with	
situations	of	this	kind	lies	in	identifying	the	
appropriate	combination	of	approaches	and	
instruments	to	tackle	the	combined	effects	of	
acute	and	chronic	vulnerability .
New Types of Relief, Livelihood 
Support and Basic Services in Conflict
Conflict	affects	all	aspects	of	livelihoods .	
War	strategies	often	deliberately	undermine	
livelihoods	and	war	economies	may	develop,	
where	a	powerful	elite	benefits	from	war	by	
using	violent	or	exploitative	practices .	War	
directly	impacts	on	livelihoods	through	the	
destruction,	looting	and	theft	of	key	assets,	
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and	indirectly	through	the	loss	of	basic	services	
and	access	to	employment,	markets,	farms	
or	pastures .	As	a	result,	most	people’s	liveli-
hood	strategies	become	extremely	restricted	
and	may	involve	considerable	risks	to	personal	
safety .	Contemporary	conflict	is	frequently	pro-
tracted,	and	risks	to	livelihoods	thus	persist	for	
long	periods	of	time .
While	food	aid	remains	the	dominant	
mode	of	tackling	food	insecurity	in	these	envi-
ronments,	agencies	have	increasingly	explored	
a	range	of	other	food	security	and	livelihoods	
support	interventions	to	help	meet	basic	needs	
and	reduce	protection	risks	in	both	acute	and	
protracted	phases	of	conflict .	These	have	
included	interventions	that	reduce	expendi-
ture,	such	as	fuel-efficient	stoves	and	grinding	
mills;	vouchers	or	grants	to	increase	access	
to	a	range	of	goods	or	services;	cash	for	work	
e .g .	for	road	rehabilitation;	and	cash	grants	to	
meet	basic	needs	or	assist	livelihood	recovery .	
Agencies	have	also	examined	the	potential	for	
incorporating	and	utilising	lessons	from	social	
protection	programming .
Social Protection
Social	protection	involves	“public	actions	
taken	to	respond	to	levels	of	vulnerability,	risk	
and	deprivation	which	are	deemed	socially	
unacceptable	within	a	given	polity	or	society”	
(Norton	et	al .,	2001) .	Considerable	overlap	
exists	among	humanitarian	assistance,	social	
protection,	wider	livelihoods	promotion	and	
food	security	interventions,	which	share	similar	
goals	in	relation	to	reducing	vulnerability,	risk	
and	deprivation	(Harvey,	2009) .	Social	protec-
tion	holds	new	potential	for	the	long-standing	
challenges	that	the	international	community	
faces	when	responding	to	conflict .	Recent	think-
ing	has	begun	to	explore	the	potential	for	the	
provision	of	regular	social	protection	as	a	way	to	
address	the	needs	of	the	millions	living	in	dif-
ficult	environments	(Harvey,	2009;	Harvey	et	al	
2007;	Darcy	2004) .	At	a	programmatic	level	how-
ever,	social	protection	in	fragile	states	and	in	
situations	of	conflict	remains	largely	uncharted	
territory,	with	traditional	forms	of	humanitarian	
assistance	often	continuing	to	be	the	predomi-
nant	mode	of	engagement .	National	systems	
for	longer-term	social	assistance	are	generally	
perceived	as	a	distant	goal .
Social	protection,	traditionally	a	concept	
applied	to	“better	performing”	environments	
where	the	state	may	be	willing	and	able	to	
provide	some	form	of	long-term	assistance	to	
its	citizens,	requires	some	adaptation	if	used	
in	conflict	situations .	Here,	a	social	protection	
agenda	needs	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	
the	range	of	risks	and	vulnerabilities	that	peo-
ple	are	confronted	with	has	as	much	to	do	with	
threats	from	violence	as	with	threats	deriving	
from	income	poverty	(Darcy,	2004) .	The	concept	
of	social	protection	in	these	contexts	will	need	
to	encompass	“threats	of	violence	and	persecu-
tion,	coercion	and	deliberate	deprivation,	as	
well	as	protection	against	loss	of	entitlements	
and	economic	vicissitudes”	(Ibid:	2) .	The	acts	
and	measures	designed	to	protect	people	
in	these	environments	may	in	some	cases	be	
limited	to	sustaining	life	and	alleviate	immedi-
ate	suffering .	In	these	contexts,	there	are	clear	
overlaps	between	social	protection	and	human-
itarian	assistance	where	both	agendas	share	
similar	objectives	aiming	at	reducing	risk	and	
vulnerability	(Harvey,	2009) .
The	obstacles	to	delivery	are	often	formi-
dable .	Devereux	describes	the	“Catch	22	of	
social	protection”	where	“the	greater	the	need	
for	social	protection,	the	lower	the	capacity	of	
the	state	to	provide	it”	(Devereux,	2000) .	In	this	
regard,	social	protection	has	been	considered	
as	an	agenda	that	can	strengthen	the	legitimacy	
of	the	state	and	support	social	and	political	
stability .	For	example	by	allowing	the	state	to	
re-shoulder	its	responsibilities	for	the	welfare	of	
its	citizens	social	protection	can	be	considered	
an	important	way	for	revitalizing	the	political	
contract	between	the	state	and	citizens	(Chris-
toplos,	2004) .
Applying	the	notion	of	social	protection	to	
situations	of	violent	insecurity,	fragile	states	and	
protracted	crisis	also	begs	the	question	of	who	
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is	responsible	for	its	delivery .	In	these	con-
texts,	even	if	in	legal	terms	the	state	remains	
ultimately	responsible	for	the	welfare	of	its	citi-
zens,	the	weakness	or	disruption	of	state	insti-
tutions,	the	lack	of	capacity	and/or	willingness	
to	provide	for	all	or	part	of	the	population,	
means	that	the	state	often	cannot	or	will	not	
play	the	leading	role	in	owning	and	advancing	
a	social	protection	agenda .	Non-state	actors,	
such	as	local	civil	society	actors	and	inter-
national	humanitarian	service	providers,	will	
often	acquire	a	central	role	in	providing	for	the	
welfare	of	the	population	in	these	situations	
(Darcy,	2004) .	Moreover,	communities	them-
selves	will	also	be	key	social	protection	actors	
for	example	through	extended	family	networks	
(e .g .	hosting	of	IDPs)	or	through	financial	sup-
port	such	as	remittances	or	zakat	in	Islamic	
communities .
Cash-Based Responses
Cash	transfers	and	vouchers	—	i .e .	pro-
viding	cash	to	people	affected	by	crisis	in	the	
form	of	unconditional	or	conditional	grants,	
Cash	for	Work	or	redeemable	vouchers	—	are	
increasingly	used	to	meet	needs	in	crises	as	an	
alternative	or	complement	to	providing	goods	
in-kind	in	response	to	crisis .	Since	the	close	of	
the	1990s	the	number	of	cash-based	respons-
es	has	surged .	Discussions	among	humanitar-
ian	agencies	have	evolved	from	whether	they	
can	be	an	appropriate	response	mechanism	
to	how,	when	and	where	organisations,	donors	
and	governments	can	best	programme	and	
support	cash	transfers .	Cash	transfers	are	seen	
as	providing	flexibility	to	aid	recipients	and	
also	supporting	local	economies .	While	few	
donors	have	explicit	policies	on	cash,	certain	
donors	(e .g .	DFID)	have	been	generally	sup-
portive	of	their	use .	It	is	nearly	impossible	to	
determine	percentage	of	cash-based	respons-
es	compared	as	a	portion	of	total	humanitarian	
programming,	because	of	the	unreliability	of	
financial	tracking	data	and	the	fact	that	aid	
agencies	and	donors	rarely	disaggregate	their	
assistance	into	cash	and	in-kind	categories .
Early Recovery
The	current	international	aid	architecture,	
instruments	and	modes	of	engagement	strug-
gle	to	address	the	range	of	strategic,	capacity	
and	financing	needs	of	countries	experienc-
ing	(or	emerging	from)	protracted	conflict .	
The	international	community	has	long	been	
concerned	with	the	need	to	strengthen	the	
synergies	between	humanitarian	and	develop-
ment	assistance	and	improve	programming	
in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	conflict,	often	
with	the	focus	on	a	“transitions”	—	from	war	to	
peace	and	from	relief,	recovery	and	ultimately	
longer-term	development .	“Early	recovery”	has	
been	gaining	momentum,	particularly	in	policy	
circles,	as	a	framework	to	better	address	needs	
and	promote	recovery	in	humanitarian	and	tran-
sitional	settings .
The	meaning	of	early	recovery	is	still	very	
much	in	discussion,	in	particular	the	extent	to	
which	it	should	include	security	and	security	
sector	reform	objectives .	UNDP	is	currently	
leading	global	efforts	to	promote	early	recov-
ery,	with	a	focus	on	the	promotion	of	a	self-sus-
taining,	nationally-owned	process	for	post-crisis	
recovery,	building	on	life-saving	interventions	in	
conflict-affected	environments	where	and	when	
appropriate .	In	conflict	settings,	there	are	con-
cerns	about	potential	trade-offs	between	meet-
ing	immediate	needs	and	promoting	eventual	
recovery .	Here	there	are	often	major	questions	
about	whether	the	conditions	exist	under	which	
effective	recovery	can	be	expected .	Others	
conceive	early	recovery	more	broadly,	as	over-
lapping	with	peace-building	and	stabilisation .	
The	extent	to	which	early	recovery	approaches	
will	influence	and	improve	programming	in	con-
flict-affected	areas	will	depend	in	no	small	part	
on	how	UN	agencies,	NGOs	and	donor	govern-
ments	define	and	fund	early	recovery	activities	
in	humanitarian	settings .	This	agenda	is	both	
flexible	and	rapidly	evolving .
Basic Service Delivery
The	surge	in	attention	to	fragile	states	
has	coincided	with	a	growing	interest	in	basic	
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service	delivery	in	these	contexts .	Distorted	or	
broken	lines	of	accountability,	weak	or	non-ex-
istent	sectoral	policy	frameworks	at	the	national	
level,	and	poor	monitoring	and	control	systems	
often	create	a	highly	fragmented	service	deliv-
ery	patterns .	Severe	governance	deficits	and	
the	breakdown	of	social	order	through	conflict	
often	translate	into	the	systematic	exclusion	of	
certain	groups	along	ethnic,	religious,	political	
and	gender	lines,	thus	seriously	challenging	
effective	provision	of	services	—	such	as	health	
care	or	water	supply	—	premised	on	norms	of	
universality,	equity	and	participation .
The	modes	and	instruments	of	engagement	
in	service	delivery	should	reflect	the	type	and	
context	of	state	fragility	and	the	characteristics	
and	dynamics	of	the	specific	service	delivery	
sector	(OECD,	2007;	Ranson	et	al .,	2007;	OECD/
OCDE,	2006) .	Despite	this	widely	agreed	princi-
ple	of	engagement,	humanitarian	and	develop-
ment	actors	wanting	to	support	service	delivery	
initiatives	in	fragile	states	continue	to	face	a	
range	of	technical,	security	and	political	hurdles	
in	pursuit	of	goals	that	may	be	hard	to	reconcile .	
These	include	finding	the	appropriate	balance	
between	responding	to	the	immediate	health	
and	other	needs	of	crisis-affected	populations	
and	building	state	capacity	to	ensure	eventual	
sustainable	service	provision .	It	also	requires	
a	balance	between	engaging	with	the	state	
and	non-state	providers;	and	between	working	
through	central	state	institutions	to	promote	
basic	service	interventions	and	supporting	de-
centralized	modes	of	delivery	which	use	lower	
level	institutions	(e .g .	local	government) .
New Actors in Humanitarian Response
The	picture	of	international	intervention	in	
conflict	settings	is	growing	more	complex	with	
the	advent	of	significant	new	actors,	including	
non-DAC	donors	and	private	sector	companies .	
While	much	attention	has	been	placed	on	re-
forming	the	humanitarian	system	from	within,	
the	wider	economic	and	geo-political	environ-
ment	and	changing	dynamics	of	humanitarian	
intervention	have	meant	that	the	international	
humanitarian	“system”	now	comprises	a	greater	
diversity	of	actors	than	ever	before .	From	as	
few	as	a	dozen	government	financiers	just	over	
a	decade	ago,	it	is	now	commonplace	to	have	
up	to	50	or	60	donor	governments	supporting	
a	humanitarian	response	reflecting	the	fact	that	
humantiarian	action	is	not	only	the	occuption	of	
rich,	and	industrialized	western	nations .	In	addi-
tion,	there	is	a	growing	engagement	of	for-prof-
it	enterprises	as	donors,	private	contractors	and	
partners	in	the	provision	of	humanitarian	relief	
and	service	delivery	in	crisis-affected	countries .
Both	trends	raise	opportunities	and	chal-
lenges	for	traditional	humanitarian	actors	in-
cluding	UN	agencies,	NGOs	and	the	Red	Cross	
Movements .	With	an	increasingly	limited	capac-
ity	to	respond,	added	resources	and	expertise	
are	likely	to	play	a	central	role	in	contributing	
towards	humanitarian	outcomes .	But	the	role	
of	these	actors	in	humanitarian	action	remains	
poorly	understood .	Recent	research	by	HPG	has	
tracked	the	growing	role	of	non-DAC	donors	
(Harmer	and	Martin,	2009)	and	the	evolving	role	
of	private	sector	actors	in	crisis	contexts	(Mar-
tin,	forthcoming) .	In	both	cases,	trends	are	hard	
to	determine,	with	contributions	that	are	often	
less	significant	in	absolute	financial	terms	than	
in	political	and	other	terms .
Operational Security and 
“Humanitarian Space”
Trends	in	security	incident	data	show	a	pro-
nounced	rise	of	the	rates	of	attacks	against	aid	
workers,	mainly	driven	by	a	few	extremely	inse-
cure	contexts	(Stoddard,	Harmer,	DiDomenico,	
2009) .	Although	attacks	on	humanitarian	opera-
tions	seem	to	have	levelled	off	in	most	parts	
of	the	world	since	2006,	in	a	small	number	of	
the	most	highly	contested	operational	environ-
ments	the	violence	has	worsened	and	taken	on	
an	increasingly	political	orientation .	The	fabled	
“humanitarian	space”	has	not	merely	shrunk	in	
these	environments,	but	the	very	concept	has	
been	rendered	meaningless,	as	aid	workers	and	
their	material	assets	have	been	treated	as	ap-
propriate	and	desirable	targets	for	hostile	ac-
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Source:	Stoddard,	Harmer,	DiDomenico,	2009
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tion .	United	Nations	security	personnel	and	oth-
ers	have	noted	a	“paradigm	shift”	in	the	threat	
environment,	in	which	personnel	are	politically	
targeted	even	when	they	are	attempting	to	en-
gage	in	neutral	humanitarian	action .	Insecurity	
leads	to	constraints	on	access	to	beneficiaries,	
which	increases	their	vulnerability .
Globally,	violence	against	aid	workers	has	
risen	significantly	over	the	past	12	years	(the	
period	for	which	data	has	been	systematically	
collected) .	The	absolute	number	of	major	secu-
rity	incidents	involving	aid	workers	—	defined	
as	killings,	kidnappings,	and	attacks	that	result	
in	serious	injury	—	has	risen	four-fold	over	the	
time	period,	with	the	largest	jump	occurring	in	
the	past	three	years .	The	average	number	of	
incidents	per	year	in	2006-2008	was	up	177	per-
cent	from	the	annual	average	of	prior	recorded	
years .	While	this	must	be	understood	against	
a	background	of	rising	numbers	of	aid	workers	
in	the	field,	the	number	of	attacks	has	unques-
tionably	outpaced	the	steadily	growing	popu-
lation	of	aid	workers,	resulting	in	a	61	percent	
rise	in	attack	rates	for	the	same	period .	In	2008	
alone,	260	aid	workers	fell	victim	to	deliberate	
violence	—	a	rate	of	9/10,000 .	Of	these,	122	lost	
their	lives .
The	jump	in	security	incidents	was	mainly	
driven	by	the	extremely	insecure	operational	
environments	of	Afghanistan,	Somalia	and	Sudan	
(Darfur),	which	together	accounted	for	more	than	
60	percent	of	the	total	attacks	on	aid	workers .	
Importantly,	when	controlling	for	these	three	
extreme	cases,	the	attack	rates	for	aid	workers	
in	the	rest	of	the	world	appears	to	be	stable,	
even	slightly	declining .	This	would	suggest	that	
advances	in	operational	security	management	
among	many	humanitarian	organisations,	includ-
ing	more	sophisticated	methodologies	for	risk	
assessment	and	mitigation,	have	seen	positive	
results	for	aid	providers	in	all	but	the	most	violent	
settings .	However	it	is	in	such	settings	that	the	
humanitarian	needs	will	often	be	greatest,	and	
agencies	engaged	in	lifesaving	relief	assistance	
need	to	find	a	way	to	sustain	vital	operations .
Although	intentionality	is	notoriously	dif-
ficult	to	ascertain	in	security	incidents,	the	best	
available	data	indicate	that	a	greater	proportion	
of	aid	worker	attacks	are	now	politically	moti-
vated	(ibid) .	The	international	aid	system,	UN	
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 33
and	INGO	components	alike,	has	been	effec-
tively	painted	by	armed	opposition	groups	as	
an	instrument	of	a	Western	political	agenda .	As	
one	UN	security	professional	observed,	humani-
tarian	aid	has	come	to	be	seen	as	a	manifesta-
tion	of	the	Western	nations”	“state-building”	
project	to	extend	their	power .	Attacks	against	
aid	operations	are	a	strike	back	against	that	
power	extension	—	“anti-state-building .”
There	is	a	divergence	between	the	victimi-
zation	rates	of	UN	agencies	and	NGOs .	In	terms	
of	aid	workers	overall,	the	rate	of	international	
staff	victims,	long	seen	to	be	declining	relative	
to	the	rising	national	staff	victims,	spiked	sud-
denly	in	the	past	three	years .	In	keeping	with	
this	finding	there	was	a	350	percent	rise	in	kid-
nappings	—	a	type	of	attack	that	traditionally	
favours	international	targets	for	their	higher	sym-
bolic	and	ransom	values .	This	global	incident	
pattern	does	not	hold	true	across	all	types	of	
aid	organisations,	however .	When	attacks	on	UN	
agencies	were	looked	at	separately,	the	casual-
ties	were	still	seen	to	be	heavily	weighted	toward	
national	staff,	particularly	contractors,	suggest-
ing	that	as	security	worsens	a	greater	reliance	on	
programming	through	local	entities	has	shifted	
the	risk	burden	to	these	individuals,	many	of	
whom	have	neither	the	resources	to	enhance	
their	own	security	nor	the	economic	wherewithal	
to	turn	down	the	opportunity	of	work .	The	ethi-
cal	problems	with	this	are	manifest .
When	contracted	drivers	are	included,	the	
data	show	that	WFP	has	had	more	than	three	
times	the	number	of	workers	killed	in	attacks	
while	on	the	job	than	each	of	the	other	UN	hu-
manitarian	agencies	and	the	largest	NGO	fed-
erations .	WFP’s	casualties	are	also	more	heavily	
borne	by	national	staff	than	is	the	case	with	its	
fellow	organizations
Operational Security — Developments in 
Policy and Practice
Within	the	humanitarian	community,	the	
security	domain	has	significantly	professional-
ised	over	the	past	five	years	and	security	budg-
ets	have	increased .	Agencies	have	established	
formal	security	posts	at	headquarters,	regional	
and	field	locations .	Security	policies	and	proce-
dures	have	been	developed	emphasizing	a	pro-
gramme-led	approach	to	risk	management,	and	
Figure 5: Highest Incident Countries, 2006-2008
Source:	Stoddard,	Harmer	and	DeDominici	(2009)
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investments	are	being	made	in	security	audits	to	
analyse	whether	practice	on	the	ground	reflects	
organisational	priorities .	The	UN	has	played	an	
active	part	in	this	policy	shift,	and	WFP	has	been	
one	of	the	leaders	in	this .	However	the	UN	suf-
fered	a	significant	setback	with	a	large	scale,	tar-
geted	attack	against	the	organisation	in	Algiers	
in	2007 .	Efforts	to	establish	a	UN-wide	incident	
reporting	mechanism,	and	encouraging	greater	
collaboration	between	aid	actors	on	the	ground	
through	the	Saving	Lives	Together	initiative	have	
also	fallen	short	of	their	original	goals .
The	strategy	of	“acceptance”	—	cultivating	
relations	with	local	actors	and	communities	—	is	
still	seen	as	a	key	approach	to	security,	particu-
larly	for	NGOs .	But	UN	humanitarian	agencies,	
including	WFP,	face	wider	security	challenges	
as	they	form	part	of	a	larger	entity	with	a	clear	
political	identity	and	role .	It	is	inherently	more	
difficult	for	UN	agencies	to	cultivate	acceptance	
as	independent	humanitarian	actors .	In	some	of	
the	most	insecure	contexts,	such	as	Somalia	and	
Afghanistan	most	security	managers	—	NGOs	
and	UN	alike	—	acknowledge	that	acceptance	
is	increasingly	not	a	viable	security	strategy .
Many	agencies	have	also	reinforced	their	
adherence	to	humanitarian	principles,	in	particu-
lar	the	principle	of	independence .	Humanitarian	
practitioners	see	independence	as	increasingly	
vital	to	their	ability	to	negotiate	access	and	to	
their	overall	level	of	security .	This	is	done	prima-
rily	by	reducing	the	agency’s	reliance	on	insti-
tutional	funding,	especially	if	a	potential	donor	
is	negatively	perceived	by	the	host	community .	
How	effective	this	is	in	maintaining	the	security	
of	staff	is,	however,	debatable .	The	ICRC	has	
had	some	success	in	regaining	the	acceptance	
that	its	unique	mandate	bestows,	but	the	UN	
and	NGOs	have	suffered	increasing	attacks	irre-
spective	of	their	funding	and	partnerships .
Remote Management and the Transfer 
of Risk
Security	incidents	have	a	significant	impact	
on	an	aid	agencies	programming	approach .	
Strategies	such	as	remote	management	are	
increasingly	employed	to	ensure	that	aid	con-
tinues	to	reach	the	beneficiary	population .	The	
organisation	withdraws	or	limits	the	movements	
of	its	international	staff,	while	shifting	more	
responsibility	to	national	staff	or	local	partners	
and	/	or	contractors .	This	approach	is	gener-
ally	based	on	the	assumption	that	local	actors	
face	a	lower	level	of	risk	than	international	enti-
ties	or	personnel .	However,	this	assumption	is	
frequently	false,	and	simply	shifts	the	burden	
of	risk	to	those	who	often	have	fewer	security	
resources	and	less	training .
Remote	management,	though	intended	
as	a	short-term	expedient,	can	have	a	series	of	
knock-on	effects	which	make	it	difficult	for	the	
agency	to	re-engage	later	through	more	tra-
ditional	means .	These	effects	include	reduced	
ground-level	information,	less	credibility	and	
lower	levels	of	trust	in	the	agency,	as	well	as	in-
creased	risks	for	local	implementing	actors	(Rog-
ers,	2006) .	Recognising	this	dilemma,	agencies	
have	increased	their	investment	in	national	staff	
capacities	in	recent	years .	Most	also	acknowl-
edge,	however,	that	more	needs	to	be	done .
Security-Related Constraints on Access
As	security	worsens,	aid	operations	are	
often	scaled	back	or	withdrawn,	affecting	both	
the	quality	and	quantity	of	assistance	benefi-
ciaries	receive .	Measuring	access	is,	however,	
a	challenging	pursuit	and	there	are	as	yet	no	
robust	means	to	assess	claims	that	access	is	
declining .	While	the	overall	footprint	of	the	
international	assistance	community	might	have	
shrunk	in	a	given	country,	some	agencies	may	
have	maintained	or	even	increased	their	opera-
tional	presence	in	response	to	the	withdrawal	
of	other	agencies .	ICRC,	for	example,	maintains	
that	it	has	increased	its	operational	engage-
ment	in	some	very	insecure	contexts,	and	has	
done	so	with	international	staff	and	without	
armed	escorts,	armoured	cars	or	military	pro-
tection .	WFP	argues	that	the	increased	number	
of	suspensions	has	partly	come	about	because	
the	organisation	has	pushed	deeper	into	the	
heart	of	conflict	environments .
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 35
OCHA	has	developed	a	tracking	system	
to	monitor	and	report	access	constraints,	and	
this	is	currently	being	piloted	in	six	insecure	
contexts .	In	his	2009	report	to	the	UN	Security	
Council	on	the	Protection	of	Civilians,	the	Sec-
retary	General	highlights	that	the	most	marked	
deterioration	of	humanitarian	access	is	evident	
in	the	striking	increase	in	attacks	on	humani-
tarian	agencies .	In	delivering	food	to	Somalia,	
Afghanistan	and	Darfur,	WFP,	for	example,	has	
suffered	repeated	attacks	on	convoys,	including	
killing	and	kidnapping	staff	and	contractors .	In	
Afghanistan,	in	the	first	half	of	2008,	800	tonnes	
of	food	aid	were	lost	in	attacks .	In	Darfur,	Sudan	
in	the	same	year	more	than	100	trucks	were	hi-
jacked,	forcing	the	organisation	to	reduce	the	
rations	of	up	to	three	million	people	by	50% .	
Somalia,	in	turn,	provides	some	particularly	stark	
evidence	of	the	impact	of	insecurity	on	access .
Emerging Threats and Potential 
Causes of Future Conflict
Urbanisation, Conflict and  
Humanitarian Crisis
The	rapid	and	uncontrolled	process	of	ur-
banization	in	the	developing	world	is	threatening	
the	well-being	and	the	development	opportuni-
ties	of	millions	of	city	dwellers .	The	threats	that	
they	are	confronted	with	are	in	many	cases	“no	
less	severe	than	some	situations	described	inter-
nationally	as	“humanitarian	emergencies’”	(IRIN	
and	UN-Habitat,	2008) .	Despite	the	scale	of	the	
challenge,	both	humanitarian	and	development	
actors	are	ill-equipped	to	deal	with	the	complex-
ities	posed	by	such	rapid	and	unplanned	urban	
growth .	The	graph	on	the	next	page	shows	the	
historic	and	projected	trends	for	urban	and	rural	
population	growth	to	the	year	2030 .	Almost	all	of	
the	projected	growth	between	now	and	2030	is	
in	urban	centres	in	developing	countries .
While	urbanisation	is	a	global	phenom-
enon,	it	affects	less	developed	countries	dis-
proportionately .	Over	the	last	two	decades	the	
urban	population	of	the	developing	world	has	
grown	an	average	of	3	million	people	per	week	
(UN-Habitat,	2008) .	It	is	estimated	that	by	the	
middle	of	the	21st	century,	the	total	urban	pop-
ulation	of	the	developing	world	have	doubled;	
with	Southern	cities	absorbing	95%	of	the	urban	
and	Africa	demonstrating	the	highest	rates .
The	rapid	growth	of	urban	centres	has	
been	accompanied	by	an	increasing	trend	in	
various	forms	of	violence,	as	well	as	being	af-
fected	by	its	consequences .	Research	by	the	
Crisis	States	Research	Centre	(CSRC)	on	Cities	
and	Fragile	States	has	shown	that	cities	can	
become	theatres	of	regional	and	international	
conflicts	and	often	experience	the	effects	of	
large	scale	displacement	due	to	civil	strife .	Cit-
ies	are	also	regularly	characterised	by	segrega-
tion	and	fear	that	is	a	result	of	violent	crime	
and	conflict .	Different	forms	of	urban	violence,	
such	as	armed	conflict,	gang	warfare,	organized	
crime	and	riots	pose	serious	threats	to	the	lives	
of	urban	residents	and	expose	them	to	ongoing	
protection	threats	(ICRC,	2008) .
In	addition	to	the	range	of	structural	prob-
lems	facing	the	urban	poor,	recent	develop-
ments	such	as	the	food,	fuel	and	financial	crisis,	
and	global	processes	such	as	climate	change	are	
inducing	new	types	of	risks	and	represent	po-
tential	triggers	for	urban	humanitarian	crises .	Ur-
ban	populations	were	the	worst	affected	by	the	
global	food	crisis	in	many	contexts	(High	Level	
Task	Force	on	the	Global	Food	Crisis,	2008) .
Youth Radicalisation, Political Islam and 
Transnational Drivers of Conflict
At	the	heart	of	much	urban	insecurity	is	
urban	unemployment .	Cities	in	fragile	states	in	
particular	suffer	from	high	levels	of	population	
growth	which	exceed	their	capacity	to	gener-
ate	jobs	and	livelihoods	(CSRC,	undated) .	Un-
employment	rates	are	usually	particularly	high	
amongst	the	youth,	engendering	frustration	
and	resentment	which	in	turn	often	leads	to	vio-
lence	and	conflict .	The	role	of	social	exclusion,	
poverty,	inequality,	power	and	powerlessness	
in	explaining	urban	social	violence	and	youth	
militancy	in	many	urban	contexts	has	been	long	
documented	(DFID,	2007) .	These	elements	in	
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themselves	do	not	however	always	lead	to	
conflict .	Extensive	research	by	Stewart	(2006)	
has	shown	that	it	is	a	combination	of	strong	
cultural	affinities,	charismatic	or	organised	
leadership	and	exclusionist	government	poli-
cies	that	tend	to	turn	latent	grievances	into	
actual	protest,	which	may	become	violent .
A	current	strong	manifestation	of	youth	
radicalisation	is	to	be	found	in	Islamic	con-
texts .	In	these	contexts	the	link	between	pov-
erty,	inequality	and	violence	associated	with	
radicalisation	or	extremism	is	not	straight-
forward .	The	traditional	backbone	of	Islamist	
political	movements	has	not	been	provided	
by	the	very	poor,	who	are	generally	too	preoc-
cupied	with	their	struggle	for	daily	survival	to	
be	suitably	mobilized	(Lieven,	2008) .	Islam-
ist	militants	often	come	from	economically	
advantaged	backgrounds	and	young	men	in	
particular	are	often	radicalized	by	considera-
tions	of	job	and	status	(Lieven,	ibid.) .	A	com-
prehensive	literature	review	for	DFID	on	con-
flict,	state	fragility	and	social	cohesion	(SDD,	
2008)	illustrates	how	the	limited	links	between	
terrorism	and	income	poverty,	underlining	
that	radicalization	and	extremism	appear	to	
be	more	a	response	to	political	conditions	
and	long-standing	feelings	of	indignity,	and	
frustration	at	lack	of	opportunity .	Poverty	and	
illiteracy	tend	to	still	be	important	motivating	
factors	to	recruit	militants	at	the	lower	levels	of	
extremist	organizations	(SDD,	ibid.) .	The	situa-
tion	however	varies	greatly	depending	on	the	
contexts	and	the	country,	making	it	very	dif-
ficult	to	draw	general	conclusions .
Transnational	forces	often	play	a	key	
role	in	influencing	conflict	dynamics	within	a	
country .	Mary	Kaldor	(1999)	has	shown	wars	
are	frequently	embedded	within	complex	
transnational	networks .	This	includes	the	role	
of	diasporas	in	financing	and	providing	politi-
cal	support	as	well	as	the	trading	in	arms	and	
conflict	commodities	such	as	natural	resources	
through	illicit	trafficking	networks	to	finance	
war	(SDD,	2008) .	Transnational	networks	tend	
to	be	more	effective	if	the	state	is	weak .	In	the	
case	of	Bangladesh,	government	authorities	
have	admitted	being	unable	to	control	unregu-
lated	flows	of	money	and	lacking	capacity	to	
identify	organisations	who	engage	in	funding	
activities	of	radicalized	and	extremist	groups	
(Munizzuraman,	2008) .	Many	states	have	been	
unable	to	regulate	the	inflow	of	money	from	
the	Gulf	or	the	Middle	East	to	national	NGO’s .	
Figure 6: Historic and Projected Trends for  
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Diaspora	groups	originating	from	Muslim	
countries	have	become	increasingly	radical-
ized	and	they	are	seen	as	not	only	financing	
salafi	groups,	but	also	as	bringing	radical	
thoughts	to	the	countries	in	question .	The	
stereotypical	image	of	militants	being	forged	
in	the	madrasas	of	Pakistan	is	becoming	rap-
idly	outdated .	Militants	are	increasingly	using	
the	internet	and	social	networking	to	access	
radical	thought	and	reach	other	groups	across	
the	world .	National	counter-terrorist	units	in	
Bangladesh	and	Pakistan	are	studying	the	
Facebook-generation	to	see	how	young	mili-
tants	are	shifting	radical	thoughts	from	coun-
try	to	country .
Natural Resource-Based Conflicts
Although	some	studies	have	overem-
phasised	the	role	of	natural	resources	in	war	
(see	Collier	2000),	the	political	economy	of	
contemporary	armed	conflicts	highlights	the	
importance	of	economic	agendas	and	natural	
resources	in	shaping	the	causes,	duration	and	
character	of	violence .	Loot-able	resources	
are	thought	to	prolong	conflicts	as	they	can	
disproportionately	benefit	insurgents	thereby	
avoiding	their	defeat .	They	can	create	inter-
nal	discipline	problems	with	many	soldiers	
preferring	conflict	to	peace	(Ballentine	and	
Nitzschke	2003) .	In	eastern	DRC,	for	example,	
different	armed	actors	have	established	a	lu-
crative	system	of	economic	profit	and	power	
through	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	
that	is	dependent	on	the	ongoing	conflict .	
Non	loot-able	resources	such	as	oil	or	deep	
shaft	minerals	tend	to	favour	governments	
in	their	attempts	to	secure	rapid	military	vic-
tory,	though	the	struggle	for	control	over	such	
resources	may	be	a	dominant	agenda	for	all	
sides	in	a	conflict .
These	economic	agendas	can	also	
change	the	character	of	a	conflict .	Conflicts	
become	complex	and	fragmented	as	econom-
ic	motives	come	to	the	fore,	which	can	lead	to	
more	indiscriminate	predation	of	civilians	as	
armed	actors	no	longer	feel	the	need	to	cre-
ate	consent	and	accountability	(Leader	2000) .	
This	can	have	substantial	effects	on	people’s	
livelihoods	as	armed	actors	destroy	or	steal	key	
assets	such	as	houses,	land,	food	supplies	and	
livestock,	often	forcing	civilians	to	flee .	Local	
institutions	or	governance	structures	central	to	
safeguarding	people’s	livelihoods	may	be	de-
stroyed	or	manipulated	for	personal	or	political	
gain .	Many	civilians	may	also	be	forced	to	seek	
coping	mechanisms	within	war	economies	that	
in	turn	can	further	sustain	the	conflict	(Jaspers	
and	Maxwell,	2009) .
Climate Change, Pastoralism and Conflict
Climate	change	may	contribute	to	natural	
resource	scarcity	such	as	declining	access	to	
water	or	to	land,	and	competition	over	increas-
ingly	scarce	resources	can	lead	to	violent	con-
flict .	There	is	a	growing	awareness	that	climate	
change	and	the	increased	frequency	and	severity	
of	extreme	weather	events	can	increase	the	risk	
of	conflict	and	may	further	exacerbate	current	
conflicts	(FMR,	2008;	Brown	et	al .	2007;	Smith	
and	Vivekananda,	2007) .	The	effects	of	climate	
change	and	violent	conflict	can	be	seen	as	mutu-
ally	reinforcing	processes .	In	conflict-affected	
states	the	interaction	of	climate	change	with	
violent	conflict	is	seen	as	creating	a	vicious	
circle	where	conflict	further	constrains	adap-
tive	capacity	and	climate	change	increasingly	
deepens	the	conflict .	In	countries	where	poverty,	
political	marginalization,	weak	governance	and	
institutional	systems	are	already	entrenched,	the	
consequences	of	climate	changes	are	likely	to	
interact	with	other	processes	to	increases	the	risk	
of	violent	conflict	(Smith	and	Vivekananda,	2007) .
Direct	and	indirect	consequences	of	cli-
mate	change	—	such	as	natural	resource	scar-
city	or	displacement	—	will	interact	with	other	
factors	including	governance	and	institutions,	
political	and	economic	stability,	thus	making	it	
difficult	to	predict	whether	or	how	violence	will	
break	out	in	any	given	context	(Crisis	Group,	
2008) .	Therefore	rather	than	seeing	climate	
change	as	the	key	driver	of	conflict,	climate	
change	and	its	consequences	should	be	seen	
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as	increasing	the	risk	and	likelihood	of	violent	
conflict	in	already	fragile	social	and	political	
environments	which	often	lack	the	capac-
ity	to	adapt,	respond	and	recover	(Smith	and	
Vivekananda,	2007) .
The	climate	of	the	arid	and	semi-arid	lands	
(ASALs)	in	the	Horn	of	Africa	is	characterised	by	
high	temperatures,	low	and	erratic	rainfall	and	
cyclical	droughts .	Pastoralists	have	developed	
sophisticated	and	dynamic	livelihood	strate-
gies,	including	building	up	herd	sizes	as	insur-
ance	against	times	of	hardship,	accessing	and	
managing	natural	resources,	and	maintaining	
high	levels	of	mobility	across	large	tracts	of	land	
(Desta	et	al,	2008;	HPG,	2009;	Markakis,	2004) .	
During	the	past	few	decades	however,	the	cli-
mate	of	the	ASALs	has	become	more	variable	
and	less	predictable	and	droughts	have	in-
creased	in	frequency	and	magnitude .	Pastoral-
ist	livelihoods	have	become	significantly	under	
strain	and	their	adaptive	capacity	to	resist	and	
recover	from	drought-related	shocks	has	been	
progressively	undermined .	Although	the	causal	
factors	are	complex,	it	is	important	to	consider	
how	climate	change	interacts	with	and	deepens	
existing	problems	(HPG,	2009) .	The	adverse	ef-
fects	of	climate	change	in	this	region	have	been	
associated	with	the	exacerbation	of	phenomena	
such	as	forced	migration,	environmental	degra-
dation,	social	breakdown	and	conflict .
In	recent	years	conflicts	over	natural	re-
sources	and	access	have	increased	significantly	
together	with	the	intensification	of	recurrent	
climate	shocks .	Pastoral	groups	resort	to	migra-
tion	as	a	climate	adaptation	strategy	and	move	
over	larger	tracts	of	land	in	search	of	avail-
able	grazing	land	and	water .	This	movement	
increases	population	pressure,	accelerates	
environmental	degradation	and	leads	to	fierce	
competition	over	scarce	resources,	often	trig-
gering	conflict	between	different	communities,	
both	nomadic	and	settled .
Land as Key Issue in Future Conflict
A	critical	issue	in	many	of	current	and	fu-
ture	conflicts	is	the	access,	ownership	and	use	
of	land .	Land	is	central	to	people’s	livelihoods,	
particularly	in	rural	societies,	and	inequities	or	
antagonisms	in	land	tenure	coupled	with	the	
institutional	failure	to	resolve	disputes	can	lead	
to	violent	conflict .	In	Colombia,	a	key	grievance	
of	the	insurgency	is	the	inequities	in	land	ten-
ure	that	resulted	from	tensions	between	large	
landholdings	and	small	scale	farming	(Elhawary	
2009) .	In	the	DRC,	a	gradual	erosion	of	custom-
ary	systems	of	land	access	due	to	colonial	and	
state	policies	of	appropriation	and	patronage	
led	to	increasing	conflicts	over	land	(Vlasen-
root	2008) .	These	tensions	in	land	tenure	are	
often	the	result	of	the	development	process,	as	
changes	in	agrarian	societies	often	create	ten-
sions	around	land	use	and	labour	as	it	requires	
communities	to	shift	to	a	different	form	of	politi-
cal,	economic,	social	and	institutional	organi-
sation .	For	example,	subsistence	farming	and	
customary	ownership	of	land	will	often	contrast	
with	the	need	for	land	and	a	sufficient	labour	
supply	on	large	mechanised	farms	or	in	cities .	
Similarly,	the	livelihoods	of	sedentary	groups	
will	often	contrast	with	those	of	mobile	pasto-
ralists .	Mining	concessions	will	also	often	affect	
people’s	access	to	land	and	consequently	their	
livelihoods .	If	institutions	(formal	or	informal)	are	
unable	to	peacefully	manage	the	antagonisms	
that	arise	from	such	transitions,	the	process	is	
likely	to	be	violent .
Land	relations	can	be	aggravated	by	con-
flict	itself,	particularly	when	there	is	large	scale	
displacement	of	populations	and/or	land	be-
comes	a	key	resource	of	conflict .	Land	can	of-
ten	be	used	to	reward	key	allies	in	conflict .	For	
example,	in	Darfur,	the	government	offers	its	
allies	land	in	return	for	engaging	in	the	conflict,	
which	consequently	affects	people’s	livelihoods	
and	creates	tensions	around	land	tenure	(de	
Waal	2009) .	Control	of	land	is	also	a	means	to	
gain	important	resources	that	may	lie	beneath	
the	land .	For	example,	in	eastern	DRC,	control	
of	land	by	armed	groups	is	central	to	acquir-
ing	mineral	wealth	and	profiting	from	its	trade .	
Similarly,	in	Colombia,	paramilitary	groups	have	
sought	to	acquire	large	areas	of	land	as	a	means	
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of	wealth	accumulation .	Forced	displacement	
can	further	aggravate	land	conflicts .	Refugees	
or	IDPs	will	often	occupy	land	in	their	areas	of	
refuge	and	others,	sometimes	opportunistical-
ly	and	other	times	out	of	necessity,	will	often	
occupy	land	in	areas	of	displacement .
These	issues	also	come	to	the	fore	in	
the	post-conflict	period,	especially	if	the	im-
portance	of	land	in	the	conflict	has	not	been	
recognised	or	addressed	in	the	peace	proc-
ess .	Despite	formal	agreements	between	bel-
ligerents,	conflicts	over	land	will	often	persist	
particularly	when	there	has	been	large	scale	
and	protracted	displacement .	Land	grabbing	
often	occurs	in	the	transition	period,	the	land	
administration	is	often	dysfunctional	or	cor-
rupt,	people	have	lost	or	had	their	documen-
tation	destroyed,	returnees	often	bring	new	
ideas,	technologies	and	capital	that	can	alter	
land	relations,	some	will	have	a	vested	interest	
in	maintaining	land	tenure	insecurity	and	land	
policy	will	often	lack	relevance	in	a	context	of	
rapid	change	(Huggins	2009,	Alden	Wily	2009) .	
Frequently	the	response	to	displacement	in	
the	post-conflict	period	is	to	return	IDPs	and	
refugees	to	their	areas	of	origin,	yet	chang-
ing	dynamics	during	the	conflict,	particularly	
around	land	tenure	means	that	this	process	is	
often	fraught	with	tensions	as	land	is	occupied	
by	others	or	returnees	might	not	have	had	
land	in	the	first	place .	For	example,	in	Rwanda,	
the	return	of	around	600,000	Tutsi	refugees	
by	the	late	1990s	and	the	return	en	masse	of	
Hutu	refugees	in	1996	and	1997	led	to	increas-
ing	tensions	over	land	access .	In	Afghanistan,	
it	was	estimated	between	March	2002	and	
May	2004	that	60%	of	returnees	were	landless,	
while	60%	of	those	going	back	to	rural	areas	
were	dependent	on	land	as	a	means	of	survival	
(UNHCR	figures	cited	in	Ozerdem	and	Sofiza-
da	2006) .	The	centrality	of	land	in	conflict	and	
post-conflict	situations	means	that	ignoring	
these	issues	can	lead	to	missed	opportunities	
to	support	people’s	livelihoods	or	worse	feed	
into	tensions	or	create	conflict	between	differ-
ent	groups	seeking	access	to	land .
Implications of Conflict Trends  
for WFP
Responding to Current and  
Future Challenges
Many	of	the	challenges	facing	WFP	in	
working	in	conflict	situations	are	already	ap-
parent	in	its	current	programmes:	how	to	as-
sess	changing	patterns	of	need	in	protracted	
crises;	finding	forms	of	assistance	appropriate	
to	these	contexts;	striking	the	right	balance	
between	relief	and	recovery	assistance;	main-
taining	secure	access	to	affected	populations;	
and	managing	complex	and	expensive	logisti-
cal	operations,	for	itself	and	others .	Some	of	
the	challenges	relate	to	principles:	how	to	work	
with	governments	or	even	other	UN	bodies	—	
particularly	in	integrated	missions	—	whose	
agendas	are	overtly	political,	while	maintaining	
neutrality	and	impartiality?	Some	are	about	
strategy	and	coordination:	how	best	to	config-
ure	WFP’s	approach	alongside	those	of	others	
(particularly	FAO)	to	achieve	the	best	combined	
result?	All	of	these	raise	questions	about	the	
proper	role	of	WFP	and	how	its	new	strategic	
plan	(2008-11)	should	be	interpreted	in	situa-
tions	of	protracted	crisis,	violent	instability	and	
weak	governance .	The	aspirations	in	that	plan	
face	huge	challenges	in	these	contexts,	yet	
these	are	the	setting	for	a	large	proportion	of	
WFP’s	global	programming .
It	is	worth	re-stating	here	the	5	strategic	
objectives	in	the	2008	Strategic	Plan:
•	 	Save	lives	and	protect	livelihoods	
in	emergencies
•	 	Prevent	acute	hunger	and	invest	in	disas-
ter	preparedness	and	mitigation
•	 	Restore	and	rebuild	lives	and	livelihoods	in	
post-conflict/post-disaster/transitions
•	 	Reduce	chronic	hunger	and	malnutrition
•	 	Strengthen	the	capacities	of	countries	to	
reduce	hunger
Each	of	these	poses	challenges	in	conflict	
situations	that	have	yet	to	be	adequately	ad-
dressed,	and	which	require	rethinking	and	ad-
aptation	of	approach .	Some	of	the	best	think-
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ing	is	emerging	from	country	programmes,	
though	many	are	struggling	with	the	reality	
that	“country	ownership”	(a	principle	stressed	
in	the	strategic	plan)	may	be	a	mixed	blessing	
in	conflict	settings,	and	sometimes	an	unrealis-
tic	goal	in	the	short	to	medium	term .
While	some	good	innovation	can	be	found	
at	the	field	level,	the	parameters	and	scope	for	
action	are	to	a	large	extent	set	in	Rome,	New	
York	and	donor	capitals .	More	flexibility	of	ap-
proach	is	certainly	required:	the	old	business	
model	cannot	cope	with	these	challenges .	The	
aspirations	outlined	in	the	strategic	plan	can	
only	be	achieved	if	each	the	contexts	in	which	
WFP	operates	is	understood	in	its	own	terms,	
and	realistic	programming	objectives	are	set .	
Blueprints	are	unlikely	to	succeed .
The	challenges	above	will	continue	for	
the	foreseeable	future,	but	they	need	to	be	
seen	against	the	backdrop	of	the	likely	future	
trends	noted	in	this	survey .	These	have	impli-
cations	for	the	kinds	of	food	insecurity	—	and	
the	operating	environment	—	that	WFP	and	
others	will	face	in	coming	years .	Some	of	the	
specific	challenges	(current	and	future)	are	
considered	below .
WFP and Safety Nets
Given	the	scale	of	its	operations	and	the	
extent	of	its	reach	in	the	field	—	unique	among	
the	UN	agencies	—	WFP	finds	itself	required	to	
deal	with	a	wide	spectrum	of	acute	and	chron-
ic	food	insecurity .	In	the	absence	of	alternative	
mechanisms,	it	is	likely	to	retain	a	key	role	(per-
haps	the	key	role)	in	providing	safety	nets	in	
protracted	conflict	situations .	Planning	for	the	
alternative,	i .e .	government-provided	safety	
nets,	forms	the	rationale	behind	strategic	ob-
jective	5	above	and	is	necessary	and	appropri-
ate;	but	it	will	depend	on	the	political	realities	
of	each	setting .	Current	WFP	approaches	to	
safety	nets	(Food	For	Work,	vulnerable	group	
feeding),	may	be	difficult	to	sustain	in	conflict	
situations .	In	any	case,	more	innovative	think-
ing	is	required	if	WFP	is	to	continue	to	provide	
effective	safety	nets	in	conflict	settings .
Alternatives to Food Aid
The	WFP	strategic	plan	recognises	the	
importance	of	developing	alternative	ways	of	
providing	food	assistance	and	food	security	
support,	including	the	use	of	cash	and	vouch-
ers:	WFP will continuously assess and align its 
approaches to changes in the external operat-
ing and funding environments, and develop 
its range of tools in order to meet hunger and 
humanitarian needs in ways that are as sensi-
tive as possible to local conditions, for ex-
ample by using vouchers and cash when ap-
propriate, as an alternative or addition to food 
commodity responses .	(SP	2008-11	para	12) .
This	has	a	particular	significance	in	con-
flict	settings,	not	only	because	approaches	
other	than	food	aid	may	be	a	more	appropri-
ate	and	efficient	way	of	transferring	value;	
but	also	because	they	can	provide	both	safer	
ways	of	programming	and	a	way	of	maximis-
ing	the	impact	of	food	aid	(e .g .	reducing	the	
need	to	sell	food	aid	in	the	market) .	One	
example	of	this	with	direct	links	to	food	aid	is	
the	provision	of	vouchers	for	milling .
WFP	has	taken	important	and	innovative	
steps	in	this	area,	piloting	and	implementing	
cash-based	responses	primarily	in	response	
to	natural	disasters	but	also	to	conflict	and	
insecurity	(e .g .	Darfur,	Occupied	Palestinian	
Territories) .	Given	the	greater	flexibility	of	un-
conditional	cash	transfers	compared	to	food	
vouchers	(allowing	people	to	determine	their	
own	priorities),	this	is	preferable	in	principle;	
though	vouchers	may	be	more	appropriate	
for	security	reasons	in	many	conflict	set-
tings .	Unlike	NGOs	that	are	largely	confined	
to	mounting	smaller-scale	programmes	and	
pilots,	WFP	has	the	opportunity	to	promote	
large-scale	cash-based	responses .	As	other	
UN	agencies	like	UNICEF	and	UNHCR	are	us-
ing	cash	and	vouchers	for	basic	needs,	reset-
tlement/reintegration,	and	education,	WFP	
should	explore	options	for	collaborating	with	
them	in	the	field	on	joint	projects	that	use	
cash	transfers	to	achieve	the	various	objec-
tives	of	different	agencies .
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Assisting Recovery
The	strategic	plan	identifies	a	role	for	WFP	
in	both	assisting	recovery	at	the	household	level	
and	in	helping	bridge	the	gap	between	conflict	
and	peace	at	the	macro-political	and	economic	
level .	The	PRRO	model	—	which	now	applies	
to	the	majority	of	WFP’s	programming	—	is	
premised	on	the	idea	that	WFP	can	help	people	
recover .	But	the	challenges	to	this	in	many	con-
flict	settings	are	immense .	DRC	is	one	example	
among	many	where	the	“recovery”	part	of	the	
programme	is	particularly	problematic,	and	
where	the	objectives	set	out	in	the	PRRO	look	
unrealistic,	at	least	in	terms	of	timeframe .	They	
are	premised	on	both	prevailing	security	and	on	
growing	state-led	assistance	and	investment .	In	
short,	the	planning	assumptions	that	underlie	
PRROs	in	conflict	settings	need	to	be	reviewed .
WFP	maintains	involvement	in	early	recovery	
through	the	Cluster	process,	but	it	faces	its	own	
challenges	in	recovery	programming .	In	particu-
lar,	it	needs	to	consider	how	best	to	programme	
food	assistance	—	including	questions	of	target-
ing	—	in	areas	transitioning	from	conflict	to	peace	
in	a	way	that	provides	for	acute	needs	while	not	
undermining	people’s	own	recovery	mechanisms,	
the	process	of	state	ownership	and	the	chang-
ing	role	of	local	authorities .	There	is	a	specific	
challenge	in	supporting	reintegration	of	former	
displaced	populations	in	ways	that	take	proper	
account	of	the	needs	of	host	communities .
Working Effectively and Accountably in 
Conflict Settings
WFP	needs	to	better	understand	the	rel-
evance	of	local	institutions	(formal	and	non-for-
mal)	to	people’s	food	security .	These	institutions	
may	play	a	benign	or	a	damaging	role .	WFP	has	
to	find	ways	of	determining	the	most	appropri-
ate	way	of	distributing	food	or	other	items	in	
situations	of	conflict	which	ensures	both that	
most	vulnerable	are	reached	and	that	the	risk	of	
diversion,	manipulation	and	corruption	are	mini-
mised .	It	is	not	alone	in	facing	this	challenge,	
though	the	international	environment	has	per-
haps	become	more	risk	averse	in	this	respect .
Related	to	this	is	the	question	of	pro-
gramme	monitoring	and	programming	quality .	
This	is	an	area	where	WFP	is	felt	by	some	to	
lagging	somewhat	in	comparison	to	others,	
partly	a	function	of	the	scale	and	complexity	of	
its	operations .	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	flex-
ibility	and	needs	responsiveness	that	WFP	as-
pires	will	depend	in	part	on	its	ability	to	moni-
tor	more	than	tonnage	delivered .	Country-level	
staff	need	to	be	given	greater	incentives	to	ask	
questions	about	continued	programme	rel-
evance	and	quality,	and	to	take	remedial	steps	
where	necessary .
Policy Coherence and  
Civil-Military Relations
When	working	alongside	governments,	
donors	and	other	UN	agencies	that	are	pursu-
ing	wider	political	and	security	objectives,	WFP	
needs	to	understand	the	political	economy	of	
the	particular	context	in	order	to	determine	
whether	and	how	to	engage .	Collaboration	with	
the	military,	for	example,	has	to	take	into	ac-
count	local	sensitivities	around	legitimacy,	since	
it	can	negatively	affect	humanitarian	access	and	
WFP	staff	security	(see	below) .	This	relates	to	
wider	dissonances	between	different	agendas	
in	integrated	approaches .	Principles,	objectives,	
priorities	and	mandates	often	differ	between	
actors	and	careful	consideration	has	to	be	given	
to	compatibility .	This	is	particularly	important	
in	light	of	recent	events	in	Darfur	where	efforts	
to	seek	justice	for	human	rights	abuses	have	
hindered	the	ability	of	agencies	to	respond	to	
immediate	needs .
Engagement with the State
The	role	of	the	state	in	conflicts,	and	in-
creasingly	with	counter-insurgency	or	stabilisa-
tion	operations,	raises	serious	questions	for	
WFP	about	whether	and	how	to	engage	with	
the	government .	Operational	humanitarian	
agencies	tend	to	by-pass	the	state	mechanisms,	
concerned	about	their	neutrality;	but	given	
WFP’s	size	and	mandate,	strategic	engagement	
is	often	called	for .	It	is	well	positioned	to	sup-
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port	the	capacity	of	state	in	providing	services	
and	ensuring	food	security .	Advocacy	is	impor-
tant	in	this	regard	but	public	criticism	may	be	
counter-productive .	Understanding	the	nature	
of	governance	in	these	contexts	is	central	in	
defining	this	engagement .	There	is	often	scope	
to	work	productively	with	certain	elements	of	
the	state	even	when	there	are	other	elements	
that	present	blockages .
Protection and Livelihoods
WFP	have	been	increasingly	engaged	in	
developing	a	role	in	the	protection	of	civilians .	
These	efforts	could	be	furthered	by	integrat-
ing	livelihoods	and	protection	in	conflict	en-
vironments .	Complementary	livelihoods	and	
protection	work	means	that	they	not	only	ad-
dress	people’s	economic	vulnerability	but	also	
engage	questions	of	political	vulnerability .	It	
would	allow	WFP	to	operate	at	multiple	levels:	
addressing	violations	that	affect	the	protection	
and	livelihoods	of	the	population	as	a	whole;	
specific	measures	that	impact	on	communi-
ties	or	individual’s	livelihoods	and	protection;	
as	well	as	responding	to	the	consequences	of	
the	violations	through	direct	assistance .	It	also	
expands	the	nature	of	the	approach	from	pure	
response	to	potential	prevention .
Operational Security
WFP	is	considered	a	leader	in	the	humani-
tarian	security	domain .	As	the	largest	of	the	UN	
agencies,	it	manages	and	supports	complex	
food	assistance	operations	in	highly	insecure	
environments .	As	a	result,	security	issues	have	
been	at	the	forefront	of	WFP’s	operational	ap-
proach .	Its	requirements	are	significant	and	can’t	
be	met	by	UNDSS	alone .	WFP	has	53	profes-
sional	security	staff	in	the	field	in	14	countries	(by	
comparison,	UNDSS	has	250	people	in	the	field	
for	the	whole	UN	family) .	Due	to	frustrating	time	
lags,	WFP	has	also	pushed	ahead	with	initiatives	
that	were	originally	designed	to	be	coordinated,	
UN-wide	exercises .	But	this	has	implications .	Ad-
equate	security	provision	for	humanitarian	op-
erations	requires	a	commonality	of	purpose	and	
coordinated	action	across	the	humanitarian	
community .	As	a	lead	agency	in	the	field,	and	
one	whose	operations	are	highly	dependent	
on	the	effectiveness	of	its	partners	and	con-
tractors,	WFP	should	advocate	for	increased	
incident	reporting,	tracking	and	sharing,	and	
for	the	establishment	of	additional	field-level	
security	services	in	all	insecure	contexts .
WFP’s	attempts	to	be	perceived	as	a	
neutral	and	independent	humanitarian	actor	
are	challenged	on	a	number	of	fronts .	First,	
WFP’s	main	enterprise	and	operational	mod-
el	—	that	of	supplying	food	aid	which	often	
has	to	be	transported	significant	distances	
means	it	is	a	highly	visible	and	easily	targeted	
entity .	As	a	result	it	more	heavily	relies	on	
escort	—	often	military	and	armed	—	to	fa-
cilitate	the	movement	of	convoy	operations .	
While	this	can	facilitate	secure	access	to	
populations,	it	may	undermine	any	percep-
tion	of	neutrality	and	independence	of	WFP	
and	its	partners	and	reduce	their	acceptance	
on	the	part	of	all	parties	to	the	conflict	and	
among	local	populations .	Secondly,	WFP,	like	
many	UN	agencies	and	NGOs,	attempts	to	
uphold	a	dual	humanitarian	and	development	
mandate,	which	results	in	it	being	perceived	
as	a	highly	visible	political	actor	as	well .	This	
perception	is	heightened	in	the	UN’s	drive	
for	coherence,	where	Integrated	Missions	
and	One	UN	approaches	makes	it	hard	to	
differentiate	between	WFP’s	mandate	and	
principles .	For	WFP,	maintaining	an	active	
acceptance	strategy	in	these	contexts	—	and	
supporting	its	partners”	efforts	in	this	regard	
—	should	be	a	priority .
This	needs	to	be	distinguished	from	a	
more	worrying	trend .	Attacks	against	aid	
workers	in	some	of	the	most	highly	insecure	
contexts	are	on	the	increase,	and	increasingly	
politically	motivated .	Attempting	to	be	neutral	
and	independent	will	not	necessarily	provide	
protection	to	WFP,	or	its	partners	and	contrac-
tors .	It	is	vital	WFP	seeks	security	solutions	for	
operating	in	these	most	dangerous	contexts,	
particularly	for	those	it	contracts	to	undertake	
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the	riskiest	work .	This	must	involve	active	steps	
to	protect	staff	and	programmes,	not	simply	
efforts	to	secure	acceptance .
Responding to Future Challenges
The	classification	of	conflict	into	neat	cat-
egories	such	as	“old”	and	“new,”	civil	or	inter-
national,	“greed”	or	“grievance”	driven,	denies	
the	complexity,	multifaceted	and	evolving	na-
ture	of	war	and	violence .	Most	conflicts	such	as	
those	in	DRC,	Colombia,	Somalia,	Afghanistan	
and	Sudan	are	protracted	in	nature	and	are	sub-
ject	to	significant	changes	in	intensity	over	time .	
The	intersection	of	different	agendas	—	wheth-
er	economic	opportunism,	climate	or	resource-
based	tensions	or	youth	disaffection	—	with	
violence	is	not	homogenous	and	results	in	dif-
ferent	effects	for	different	contexts	and	groups .	
The	potential	to	exacerbate	violence	through	
ill-informed,	poorly	targeted	or	inappropriate	
responses	in	such	environments	is	high .	This	
suggests	the	need	for	WFP	to	underpin	its	re-
sponses	with	strong,	timely	contextual	analysis	
where	the	different	motivations	for	violence	are	
examined;	the	distribution	of	power	and	wealth	
between	different	groups	is	explored;	and	the	
implications	for	people’s	livelihoods	and	food	
security	understood .
Youth Radicalisation
Youth	are	of	particular	concern	in	driving	
violence	associated	with	radicalisation	due	to	
their	relative	receptivity	to	ideological	narra-
tives	and	as	such,	any	conflict	assessment	must	
ensure	a	strong	focus	on	this	group .	WFP	may	
be	in	a	position	to	respond	in	contexts	dem-
onstrating	strong	linkages	between	extremism	
and	vulnerability,	but	in	others,	this	will	be	be-
yond	the	organisation’s	remit .	In	many	such	en-
vironments,	anti-terrorist	legislation	may	hinder	
WFP’s	ability	to	form	partnerships	and	access	
particular	groups .	However,	WFP	should	remain	
alert	to	the	security	implications	of	international	
organisations	becoming	associated	with	anti-
Western	sentiments	in	particular	contexts	and	
be	particularly	attuned	to	the	potential	of	being	
perceived	as	an	agent	of	conflict	through	the	
provision	of	assistance	to	certain	social,	ethnic	
or	religious	groups .
Responding to Chronic Vulnerability
The	growing	significance	of	resource-based	
conflicts	in	the	context	of	increased	climate	
change,	population	growth	and	food	short-
ages	underscores	the	necessity	of	livelihoods	
interventions	in	many	of	these	conflict	contexts .	
Whilst	there	is	increased	recognition	amongst	
humanitarians	of	the	significance	of	livelihood	
support	in	conflict,	biases	in	the	system	—	po-
litical,	financial,	institutional	—	tend	to	result	in	
a	preponderance	of	short-term	relief	interven-
tions .	Experience	with	pastoralist	communities	
highlights	the	risks	associated	with	short-term	
interventions	in	contexts	of	longer-term	vulner-
ability,	where	over-dependence	on	ex-post	
food	assistance	in	particular	has	been	detrimen-
tal	to	pastoralist	livelihoods .	Whilst	food	aid	will	
remain	an	important	means	of	meeting	emer-
gency	food	requirements,	WFP	interventions	in	
the	context	of	protracted	vulnerability	associ-
ated	with	climate	and	resource-based	conflicts	
should	form	part	of	coordinated	interventions	
aimed	at	meeting	basic	needs,	protecting	
livelihoods	assets	and	supporting	livelihoods	
strategies .	Guarding	against	centralised,	camp-
based	distributions	in	such	crises	is	important	
to	help	support	the	continuation	of	livelihoods	
strategies	and	the	maintenance	of	assets .	WFP	
has	significant	experience	to	draw	from	in	this	
regard;	for	example	from	Darfur,	which	dem-
onstrates	how	food	assistance	in	rural	contexts	
can	help	farmers	to	retain	access	to	land .
Urban Crises
Humanitarian	actors	have	been	slow	to	
recognise	the	trend	towards	urbanisation .	
While	the	recent	food	crisis	and	other	global	
processes	demonstrate	the	potential	for	urban	
vulnerability	to	serve	as	a	trigger	for	future	
conflicts	(food	riots	etc .),	the	predominance	
of	the	elite	rather	than	the	impoverished	in	
youth	radicalisation	highlights	how	urban	con-
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flicts	cannot	be	pinned	to	poverty	alone .	But	
humanitarian	agencies	are	faced	with	a	range	
of	institutional	and	operational	difficulties	in	
responding	to	the	needs	of	urban	communi-
ties;	not	least	the	identification	and	targeting	
of	(often	hidden)	vulnerable	groups,	and	de-
vising	interventions	appropriate	to	urban	en-
vironments .	Methodologies,	approaches	and	
tools	to	address	associated	risks	for	vulnerable	
groups	are	still	in	their	infancy,	although	IDMC	
and	Tufts	have	made	headway	in	developing	
profiling	tools	and	HPG	is	undertaking	new	
research	exploring	the	different	humanitar-
ian	interventions	in	urban	settings .	Cash-	and	
voucher-based	interventions	are	particularly	
relevant	in	urban	contexts	and	as	a	result,	
there	is	an	opportunity	for	WFP	to	play	a	signif-
icant	role	in	both	the	refinement	of	approaches	
and	the	development	of	tools .
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Introduction
A major humanitarian disaster has been unfolding in Sri Lanka. The message in 
official pronouncements and most of the national press is that this is a disaster that 
the government has been trying to ameliorate. Defence Minister Gotabaya Raja-
pakse described the situation as “the world’s biggest hostage rescue operation.”11 
Sri Lankan officials have described the government’s military push as a “humanitar-
ian” operation. Simultaneously, it has been presented as part of a war on terrorism. 
With the military defeat of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], according to 
the Sri Lankan government, “The President’s dream of creating an environment in 
which all citizens can live in harmony and liberty is now being realised.”12
11 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily News, 21 April 2009.
12 ITN News, UK, April 26 2009.
Significantly,	the	Sri	Lankan	govern-
ment’s	discourse	has	found	significant	ech-
oes	within	the	international	community	and	
within	the	UN	system .	Most	strikingly,	the	
UN	Human	Rights	Council	rejected	a	draft	
statement	that	was	critical	of	the	Sri	Lankan	
government	and	on	27	May	2009	put	out	an	
alternative	statement	that	was	very	uncritical,	
with	one	clause	“Welcoming	the	conclusion	
of	hostilities	and	the	liberation	by	the	Gov-
ernment	of	Sri	Lanka	of	tens	of	thousands	of	
its	citizens	that	were	kept	by	the	LTTE	against	
their	will	as	hostages,	as	well	as	the	efforts	by	
the	Government	to	ensure	safety	and	securi-
ty	for	all	Sri	Lankans	and	bringing	permanent	
peace	to	the	country .”13	
Helping	to	give	some	degree	of	plausi-
bility	to	official	accounts	of	the	recent	“hu-
manitarian	rescue	operation”	have	been	the	
13  UN Human Rights Council, adopted text, 
Eleventh special session, 27 May 2009, p. 2.
extremes	to	which	the	rebel	LTTE	Tigers	have	
been	prepared	to	go	in	their	violence	against	
civilians,	including	the	coercion	of	support-
ers .	Having	enjoyed	some	degree	of	civilian	
support	in	espousing	a	separate	state	for	the	
Tamils,	the	rebel	Tigers	became	increasingly	
unpopular	with	much	of	the	Tamil	population .	
In	line	with	patterns	observable	elsewhere,14	
this	seems	only	to	have	reinforced	the	abuses	
of	the	Tigers	against	the	civilian	population:	
the	support	that	they	could	not	garner	vol-
untarily	was	increasingly	secured	through	the	
use	of	force	(including	forcible	taxation)	and	
this	in	turn	seems	to	have	helped	to	gener-
ate	a	“vicious	circle”	in	which	the	increasing	
antipathy	felt	by	civilians	generated	greater	
levels	of	coercion .	
Although	a	great	many	Tamils	are	disil-
lusioned	with	the	Tigers,	a	countervailing	
tendency	is	also	important	to	note .	This	is	the	
tendency	for	government	abuses	to	reinforce 
support	for	the	Tigers	—	not	least	within	the	
Tamil	diaspora .	
14 See, for example, David Keen, 2005, Conflict and 
Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey.
10 The views expre sed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP.
11 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily 
News, 21 April 2009.
12 ITN News, UK, April 26 2009.
13 Ranil Wijayapala, “New 24 hour ultimatum to LTTE,” Daily 
News, 21 April 2009.
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Even	from	the	outset,	the	LTTE’s	use	of	
force	included	violence	against	rival	Tamil	or-
ganisations .	It	was	extended	to	forcible	recruit-
ment,	including	the	recruitment	of	children .15	
Human	Rights	Watch	noted	in	December	2008	
that	the	LTTE	had	dramatically	increased	its	
forced	recruitment	practices .16	In	addition	to	
abuses	against	the	Tamil	population	they	claim	
to	represent,	the	LTTE	Tigers	have	—	as	is	well	
known	—	have	carried	out	numerous	acts	of	ter-
rorism	against	the	Sri	Lankan	population	more	
generally,	including	government	officials	and	
ordinary	members	of	the	public .	A	December	
2008	Human	Rights	Watch	report	noted:	
… the LTTE has brutally and systemati-
cally abused the Tamil population on 
whose behalf they claim to fight… the 
LTTE bears a heavy responsibility for 
the desperate plight of the civilians in 
the Vanni17… The LTTE has frequently 
targeted civilians with bombs and 
remote-controlled landmines, killed 
perceived political opponents includ-
ing many Tamil politicians, journalists, 
and members of rival organizations, 
and has forcibly recruited Tamils into its 
forces, many of them children.18 
During	the	recent	government	military	
push	from	September	2008,	the	LTTE	has	used	
civilians	as	a	human	shield	—	forcing	large	num-
bers	who	were	under	its	control	to	move	east-
wards	to	a	narrow	strip	of	land	in	the	north-east .	
This	action	seems	to	have	been	undertaken	in	
the	hope	that	the	presence	of	civilians	would	
prevent	a	government	assault	from	destroying	
15 I use the word children here to mean those under 18.
16 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: 
LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” December, p. 3). 
Internally displaced people reported LTTE recruiting children 
as young as 12, and sometimes four or five from the same 
family (BBC, 6 April 2009, in IDMC [International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict 
facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009. p. 10).
17 This is sometimes written as “Wanni.”
18 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Trapped and Mistreated: 
LTTE Abuses against Civilians in the Vanni,” December, pp. 
2-3.
the	Tiger	forces	in	the	north,	a	hope	that	has	
turned	out	to	be	misplaced .	
Not	every	element	of	the	humanitarian	
disaster	can	be	pinned	on	the	Tigers,	how-
ever,	and	it	is	important	to	consider	a	radically	
different	interpretation	of	the	unfolding	hu-
manitarian	disaster	from	the	one	presented	by	
the	Sri	Lankan	government .	According	to	this	
alternative	view,	the	disaster	has	been	actively	
produced	by	the	combined	agendas	of	the	
most	powerful	actors .	It	is	worth	recalling	that	
for	many	years	responses	to	conflict-generated	
emergencies	around	the	world	were	inhibited	
by	a	model	of	disaster	and	disaster-response	
that	was	based	largely	on	natural disasters .19	
This	model	tended	to	produce	a	pattern	of	re-
sponse	(and	an	accompanying	discourse)	that	
was	essentially	technical	in	its	orientation:	it	
was	based	primarily	on	counting	the	numbers	
of	displaced	in	various	locations	and	shipping	
out	a	corresponding	quantity	of	food	(and	
sometimes	other	relief	supplies)	without	asking	
too	many	questions	about	official	obstruction	
of	relief	or	about	the	processes	by	which	the	
target	population	had	become	displaced	or	
had	arrived	at	a	condition	of	extreme	depriva-
tion .	This	model	was	subjected	to	increasing	
criticism,	not	least	because	of	an	awareness	of	
the	devastating	famine	among	internally	dis-
placed	people	in	Sudan	in	the	late-1980s	(and	
periodically	through	the	1990s)	and	because	of	
the	critiques	of	international	efforts	to	channel	
relief	to	Rwandans	in	Zaire/Democratic	Repub-
lic	of	Congo	and	Tanzania	in	circumstances	
where	the	initial	humanitarian	disaster	(the	
1994	genocide)	had	been	largely	ignored .20	It	is	
worth	stressing	that	an	apolitical	and	technical	
discourse	around	humanitarian	disasters	often	
19 For example, Mark Duffield, 1994. “The Political 
Economy of Internal War,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony 
Zwi, (eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies. London: Zed Books 
and Save the Children, UK; David Keen, 2008, The Benefits 
of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in 
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first 
published, 1994, Princeton University Press).
20 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 
1996, Copenhagen: Danida.
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exists	—	and	flourishes	—	in	circumstances	
where	disaster	is	politically-generated	and	
where	both	national	and	international	actors	
have	strong	political	or	geopolitical	agendas .	
For	national	governments,	a	technical	dis-
course	may	have	the	advantage	of	obscuring	
their	own	role	in	generating	a	disaster .	This	
may	also	suit	powerful	international	actors .	For	
example,	in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	inter-
national	quietude	over	government	abuses	in	
Sudan	in	the	1980s	was	closely	related	to	a	de-
sire	not	to	embarrass	a	“friend	of	the	West”	(as	
well	as	a	bureaucratic	interest	in	insisting	that	
aid	money	had	been	well	spent) .21	
Even	in	contexts	where	conflict	has	clearly	
been	driving	a	humanitarian	emergency,	there	
has	been	a	tendency	to	blame	every	ill	on	
some	vilified	rebel	group	—	for	example,	the	
Revolutionary	United	Front	in	Sierra	Leone,	
the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	in	Uganda,	the	
Hutu	extremists	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo	[DRC]	—	without	giving	adequate	at-
tention	to	the	role	of	society	as	a	whole	(and,	
in	particular,	government	actors)	in	helping	
to	generate	or	at	least	to	sustain	a	particular	
conflict .22	Naturally,	the	actual	abuses	of	these	
vilified	rebel	groups	(whether	these	are	am-
putations	in	the	case	of	Sierra	Leone,	recruit-
ment	of	children	in	the	cases	of	Sierra	Leone	
and	Uganda,	or	prior	involvement	in	genocide	
in	the	case	of	Rwanda/DRC)	will	tend	to	give	
a	degree	of	plausibility	to	these	discourses .	
Even	when	looking	at	the	causes	of	natural	
disasters,	it	is	unwise	to	concentrate	exclu-
sively	on	an	“external	factor”	(for	example,	a	
drought,	a	flood,	an	earthquake	or	a	tsunami)	
without	giving	adequate	attention	to	the	
internal	—	or	one	might	say	social	—	factors	
(markets,	political	inequalities,	the	location	
and	structure	of	residences	and	so	on)	that	
21 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political 
Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-
89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton 
University Press). 
22 David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra 
Leone, Oxford: James Currey; David Keen, 2008, Complex 
Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.
mediate	the	external	shock	and	determine	
the	human	impact	of	the	disaster .	In	conflict-
related	emergencies,	this	danger	is	redoubled	
since	political	factors	tend	to	determine	not	
just	how	a	shock	is	mediated	but	the	nature	of	
the	shock	itself .	In	these	circumstances,	blam-
ing	a	vilified	rebel	group	can	easily	distract	
attention	from	ways	in	which	the	wider	society	
and	elements	of	the	government	itself	may	be	
helping	to	generate	or	sustain	an	emergency .	
Indeed,	this	quality	of	distracting	attention	
has	often	been	part	of	the	function	of	such	a	
pattern	of	blame .23	
Despite	many	years	of	criticism	of	the	
“natural	disaster	model,”	it	is	striking	that	in	
Sri	Lanka	the	old	“natural	disaster”	model	of	
emergency	response	has	retained	a	great	deal	
of	influence .	In	particular,	the	response	(and	ac-
companying	discourse)	has	been	largely	techni-
cal	in	orientation,	and	based	mainly	on	count-
ing	(or	estimating)	the	numbers	of	displaced	in	
various	locations	and	shipping	food	to	them .	
As	in	many	earlier	crises,	there	has	been	a	
lack	of	interest	—	at	least	at	the	level	of	public	
discourse	—	in	the	processes	by	which	people	
have	become	displaced	or	otherwise	deprived,	
whilst	publicly	available	descriptions	of	the	offi-
cial	obstruction	of	relief	have	been	very	scarce .	
Contributing	to	these	omissions	—	as	in	earlier	
crises	—	has	been	the	humanitarian	commu-
nity’s	tendency	to	adopt	relatively	short-term	
time-horizons .	As	one	senior	aid	worker	in	Sri	
Lanka	put	it,	“The	decisions	of	humanitarians	
are	reactive	—	‘There	are	40,000	people	here,	
what	to	do?’”	As	in	many	earlier	crises,	a	rather	
apolitical	discourse	has	flourished	within	a	na-
tional	and	international	context	that	has	been	
intensely	political	—	notably,	a	civil	war	that	has	
been	framed	as	part	of	a	wider	international	
“war	on	terror .”
23 I discuss these dynamics at greater length in: David Keen, 
2005, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine 
and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James 
Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton University Press); 
David Keen, 2005, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 
Oxford: James Currey; David Keen, 2006, Endless War: 
Hidden Functions of the “War on Terror”; and David Keen, 
2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity.
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Experience	in	a	range	of	countries	strongly	
suggests	that	the	most	needy	groups	will	tend	
to	be	unable	to	stake	a	claim	to	relief	within	the	
administrative	structures	of	their	own	country	
for	precisely	the	same	reasons	that	they	were	
exposed	to	deprivation	in	the	first	place	—	
because	they	lack	political	clout	within	those	
institutions .	If	this	applies	even	in	natural	dis-
asters,	it	is	likely	to	be	even	more	applicable	
in	wartime:	those	who	cannot	stake	a	claim	to	
physical	security	may	also	be	unable	to	stake	a	
claim	to	relief .	It	is	striking	that	in	Sri	Lanka	the	
government	has	made	at	least	some	effort	to	
direct	food	aid	at	areas	where	the	rebels	are	
strong .	Quite	how	far	Sri	Lanka	deviates	from	
the	norm	in	a	great	many	other	conflicts	will	be	
explored	in	what	follows .	
This	report	tries	to	take	a	very	broad	look	
at	the	provision	and	manipulation	of	interna-
tional	assistance	in	Sri	Lanka,	asking	what	have	
been	the	opportunities	—	taken	and	not	taken	
—	for	improving	the	delivery	of	relief	and	the	
protection	environment	more	generally	within	
this	context .	It	focuses	primarily	on	2009	but	
also	includes	significant	information	on	human-
itarian	access	in	preceding	years .
The	interviews	in	Sri	Lanka	included	discus-
sions	with	aid	workers	and	government	officials	
in	Vavuniya	(on	the	periphery	of	the	conflict	
zone) .	They	included	interviews	with	military	
and	civilian	officials	and	with	international	and	
national	aid	agency	staff .	Unfortunately,	while	
we	would	have	liked	to	have	much	more	exten-
sive	contact	with	the	designated	“beneficiar-
ies”	of	humanitarian	interventions,	interviewing	
displaced	people	inside	the	camps	in	Vavuniya	
was	virtually	impossible .	The	Sri	Lankan	military	
do	not	just	surround	the	camps	but	they	also	
have	a	heavy	presence	inside	them .	Even	at	a	
major	aid	coordination	meeting	in	Vavuinya,	it	
was	striking	how	many	uniformed	and	armed	
soldiers	were	lining	the	sides	of	the	room .	It	is	
notable,	too,	that	Vavuniya	is	the	headquarters	
of	the	government	security	forces	for	the	Vanni	
region .	We	were	told	that	paramilitary	groups	
(many	of	them	anti-LTTE)	also	have	a	significant	
presence	in	the	camps	and	in	Vavuniya	town	
more	generally .	
Aid	workers	emphasised	strongly	that	
interview	material	should	not	be	attributed	
to	them	or	their	organisations,	and	national	
staff	were	particularly	fearful	of	official	or	
paramilitary	retaliation	if	they	were	perceived	
as	leaking	“dangerous	talk”	to	international	
researchers .24	Certainly,	Sri	Lanka	is	a	danger-
ous	place	for	aid	workers .	The	worst	incident	
was	the	killing	of	17	local	staff	of	the	French	
NGO	Action	Contre	La	Faim	in	Muttur	in	Au-
gust	2006 .	Based	on	number	of	attacks	on	
aid	workers	in	2006-8,	Sri	Lanka	ranked	fourth	
worst	in	the	world .25	Aid	staff	(and	researchers/
consultants	like	myself)	also	face	severe	travel	
restrictions,	and	the	great	majority	of	aid	work-
ers	have	to	operate	on	the	edge	of	the	conflict	
zone .	Even	for	representatives	of	major	gov-
ernment	and	bilateral	donors,	getting	access	
to	Vavuniya	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	(let	
alone	access	to	those	areas	undergoing	active	
hostilities) .	As	is	well	known,	there	are	also	very	
far-reaching	government	restrictions	on	jour-
nalism	in	the	country	as	a	whole	and	the	north	
in	particular;	clearly,	this	limits	the	quality	of	
accounts	in	the	press .	
Some Significant WFP Successes
Many	of	those	we	interviewed	gave	WFP	
a	great	deal	of	credit	for	getting	large	quanti-
ties	of	food	to	the	Vanni	in	extremely	difficult	
circumstances,	particularly	when	the	war	in-
tensified	from	September	2008 .	As	one	NGO	
worker	put	it:	
WFP was the only organisation still 
useful for the people of the Vanni in 
24 Some interviewees said the camps had numerous 
paramilitaries. The International Crisis Group noted that 
killings and disappearances in Eastern Province have 
apparently been committed by government security 
forces and/or their allies in the anti-LTTE Tamil Makkal 
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) (International Crisis Group, 2009, 
“Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons 
from the Eastern Province,” April 16).
25 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, 
2009, “Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 
update,” HPG Policy Brief 34, ODI, London, April.
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November-December-January [2008-
9]. It was the only UN organisation still 
doing something in the Vanni… WFP 
was sending food on convoys and now 
[that is, April 2009] they’re sending 
food to the no fire zone. They’ve been 
heroic in terrible circumstances.
Along	similar	lines,	a	Sri	Lankan	aid	worker	
noted:	“WFP	dispatched	food	to	the	Vanni .	
When	we	compare	with	other	agencies,	WFP	
did	a	good	thing .	IDPs	[internally	displaced	
persons]	told	me	they	really	depend	on	WFP	
food,	especially	during	the	“high	time”	from	
September	2008 .”	In	a	context	where	advocacy	
and	protection	work	could	easily	provoke	some	
kind	of	backlash,	delivering	food	represented	a	
concrete	and	knowable	benefit .	An	aid	worker	
who	travelled	with	several	of	the	WFP	food	con-
voys	from	October	2008	said	simply:	“When	you	
see	the	people	[receiving	food],	you	are	really	
happy .”	Even	before	this	period,	WFP	was	a	key	
provider	of	food	for	the	north .	When	the	benefi-
ciaries	of	various	schemes	(general	food	ration	
for	IDPs,	school	feeding,	supplementary	feed-
ing,	food	for	work,	food	for	training)	were	asked	
in	2006	about	who	was	providing	the	food,	their	
answers	suggested	that	60	per	cent	came	from	
WFP,	18	per	cent	from	the	government,	and	8	
per	cent	from	NGOs .26	
A	local	NGO	worker	stressed	that	WFP	had	
had	considerable	success	in	ensuring	an	unbro-
ken	food	pipeline,	notably	to	the	Vavuniya	area,	
and	that	the	pipeline	for	the	displaced	seemed	
to	be	in	good	shape	for	the	immediate	future .	
He	added,	“Of	all	the	agencies,	WFP	seems	to	
be	able	to	be	better	prepared	on	the	ground .”	
Another	local	NGO	worker	said,	“When	the	
situation	was	very	urgent,	WFP	contacted	us	to	
feed	those	IDPs	and	worked	with	them	[WFP] .	
The	security	forces	appreciated	it .	We	had	a	
strong	partnership	with	WFP .”	A	third	local	
NGO	worker	said,	“WFP	has	done	a	commend-
able	job	to	respond	to	such	a	large	displace-
26 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment,” 
Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 24.
ment .	It	managed	in	the	most	difficult	
period .”27
Many	interviewees	stressed	that	WFP	had	
had	to	overcome	a	great	deal	of	obstruction	
from	government	authorities,	most	notably	the	
military .	One	WFP	worker	with	extensive	expe-
rience	of	aid	delivery	said:	“The	government	
doesn’t	want	any	help	[in	the	Vanni],	even	food,	
because	they	want	people	out .”	He	said	that	
in	these	circumstances	the	WFP	country	office	
had	had	to	make	a	huge	effort	to	get	the	food	
into	the	north,	and	had	done	really	well .	Along	
similar	lines,	a	WFP	worker	with	several	years	
of	experience	tracking	deliveries	to	the	north	
commented,	“WFP	had	a	very	good	working	
relationship	with	the	government	and	we	man-
aged	to	coax	them	to	deliver	some	food .	But	
it	was	always	a	struggle,	especially	for	the	IDPs	
[internally	displaced	persons] .”	
WFP	was	seen	has	having	reacted	flexibly	
and	with	ingenuity	in	its	logistical	operations .	
Several	examples	are	notable .	
First,	the	practice	of	purchasing	food	lo-
cally	was	a	useful	tactic	in	the	face	of	security	
concerns	and	official	obstructions .	As	one	local	
aid	worker	noted:	“There	were	many	obstruc-
tions	from	the	SLA	[Sri	Lankan	army]	side .	We	
bought	high	quality	rice	locally .	So	that	helped	
us	a	lot .	There	was	a	surplus	and	they	cannot	
sell	to	this	side	[that	is,	south	of	the	Vanni]	
because	of	transport	and	other	things .”	Some	
support	for	livelihoods	in	agricultural	com-
munities	also	resulted	from	this	policy	of	local	
purchase .28	Clearly,	the	problem	of	rising	food	
prices	indicates	a	need	to	guard	against	fuel-
ling	such	price	rises	with	local	purchase	and	
the	need	for	substantial	inputs	of	food	into	the	
north	in	particular .	It	would	also	be	a	mistake	
27 One local NGO worker said other agencies circulate a 
hard copy of previous minutes before the meeting, adding 
that WFP only circulated these at the meeting itself. The 
result, he said, was that senior management of other aid 
agencies do not get a chance to prepare any follow-up to the 
previous meeting.
28 Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, 
agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 9. There were some delays 
in delivery of locally purchased rice (WFP, “Standard Project 
Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 10067.1,” n.p.).
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to	suppose	that	local	purchase	made	up	for	the	
shortages	in	deliveries	from	outside	the	region .
A	second	example	of	flexible	operations	
was	the	practice	of	sealing	trucks	under	military	
supervision .	Although	this	infringed	the	prin-
ciple	of	not	allowing	military	personnel	in	WFP	
compounds,	sealing	trucks	helped	to	make	
relief	convoys	more	acceptable	to	the	govern-
ment	by	reducing	the	perceived	risk	of	sup-
plies	reaching	the	LTTE	via	the	convoys .	One	
logistics	worker	said	of	the	sealing	practice:	
“We	agreed	the	military	could	check	the	trucks,	
doing	sealed	loadings .	It	breached	the	princi-
ple	of	not	having	arms	in	the	compound,	but	it	
does	work .”
Third,	the	use	of	the	logistics	hub	at	Va-
vuniya,	with	significant	storage	in	place	there,	
helped	to	give	WFP	at	least	some	degree	of	
operational	autonomy .	In	addition,	fourteen	
mobile	storage	units	were	deployed	to	areas	
close	to	conflict-affected	populations	in	the	
Vanni .	WFP	also	had	30	of	its	own	trucks .29	As-
sessing	operations	in	2008,	one	WFP	report	
noted	that	“Special	Operations	trucks	and	
buffer	stocks	in	the	humanitarian	hub	close	to	
conflict-affected	areas	negated	delays	[in	deliv-
ery	to	the	Vanni]	by	the	end	of	the	year .”30	WFP	
staff	on	the	ground	emphasised	these	advan-
tages,	but	stressed	the	importance	of	adding	
to	the	amounts	held	in	storage:	“In	September	
last	year,	we	had	up	to	two-and-a-half	months	
buffer	stock .	At	present,	I	can	give	full	ration	for	
9 .51	days	for	100,000	people…	We	should	say	
we	need	this	food	in	stock .”
A	fourth	example	of	flexibility	was	WFP’s	
role	in	organising	large-scale	transportation	
of	food	by	sea	(under	an	ICRC	flag)	after	road	
convoys	became	impossible	in	January	2009 .	
However,	it	is	notable	that	there	were	severe	
shortfalls	in	the	delivery	of	food	to	those	dis-
placed	in	Mullaitivu,	particularly	in	February	and	
March	2009 .
29 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
30 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 
10067.1,” n.p.
WFP	seems	to	have	been	successful	in	
cultivating	a	good	image	with	the	Sri	Lankan	
government .	During	the	research,	mention	
of	WFP	drew	a	favourable	response	from	civil	
and	military	officials	alike .	Within	WFP’s	coun-
try	office,	there	was	a	sensitivity	to	the	fact	
that	the	Sri	Lankan	government	is	a	highly	so-
phisticated	and	capable	entity	administering	
a	middle-income	country	with	a	development	
record	that	is	in	many	respects	a	strong	one .	
As	one	senior	staff	member	put	it:	“Coming	in	
with	a	condescending	attitude	is	not	right,	or	
talking	about	capacity	building .”	A	local	NGO	
worker	said .	“WFP	has	been	good	in	accept-
ing	other	points	of	view,	very	participatory,	
more	so	than	other	UN	agencies .	Some	of	
these	are	very	bureaucratic .	They	stick	to	their	
mandate	and	use	it	as	an	excuse	rather	than	
having	real	participation,	and	many	want	only	
to	work	with	their	traditional	partners	while	
WFP	are	flexible	and	look	at	who	will	deliver	
the	goods .”	WFP’s	sensitivity	can	only	have	
been	a	major	asset	when	it	came	to	the	very	
difficult	task	of	negotiating	access	for	food	
convoys	in	the	Vanni .	There	also	seems	to	have	
been	a	good	level	of	tactical	awareness	within	
WFP	when	it	came	to	getting	food	delivered	
—	evidenced,	for	example,	by	the	emphasis	
that	staff	placed	on	the	need	to	discern	which	
parts	of	the	government	were	most	receptive	
to	WFP	goals	and	to	work	in	close	cooperation	
with	these	actors .	
The	close	relationship	with	the	government	
has	had	a	more	worrying	side,	however .	A	high	
degree	of	official	favour	and	goodwill	may	have	
been	fostered	by	an	emphasis	on	avoiding	pub-
lic	criticisms,	notably	of	the	government,	and	
by	a	pattern	of	relief	provision	that	was	largely	
consistent	with	—	and	even	actively	helpful	
for	—	the	government’s	political	and	military	
objectives .	Many	of	those	we	interviewed	ex-
pressed	concerns	along	these	lines .	A	fuller	
assessment	of	the	impact	of	WFP	—	and	of	aid	
agencies	more	generally	—	is	best	approached	
via	an	analytical	narrative	of	the	unfolding	
emergency,	and	this	is	attempted	below .
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Analytical Narrative
Government Manipulation of Relief and 
the Risk of Complicity
Manipulation	of	relief	by	the	LTTE	has	been	
significant,	and	international	assistance	undoubt-
edly	helped	in	consolidating	LTTE	administrative	
capacity	in	the	north .	The	focus	here,	however,	is	
primarily	on	government	manipulation	—	a	phe-
nomenon	emphasised	by	most	of	those	we	inter-
viewed .	If	relief	operations	in	the	north	of	Sri	Lan-
ka	have	been	largely	subordinated	to	the	gov-
ernment’s	military	and	political	agendas,	many	of	
the	mechanisms	involved	are	quite	familiar	from	
past	emergencies .	Such	manipulation,	whilst	
extremely	regrettable,	should	not	be	surprising .	
During	civil	wars	elsewhere,	it	has	been	much	
more	the	rule	than	the	exception .	Nor	is	this	
kind	of	manipulation	anything	very	new	in	the	Sri	
Lankan	context .	For	example,	in	the	late	1990s	
the	Norwegian	Refugee	Council	was	reporting	
claims	that	the	government	had	deliberately	
provided	food	at	below	the	level	of	need	of	IDPs,	
and	had	deliberately	delayed	assistance .31	It	can	
be	argued	that	the	long	years	of	war	in	Sri	Lanka,	
combined	with	long	experience	of	humanitarian	
operations,	have	made	both	sides	in	the	war	very	
good	at	manipulating	relief .32
A	key	strategy	in	Sri	Lanka	—	also	familiar	
from	Ethiopia	and	Sudan,	for	example	—	has	
been	using	relief	to	weaken	populations	linked	
to	the	rebels	and	ultimately	to	promote	the	de-
population	of	areas	of	rebel	strength .	Many	aid	
workers	pointed	to	a	set	of	policies	and	prac-
tices	on	the	part	of	government	actors	that	have	
had	the	predictable	effect	of	debilitating,	dis-
placing	and	ultimately	interning	a	very	substan-
tial	portion	of	the	Tamil	population .	In	practice,	
the	Sri	Lankan	government	has	used	the	broad	
rubric	of	“security	issues”	to	impose	very	far-
reaching	restrictions	on	the	medical	supplies,	
water	and	sanitation	and	food	that	have	been	
31 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection 
and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 11.
32 See, notably, Nicholas Crawford, “Sri Lanka: Principles and 
Protection in Programming,” draft, n.d.
directed	at	the	Vanni	region .	As	one	UN	worker	
put	it,	“The	government	uses	aid	to	control	the	
movement	of	the	population,	to	dictate	the	
course	of	military	operations .”	
A	second	technique	in	Sri	Lanka	has	been	
using	relief	as	cover	for	military	manoeuvres,	
notably	when	it	came	to	the	aid	convoys	from	
October	2008	(discussed	below) .	Again,	the	use	
of	relief	as	cover	for	military	activities	has	a	long	
history,	and	includes	Nigeria/Biafra33	and	Su-
dan;	in	the	latter	case,	many	relief	trains	to	the	
south	in	the	late	1980s	carried	military	supplies	
for	government	forces	as	well	as	relief	food	and	
commercial	food .34	
A	third	mechanism	in	Sri	Lanka	has	been	
using	visas,	travel	permits,	written	agreements,	
compulsory	evacuations,	impediments	to	land	
convoys,	and	various	kinds	of	intimidation	to	
minimise	the	damaging	information	leaking	out	
via	the	activities	of	aid	agencies .
A	fourth	mechanism	in	Sri	Lanka	(clearly	in	
some	kind	of	tension	with	the	previous	three)	
has	been	to	use	the	existence	of	humanitarian	
operations	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	gov-
ernment’s	good	intentions	and	“humanitarian	
credentials .”	This	practice	has	provided	impor-
tant	legitimacy	for	the	government	even	as	that	
government	has	contributed	to	humanitarian	
crisis	in	important	ways .	As	several	aid	workers	
stressed,	the	Sri	Lankan	government	has	been	
taking	full	credit	for	WFP	deliveries	as	“govern-
ment”	food .	Together	with	the	government’s	
own	relief	convoys,	this	process	of	“taking	
credit”	appears	to	have	been	useful	in	sustain-
ing	a	degree	of	internal	legitimacy .	Moreover,	
the	government’s	involvement	in	—	and	acqui-
33 During Nigeria’s civil war in 1967-70, the Nigerian 
government tried to starve out the Biafran rebels; partly to 
secure relief and partly for military reasons, the rebel Biafran 
administration mixed relief flights with those bringing in 
military supplies and insisted on night-flights to impede 
Nigerian government interceptions (see, for example, John 
Stremlau, 1977, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil 
War, 1967-1970, Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress; Dan 
Jacobs, 1987, The Brutality of Nations. New York: Knopf. 
34 David Keen, 2008, The Benefits of Famine: A Political 
Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-
89, Oxford: James Currey (first published, 1994, Princeton 
University Press). 
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escence	in	—	food	deliveries	to	the	north	may	
have	helped	to	give	the	impression	internation-
ally	that	this	has	been	a	relatively	“humani-
tarian”	war	and	a	relatively	well-intentioned	
government .	For	example,	one	very	senior	aid	
worker	noted:	“It’s	a	relatively	civilised	war,	with	
channelling	food	through	to	enemy	territory .”	
Again,	there	are	many	precedents	for	using	re-
lief	as	a	source	of	legitimacy .35
A	fifth	mechanism	in	Sri	Lanka	has	been	
using	the	existence	of	relief	operations	as	a	kind	
of	“leverage”	over	the	international	community:	
agencies	have	in	effect	been	encouraged	to	
accept	quietude	in	return	for	access .	In	several	
earlier	crises,	an	implicit	deal	has	arguably	been	
struck	in	which	the	international	community	
sacrifices	strong	pressure	on	protection	issues	
for	the	ability	to	carry	out	high-profile	relief	
operations .	This	dynamic	came	into	play	in	
Bosnia,	as	Mark	Cutts	has	shown .36	In	relation	
to	Sudan	in	the	1990s,	Alex	de	Waal	suggested	
that	the	UN’s	Operation	Lifeline	in	Sudan	from	
1989	became	an	end	in	itself,	more	important	
than	addressing	the	underlying	human	rights	
abuses,	and	that	this	preoccupation	with	secur-
ing	access	for	relief	gave	the	Sudan	government	
important	leverage	internationally .37
Whilst	we	have	seen	that	WFP’s	relatively	
close	relationship	with	the	Sri	Lankan	govern-
ment	facilitated	a	number	of	important	food	
deliveries	to	the	north,	many	interviewees	
stressed	their	concern	that	WFP,	in	effect,	had	
fallen	in	line	with	government	priorities	that	
were	damaging	to	large	elements	of	the	Sri	
Lankan	population .	One	aid	worker	within	WFP	
35 A good example is Operation Lifeline Sudan in the 1990s.
36 Mark Cutts, 1999, The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 
1992–95: The Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access, 
Working Paper 8, New Issues in Refugee Research, Geneva: 
UNHCR.
37 Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: Politics and the 
Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: James Currey. See 
also Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield et al., 1996. “OLS: Operation 
Lifeline — a Review.” Geneva: Department for Humanitarian 
Affairs, July. Human Rights Watch, 1999, “Famine in Sudan, 
1998” The Human Rights Causes; Marc Lavergne and Fabrice 
Weissman (eds.), 2004, In the Shadow of “Just Wars”: 
Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
said	the	organisation	“risked	becoming	the	
logistics	arm	of	the	government .”	Concerns	
around	cooption	extended	well	beyond	WFP,	
and	one	experienced	aid	worker	commented,	
“The	UN	has	been	relegated	to	being	a	sub-
agency	of	the	government .”
The	mechanics	of	organising	convoys	
underlined	that	danger	of	becoming	a	“logis-
tics	arm .”	One	experienced	WFP	worker	said:	
“When	there’s	an	influx	of	IDPs,	sometimes	the	
military	dictate	to	the	line	ministry	[the	MN-
BEID]	and	they	[the	ministry]	then	contact	WFP	
and	say	we	need	a	convoy .”	Many	of	those	inter-
viewed	stressed	that	strong	control	over	relief	
operations	has	been	exercised	by	the	govern-
ment	and	by	the	Sri	Lankan	Ministry	of	Defence	
in	particular .	For	example,	one	aid	worker	com-
mented:	“The	Ministry	of	Defence	is	in	control	
of	everything .	What	they	say	goes .	So	that’s	
another	element	of	challenge .”	The	dangers	of	
serving	as	a	“sub-agency	of	the	government”	
were	clearly	enhanced	in	a	context	where	the	
government	has	manipulated	humanitarian	aid	
for	political	and	military	purposes .	
To	a	very	large	extent,	the	Sri	Lankan	gov-
ernment	has	dictated	terms	to	the	international	
community	when	it	comes	to	humanitarian	aid	
and	protection	issues .	The	government	has	been	
able	to	—	and	has	been	permitted	to	—	control	
the	information	environment	to	a	very	high	de-
gree .	Several	sources	expressed	the	belief	that	
the	Sri	Lankan	government	has	learned	lessons	
about	information	control	from	other	contem-
porary	crises	(including	Afghanistan,	Sudan	and	
Israel/Gaza)	—	and	indeed	that	other	govern-
ments	may	well	learn	lessons	from	Sri	Lanka .	One	
UN	worker	noted,	“This	is	the	training	ground	for	
any	state	that	wants	to	behave	like	this .	Fifteen	
years	ago	the	UN	was	stronger	and	principles	
weren’t	up	for	negotiation	to	that	extent .”
Shortage of Relief for the Vanni from 
2006 to the September 2008 Evacuation 
of Aid Agencies
One	2007	paper	looking	at	protection	is-
sues	noted,	“Questions	of	bias	(eg	favouring	
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government-controlled	areas	or	government-
declared	return	areas	at	the	expense	of	LTTE	
strongholds)	on	the	part	of	GOSL	[Government	
of	Sri	Lanka]	in	the	prioritization	of	WFP	food	
deliveries	have	been	raised .”38	There	is	indeed	
evidence	of	such	a	bias .	Regionally-disaggre-
gated	figures	for	quantities	dispatched	and	ton-
nages	called	forward	were	obtained	for	WFP’s	
PRRO	relief	operations	in	2006 .	When	the	ton-
nage	dispatched	is	expressed	as	a	percentage	
of	the	tonnage	“called	forward,”	the	figure	for	
the	north	(Killinochi,	Mullativu,	Jaffna,	Trincoma-
lee,	Batticaloa,	Mannar,	Vavuniya)	was	26 .38	
per	cent,	whereas	the	corresponding	percent-
age	for	other	districts	of	Sri	Lanka	was	roughly	
double	that	—	at	53 .33	per	cent .	Strikingly,	the	
LTTE-controlled	areas	of	Killinochi	and	Mullaiti-
vu	fared	the	worst	with	only	14 .9	per	cent	of	the	
tonnage	“called	forward”	actually	dispatched,	
and	Jaffna	had	a	figure	of	only	16 .65 .	Yet	ton-
nages	called	forward	—	as	well	as	evidence	
available	from	other	sources	—	suggest	that	
needs	in	Killinochi,	Jaffna	and	Mullaitivu	were	
particularly	severe .	Note	that	these	are	not	ton-
nages	delivered	but	tonnages	dispatched .39
In	addition	to	security	obstacles	and	gov-
ernment	obstruction,	also	significant	were	truck-
ers’	anxieties	about	delivering	to	the	north .40	
But	such	reluctance	can	be	countered	with	
financial	incentives	if	the	will	is	there .	One	aid	
worker	who	has	tracked	deliveries	to	the	north	
over	many	years	said	government	obstruction	
was	a	key	reason	for	low	delivery	to	the	north .	A	
local	staff	worker	with	WFP	commented:	
Our assistance reached the people 
with great difficulty. It needed approval 
38 WFP, 2007, “WFP Sri Lanka: Food Assistance for Protection 
and Peace-Building,” 18-23 March, p. 3.
39 Calculations from monthly figures in WFP records. 
Mother-and-child nutrition programmes for Mullaitivu district 
were very badly hit in the period April-July 2006 (WFP, 2006, 
“Emergency Food Security Assessment,” Vanni, Sri Lanka, 
October, p. 10.)
40 Interview with WFP worker. See also WFP Sri Lanka, 
“Special Operation SP 10539.0, Augmentation of logistics 
preparedness capacity,” 1 September 2006-31 January 2007, 
p. 3.
from the Ministry of Defence, especially 
after August 2006. So we couldn’t get 
the approved amount of food for our 
beneficiaries — IDPs, food-for-work, 
school feeding, and mother and child 
nutrition. We couldn’t get sufficient 
food for these. The increasing fuel 
price led to some difficulties.
A	food	sector	coordination	meeting	on	24	
July	2007,	which	included	UN	and	NGO	repre-
sentatives,	noted	of	the	Vanni:	“All	agreed	the	
region	was	not	receiving	much	attention	com-
pared	to	the	East .”41	A	WFP	report	noted,	“The	
lack	of	a	clear	UN-government	agreement	to	es-
tablish	humanitarian	corridors	and	facilitate	the	
passage	of	humanitarian	aid	and	staff	through	
security	checkpoints	was	a	bottleneck	for	the	
movement	of	assistance .”42	Given	the	scarcity	of	
relief	reaching	the	north,	programmes	like	food-
for-training	and	food-for-work	took	a	back	seat	
to	relief	feeding	for	IDPs .43
Needs	in	Jaffna	were	significant,	and	one	
June	2007	report	noted,	“All	600,000	inhabit-
ants	of	Jaffna	district	are	in	one	way	or	the	
other	directly	or	indirectly	affected	in	their	
livelihoods .”44	The	closure	of	the	A9	road	by	the	
government	in	August	2006	had	led	to	severe	
shortages	of	food,	fuel	and	electricity	in	Jaff-
na .45	But	the	displaced	in	Jaffna	were	not	get-
ting	much	international	attention .46	At	a	Food	
Sector	Coordination	Meeting	on	24	July	2007,	it	
was	noted	that	WFP	had	been	targeting	120,000	
41 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 2.
42 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
43 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, 
Sri Lanka, October, p. 12.
44 World Food Programme, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security 
Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security and 
Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, June 
(p. 39).
45 Newsweek, 16 October 2008, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 7.
46 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 7.
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people	in	Jaffna,	but	that	“Shipping	remains	a	
problem,	as	commercial	shipments	appear	to	
take	priority	ahead	of	humanitarian	ones .”47	A	
WFP	report	noted	that	“…	movement	of	com-
modities	to	Jaffna	was	dependent	on	govern-
ment-managed	shipping .”48	Another	noted	that	
relief	to	Jaffna	had	been	impeded	by	“refusal	
to	allow	WFP	to	directly	charter	vessels .”49	A	
third	WFP	report	observed:	“The	Government	
has	promised	to	arrange	ships	to	transport	WFP	
food	but	so	far	this	has	not	happened .	Currently	
WFP	only	has	200	tons	of	food	in	Jaffna	district,	
compared	to	a	potential	monthly	requirement	
of	almost	3,000	tons .”50	A	UN	aid	worker	said	
there	had	not	been	a	full	ration	for	IDPs	in	the	
north	since	February	2008,	estimating	deliver-
ies	at	50	per	cent	of	those	that	would	provide	a	
full	ration .	A	global	trend	of	rising	food	prices	
was	compounding	the	rising	fuel	prices	and	ob-
struction	from	both	sides	of	the	conflict	—	with	
all	these	factors	helping	to	prevent	adequate	
deliveries .	One	worker	closely	involved	in	food	
distributions	for	WFP	said,	“From	the	beginning	
of	2008,	with	global	prices,	our	budget	meant	
we	could	no	longer	provide	enough .	Plus,	there	
were	[government]	controls	at	Omanthai	and	
controls	on	the	LTTE	side .”	In	addition	to	the	
effect	of	restricting	supply,	prices	were	also	
boosted	by	the	costs	involved	in	unloading	and	
reloading	at	checkpoints .51	
An	NGO	worker	in	Vavuniya	emphasised	
the	inadequacy	of	food	deliveries	to	the	north,	
particularly	before	the	September	2008	evacu-
ation	of	aid	agencies:	“When	we	could	work	in	
the	Vanni,	WFP	was	providing	basic	food	and	
there	was	slow	registration	with	the	govern-
ment .	Food	sent	till	September	2008	to	the	
47 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 1.
48 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 
10067.1,” n.p.
49 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity,” n.p.
50 WFP, “Hunger’s global hotspots,” 25 May 2007.
51 WFP, “Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda 
item 8, 27-30 October,” p. 6.
Vanni	was	not	enough	to	feed	all	the	Vanni .”	
He	said	deliveries	actually	increased	from	Sep-
tember	2008:	“When	we	had	to	leave,	with	the	
trucks	[convoys	from	October],	more	food	went	
into	the	Vanni .”
There	were	also	significant	concerns	about	
distribution	systems .	For	example,	a	food	sector	
coordination	meeting	on	24	July	2007	noted,	
“All	agreed	that	the	registration	system	is	inad-
equate	and	with	3	overlapping	systems	in	place	
(President’s	Secretariat,	UNHCR/MNBD	and	
Special	Task	Force)	it	is	very	hard	to	monitor .”52
Some Government Concerns in Relation 
to Relief for the North
By	contrast	with	the	many	aid	workers	who	
criticised	a	neglect	of	the	north	over	a	significant	
period,	government	representatives	stressed	
that	the	government	was	trying	to	meet	needs	
throughout	the	country,	whilst	donors	were	un-
reasonably	targeting the	north .	As	one	official	at	
the	Ministry	of	Nation	Building	and	Estate	Infra-
structure	Development	put	it	(MNBEID):	“Some	
donors	restrict	only	for	the	north .	It’s	not	helpful .	
We	don’t	have	anything	for	the	east .	If	anything,	
they	should	say	conflict-affected	areas,	not	the	
north .”	The	relative	scarcity	of	nutritional	data	
for	the	north	(and	the	suppression	of	important	
nutritional	data	that	has been	collected)	adds	to	
the	difficulty	of	lobbying	for	deliveries	that	are	in	
proportion	to	need,	including	the	prioritisation	
of	deliveries	to	the	north .
Officials	at	the	MNBEID	told	us	that	re-
strictions	on	deliveries	to	the	north	were	due	
to	security	concerns	and	not	to	anything	else .	
Certainly,	the	government	has	had	significant	
security	concerns,	and	some	of	these	are	legiti-
mate .	Government	officials	expressed	concern	
that	national	staff	in	aid	agencies	might	have	
some	links	to	the	LTTE	and	also	that	relief	ma-
terials	with	a	possible	military	“dual	use”	might	
fall	into	the	hands	of	the	rebels .	When	we	sug-
gested	to	one	very	senior	military	officer	that	
food	was	relatively	difficult	to	use	directly	for	
52 Food Sector Coordination Meeting, 24 July 2007, p. 2.
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military	purposes,	he	replied,	“Yes,	food	is	not	
so	much	a	“dual	use”	item,	but	the	local	staff	
worry	was	there	—	and	there	were	detections,	
batteries	in	the	panel	of	the	truck,	trucks	hired	
by	WFP .”	He	added:
All organisations had to depend on 
local staff. Some of the local staff 
employed by the majority of organisa-
tions were recommended by the LTTE. 
We had a problem identifying their 
neutrality. We don’t know if they gave 
them [the LTTE] a percentage of their 
salaries or whatever. We have no way of 
monitoring anything happening on that 
side. We’re finding stuff buried now all 
over the conflict zone… There’s a worry 
on local staff, even with WFP.
Some	of	the	aid	workers	we	spoke	with	
indicated	that	a	portion	of	national	staff	in	the	
north	would	indeed	have	had	some	links	to	
the	LTTE	(and	that	some	others	would	be	con-
nected	to	various	paramilitary	groups) .	One	
experienced	aid	worker,	who	was	generally	
very	critical	of	the	Sri	Lankan	government,	said,	
“Some	25	per	cent	of	local	staff	probably	have	
some	sympathy	or	links	to	LTTE .	We’ve	had	
staff	threatened	by	anonymous	phone	calls .”	
It	is	also	fair	to	reiterate	that	while	the	military	
usefulness	of	relief	goods	is	uncertain,	the	LTTE	
administration	in	the	north	was	clearly	strength-
ened	by	international	assistance	in	many	ways .
Under	the	PRRO,	WFP	food	has	been	
handed	over	to	government	authorities,	with	
only	a	limited	degree	of	monitoring	allowed .	
One	NGO	worker	who	had	earlier	been	working	
with	NGOs	in	southern	Africa	was	struck	by	the	
difference	in	Sri	Lanka:	
Here, WFP brings in food and hands 
over to the government. As the conflict 
has changed, the government’s rela-
tionship with WFP has become more 
political. The government see the food 
as theirs, and being able to direct where 
the food goes. As NGOs, we have very 
little to do with WFP in Sri Lanka.
One	WFP	worker	noted:	
When we came to this country, back in 
1968, it was a development problem. 
When we came in the Tsunami emer-
gency [from December 2004], we were 
using the government as our partner 
only. In other countries, we have solidly 
relied on NGOs. [But here] convoys’ 
food was handed over to the Addition-
al Government Authority (AGA) who 
remained behind. We take food to the 
nearest government warehouse and 
they distribute and we come back later 
to monitor.
He	saw	a	significant	advantage	in	handing	
food	over	to	the	government,	particularly	in	cir-
cumstances	where	relief	agencies	could	easily	
be	accused	of	aiding	and	abetting	the	rebels:	
“One	time	they	complained	that	WFP	bags	
were	being	used	for	LTTE	bunkers,	but	we	said	
‘We	gave	them	to	you,	what	happened?’	They	
withdrew	it	[the	allegation]	straight	away	from	
the	Ministry	of	Defence	website!”
Relief and the Military Push from 
September 2008
Whilst	the	government’s	military	push	in	the	
east	of	the	country	had	been	relatively	slow,	the	
push	from	the	west	was	very	rapid	—	particularly	
from	September	2008 .	The	Sri	Lanka	army’s	
rapid	military	advance	dramatically	changed	the	
humanitarian	context	in	the	country .	One	expe-
rienced	aid	worker	commented,	“Up	to	Septem-
ber	2008,	the	situation	was	more	or	less	stable,	
but	then	there	was	a	huge	change	—	another	
country,	another	problem .”	September	2008	saw	
the	government	telling	humanitarian	agencies	
that	they	should	move	out	of	the	Vanni,	noting	
that	their	security	could	no	longer	be	guaran-
teed .	Only	ICRC	and	Caritas	remained .53
In	this	new	context,	some	of	the	optimism	
that	had	been	expressed	about	the	virtues	of	
53 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 4-5.
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working	closely	with	the	Sri	Lankan	government,	
already	rather	strained	in	view	of	the	prolonged	
obstruction	of	relief	supplies	to	the	north,	be-
gan	to	look	increasingly	unrealistic .	One	exam-
ple	of	such	optimism	was	a	WFP	PRRO	Concept	
Paper	for	2008,	which	noted:	
The continued working through Govern-
ment structures will require considera-
ble effort and initiative to ensure appro-
priate standards of delivery but, if suc-
cessful, will allow for better access and 
a greater, more integrated response 
capacity than working independently. 
Eventually maintaining this approach 
should also allow WFP to cease food 
distribution activities in Sri Lanka.54
As	of	October	2009,	such	“cessation	of	
food	distribution	activities”	looks	a	long	way	
off .	The	enforced	evacuation	of	aid	agencies	
in	September	2008	was	defended	by	the	Sri	
Lankan	government	as	necessary	for	the	secu-
rity	of	aid	staff .	But,	as	one	Human	Rights	Watch	
report	noted,	aid	agencies	are	accustomed	to	
dealing	with	environments	in	which	there	are	
significant	physical	dangers	and	they	need	to	
be	able	to	exercise	their	own	professional	judg-
ment	on	operating	in	insecure	areas .55	There	
has	been	a	great	deal	of	discussion	in	the	in-
ternational	community	about	the	importance	
of	“protection	by	presence”	in	the	context	of	
various	crises	around	the	world;	but	clearly	this	
mechanism	was	not	being	taken	very	seriously	
in	Sri	Lanka:	as	soon	as	a	military	conflict	threat-
ened	to	escalate,	the	humanitarian	presence	
was	virtually	removed .	One	experienced	aid	
worker	remembered:	
There was a push on the east side of 
the country from March 2008. The idea 
was to close the LTTE in Mullativu. 
When the offensive came to Kilinoc-
hchi, so at that point the government 
54 WFP PRRO Concept Paper for 2008 .
55 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 3.
says we will have to use massive force. 
They came to us and said we can no 
longer provide security assistance, 
you need to go out. The LTTE tried to 
secure Kilinochchi, now it’s completely 
destroyed… When the government 
entered, a lot of civilians were pushed 
by the LTTE to retreat. Surprising eve-
rybody was the speed [of the govern-
ment advance].
He	said	humanitarians	were	regarded	as	“a	
nail	on	the	foot	of	military	plans	to	advance .”	
He	suggested	that	the	government’s	plan	had	
been	to	“push	back	the	civilians,”	adding,	“But	
that	conflicts	with	international	laws	on	how	to	
handle	IDPs .	Plus,	shelling	causes	casualties	to	
IDPs .”	In	this	context,	he	emphasised,	ejecting	
aid	workers	offered	the	advantage	of	ejecting	
potential	witnesses .
Protests	underlined	the	dangers	that	were	
seen	to	arise	from	the	aid	agencies’	evacuation .	
One	aid	worker	remembered	that	at	the	time	of	
the	humanitarian	withdrawal	from	Kilinochchi,	
“Local	inhabitants	were	blocking	the	[com-
pound]	gates	and	saying	you	can’t	leave,	you’re	
leaving	us	so	exposed .”56	There	was	undoubt-
edly	also	pressure	from	the	LTTE	to	remain .	This	
was	mentioned	by	another	aid	worker,	who	also	
stressed	that	government	guarantees	of	secu-
rity	for	those	evacuating	from	Kilinochchi	were	
meaningless	in	practice:	
The LTTE organised demonstrations 
that wouldn’t let us leave. We were 
stuck. There were nine UN internation-
als and two from international NGOs 
and local staff, a terrible situation. It 
was obvious we had to leave. It was 
always about getting permission to 
leave from the LTTE. The solution came 
from thanking the LTTE for their coming 
solution, showing them to be in control, 
so it would have been difficult to stop 
us. We were 15-20 minutes delayed 
56 See also WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, 
Project 10067.1.”
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when the LTTE were messing with us. 
Then there was a great air strike, three 
bombs on the road where we were sup-
posed to be! So a guarantee here is not 
a guarantee. [The air strike here would 
have been from the government.]
Underpinning	the	crisis	in	the	Vanni	was	
not	just	the	necessity	of	repeated	displace-
ment	but	also	a	huge	disruption	of	production,	
notably	agricultural	production .	The	escalation	
of	violence	in	the	north	hit	food	production	
hard:	Kilinochchi	and	Mullaitivu	have	been	im-
portant	rice-producing	areas	and	probably	had	
no	significant	agricultural	production	in	2009,	
whilst	the	previous	military	push	in	the	east	had	
already	damaged	rice	production	there .	
The	Sri	Lankan	government	claimed	that	in	
the	absence	of	international	agencies,	it	would	
provide	for	the	people	of	the	Vanni .	However,	
the	government	has	not	been	able	to	back	up	
this	claim	by	demonstrating	the	level	of	as-
sistance	given	or	the	adequacy	of	distribution	
mechanisms .57	With	the	withdrawal	of	humani-
tarians,	diplomatic	and	aid	agency	energy	was	
heavily	invested	in	securing	permissions	for	de-
liveries	into	the	Vanni	by	convoy .	The	first	relief	
convoy	was	in	October	2008 .	
Beginning	in	October	2008,	convoys	
went	to	three	main	places:	Mullyavallai,	Thar-
mapuram	and	Puthukkudiyiruppu	(known	as	
PTK) .	But	after	early	December,	they	could	not	
go	to	Mullyavalai	and	then	they	were	cut	off	
from	Tharmapuram	and	the	last	convoy	(which	
departed	on	January	16	2009)	got	stuck	at	PTK	
because	of	increased	fighting .	
A	careful	analysis	of	the	adequacy	of	con-
voy	relief	deliveries	from	October	to	mid-De-
cember	2008	has	been	done	by	Human	Rights	
Watch .	It	showed	that	actual	deliveries	were	
only	40	per	cent	of	the	minimum	nutrition	re-
quirements	of	the	displaced .	It	is	worth	quoting	
the	analysis	at	some	length:
57 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.
Seven large UN food convoys were dis-
patched to the Vanni between October 
2, 2008, and December 15, 2008, car-
rying a combined load of 4,120 metric 
tons of food (another food convoy is 
scheduled for December 18)… The UN 
World Food Program (WFP) and the 
government estimate that at least 750 
metric tons per week are needed to 
meet the minimum nutritional require-
ment of the displaced population in 
the Vanni… Even the 750 metric tons 
is an underestimate, since the basic 
minimum WFP rations per person of 0.5 
kilograms [cereals, pulses, oil, sugar] for 
230,000 persons (the smallest credible 
estimate of the displaced population) 
would require a total of 805 metric 
tons per week, or 3,450 metric tons per 
month. Based on this formula, the IDP 
population of the Vanni would require 
a total of at least 10,250 metric tons of 
food for the three months between the 
withdrawal of the UN on September 16, 
2008, and the time of the finalization 
of this report, December 15. However, 
the seven food convoys combined only 
delivered a total of 4,120 metric tons 
of food, a shortfall of 6,230 metric tons 
of food over the minimum nutrition 
requirements of the displaced (p. 27) 
population... As a result, a very large 
gap exists between the minimum daily 
requirements of the population and the 
food being brought into the Vanni. Ac-
cording to humanitarian officials, some 
of the camps they work in are already 
down to distributing just two meals per 
day, and one camp is reportedly surviv-
ing on just one meal a day.” (pp. 27-28).58 
A	3	October	2008	WFP	press	release	not-
ed,	“WFP	plans	to	send	a	minimum	of	one	aid	
58 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December. 
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convoy	per	week .”	But	seven	convoys	between	
October	2	and	December	15	represents	rather	
less	than	a	convoy	a	week .	Even	so,	it	was	a	
major	feat,	given	the	obstacles	involved .	After	
the	tenth	convoy	arrived	in	the	Vanni	(the	first	
of	2009),	WFP	noted	that	it	had	now	delivered	
6,617	metric	tons	of	food .	In	addition,	WFP	had	
procured	781	metric	tons	of	rice	from	within	the	
region	for	distribution	to	the	IDPs .59	
In	the	reports	of	WFP	and	other	UN	agen-
cies	there	was	a	great	deal	of	focus	on	the	
displaced .	Whilst	there	was	sometimes	an	ac-
knowledgement	that	other	people	in	the	north	
were	very	much	in	need	of	assistance,	there	was	
a	tendency	for	the	displaced	to	be	equated	with	
“those	in	need .”	Particularly	as	the	escalating	
war	displaced	more	and	more	people,	esti-
mates	for	the	displaced	came	to	stand	as	a	kind	
of	proxy	for	the	population	in	general .	But	all	
this	carried	the	danger	of	underestimating	the	
numbers	in	need	of	relief	by	omitting	the	non-
displaced .	Human	Rights	Watch	noted	in	De-
cember	2008	that	those	who	were	not	displaced	
and	living	in	LTTE-controlled	areas	of	the	Vanni	
had	“almost	identical	security	concerns	and	
humanitarian	problems,	so	the	total	affected	
population	—	displaced	and	non-displaced	
—	is	well	over	300,000,	even	by	conservative	
estimates .”60	A	number	of	WFP	food	security	
59 WFP News Release, “First WFP food convoy of 2009 
reaches the Vanni region,” 9 January 2009, Rome.
60 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 40. By “conservative estimates,” they meant 
the estimate of 230,000 displaced. Human Rights Watch 
noted, “There are an estimated 230,000 to 300,000 displaced 
persons currently trapped in the Vanni conflict zone, as well as 
a small number of Vanni residents who remain in their homes.” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 25). While UNHCR put the number of displaced 
in the Vanni at 230,000 in November 2008, a UN interagency 
assessment mission of October 17-18 2008 put the number at 
300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, 
and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni 
Region,” December, pp. 23-24). The figure of 230,000 was 
mentioned by the UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator (“Press release: UN convoy delivers food to Vanni 
civilians,” 18 October 2008). WFP noted in October 2008 that 
the organisation “has dispatched a first convoy of food and 
other supplies for 200,000 displaced people in the LTTE-
controlled area of Sri Lanka.” (WFP News Release, “First food 
aid convoy reaches thousands of displaced in northern Sri 
Lanka,” 3 October 2008, Rome).
assessments	had	found	that	conflict	had	had	a	
profound	effect	on	host	families	and	non-dis-
placed	households	as	well	as	IDPs .61	If	we	take	
a	figure	of	300,000	in	need,	then	the	quantity	
delivered	between	October	2	and	December	15	
2008	would	represent	only	about	31	per	cent	of	
the	amount	required .
Human	Rights	Watch	noted	in	February	
2009,	“Since	September	[2008],	the	WFP	has	
delivered	8,300	metric	tons	of	mixed	food	com-
modities	to	the	area	in	11	separate	convoys .	
Since	January	16	the	WFP	has	been	unable	to	
deliver	any	food	to	the	areas .”62
There	were	some	relief	deliveries	in	addi-
tion	to	the	main	international	convoys	—	nota-
bly	a	consignment	from	the	Indian	government	
and	the	government	convoys	carrying	food-
for-sale	—	but	these	will	not	have	significantly	
plugged	the	gaps .63
Shortfalls	in	essential	provisions	were	even	
more	serious	when	it	came	to	non-food	items	
and	services .	A	senior	aid	worker	said:	“There	
was	no	shelter,	and	[there	was]	control	of	medi-
cines	that	could	go	in	—	not	making	it	com-
fortable	for	the	IDPs .”	Another	aid	worker	who	
61 An October 2008 WFP report observed, “WFP emergency 
food security assessments (EFSAs) in LTTE-controlled Vanni 
in October 2006, Jaffna in November 2006, Batticaloa in 
May 2007 and Trincomalee in July 2007 all indicate similar 
effects of conflict on IDPs, host families and non-displaced 
households…” (WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operation, Sri Lanka 10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive 
Board Approval, agenda item 8, 27-30 October, p. 6). In 
a June 2007 report, WFP noted, “Besides the internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) are an increasing proportion of the 
general population across a number of areas in the North and 
East that are affected by the conflict” (WFP, 2007, “Sri Lanka 
Food Security Assessment,” based on the Integrated Food 
Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final 
report, June, p. 37). 
62 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February.
63 Human Rights Watch noted, “The government is also 
sending in additional convoys of non-UN food through 
Government Agents, but the food on those convoys is 
destined partly to be sold at (28) the government-organised 
Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society (MPSC) stores, and not 
for free distribution to displaced persons.” Many displaced 
people did not have the money to buy the food. The Indian 
government contributed 1,700 tons of humanitarian assistance 
(including food, clothing and hygiene items) in late November 
(distributed by ICRC) (Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, 
Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s 
Vanni Region,” December, pp. 28-9).
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 63
travelled	with	many	of	the	convoys	said	simply,	
“The	government	of	Sri	Lanka	does	not	want	
anything	to	go	in	[to	the	Vanni]	except	food .”	
Partly	because	of	repeated	displacements	with-
in	the	north,	shelter	and	water/sanitation	were	
of	particular	importance .	Human	Rights	Watch	
noted	in	December	2008:	
It is in the non-food sectors that the 
impact of the ordered withdrawal has 
been felt most severely; it is these 
sectors that are not included in the 
permitted UN shipments ino the Vanni 
and which are most impacted by the 
absence of qualified humanitarian per-
sonnel on the ground. The provision 
of basic assistance to IDPs in the Vanni 
is made more complicated by the fact 
that many families have had to move 
multiple times to escape approaching 
fighting. Each time, new shelters and 
sanitation facilities need to be con-
structed and new supply  
lines established.64 
One	aid	worker	said	the	political	impor-
tance	of	being	seen	to	deliver	food	did	not	
seem	to	extend	to	other	supplies .	“We	could	
not	take	medicine	on	the	convoys	[from	Octo-
ber	2008] .	The	government	says,	“We	continue	
to	provide	food	to	the	population .”	Starvation	
would	be	huge	in	the	media,	but	blocking	medi-
cine	is	not	so	dramatic	or	visible .”
The	Sri	Lankan	government’s	ability	to	al-
low	some	relief	deliveries	but	not	others	did	not	
enhance	the	sense	of	unity	among	different	aid	
agencies .	One	aid	worker	who	travelled	with	
some	of	the	convoys	said:	
The great majority of non-food items 
were not allowed. There was a lot of 
negotiation to add other items and it 
was delaying departure and distribu-
tion. There were jealousies of WFP be-
64 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 25.
ing in the frontline and other agencies 
not. The Humanitarian Coordinator 
was under pressure from other agen-
cies that were not seen to be doing 
something for the people. If UNHCR 
wants to get shelter, it has to go and 
get permissions [from the government] 
separately, and UNICEF for water and 
sanitation and education materials. At 
times permission comes from Colombo 
and the commander here [in Vavuniya] 
says no.
With	agencies	vying	for	space	on	the	
convoys,	the	chances	of	collective	pressure	
and	advocacy	seem	to	have	been	significantly	
reduced .	One	UN	worker	commented:	“The	
government	likes	bilateral	agreements,	with	
UNICEF,	UNHCR	etc .	Some	agencies	were	not	
happy	with	WFP	expansion	from	September	
2008 .	They	wanted	their	goods	on	it	[the	convoy	
operation]	too .	They	bypassed	some	collective	
procedures .”	Another	aid	worker	said:	
With WatSan [water and sanitation], 
the amount going in for two years was 
negligible. What was going in was on 
the GA [Government Authority] con-
voys. There were more and more IDPs 
over time with the [military] push. We 
were never allowed to take water tanks 
and pipes in any significant quantities, 
and it was deliberate. They [the peo-
ple in the north] were supposed to 
get sick. UNICEF never made a fuss, 
not publicly.
Significantly,	the	discrimination	against	
non-food	items	was	not	new .	Figures	from	
OCHA-Kilinochchi	for	2006	indicated	that	while	
16	per	cent	of	food	projects	in	the	Vanni	were	
negatively	affected	by	the	conflict,	fully	49	per	
cent	of	Water	and	Sanitation	projects	were	af-
fected,	51	per	cent	of	health	projects	and	55	per	
cent	of	education	projects .65
65 WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, Vanni, 
Sri Lanka, October, p. 32.
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Some	of	those	interviewed	recalled	that	
the	convoys	that	went	into	the	Vanni	from	
October	2008	were	manipulated	for	military	
purposes .	Part	of	this	seems	to	have	been	an	
attempt	to	use	relief	to	influence	population	
movements	within the	Vanni .	One	aid	worker	
commented	angrily:
There was strong pressure. At a De-
cember 12 [2008] meeting, I said 
that [coming] convoy was screwed… 
When WFP was ordered to leave PTK 
[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and go to the no 
fire zone, it was supposed to draw peo-
ple there. The convoy ended up in the 
no fire zone getting shelled to shit, and 
the strategy didn’t work because the 
LTTE was putting their own people into 
the no fire zone.
In	this	connection,	it	is	important	to	recall	
that	the	government	was	in	any	case	trying	to	
encourage	population	movements	to	the	ex-
treme	north-east	of	the	country .	An	aid	worker	
with	extensive	experience	of	the	north	noted:	
No army wants enemies behind their 
lines. People were pushed east to west. 
It was both the army and the LTTE, a 
combination of the army and LTTE not 
letting people go through their lines. 
If you get through the LTTE, then you 
have to go through the army. During 
convoy number 1, to Mullaitivu and 
PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu], the second to 
third of October, I saw empty vehicles 
going east to west and full vehicles 
west to east, 24 hours a day.
One	WFP	situation	analysis	in	September	
2009	noted	that	civilians	were	likely	to	be	pre-
vented	from	moving	from	LTTE	areas	because,	
first,	the	LTTE	wanted	to	keep	control	of	this	
population	and,	second,	“the	Sri	Lankan	Army	
(SLA)	wants	no	Tamil	elements	to	move	through	
the	lines	and	have	potential	infiltrated	elements	
in	its	back .”66
66 WFP situation analysis, 22 September 2008.
Another	problem	was	that	the	two	war-
ring	parties	were	seeking	to	take	advantage	
of	the	convoys	as	physical	cover	for	military	
manoeuvres .	An	aid	worker	who	travelled	with	
several	convoys	recalled:	“Going	and	coming,	
every	convoy	in	no	man’s	land	suffered	security	
incidents .	We	are	not	targeted	by	both	par-
ties,	the	problem	is	when	someone	wants	to	
take	advantage	of	the	convoy,	especially	in	no	
man’s	land .”	He	recalled	the	final	convoy:	
The January 16 [2009] convoy, we 
left here around 10 am and reached 
about 60 kilometres from here. We 
were not allowed to use the A9 [main 
road], I think the military wanted to 
use it. They wanted us to use a dirt 
road. From Puliyankulam, we had to 
use a dirt road. At Ouddusuddan, 
the convoy branched into two, one 
to Mullyavallai and the other to PTK 
[Puthukkudiyiruppu] and then Thar-
mapuram, delivering food. We were 
trapped at PTK. There was fighting 
going on all around. The LTTE were 
firing over the warehouses and the 
military firing back to other ware-
houses. The government was arguing 
that they will lose military advantage if 
they have to make way for the convoy.
He	explained	the	manipulation	of	the	con-
voy	in	more	detail:	
The SLA [Sri Lankan army] wants to fol-
low the convoy and use the convoy to 
hide behind, and if you are behind the 
convoy, the other side cannot fire. The 
government used convoys for physical 
cover to move and to find if an areas 
is safe and, if so, they ask others to 
come and join. Before they change 
their forward position, they send oth-
ers ahead.
A	Human	Rights	Watch	report	cited	one	
source	who	indicated	that	convoys	had	been	
delayed	when	the	Sri	Lankan	army	and	LTTE	
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insisted	on	different	routes,	with	both	favouring	
routes	that	would	allow	them	to	advance	their	
military	positions .67	
Another	aid	worker	who	travelled	with	
the	January	16	convoy	told	us	that	both	sides	
used	it	as	cover:	“They	[the	government	army]	
did	it	to	us,	and	the	LTTE	used	the	convoy	to	
move	around .”	It	is	clear	that	convoys	travelled	
without	effective	guarantees	for	the	safety	of	
staff .	This	aid	worker	added:	“For	all	of	us	on	
the	convoys,	the	security	was	not	enough .	The	
guarantees	were	so	low!	The	guarantees	for	the	
convoys	couldn’t	be	trusted .	The	last	convoy	
[January	16	2009]	was	crazy,	too	much	shell-
ing,	from	land	and	sea .”	WFP’s	Asia	Regional	
Director	had	stated	in	a	3	October	2008	press	
release:	“WFP	takes	the	safety	and	security	of	
humanitarian	aid	workers	very	seriously .	We	
will	not	tolerate	threats	to	humanitarian	work-
ers	nor	disruptions	to	the	critical	dispatching	of	
food	for	the	people	hit	hardest	by	the	continu-
ing	conflict	in	northern	Sri	Lanka .”	Whilst	WFP	
undoubtedly	had	a	concern	for	the	safety	of	
its	workers,	the	strong	diplomatic	pressure	for	
convoy	delivery	alongside	relatively	weak	pres-
sure	on	protection	issues	(including	the	use	of	
military	convoys	as	cover)	was	certainly	endan-
gering	humanitarian	workers .
Human	Rights	Watch’s	calculation	that	
convoy	deliveries	(to	December	15	2008)	met	40	
per	cent	of	nutritional	requirements	was	based	
on	the	assumption	of	an	efficient	distribution	
system	with	minimal	waste	or	siphoning	off	
of	aid .	This,	as	Human	Rights	Watch	pointed	
out,	was	difficult	to	confirm	or	monitor	without	
a	humanitarian	presence	in	the	Vanni .	It	does	
appear	that	relief	was	subject	to	significant	po-
litical	manipulation	once	it	arrived	—	not	least	
by	the	LTTE .	Some	felt	that	a	lack	of	adequate	
international	supervision	of	distribution	fed	into	
diversion	of	relief	from	the	intended	benefici-
67 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February. pp. 24-5. Human Rights Watch cites one source 
saying the Sri Lankan army (SLA) had used the convoy on 
December 29 to advance its position and that “long lines of 
SLA troops were walking alongside the convoy” (p. 25).
aries .	Whilst	a	few	international	staff	travelled	
with	the	convoys,	monitoring	was	very	limited .	
The	aid	worker	who	complained	about	lack	of	
security	guarantees	added:	“The	time	that	staff	
were	allowed	to	stay	and	interview	people	was	
very	limited,	one	to	two	hours .	NGO	staff	were	
not	able	to	go .”	Those	on	the	convoys	acknowl-
edged	that	some	of	the	relief	food	ended	up	
with	the	LTTE,	saying	this	was	inevitable .	One	
international	aid	worker	commented:	
Expats were not there for the distribu-
tion of food September to December 
2008. Feedback from colleagues says 
that on the list of beneficiaries given 
by the GA [Government Authority] 
sometimes the same name was there 
two times… Colleagues said there was 
not a real monitoring of the distribution 
and some IDPs didn’t receive food they 
were entitled to. It was remote control 
with problems. Some part of the food 
was taken by the LTTE. In the last few 
weeks, I heard the LTTE take first what 
they want, the rest is distributed to the 
population… Before, it was more si-
phoning off some of what people got. 
I’m not saying it’s better to stop. Peo-
ple need the food.
It	was	difficult	to	get	a	clear	picture	of		
how	extensive	such	distribution	problems	
were .	Certainly,	some	senior	staff	at	WFP	did	
not	see	them	as	significant .	One	senior	UN	of-
ficial	commented:
Donors were resisting sending in food 
without international supervision. WFP 
sided with the government. WFP be-
lieved that food should go in. The gov-
ernment was saying it wouldn’t allow 
international staff to be in the conflict 
area. The loss of international supervi-
sion was not a drawback at all. Rapid 
monitoring confirmed several times 
that people received food and received 
their fair share.
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Manipulation	of	humanitarian	operations	
by	the	government	included	a	manipulation	
of	the	information	flows	associated	with	such	
operations .	If	the	most	obvious	element	of	this	
was	the	government’s	instruction	in	Septem-
ber	2008	that	humanitarian	agencies	should	
leave	the	Vanni,	government	opposition	to	
international	aid	monitors	can	also	be	seen	
as	an	attempt	to	control	flows	of	information .	
Significantly,	those	international	aid	workers	
who	did	travel	with	the	convoy	had	only	a	very	
limited	time	to	talk	with	people	before	the	
aid	workers	had	to	return .	When	road	convoys	
were	no	longer	possible,	the	emphasis	in	re-
lief	operations	shifted	to	transporting	food	by	
sea,	specifically	from	Trincomalee	to	Mullaitivu	
district,	with	WFP	food	being	transported	on	
ICRC-chartered	ships .	Again,	the	shift	may	have	
been	related	to	the	government’s	aversion	to	
witnesses .	As	one	UN	worker	put	it:
We were no longer able to go to Kilino-
chchi, so we opened a corridor to Oud-
dusuddan. The convoy went only to 
PTK [Puthukkudiyiruppu]. From the end 
of January 2009, it was no longer pos-
sible… When the military were pushing 
the LTTE to coastal areas, there were 
no more WFP convoys… They al-
lowed vessels by sea. The government 
doesn’t want people to see the devas-
tation of the land.
Civilians	were	now	being	squeezed	into	
a	shrinking	conflict	zone	in	the	area	north	of	
Puthukkudiyiruppu	in	Mullaitivu	district .68	Con-
ditions	were	dangerous	and	squalid .	ICRC	was	
taking	out	some	of	the	sick	and	wounded,	and	
bringing	in	food .69	
Small	shipments	of	relief	to	Mullaitivu	
district	started	on	17	February .70	WFP’s	aim,	
68 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 3.
69 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 5.
70 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1.
expressed	on	February	27	2009,	was	to	deliv-
ery	up	to	300	metric	tons	of	food	commodities	
per	week	by	boat .71	But	in	the	period	before	
7	March	2009,	160	metric	tons	of	(mixed)	food	
had	arrived	by	sea	there .	On	7	March,	WFP	an-
nounced	that	an	additional	shipment	of	500	
metric	tons	had	arrived	in	Mullaitivu .	By	2	April,	
1,189	metric	tons	had	arrived,	and	on	2	April	
WFP	dispatched	another	1,030	metric	tons .72	At	
end-April	2009,	one	UN	worker	said:	
It’s	been	very	difficult	to	get	food	into	the	
Vanni,	no	food	since	6	April	[2009] .	There	are	
serious	problems .	The	government	sends	in	
just	enough .	Just	when	accusations	of	trying	
to	starve	people	come	out,	they	send	in	some	
food .	It	was	very	inadequate	in	February .
Relief and the Politics of Numbers
Decisions	on	how	much	relief	to	allocate	—	
and	retrospective	assessments	on	its	adequacy	
—	depend	heavily	on	assessments	of	the	num-
bers	in	need .	Yet	numbers	trapped	in	Mullaitivu	
were	very	much	a	matter	of	dispute .
In	early	April,	ICRC	estimated	the	number	
of	IDPs	trapped	in	a	thin	strip	of	land	in	Mul-
laitivu	district	at	150,000 .73	On	April	7,	the	UN	
Secretary	General’s	representative	on	internally	
displaced	persons	Walter	Kaelin	spoke	over	
“over	100,000”	trapped	in	this	strip	of	land .74	
Just	a	day	later,	UN	humanitarian	relief	coor-
dinator	John	Holmes	estimated	the	numbers	
trapped	at	150-190,000 .75	On	20	April,	an	In-
ternational	Crisis	Group	report	noted	that	“as	
many	as	150,000	or	more	civilians”	were	in	Mul-
laitivu	district,	adding	that	“UN	satellite	image-
71 WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food 
deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009.
72 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons 
of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.
73 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, 
fiscal year 2009,” citing figures for 1 April.
74 Text at “UN expert on IDPs tells LTTE to free all 
civilians,” 8 April 2009, News Line, President’s Office, Sri 
Lanka (http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/
ca200904/20090408un_expert_on_idp_tells_ltte_free_civilians.
htm).
75 See, for example, John Holmes, “Let them decide,” 8 April 
2009.
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ry	as	of	23	March	2009	shows	more	than	30,000	
tents	in	the	area:	estimates	of	the	number	of	
men,	women	and	children	at	risk	vary	depend-
ing	on	assumptions	about	the	average	numbers	
in	each	tent .”76
WFP	put	the	numbers	rather	lower .	A	27	
March	WFP	internal	situation	report	noted,	
“The	government	estimates	that	there	are	
about	70,000	IDPs	remaining	in	the	Vanni .	Other	
sources	claim	the	number	to	be	over	100,000 .”77	
When	the	dispatch	of	1,030	metric	tons	of	food	
for	Mullaitivu	was	announced	by	WFP	on	April	2	
2009,	it	was	noted	that	“The	WFP	food	sent	to	
the	area	will	be	sufficient	to	feed	approximately	
100,000	Internally	Displaced	Persons	(IDPs)	for	
a	period	of	20	days .”78	Strictly,	the	press	release	
was	not	claiming	that	there	were	only	100,000	
IDPs	in	the	Vanni/Mullaitivu,	and	the	assumption	
may	have	been	that	not	every	IDP	in	the	Vanni	
needed	a	full	ration .	But	the	figure	may	still	
have	contributed	to	the	impression	of	a	smaller	
number	than	the	actual	number .	This	impres-
sion	was	not	fully	corrected	by	the	use	in	other	
reports	of	the	phrase	“more	than	100,000”	(as	
in	a	March	27	WFP	internal	situation	report,	
which	noted,	“More	than	100,000	IDPs	are	still	
trapped	in	Vanni	“safe	zone”	and	require	hu-
manitarian	assistance .”79
Earlier,	WFP	was	giving	credence	to	much	
higher	figures .	In	a	2007	Food	Security	Assess-
ment,	one	table	notes:	Population	estimate	
(2006)	Jaffna	1,513,196,	Kilinochchi	157,946,	
Mannar	460,918,	Mullaitivu	793,063,	Vavuniya	
412,784,	Trincomalee	807,024 .	Table	10,	p .	51 .80	
76 ICG, 2009, “Crisis in Sri Lanka,” April 20. An ICG report of 
9 March, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” noted, “Independent 
estimates from sources on the ground and satellite imagery 
suggest at least 150,000 people are trapped by the LTTE and 
the Sri Lankan military….” OCHA reported that, as of 8 April, 
more than 7,500 patients and relatives were evacuated from 
Mullaitivu district by boat.
77 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 2.
78 WFP News Release, “WFP Dispatches another 1000 tons 
of food to the Vanni,” Rome, 2 April 2009.
79 WFP, Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1. 
80 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 51. The report 
also gives a high figure for numbers in need: “… 900,000 
The	total	here	for	the	Vanni	(i .e .	excluding	Jaffna	
and	Trincomalee)	is	1,824,711 .	This	may	well	be	
an	overestimate	and	not	all	of	these	people	will	
have	been	caught	up	in	the	mass	movement	to	
the	coastal	strip	at	Mullaitivu,	but	the	difference	
with	later	figures	is	still	striking .	It	is	very	rare	to	
find	any	substantial	or	even	brief	explanation	of	
how	population	estimates	have	been	arrived	at,	
and	in	these	circumstances	such	substantial	falls	
in	numbers	may	pass	almost	without	comment	
or	explanation .
The	figure	of	100,000	trapped	in	Mullaitivu	
district	has	been	mentioned .	An	October	2007	
WFP	report	mentioned	“400,000	conflict-affect-
ed	beneficiaries,”	and	the	figure	it	was	planned	
to	help	was	500,000 .81	Insofar	as	UN	agencies	
were	dealing	in	such	rounded-up	figures,	confi-
dence	in	the	numbers	used	must	be	limited .
If	we	turn	now	to	government	estimates	
of	the	IDPs	in	the	Vanni	(more	and	more	con-
centrated	in	Mullaitivu	district	as	the	war	pro-
gressed),	there	were	many	different	estimates .82	
USAID	quotes	a	Sri	Lankan	government	esti-
mate	of	50-60,000	people	trapped	in	Mullaiti-
vu .83	A	senior	civilian	official	in	Vavuniya	put	the	
number	significantly	higher,	telling	us	towards	
the	end	of	April	that	“160-170,000	may	be	there	
in	the	Vanni .”	One	fairly	senior	official	told	us	
around	80,000	people	had	arrived	in	Vavuniya	
in	the	last	few	days,	with	roughly	50,000	people	
still	present	in	the	Vanni .	Even	within	the	mili-
tary,	different	officials	came	up	with	different	
estimates .	A	more	senior	military	official	com-
mented,	“We	originally	said	60-120,000	in	the	
need support with livelihood protection as their coping 
strategies are depleting in Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, 
Vavuniya and Trincomalee.” (WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food 
Security Assessment, based on the Integrated Food Security 
and Humanitarian Phase Classification Approach, final report, 
June, p. 50).
81 WFP, “Budget Increases to Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operations — Sri Lanka 10067.1,” Projects for Executive 
Board Approval, Agenda item 9, Executive Board, Second 
Regular Session, Rome, 22-26 October 2007, p. 5.
82 Reported in November, cited in Human Rights Watch, 
2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of 
Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 24.
83 USAID, “Sri Lanka — Complex Emergency, Fact sheet 4, 
fiscal year 2009,” 10 April 2009.
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no	fire	zone .	Maybe	105,000	are	here	already .	
There	are	only	10-15,000	left	there	[in	the	Van-
ni] .”	The	International	Displacement	Monitoring	
Centre	cites	a	government	estimate	of	only	
1,000	people	in	the	Vanni	in	April .84
Much	higher	numbers	came	from	local	
government	officials	in	the	north .	In	December	
2008,	a	Human	Rights	Watch	report	noted	that	
the	Government	Agents	for	Mullaittivu	and	
Kilinochchi	were	estimating	a	total	of	348,102	
displaced	in	their	regions .85	But	in	Colombo	
government	officials	told	us	they	were	very	
sceptical	about	local	government	officers’	
numbers .	An	official	with	the	Ministry	of	Nation	
Building	and	Estate	Infrastructure	Develop-
ment	(MNBEID)	said:	“We	heard	figures	up	
to	500,000 .	We	agree	110,000,	the	number	of	
people	in	the	uncleared	areas .	A	lot	of	names	
were	repeated	—	that	inflated	the	numbers…	
Government	agents	exaggerate	the	numbers .”	
The	issue	of	“double-counting”	those	displaced	
more	than	once	was	also	raised	by	Human	
Rights	Watch .86	Some	aid	workers	were	also	
sceptical	about	the	figures,	saying	that	the	LTTE	
was	able	to	exert	pressure	that	inflated	them .
Inadequate Relief in Mullaitivu
Given	the	widely	varying	estimates	of	
population,	the	adequacy	of	food	deliveries	
can	only	be	conditionally	calculated .	The	last	
international	relief	food	to	arrive	in	the	Vanni	by	
land	came	on	January	16	convoy .	If	we	allow	for	
a	week	at	the	end	of	January,	a	total	of	66	days	
elapsed	between	the	last	road	relief	and	the	
beginning	of	April .	Yet	if	we	take	the	figure	of	
100,000,	the	1,189	metric	tons	of	food	that	ar-
rived	by	the	beginning	of	April	would	have	been	
enough	to	feed	this	population	for	only	24	days .	
If	we	take	the	ICRC/ICG	figure	of	150,000,	this	
84 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 4.
85 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 23.
86 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December.
amount	would	have	fed	the	population	for	only	
16	days .	If	we	take	the	Government	Agents’	fig-
ure	of	348,102,	then	this	quantity	of	food	would	
have	fed	the	population	for	only	about	7	days .
The	March	7	2009	Situation	Report	of	Mul-
laituvu	District	Additional	Government	Agent	
(AGA)	K .	Parthipan	gives	a	very	detailed	ac-
count	of	quantities	of	relief	received	and	quanti-
ties	needed:	
Almost the entire people from all AGA 
Divisions of the District are displaced. 
The IDPs of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi 
and parts of Vavuniya, Mannar and 
Jaffna Districts are now staying in Mul-
laitivu District… The population of 
Mullaitivu District at present is about 
81,000 families, consisting of about 
330,000 persons… The required food 
items for the issue of Dry Ration under 
WFP have not been transported to the 
district. Only a few MT of food items 
were brought by ships and were issued 
to the IDPs. There is a severe shortage 
for food in the area. People are unable 
to purchase the food in the market. 
Prices of the food items have increased 
and vegetables and fruits are not avail-
able at all in the area.87 
This	figure	is	rather	close	to	the	Govern-
ment	Agents’	figure	of	348,102	(cited	above) .	
The	AGAs’s	Situation	Report	gave	a	monthly	
food	requirement	for	February	of	4,950	metric	
tons	(mixed	foods),	noting	that	only	110	metric	
tons	had	actually	arrived	in	February .	Since	the	
food	was	so	scarce,	it	was	distributed	to	about	
30,000	people,	while	the	great	majority	did	not	
get	any	relief	food .88
Since	the	Sri	Lankan	government	played	a	
considerable	part	in	pushing	people	into	this	
strip	of	land,	it	might	reasonably	have	antici-
pated	that	substantial	deliveries	by	sea	would	
87 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. 
Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.
88 Situation Report of Mullaitivu District by Addl. Govt. 
Agent, Mr K. Parthipan, 7 March 2009.
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be	necessary .	It	seems	quite	possible	that	the	
grave	and	predictable	shortfalls	in	February	
and	March	served	a	military	function	in	en-
couraging	civilians	to	break	free	from	the	LTTE	
and	come	to	government-held	areas,	notably	
Vavuniya,	where	IDPs	were	safer	with	better	
access	to	relief .	
Of	course,	the	significant	degree	of	LTTE	
control	in	the	north	complicated	the	difficulty	
of	getting	accurate	figures .	Even	so,	it	is	dif-
ficult	to	believe	that	in	a	small	country	with	a	
sophisticated	administration	and	a	significant	
government	presence	in	the	north,	there	
could	be	so	much	doubt	about	the	numbers	
in	the	Vanni .	What	seems	to	have	happened	is	
that	different	elements	within	the	government	
made	widely	varying	estimates,	influenced	by	
a	range	of	political	factors .	In	general,	mini-
mising	the	numbers	may	have	served	a	func-
tion	in	minimising	the	implied	need	for	relief	
as	well	as	in	minimising	the	implied	casualties .	
Certainly,	population	estimates	coming	from	
the	military	were	particularly	low .	Certainly,	
the	government’s	low	population	figures	for	
the	Vanni	were	seen	by	several	aid	workers	
as	encouraging	or	legitimising	low	food	de-
liveries	or	as	a	kind	of	morale-booster	for	the	
military	push	against	the	LTTE	rebels .	One	aid	
worker	commented:
An example of data that was use-
ful — OCHA implemented it with full 
WFP cooperation — was detailing 
the amount that went it the Vanni. 
We could say only a small amount 
went it and could do advocacy. But it 
depends on the population. Then the 
government says it’s only 70,000 odd. 
It was partly to show the food was ad-
equate and partly to show there were 
not many Tamils and they were not a 
force to be reckoned with. The GAs 
in Mullativu and Kilinochchi had 350-
370,000 figures. But Colombo was say-
ing they’re compromised by the LTTE. 
There are incentives to ask for more. 
Plus, they were totally compromised.
Another	aid	worker	suggested,	“Maybe		
the	70,000	number	was	to	make	assistance		
inadequate .”	
Crisis in Vavuniya
While	the	migration	to	Vavuniya	was	cer-
tainly	rapid	and	dramatic,	the	question	of	why 
people	had	moved	there	was	relatively	neglect-
ed .	The	Sri	Lankan	government’s	official	expla-
nation	was	that	these	people	had	fled	to	safety	
after	being	held	captive	by	the	LTTE	rebels .	
That	flight	from	the	Tigers	was	indeed	an	im-
portant	part	of	the	story,	and	the	most	rapid	
influxes	into	Vavuniya	coincided	with	govern-
ment	successes	in	breaking	through	the	LTTE	
ranks	and	releasing	some	of	the	civilians	that	
the	rebels	had	been,	in	effect,	holding	captive .	
Several	caveats	are	worth	stressing,	how-
ever .	First,	while	the	desire	to	escape	the	LTTE	
was	strong,	it	was	also	hard	to	separate	this	
from	the	vulnerability	to	government	attacks	
which	proximity	to	the	Tigers	involved .	
Second,	there	was	significant	migration	
into	Vavuniya	at	the	end	of	2008	and	beginning	
of	2009	—	that	is,	before	the	“rescue	opera-
tion”	in	Mullativu .89	
Third,	those	we	interviewed	suggested	a	
number	of	other	factors	influencing	the	large-
scale	movement	of	civilians	towards	Vavuniya .	
One	major	factor	in	the	movement	to	Vavuniya	
from	November	2008	to	April	2009	was	pro-
longed	government	shelling	and	aerial	bomb-
ing	of	areas	within	the	Vanni,	particularly	from	
August	2008 .	In	addition	to	constituting	a	direct	
security	threat,	these	military	actions	also	de-
stroyed	much	of	the	infrastructure	needed	for	
continued	existence	within	the	area .	Aid	work-
ers	reported	in	April	2009	that	wounds	for	those	
in	Vavuniya	hospital	were	mostly	shrapnel	and	
gunshot	wounds .	Until	roughly	the	second	week	
of	April,	most	of	the	wounds	were	from	shrapnel	
89 A WFP report noted at end-March, “Since late January, 
nearly 52,000 IDPs have crossed over to government 
controlled areas and are accommodated in IDP centres/
welfare villages: Vavuniya (44,823), Jaffna (4,861), Mannar 
(856), Trincomalee (464) and Pulumudai hospital (957)” (WFP, 
Internal situation report, March 27 2009, p. 1).
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 200970
(the	result	of	shelling	operations),	and	after	this	
more	and	more	were	bullet	wounds .	One	aid	
worker	in	Vavuniya	said	“Casualties	were	mainly	
by	the	SLA	(Sri	Lankan	army) .	The	government	
says	there’s	shelling	by	the	LTTE,	but	that’s	not	
happening .	The	LTTE	is	shooting	at	people,	and	
there’s	[LTTE]	suicide	bombers	to	scare	them .”	
A	UN	worker	commented:	“Civilians	have	been	
deliberately	shelled .	Probably	the	figures	are	
pretty	high,	maybe	the	same	figure	killed	as	
Srebrenica…	Part	of	the	strategy	is	to	shell	
civilians	to	move	them	around .	I	guess	10,000	
lives	lost	and	thousands	maimed .”	In	an	open	
letter	to	the	IMF	on	May	13	2009,	Human	Rights	
Watch	noted,	“According	to	the	United	Nations,	
as	of	late	April	more	than	6,500	civilians	have	
been	killed	and	more	than	13,000	wounded	in	
the	conflict	area	since	January	2009 .	Given	the	
intense	fighting	over	the	past	two	weeks,	those	
numbers	will	have	increased	significantly .“90
A	second	factor	encouraging	movement	to	
Vavuniya	was	the	restriction	of	supplies	(includ-
ing	food	supplies)	moving	into	the	Vanni	over	
a	significant	period .	One	NGO	worker	made	
an	explicit	connection	between	the	drying	up	
of	food	supplies	and	the	migration:	“From	Oc-
tober	2008,	the	convoys	were	very	good,	and	
NGOs	tried	to	bring	in	food	through	the	GA	
convoys .	But	then	permission	to	go	by	road	was	
not	there .	People	started	to	come	to	Vavuniya .”	
Another	aid	worker	commented:	“The	
condition	of	IDPs	is	increasingly	worse	and	
worse	the	more	they	stay	in	the	no	fire	zone .	80	
per	cent	of	medical	problems	are	surgical	cas-
es .	Malnutrition	is	becoming	more	and	more	of	
a	problem .”
We	have	seen	that	even	the	convoys	had	
met	only	around	40	per	cent	—	at	best	—	of	
the	displaced	peoples’	nutritional	needs,	while	
relief	transported	by	ship	met	only	a	fraction	of	
the	needs	in	February	and	March	2009 .
A	UN	worker	stressed	that	the	govern-
ment’s	emphasis	on	escaping	the	Tigers	had	to	
be	put	into	a	broader	context:	“They	[the	IDPs]	
90 Human Rights Watch Letter to IMF Executive Directors on 
Sri Lanka’s IMF Loan Request, 13 May 2009.
want	to	get	away	from	the	LTTE	and	the	conflict	
zone .	But	they	would	rather	go	to	their	homes .	
There’s	mine	clearance	[needed],	basic	services	
are	none,	a	lack	of	basic	security .	So	it’s	not	re-
alistic	to	ask	for	them	to	stay	in	the	Vanni	right	
now .”	One	representative	of	a	major	donor	said:	
In Vavuniya, the people say they are 
leaving because of, one, shelling, and, 
two, hunger. It’s the same thing on 
medicines — the government has a 
longstanding policy of not allowing 
antibiotics, ostensibly because they 
wouldn’t want it to fall into LTTE hands 
and treat their war-wounded, and the 
same with anaesthetics.
A	local	aid	worker	gave	a	similar	analysis:	
“Why	did	they	not	send	food	to	the	Vanni	if	it’s	
a	humanitarian	war?	People	are	not	willing	to	
come	here	[to	Vavuniya],	but	continuous	shell-
ing,	heavy	damage	and	no	food	or	medicine	
make	the	people	come	out .”
A	third	factor	encouraging	the	movement	
to	Vavuniya	was	the	government	policy	of	bus-
sing	people	from	the	Mullaitivu	area,	first	to	
Omanthei	and	then	further	south	to	Vavuniya .	It	
is	not	at	all	clear	that	the	displaced	had	the	op-
tion	of	not catching	the	buses .	One	aid	worker,	
a	veteran	of	many	emergencies,	said	“The	
people	want	to	get	away	from	the	LTTE,	but	
then	they	have	to	go	with	the	army .	The	military	
put	people	on	buses,	but	it’s	not	voluntary,	not	
at	all .”	One	senior	government	administrator	
hinted	at	this	problem	by	noting,	“People	are	
coming	[to	Vavuniya],	I	don’t	know	if	wilfully,	
transporting	by	buses .”
A	fourth	factor	encouraging	mass	move-
ment	to	Vavuniya	has	been	information	control .	
In	particular,	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	
people	were	not	told	the	whole	story	about	
the	camps	in	Vavuniya	—	notably	the	lack	of	
freedom	of	movement	for	those	inside .	One	
aid	worker	in	Vavuniya,	for	example,	stressed	
that	the	displaced	were	shocked	by	what	they	
found	in	Vavuniya,	especially	the	internment:	“‘If	
we’d	known	what	was	coming,	we’d	never	have	
come .’	You	hear	that	all	the	time .”	
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Significantly,	some	IDPs	do	appear	to	have	
anticipated	the	reception	they	would	get	—	and	
this	seems	to	have	been	one	factor	helping	to	
reinforce	LTTE	“control”	over	civilians .	Whilst	
acknowledging	that	LTTE	intimidation	was	the	
main	reason	for	civilians	not	fleeing	the	Mullaiti-
vu	area,	a	February	2009	Human	Rights	Watch	
report	noted	that	many	civilians	were	reluctant	
to	flee	because	of	fears	of	their	life	and	safety	
in	the	hands	of	government	forces;	as	one	relief	
worker	commented:	
If people knew that there was ICRC or 
other international agency waiting for 
them on the other side, thousands, 
virtually all of them, would have run 
for safety, even if it meant breaking 
through LTTE cordons. But risking your 
life to end up in government detention 
— not many are willing to do this.91
In	Vavuniya	district,	the	displaced	were	
confined	in	camps	behind	barbed	wire	and	un-
able	to	move	to	friends	or	relatives	or	to	pursue	
any	economic	strategies	beyond	the	camps .	
In	effect,	the	displaced	have	in	effect	been	
interned	in	camps	in	Vavuniya .	One	senior	aid	
worker	commented:	“There	is	little	freedom	
of	movement;	all	the	camps	are	barbed	wire…	
Families	get	separated	at	screening	centres	and	
it’s	very	difficult	to	get	families	together	again .”	
Another	aid	worker	commented:	“Firewood	
will	run	out .	When	people	are	desperate,	the	
army	surrounds	them	and	allows	them	to	go	
out	into	the	bush	around	here .”	Military	officials	
have	claimed	that	the	barbed	wire	is	there	to	
protect	those	in	the	camp	from	the	LTTE .92	One	
aid	worker	mentioned	this	interpretation	but	
stressed	that	the	location	of	concertina	wire	on	
the	inside of	the	fence	indicates	it	is	there	to	
keep	people	in .	A	fourth	aid	worker	comment-
ed:	“Ninety	per	cent	have	family	they	could	go	
91 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February, p. 28.
92 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February, p. 32.
to	—	if	not	in	Vavunya,	then	elsewhere .”	The	
military	in	Vavuniya	told	us	that	freedom	of	
movement	would	come	in	gradually .
Self-help	was	being	actively	discouraged .	
As	one	aid	worker	noted:
You have masons, bakers, competent 
people. But the Sri Lankan govern-
ment will not allow any agencies to 
employ people from the camps. They 
say they’re sending them to techni-
cal school to teach them a trade, but 
many already have a trade. If they want 
bread, give them an oven to make it or 
bricks to make an oven!... They don’t 
let you work with IDPs, forming com-
mittees, like for food distribution. They 
won’t allow it.
There	was	a	major	sense	of	crisis	as	unex-
pectedly	large	numbers	of	internally	displaced	
people	flooded	into	the	town .	An	IDMC	(In-
ternational	Displacement	Monitoring	Centre)	
report	noted	that,	“Over	150,000	IDPs	had	
managed	to	flee	the	Vanni	between	November	
2008	and	April	2009 .	They	were	being	housed	in	
camps	and	sites	in	the	government-controlled	
districts	of	Vavuniya,	Mannar,	Trincomalee	and	
Jaffna .”93	By	April,	the	influx	into	Vavuniya	was	
extremely	rapid .	People	were	crammed	into	
small	areas	with	inadequate	or	non-existent	
toilet	facilities	and	a	lack	of	clean	water .	The	
hospital	was	severely	overcrowded .	One	aid	
worker	observed:	“The	hospital	is	choked	with	
people	with	missing	limbs .	It	has	2,000	people	
and	is	designed	for	450	patients .”	Another	aid	
worker	noted:
People are being discharged from 
Vavuniya hospital who shouldn’t be, 
and they’re being discharged into 
camps… C-sections [cesarian sections] 
are normal in this country, but women 
are being discharged after three days 
— there’s so much risk of infection… 
There’s no list of patients. People just 
93 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009.
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disappear from the hospital and you 
don’t know who’s gone.
Looking	back	on	the	mass	influx	into		
Vavuniya,	a	local	NGO	worker	noted	in	Septem-
ber	2009:	
We could have been better prepared 
to face the emergency. WFP, the gov-
ernment, the NGO community — get-
ting ready as a coordinated effort was 
neglected. WFP staff were preoccupied 
with supplying food to the no fire zone. 
The government figure [for those who 
would come out] was very low, maybe 
100,000, and then there were 290,000!
Aid	workers	stressed	there	was	a	desire	to	
keep	the	displaced	away	from	the	rest	of	the	
population .	When	we	asked	a	senior	civilian	of-
ficial	about	the	lack	of	freedom	of	movement,	
there	was	an	evident	concern	to	protect	the	
resident	population	of	Vavuniya:	“There	are	
200,000	civilians	in	Vavuniya	already .	There	is	
not	any	industrial	activity .	The	IDPs	can’t	do	cul-
tivation	—	they	don’t	have	land .”
Whilst	Vavuniya	has	been	severely	over-
crowded,	establishing	a	“spill-over	area”	has	
been	fraught	with	difficulties .	One	NGO	worker	
observed,	“…	the	[current]	idea	of	getting	
more	IDPs	into	Mannar,	one	minute	it’s	on,	one	
minute	off .	It	seems	the	Minister	of	Defence	
wants	everyone	in	Vavuniya .”
Closely	related	to	the	policy	of	internment	
is	the	weakness	of	screening	processes .	This	is	
a	particular	worry	in	view	of	the	history	of	gov-
ernment-related	disappearances	of	those	sus-
pected	or	accused	of	links	to	the	LTTE .94	Such	
screening	as	has	occurred	seems	to	have	been	
pretty	superficial .95	One	NGO	worker	noted:	
94 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org). On 
these disappearances, see for example International Crisis 
Group, 2009, “Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province,” 16 April.
95 NRC Sri Lanka, April 2009, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 6.
There isn’t a thorough screening proc-
ess. If there was a thoughtful and clear 
procedure, for example in Omanthei, 
then we’d be in a much better position 
to negotiate for freedom of movement 
— not necessarily full resettlement but 
for example day passes and some abil-
ity to leave the camps. So long as that 
screening is not done properly, they 
can say they need restrictions on the 
camps. Being able to achieve anything 
in these circumstances is very difficult.
Along	similar	lines,	a	UN	worker	noted	in	
April:	
The screening process doesn’t exist in 
any sense that it has an end-point… 
You need to check, but show us that 
system! People are sitting under sur-
veillance for a year. If there was screen-
ing, one single person could say I am 
a combatant or not. That hasn’t hap-
pened. It justifies detaining 200,000 
people96 on the grounds that they are 
a security threat. We bought the line 
that they would show us that [screen-
ing] system.
One	representative	of	a	major	donor	sug-
gested,	“They	haven’t	screened	these	people	
very	well .	They	probably	take	metal	objects	off	
them .	There	are	probably	a	lot	of	ex-combat-
ants	in	these	camps .	So	it	really	is	an	internment	
situation .”	A	UN	worker	suggested	starkly,		
“The	government	think	the	entire	population		
is	pro-revolution .”
Aid	workers	said	screening	began	with	a	
basic	body	search,	then	some	basic	screening	in	
Vallipuram,	then	on	to	Kilinochchi	and	Omanthai	
for	more	basic	screening .	An	official	at	the	Minis-
try	of	Resettlement	and	Disaster	Relief	Services	
acknowledged:	“Screening	is	not	a	very	thor-
ough	process	because	of	such	large	numbers,”	
whilst	a	senior	civil	official	in	Vanuniya	noted	that	
in	practice	there	was	not	much	screening .	
96 Subsequently, the number rose significantly.
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The	rapidity	of	the	influx	and	the	inad-
equacy	of	preparations	gave	the	impression	
that	this	was	a	sudden	and	unexpected	popula-
tion	movement .	However,	the	influx	had	actually	
been	part	of	government	planning .	As	one		
Human	Rights	Watch	report	noted	in		
December	2008:	
In September 2008, the Sri Lankan 
authorities informed the UN and 
humanitarian organizations that they 
were in the process of drawing up 
contingency plans to keep up to 
200,000 displaced people from the 
Vanni in new camps in Vavuniya dis-
trict, in case a mass outflux from the 
Vanni materialised.97 
This	announcement	left	aid	agencies	in	a	
dilemma,	and	the	government	was	presumably	
aware	that	it	would .	If	they	prepared	for	a	ma-
jor	influx,	they	might	be	said	to	be	encouraging	
and	facilitating	the	depopulation	of	the	north .	
This	was	particularly	problematic	as	the	Sri	
Lankan	government	had	not	answered	ques-
tions	on	whether	those	who	were	displaced	to	
Vavuniya	would	enjoy	freedom	of	movement .98	
One	NGO	worker,	speaking	in	April	2009,	em-
phasised	the	practical	problems	created	by	
international	agencies’	reluctance	to	prepare	
for	an	influx:	“We	said	we	had	principles	in	
relation	to	the	camps,	not	preparing	the	land	
and	we	won’t	build	before	the	IDPs	are	here .	
We	were	strict,	and	now	have	more	problems .”	
There	was	also	a	significant	problem	with	the	
government	not	allocating	land	to	receive	peo-
ple .	One	UN	worker	commented:
It’s a protection emergency. They have 
interned the entire civilian population 
that’s come out of the Vanni, saying 
there are security reasons for not hav-
97 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 17.
98 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 17. 
ing freedom of movement. Security 
is such a big factor. They wouldn’t 
allocate land to us. We are finding our-
selves in a situation as though it came 
out of nowhere.
Adding	to	the	difficulties	of	providing	as-
sistance,	it	appears,	was	a	reluctance	to	accept	
NGO	help	and	a	claim	by	the	government	that	it	
could	cope	on	its	own .	An	IDMC	report	noted,	
“In	Vavuniya,	the	government	initially	insisted	
that	it	would	take	primary	responsibility	for	the	
IDPs	and	that	there	was	no	need	for	NGOs	to	
become	involved .”99	
Contributing	to	the	lack	of	preparation	was	
a	severe	underestimation	of	the	numbers	in	the	
Vanni	by	powerful	elements	of	the	government .	
One	very	senior	aid	worker	commented,	“The	
government	believed	its	own	propaganda	on	
numbers	—	the	70,000 .	It	fell	in	with	the	military	
figures .”	The	UN	worker	complaining	about	lack	
of	land	allocation	added:
Since September last year [that is, 
September 2008], agencies were told 
they need to leave the Vanni. The gov-
ernment said we will bring everyone 
to Vavuniya and it was saying there 
are only 70,000 there [in the Vanni]. 
They said the UN was exaggerating 
[the numbers] and that LTTE is always 
exaggerating to get more resources. 
Since then [September 2008], we are 
starting to prepare. We try to discour-
age displacement so as not to create 
a city so people will come, but we at 
least try to get land, clear the land. 
We’ve been saying this since Septem-
ber. The consequences now are no 
draining, no toilets, last night it rained 
[in Vavuniya], no road, the ground is 
not level. The first people were com-
ing in November 2008. It’s not like 
there hasn’t been warning.
99 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.
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One	aid	worker	in	Vavuniya,	who	had		
given	considerable	attention	to	the	numbers	
issue,	commented:	
CIMIC [Sri Lanka’s Civil Military Coop-
eration unit] said there were 432,000 
citizens in the Vanni. This was in Octo-
ber-November 2008. There were some 
losses of life. Perhaps 370,000 were left 
in the Vanni late November, 365,000 
with those who went to Jaffna. The 
army agreed — 400,000 was written 
on the whiteboard [that is, the military 
whiteboard] in November 2008, I saw 
it. Now the army has been saying a 
maximum of 70,000. There’s been no 
census in the Vanni since 1983. Some 
of our esteemed colleagues took the 
70,000 figure too much, didn’t question 
it. It’s a big reason why preparation is 
so bad now.
The	figure	of	365,000	is	not	so	far	from	
the	abovementioned	of	total	of	348,102	given	
by	the	Government	Agents	of	Mullaitivu	and	
Kilinochchi	districts .
Particularly	with	the	focus	of	the	war	shift-
ing	towards	the	coast	of	Mullaitivu	district,	there	
was	an	opportunity	to	increase	road	deliveries .	
But	this	was	neglected .	One	aid	worker	said	in	
April	2009,	“The	government	has	not	allowed	
food	to	go	to	Kilinochchi,”	adding	that	the	food	
was	in	stock	and	could	be	moved	there .	At	a	
major	aid	coordination	meeting	in	Vavuniya	on	
April	22	2009,	the	lack	of	food	in	Omanthai	was	
raised	as	a	major	problem .	The	government	was	
handling	feeding	there .	One	aid	worker	with	
good	knowledge	of	the	situation	in	Omanthai	
commented:	“The	food	and	water	situation	is	
uncertain .	It	looks	like	people	didn’t	eat	in	Val-
lypuram .	People	are	starving	in	Omanthai,	no	
water,	food,	exhaustion .	2-3	people	died .”	
Security	obstacles	should	not	have	been	
prohibitive,	this	aid	worker	emphasised:	“Just	
after	the	no	fire	zone,	there’s	a	risk	of	suicide	
attacks	but	it’s	OK	beyond	that .	We	should	be	
present	to	give	water	and	food .”	One	senior	
UN	worker	commented	that	there	was	no	good	
reason	that	WFP	could	not	be	in	Kilinochchi	and	
Omanthai,	pointing	out	that	the	road	was	being	
used	for	civilians	coming	out	of	the	area .
A	national	aid	worker	commented:	“They’re	
sending	15-20	buses	a	day .	People	don’t	have	
food,	water	facilities,	elderly	and	injured	peo-
ple .	300	buses	are	at	Omanthai .	The	situation	
is	much	worse	there	than	here .”	A	senior	aid	
worker	noted	that	21	elderly	people	had	died	
in	Omanthai	the	previous	day,	apparently	from	
exhaustion .	Problems	were	compounded	when	
buses	were	returned	from	Vavuniya	to	Omanthai .	
As	one	aid	worker	noted:	“They	put	them	in	
buses	in	Omanthai .	Some	20,000	are	in	Oman-
thai	now .	A	lot	came	to	transit	centres	in	buses	
and	didn’t	find	any	space,	so	they	had	to	go	back	
to	Omanthai .”	In	an	article	for	the	respected	Sri	
Lankan	think-tank,	the	Centre	for	Policy	Alterna-
tives,”	Sanjana	Hattotuwa	noted:	“A	court	order	
issued	April	[that]	I	got	via	email	from	the	Vavuni-
ya	District	Magistrate	Court	flagged	up	30	cases	
in	IDP	camps	where	senior	citizens	had	passed	
away	due	to	the	starvation	and	malnutrition	and	
without	any	special	care .”100
Distribution	systems	were	also	a	problem .	
One	aid	worker	commented	on	Omanthai	in	
particular:	“There	is	no	distribution	system .	
The	stronger	ones	get	food,	there	is	a	fight	and	
the	weaker	ones	cannot .”	Even	in	Vavuniya,	the	
feeding	arrangments	were	seen	as	damaging	
for	a	number	of	vulnerable	groups .	One	UN	
worker	noted:
Given mass internment, people’s abil-
ity to supplement is very restricted, 
except if they bribe soldiers, who are 
not too much on the make [that is, not 
much inclined to take bribes]. There are 
150,000 you need to fully support. WFP 
is providing a basic food basket, but 
the food may be culturally inappropri-
ate, a lack of variety, or not tasty. The 
government has always had a policy of 
100 Sanjana Hattotuwa, 2009, “Cartography of shame,” 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, 17 May.
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giving cooked meals. This emergency 
has been going three months and 
they are still doing communal cook-
ing. It doesn’t allow decisions on who 
eats first in a family. It’s very clear that 
the most vulnerable are finding it dif-
ficult to access food in the camps. A 
woman with a 20-day-old baby — if I 
have no family members, it’s necessary 
to go and wait in line and scuffle and 
try to get my food, so I’ll miss meals 
regularly. The are no separate lines or 
cooking areas for the most vulnerable. 
The government has reliable registra-
tion data. They have data on women 
with small children etc., but they don’t 
share with WFP or UNHCR. Coopera-
tion with the government is very poor... 
Pregnant women are also vulnerable, 
and the elderly. They don’t have the 
stamina, with months of not having ac-
cess to food in the Vanni, they are very 
weak, dehydrated. There are recorded 
instances of preventable deaths.101
Commenting	on	the	problems	in	Vavuniya	
arising	from	the	low	population	estimate	of	
70,000,	one	aid	worker	commented,	“They	can	
always	blame	it	on	us	—	there’s	nothing	in	writ-
ing .”	In	general,	government	officials	tended	
to	play	down	problems	in	the	north	and	among	
those	entering	Vavuniya,	whether	this	was	pro-
tection	problems,	malnutrition	or	disease .102	
The Question of Speedy  
Population Return
Given	that	the	displaced	population	is	basi-
cally	being	interned	in	Vavuniya,	the	need	to	
101 One local NGO worker said the quality of the dahl 
provided was very low and that it would have been more 
culturally appropriate to provide unpolished brown rice than 
white rice. 
102 Human Rights Watch noted: “… the humanitarian plight 
of the Vanni displaced population has greatly concerned 
neighbouring India, with a large Tamil population in Tamil 
Nadu state; lowering the figures of affected persons may be 
an attempt to limit Indian pressure.” (Human Rights Watch, 
2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and Detained: The Plight of 
Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” December, p. 24)
facilitate	a	quick	and	safe	return	from	Vavuniya	
to	areas	further	north	becomes	all	the		
more	urgent .
Civil	and	military	officials	stressed	that	the	
Sri	Lankan	government	sees	this	task	as	urgent	
but	that	the	government	faces	severe	con-
straints,	notably	in	de-mining .	One	senior	civil-
ian	official	stressed	that	work	to	allow	people	
to	return	had	already	begun:	“We	have	started	
reconstruction	of	the	A9	[road],	hospitals,	build-
ings,	schools	and	other	administrative	blocks,”	
adding,	“The	problem	of	demining,	the	army	
will	do	it	very	quickly .”	Although	the	official	line	
is	that	the	LTTE	was	being	comprehensively	
routed	in	the	north-east,	there	seems	to	be	an	
awareness	that	pockets	of	LTTE	resistance	will	
remain .	This	may	another	reason	to	discourage	
resettlement .	One	NGO	worker	commented,	
“The	government	stress	the	need	for	de-mining	
and	that	there	might	be	clusters	of	LTTE	and	
they	need	to	be	cleared	out .”
When	we	asked	when	it	would	be	possible	
for	people	to	return,	answers	were	generally	
vague .	For	example,	a	senior	military	officer	
said,	“That’s	a	very	difficult	question	to	answer .	
De-mining	is	necessary .”	Others	reiterated	the	
view	that	the	population	would	be	returned	to	
the	north	as	soon	as	possible	and	that	explod-
ed	mines	were	a	major	obstacle .	One	official	at	
the	Ministry	of	Resettlement	and	Disaster	Relief	
Services	told	us:	“People	were	all	under	the	
control	of	the	LTTE,	100,000	people .	As	soon	
as	possible,	they	will	be	resettled .	The	area	is	
heavily	mined .	De-mining	has	to	be	done .	The	
process	has	already	started	in	Mannar	and	at	
the	end	of	the	month	it	should	be	done	there .”	
In	fact,	experience	in	Mannar	has	not	been	par-
ticularly	encouraging .	One	aid	worker	whose	
organisation	was	working	in	Mannar	said:	“In	
Mannar	it	took	ages	for	organisations	to	do	de-
mining,	partly	because	of	army	authorisations…	
It	took	six	months	for	these	people	to	go	back .”	
Some	people	are	still	in	camps	there,	moreo-
ver .	One	man	who	had	been	working	in	Mannar	
observed,	“People	have	been	more	than	one	
year	in	camps	in	Mannar,	and	movement	is	re-
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stricted .”	Another	aid	worker	gave	more	details	
on	the	restrictions	in	Mannar:	“If	one	member	
of	a	family	is	going,	you	had	to	leave	the	rest	of	
the	family	members	in	the	camps .	It’s	affected	
access	to	schools,	even	university	and	hospi-
tals,	for	a	single	person .”	He	added	that	restric-
tions	had	loosened	to	the	point	where	leaving	
one	member	of	a	family	behind	was	sometimes	
acceptable,	but	said	this	was	still	a	major	prob-
lem	for	anyone	without	family	present .	Another	
aid	worker	added,	“They	have	no-one	to	serve	
as	“collateral .”103
One	representative	of	a	major	donor	was	
also	sceptical	about	the	government’s	resettle-
ment	plans:	
In Sri Lanka, we’ve seen some IDPs in 
camps for many years. There’s currently 
a caseload under SO1 of 433,000 peo-
ple. Many IDPs are in camps for a year 
or more, so they’re not meeting the US 
government definition of an emergen-
cy. Many can’t go home because of the 
government and when that’s the case, 
it’s not incumbent on the international 
community to feed them. It’s up to the 
government… The UN ought to be 
working with the government for a real-
istic resettlement strategy. In February 
2009, the government said 80 per cent 
would go home by end-2009. It’s clear 
now that that’s not going to happen. 
Now is the time the government can 
and should develop a returns strategy 
and WFP ought to be part of that.
An	aid	worker	based	in	Trincomalee	com-
mented:	“Two	years	from	now	when	it’s	not	on	
the	front	page,	resettlement	is	going	to	be	a	
103 A Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) report noted, “Two 
camps at Kalimoddai and Sirikundel in Mannar have been 
in existence since March 2008, and house approximately 
900 IDPs, only a small fraction of whom have been allowed 
to leave permanently. To leave, they have to obtain a pass 
for a specific purpose from the army and have a family 
member act as guarantor.” (CPA, “A profile of human rights 
and humanitarian issues in the Vanni and Vavuniya,” March 
2009, 40, cited IDMC [International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing 
severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 6).
big	problem .”	Along	similar	lines,	a	UN	worker	
noted:	“There’s	current	coverage,	yes,	but	how	
long	will	it	last?	People	in	camps	will	be	forgot-
ten	—	just	like	at	Puttalam	where	there	have	
been	camps	for	15	years .”	In	fact,	there	are	
over	60,000	IDPs	living	in	more	than	140	camps	
in	Puttalam	and	these	camps	have	existed	
since	1990 .104	Meanwhile,	in	Jaffna,	many	IDPs	
have	been	unable	to	return	home	after	their	
land	was	declared	to	fall	within	government-
designated	High	Security	Zones .105	On	the	
other	hand,	resettlement	from	the	Eastern	
Province	has	been	far-going	(and	indeed	there	
were	pressures	to	return .106
The	priority	given	by	the	government	to	
establishing	of	relief	villages	made	many	aid	
workers	sceptical	about	the	urgency	with	which	
resettlement	was	being	contemplated .	As	one	
NGO	worker	put	it:	“Everyone	has	been	under	
huge	pressure	to	contribute	to	the	construc-
tion	of	these	villages…	The	idea	of	relief	vil-
lages	is	that	people	are	to	be	housed	for	2-3	
years	and	we’re	saying	focus	on	three	months	
and	monitor	it	and	see	what	we	learn	from	it .”	
Another	aid	worker	noted,	“The	international	
community	is	sticking	to	a	three	month	time-
line,	and	maybe	another	three	months .	The	
government’s	initial	plan	was	for	1-3	year	model	
villages .	Manik	Farm	was	going	to	be	the	
model .”	While	more	temporary	shelter	was	in	
practice	also	set	up,	a	senior	civilian	official	told	
us	that	three	villages	on	the	Manik	Farm	model	
104 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 9. The displaced in 
Puttalam have been receiving rations from WFP and the 
government. There has been some local integration; but the 
government resists this, saying the displaced will one day 
return to their homes (p. 9). 
105 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 1.
106 IDMC commented, “In the Eastern Province, where there 
had been massive displacement in 2006 and 2007, almost all 
the IDPs had returned to their areas of origin, with exceptions 
including those whose land had been designated as a High 
Security Zone by the government.” (IDMC [International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre], “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 1). 
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were	indeed	being	planned .107	A	January	2009	
document	from	the	Ministry	of	Resettlement	
and	Disaster	Relief	Services	makes	the	gov-
ernment’s	intentions	pretty	plain:	“Since	the	
incoming	IDPs	[in	Vavuniya]	would	be	large	in	
numbers	and	expected	to	stay	relatively	long-
er	period	(2-3	years),	welfare	villages	will	be	
established	with	semi	permanent	structures	
which	include	shelters	and	other	facilities…	 .”108
The	facilities	planned	included	temples,	
churches	and	libraries	—	no	doubt	useful,	but	
not	the	kind	of	thing	one	would	associate	with	
a	short-term	stay .
Several	aid	workers	voiced	a	suspicion	
that	some	kind	of	permanent	or	semi-perma-
nent	demographic	change	might	be	intended,	
and	both	political	and	economic	reasons	were	
put	forward	for	such	a	process .	One	local	
NGO	worker,	who	echoed	others’	emphasis	
on	the	lack	of	resettlement	from	camps	in	
Mannar,	pointed	to	a	number	of	reasons	for	
government	actors	to	oppose	resettlement	to	
the	north:	
The government is planning to keep 
the people in the area for more than 
three years. The reasons? First, you 
can destroy the financial capacity of 
the Tamils. Second. If they have no 
purchasing power, they have to get 
out and lose our education and lose 
strong children and have malnour-
ished children. Our total generation 
will be spoiled, and you can treat thee 
guys as slaves. Third, the opportunity 
to bring all the wealth from the Vanni, 
timber, coconuts, we can abandon 
our area… The sea is our big re-
source, pearl in the Mussali area. In 
future, they can do resettlement for 
Sinhalese families. In Mannar most of 
107 See also Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief 
Services, 2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of 
Vanni,” January.
108 Ministry of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, 
2009, “Urgent Relief Programme for the People of Vanni,” 
January.
the area was cleared [that is, of LTTE] in 
2006, but they still did not do any re-
settlement [of the displaced] in almost 
two years. You can easily do mine clear-
ance. Do they need two years to do the 
mine clearing?
An	international	aid	worker	also	empha-
sised	that	economic	value	of	the	Vanni	might	
impede	resettlement .	He	noted,	“The	north	is	
the	breadbasket	of	the	country .	It	was	produc-
ing	60	per	cent	of	the	rice .”109
A	senior	UN	worker	said:	“Some	IDP	cen-
tres	are	semi-permanent .	Some	suspect	the	
government	is	trying	to	go	for	demographic	
change .”	An	NGO	worker	said,	“Eventually,	re-
population	[of	the	Vanni]	might	be	three	to	five	
years .	There	might	be	some	ethnic	re-composi-
tion .”	He	believed	that	the	government’s	strat-
egy	was	to	keep	the	guerrillas	separate	from	the	
Tamil	population	and	to	exercise	close	control	
over	the	latter:	“The	view	is,	keep	the	fish	away	
from	the	water,	they’ll	fade	away .”	Another	aid	
worker	said	the	burying	of	PVC	pipes	at	“semi-
permanent	settlements”	suggested	they	were	
actually	intended	as	permanent .	He	added,	
“The	long-term	aim	is	to	break	them	[the	Tamil	
population]	psychologically .	Manik	Farm	has	tin	
roofs	—	they’re	sweathouses,110	plus	the	lack	of	
freedom	of	movement .”
Significantly,	the	poor	protection	environ-
ment	was	damaging	the	funding	of	humanitar-
ian	operations .	A	senior	UN	worker	noted	that	
donor	government	scepticism	on	protection	
issues	and	resettlement	was	inhibiting	their	
funding	of	aid	operations:	“Humanitarian	
agencies,	others	haven’t	got	too	much .	You’re	
talking	about	5-20	per	cent	funding .	WFP	is	
close	to	59-60	per	cent	funding .”	When	I	asked	
why	the	figures	were	so	low	for	most	agencies,	
he	replied:	
109 On the importance of the north as the “rice basket” of Sri 
Lanka, see WFP, 2006, “Emergency Food Security Assessment, 
Vanni, Sri Lanka, October, p. 9; and WFP, Internal situation 
report, March 27 2009, p. 1.
110 See also Sanjana Hattotuwa, “Cartography of shame,” 17 
May 2009, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo.
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Donors have no faith in the handling 
of IDPs and protection issues are not 
being addressed. Donors want settle-
ments to be temporary and a roadmap 
to the IDPs’ return. The government 
has no roadmap. Defence people say it 
will take longer than other representa-
tives, different stories.
In	September	2009,	a	local	NGO	worker	
stressed	the	urgency	of	dealing	with	conges-
tion	in	the	camps,	emphasising	that	creating	
new	smaller	camps	was	not	the	answer	whilst	a	
strong	advocacy	campaign	from	the	UN	system	
was	essential:	
260,000 are being kept in camps. It’s 
internment and not acceptable. The 
screening process is unending… It’s 
very difficult to predict what numbers 
will be in camps by the end of the year. 
The government is not willing to share 
any schedule. The monsoon rains are 
fast approaching and we fear that we 
will not be able to prevent an impend-
ing disaster…111 Relieving the conges-
tion in the camps is still not happening 
on a large scale. Even those who are 
taken out are still kept in temporary 
camps in their districts rather than be-
ing released to their relations or friends, 
as claimed by the government. We are 
asked to food these people in these 
new camps and we do not have resourc-
es and we also face an ethical dilemma. 
Another	local	aid	worker,	speaking	in	Sep-
tember	2009,	said:	“The	UN	says	it’s	providing	
shelter	for	120,000	people,	but	260,000	are	oc-
cupying	those	shelters,	so	people	are	living	in	
overcrowded	tents .	Woman	are	mingling	with	a	
lot	of	strangers	and	people	they	don’t	know .	It’s	
very,	very	unhealthy	to	say	the	least .”
111 The possibility of major disease outbreaks was stressed 
by other local NGO workers. One said in September 2009, 
“We are facing the monsoon. When the rain comes, the water 
systems will all get clogged. The water purification system 
can’t handle it.” 
Advocacy And Humanitarian 
Priorities 
We	did	encounter	some	praise	for	UN	ad-
vocacy	efforts .	Most	strikingly,	one	NGO	worker	
commented,	“To	be	honest,	the	UN	did	well	in	
terms	of	advocacy	—	answering	to	the	needs,	
and	in	parallel,	advocacy .”	
Levels	of	advocacy	and	interest	were	seen	
has	having	increased	significantly	with	the	crisis	
in	the	“no	fire	zone”	in	the	first	five	months	of	
2009	and	the	mass	influx	into	Vavuniya .	As	one	
UN	worker	observed,	“It’s	not	just	statements	
between	the	agencies	here .	You	get	something	
from	the	Secretary	General,	something	from	
the	High	Commission	for	Human	Rights,	a	lot	of	
high-level	interest	recently .”	The	UN	Secretary	
General’s	special	representative	on	Internally	
Displaced	Persons	Walter	Kaelin	called	for	free-
dom	of	movement	for	the	IDPs .	UN	Under-sec-
retary	general	for	humanitarian	affairs	Sir	John	
Holmes,	who	visited	in	February	and	April	2009,	
repeatedly	called	for	a	temporary	ceasefire	and	
for	improved	humanitarian	access	and	he	called	
on	the	LTTE	and	the	government	to	avoid	use	
of	heavy	weapons .	There	were	also	visits	from	
the	UN	Secretary	General	Ban	ki-Moon,	who	
criticised	the	government’s	use	of	heavy	weap-
onry,	in	civilian	areas	and	from	the	Secretary-
General’s	chef	de	cabinet	Vijay	Nambiar .
Some	states	including	France,	the	US	and	
Britain	increased	their	pressure	on	Sri	Lanka	as	
the	crisis	in	Mullaitivu	worsened	in	April	2009 .	
But	in	New	York	the	issue	remained	relegated	
to	informal	statements	and	unofficial	meetings	
taking	place	not	in	the	Security	Council	cham-
ber	but	in	the	basement	of	the	UN	building .	
Important	states	opposing	engagement	by	the	
Security	Council	have	included	China,	Russia,	
Libya,	Vietnam	and	Japan .112	
Despite	some	recognition	of	increased		
interest,	most	of	those	we	interviewed	were	
very	critical	of	the	advocacy	effort	over	a	pro-
longed	period .	
112 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).
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Weighing Advocacy and Delivery: The 
Wrong Balance?
In	many	crises	around	the	world,	aid	workers	
have	seen	themselves	as	making	difficult,	if	not	
impossible,	decisions	between	prioritising	the	
delivery	of	services,	on	the	one	hand,	and	speak-
ing	up	about	abuses	and	protection	issues,	on	
the	other .	In	academia,	Hugo	Slim	has	expressed	
this	dilemma	very	eloquently,	and	has	suggested	
that	there	is	often	a	strong	case	for	prioritising	
the	provision	of	an	immediate	and	knowable	
benefit	(delivering	services)	over	the	hope	of	a	
longer-term	and	essentially	unknowable	benefit	
(through	advocacy) .113	In	Sri	Lanka	(as	in	other	
countries	undergoing	conflict-related	disasters),	
getting	the	balance	right	has	been	difficult .	
We	heard	some	aid	workers	express	the	
fear	that	their	ability	to	deliver	relief	would	be	
impeded	by	advocacy,	particularly	if	this	took	
the	form	of	public	criticism .	But	before	conclud-
ing	that	advocacy	can	reasonably	be	sacrificed	
to	delivery,	three	important	points	are	worth	
stressing .	First,	it	is	noteworthy	that	several	of	
those	interviewed	in	Sri	Lanka	felt	that	a	prioriti-
sation	of	delivery	over	advocacy	had	ultimately	
had	very	adverse	affects	for	the	protection	of	
target	populations,	and	had	actually	done	lit-
tle	to	enhance	staff	security	or	even	the	ability	
to	deliver	relief	goods	and	services .	In	fact,	
the	amount	of	“humanitarian	space”	in	which	
aid	agencies	could	operate	was	perceived	as	
having	shrunk	alongside	a	series	of	conces-
sions	to	the	Sri	Lankan	government .	Second,	in	
practice	decision-making	has	not	been	simply	
a	question	of	weighing	delivery	against	advo-
cacy .	Many	other	considerations	have	come	
into	play,	including	geopolitical	concerns	and	
organisational	or	bureaucratic	interests .	These	
considerations	underline	the	possibility	that	the	
balance	between	advocacy	and	delivery	may	
not	have	been	optimal	from	the	point	of	view	of	
the	target	population .	A	third	consideration	is	
113 Hugo Slim, 1997, “Doing the Right Thing: Relief 
Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in 
Political Emergencies and War,” Disasters, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 
244-257.
the	signal	that	may	be	sent	internationally	when	
humanitarian	principles	are	compromised	in	the	
pursuit	of	access	adjust	structure	of	this	section .
We	have	noted	the	perceived	shrinkage	
of	“humanitarian	space .”	Some	concessions	
were	not	immediately	damaging	to	target	
populations	but	may	nevertheless	have	been	
significant	in	allowing	the	government	to	send	a	
signal	of	its	power,	whilst	also	sending	a	signal	
to	the	government	that	it	could	go	even	further .	
One	such	may	have	been	allowing	government	
soldiers	to	search	UN	vehicles,	notably	at	Meda-
vachchiya,	just	south	of	Vavuniya .	
More	fundamentally,	the	international	
community’s	willingness	to	support	a	peaceful	
solution	to	Sri	Lanka’s	long-running	civil	war	was	
repeatedly	called	into	question .	This	is	com-
plicated	and	cannot	be	examined	in	any	detail	
here .	One	critic	of	international	approaches	to	
peacemaking	in	Sri	Lanka	has	observed:
In June 2003 donors pledged US $4.5 
billion in reconstruction aid for the “en-
tire” country, but only the (unspecified) 
amount destined for the war-shattered 
northeast was made conditional on 
“progress” in the peace process. 
Outside these pledges, bilateral and 
multilateral aid to the state continued… 
By not recognising that rising violence 
was a cycle of retaliation between army-
backed paramilitaries and the LTTE, 
international actors denounced the 
latter’s intransigence and saw the state 
as tolerant and applied sanctions and 
incentives accordingly. Indeed, LTTE 
protests that violence was sustained by 
ongoing state support for paramilitaries 
in contravention of the CFA [Ceasefire 
Agreement] were not taken seriously by 
the international community until late 
2006, long after the shadow war had 
become open (if undeclared) war.114
114 Suthaharan Nadarajah, “Prejudice, asymmetry and 
insecurity,” Conciliation Resources, London, p. 1-2 (http://
www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/incentives/asymmetry.php).
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One	local	UN	worker	recalled:	
There were lots of conditions for agen-
cies to work after the east was liber-
ated. That’s when the state saw how 
far it could push. NGOs were told they 
have to do provision of services and 
not human rights work… If one agency 
refuses to engage, another will go in. 
That’s a problem.
A	UN	worker	with	prolonged	experience	of	
the	country	said	the	Sri	Lankan	government	had	
been	emboldened	by	international	quietude	
over	the	ejection	of	the	ceasefire	monitoring	
mission	in	January	2008:
We should have had a bigger protest 
when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
was asked to leave [in January 2008]. 
They were monitoring the ceasefire. 
Nobody did anything, and after a while 
I think the Sri Lanka government got 
very bold because nobody was stand-
ing up to them.
This	theme	of	emboldening	the	govern-
ment	was	to	be	echoed	by	many	of	those	we	
spoke	with .	Certainly,	the	government	felt	bold	
enough	to	eject	humanitarian	agencies	from	the	
north	in	September	2008	(with	the	exception	of	
ICRC	and	CARITAS) .	Further,	some	aid	workers	
saw	the	international	community’s	near-silence	
at	this	expulsion	as	giving	a	“green	light”	to	the	
escalation	of	war .	Asked	if	there	were	protests	
from	influential	international	governments	at	
the	expulsion,	one	experienced	UN	worker	said:	
No, they [the government] have the 
support of the Americans, the Pakista-
nis and the Indians for their strategy. 
The Americans wanted to avoid civilian 
casualties — they pushed to allow the 
humanitarian corridors to go in, but 
only to the extent that it did not conflict 
with war objectives.
One	NGO	worker	who	had	recently	arrived	
in	the	country	recalled	the	evacuation:	
I was surprised and shocked it was 
so easy. It took only a few days. Local 
staff started working for the GA [Gov-
ernment Authority] as volunteers and 
then civil servants. I don’t understand 
why it was so easy to tell everyone 
to leave. Some expats were really 
upset at headquarters in Colombo, 
saying they should have reacted in a 
stronger way.
The	NGO	worker	added	that	given	the	
fighting,	it	would	have	been	very	dangerous	to	
stay,	pointing	out	that	clearly	identifiable	hos-
pitals	had	been	attacked .	However,	the	feeling	
that	more	could	have	been	done	to	protest	the	
expulsions	was	widespread .	Another	aid	work-
er	who	had	been	working	in	Kilinochchi	said,	
“In	August	and	September	2008,	bombs	were	
dropped	from	planes	right	next	door	to	our	
office .	We	were	really	angry .	The	statements	
coming	out	of	Colombo	were	completely	un-
helpful,	including	OCHA/Colombo .”	
The	evacuation	of	aid	agencies	in	Sep-
tember	2008	was	compensated,	to	a	limited	
extent,	by	the	creation	of	a	series	of	road	con-
voys	for	relief,	but	we	have	seen	that	these	
did	not	meet	the	full	extent	of	humanitarian	
need,	even	in	late	2008 .	After	16	January	
2009,	the	convoys	were	no	longer	possible	
because	of	the	escalating	war .
One	UN	aid	worker,	whilst	very	mindful	
of	the	dangers	for	aid	agency	operations	of	
speaking	out	too	publicly	or	boldly,	said:	
There’s a different level of negotia-
tion that actually becomes begging. 
There’s a need for stronger advocacy 
at all levels. We say, “No, we can-
not be searched.” You protest, then 
you accept. You are a Catholic and a 
Protestant at the same time! First the 
vehicles, then the staff, then the “big 
guns” [visiting dignitaries].
One	UN	aid	worker	said,	“The	bullying	
that	has	gone	on	here	has	been	absolutely	
incredible .	We	have	compromised .	Historians	
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and	academics	will	work	out	whether	it	was	cor-
rect .”	A	third	UN	worker	said:	
There are very few opportunities to 
look back and say “We confronted, 
and it didn’t work.” We’re told we have 
no leverage. I don’t know if that’s true. 
It gets taken from us, and we accept. 
It’s different from saying, “We tried 
other strategies and they failed.” Over-
whelmingly, we decided at all costs to 
stay engaged. It hasn’t worked. It hasn’t 
helped us to protect IDPs and it hasn’t 
helped us to get influence.
The	argument	that	speaking	out	could	
improve	the	protection	environment	was	sup-
ported	with	an	example	from	the	east .	One	UN	
worker	recalled:	
I was working in the east. There were 
forced returns of refugees from Bat-
ticaloa to Trincomalee.115 UNHCR was 
releasing protection information in a 
very controlled way, in bed with the 
government. People were getting 
beaten onto buses, separated. Informa-
tion did get out there, for example via 
OCHA, forcing UNHCR to come out 
with a strong statement. From then on, 
the way returns happened was so much 
better, though there were still abuses.
When	the	relief	convoys	from	October	
2008	were	used	as	cover	for	government	(and	
LTTE)	military	operations,	this	seems	to	have	
drawn	little	or	no	protest .	It	appears	that	silence	
on	this	issue	was	seen	as	the	price	to	pay	for	
getting	relief	delivered .	When	I	asked	an	aid	
worker	who	had	travelled	with	several	convoys	
whether	there	had	been	any	protests	from	the	
UN	at	convoys	being	used	for	military	cover,	he	
115 An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) report 
(“Sri Lanka Fact Sheet — Batticaloa District,” 22 March 2007) 
noted: “Despite Government assurances that all return 
movements will be voluntary, interagency monitoring reports 
indicate that heavy pressure has been applied on IDPs, 
including local authority statements that assistance will be 
stopped if they stay in Batticaloa.”
said,	“There	was	no	protest	from	WFP	because	
they	know	the	LTTE	is	also	using	the	convoys .”	
A	second	aid	worker	who	also	had	experience	
on	the	convoys	said	getting	permission	for	
the	convoys	was	actually	dependent	on	the	
government	being	able	to	use	them	militarily:	
“The	government	cannot	give	a	green	light	if	
they	cannot	ensure	that	they	will	also	take	ad-
vantage .”	Objections	to	the	convoys	from	both	
sides	reportedly	helped	to	create	a	context	in	
which	military	manipulation	by	both	sides	was	
tacitly	accepted .
When	it	came	to	assistance	in	Vavuniya,	
significant	concessions	on	principle	were	made .	
One	such	was	the	decision	to	work	at	the	
government	relief	village	of	Manik	Farm .	One	
aid	worker	said	of	the	Sri	Lankan	government:	
“They	are	clever,	it’s	working .	What	we	refused	
three	month	ago,	we’re	now	accepting .	Manik	
Farm,	with	a	plan	to	detain	for	3-5	years,	we	re-
fused,	but	now	we’re	working	there .”
Interviewees	said	the	boldness	of	the	
government	extended	to	ejecting	individual	
aid	workers	without	giving	reasons	and	to	at-
tempts	to	abolish	the	“cluster	system”	(a	sys-
tem	under	which	different	agencies	take	the	
lead	on	particular	activities	in	accordance		
with	their	expertise) .	One	aid	worker	in	Vavu-
niya	complained:	
They [the government] tried to abolish 
the cluster system. They basically de-
cide what to do, and nobody stands up 
to them. They play the PNG [persona	
non	grata] game. Two CARE people 
were just PNG’d, one had been in the 
country for four years. They had a lot of 
institutional memory. They [the govern-
ment] gave no reason.
Collective	concessions	on	important	hu-
manitarian	principles	may	send	a	signal,	both	
locally	and	internationally,	that	emboldens	
abusive	actors	to	step	up	their	manipulation	of	
aid .	The	same	may	apply	to	a	parallel	manipula-
tion	of	truth .	In	Sri	Lanka,	several	aid	workers	
expressed	strongly	the	view	that	this	process	
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was	taking	place	in	the	country .	One	diplomat	
stressed	the	importance	to	the	government	of	
controlling	information	flows:
There are certain parameters — the 
idea that you must not give in to inter-
national pressure to stop the war, which 
partly has happened before. In the 
1990s, there were so many human rights 
violations in the counterinsurgency that 
it limited the state’s ability to crush the 
insurgency. A paradigm shift now, so 
you use propaganda and state resourc-
es to get support for the war. You have 
an organisation that can hold onto the 
objective of finishing the business. The 
army is not going to rebel — the Presi-
dent’s brother is in charge.
We	may	note	here	that	it	is	not	necessarily	
the	absence	of	human	rights	violations	that	may	
“create	space”	for	eradicating	the	LTTE	but	the	
absence	—	or	near	absence	—	of	information	
on	these	violations .	
Commenting	on	the	Sri	Lankan	govern-
ment’s	success	in	lobbying	for	the	rejection	of	
a	critical	resolution	at	the	UN	Human	Rights	
Council	in	Geneva	and	for	the	adoption	of	a	
complimentary	resolution	on	27	May	2009,		
Sri	Lanka’s	Permanent	Representative	to	the	
United	Nations	in	Geneva,	Dr	Dayan		
Jayatilleka,	observed:	
The attempt to hold a special session 
of the HRC [UN Human Rights Council] 
was on for four weeks. Those driving 
the move wanted to hold it when the 
war was on, and they pushed for it to 
be held on May 14th. They wanted to 
put the international brakes on our final 
offensive. In short they wanted to save 
the Tigers. We thwarted that exercise 
and bought the time and space for our 
armed forces to finish the job.116
116 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand 
up for you,” interview in Waani Operation, June 3 2009 
[wannioperation.com].
Where	untruths	are	not	challenged,	there	is	
always	the	possibility	of	buying	into	them	or	of	
encouraging	others	to	buy	into	them .	One	aid	
worker	mentioned	a	range	of	issues	where	he	
felt	untruths	needed	to	be	challenged:	
When the BP-100 was locked up [the 
vehicle transporti ng these high-energy 
biscuits was detained at Medovach-
chiya], the government accused 
UNICEF of feeding the Tigers to make 
“Supertigers.” Is this not something to 
stand up and refute?117 I feel like it’s got 
progressively worse to the point where 
[Defence Minister] Gotabaya Rajapakse 
can say ridiculous things like not one 
person has been killed in our “humani-
tarian operation.” We’ve made them 
believe there is total impunity. They’ve 
started to believe their own figures. 
We’ve been saying it’s not 70,000 [the 
total number of people in the Vanni]… 
They are in trouble. The situation is go-
ing to get so bad.
Meanwhile,	there	was	considerable	intimi-
dation	of	journalists,	and	reports	on	the	war	
were	consistently	pro-government .	Constraints	
on	journalism	certainly	inhibited	national	and	
international	understanding	of	the	unfolding	
humanitarian	disaster	in	the	north .118
Some	NGO	workers	complained	that	they	
had	had	to	sign	a	Memorandum	of	Understand-
ing	(MOU)	with	the	government	that	prevented	
them	from	speaking	publicly	even	on	the	ade-
quacy	of	relief	services	that	were	being	provided .
Aid	agencies’	reluctance	to	speak	publicly	
on	sensitive	issues	has	even	extended	to	with-
117 A statement from the UN Office of the Resident/
Humanitarian Coordinator noted, “The United Nations 
deplores that such life saving items, destined for severely 
malnourished children, were diverted from their intended 
purpose” (UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator, “UN Sri Lanka Statement,” 10 March 2009, 
Colombo.)
118 On these, see for example International Press Freedom 
and Freedom of Expression Mission to Sri Lanka, 2008, 
“Media under fire: Press freedom lockout in Sri Lanka,” 
December (http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_sri_Lanka.
pdf).
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holding	the	results	of	nutritional	surveys .	(Natu-
rally,	these	surveys	represent	a	basic	foundation	
for	assessing	the	severity	of	humanitarian	emer-
gencies	and	for	matching	assistance	to	needs .)	
Levels	of	malnutrition	among	the	IDPs	in	Vavuni-
ya	do	seem	to	have	been	significant .	One	survey	
of	six	camps	in	early	March	by	Dr	Renuka	Jaya-
tissa	of	Sri	Lanka’s	Medical	Research	Institute	
found	that	more	than	25	per	cent	of	children	
under	five	were	suffering	either	severe	or	mod-
erate	wasting .119	According	to	one	report,	“Mal-
nutrition	among	children	below	the	age	of	five	
in	Mullaitivu	district	has	reached	25	per	cent,	the	
highest	in	the	island .	The	results	are	believed	to	
be	indicative	of	malnutrition	among	children	still	
strapped	in	the	war	zone .”120	Towards	the	end	of	
April	2009,	one	senior	UN	aid	worker	said:
The government is not very coopera-
tive on getting an objective baseline. 
UNICEF did a nutritional assessment 
more than a month ago, and when I ask 
I am told “We’re still finalising and talk-
ing with the government.” We could 
say we will not provide food unless we 
can provide nutritional data with results 
that can be public. They don’t want to 
release nutritional data because they 
don’t want to be accused of having 
starved people inside the Vanni.
Another	UN	aid	worker	said:	“There	are	high	
level	of	malnutrition,	25	per	cent	among	IDPs	in	
Vavuniya .	The	government	won’t	release	it	[the	
recent	UNICEF	survey] .	It	will	be	used	internally	
by	UNICEF	for	their	budget .”	In	September	
2009,	One	local	NGO	worker	commented,	“It’s	
difficult	to	get	a	current	assessment	[of	the	nutri-
tional	situation] .	We	are	working	with	the	health	
ministry .	We	helped	collect	nutritional	data	and	
119 Renuka Jayatissa, 2009, Rapid Assessment of Nutritional 
Status Among Displaced Population in Vavuniya, Medical 
Research Institute, Colombo.
120 AFP, “Quarter of displaced Sri Lankan children 
malnourished,” 11 April 2009, in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, p. 10.
sent	it	to	the	Ministry	of	Health,	and	now	they	
are	not	willing	to	share	the	results	with	us .”
Also	criticised	by	aid	workers	in	the	field	
were	the	relatively	weak	protests	—	at	least	in	
public	—	at	the	civilian	casualties	resulting	from	
government	shelling	and	aerial	bombardment	
during	the	intensified	military	push	from	Sep-
tember	2008 .	There	were	some	protests	from	
various	officials	(as	noted	above),	but	many	felt	
they	were	too	little	and	too	late .	The	lack	of	pro-
test	at	child	deaths	resulting	from	these	raids	
was	contrasted	by	some	aid	workers	with	what	
they	saw	as	a	much	greater	degree	of	public	
protest	of	child	recruitment	(by	the	LTTE) .	One	
UN	worker	observed:	
There are probably more than 1,000 
children killed in the war since Janu-
ary 2009. We don’t hear that. The 
UN spoke on underage recruitment, 
which was not verified, but not on child 
deaths. It compromised our neutral-
ity a great deal… It was not helpful to 
have the UN back away from casualty 
figures, 4,500. If the UN speaks out on 
this, it is only going to be embarrassed 
by the scale of the error in the other 
direction in a year’s time. It became 
embarrassing for ICRC to come out 
and speak about casualties because 
no-one else would, so the UN said a 
bit more… Our ability to verify that 
[child recruitment] was much less than 
our ability to verify child deaths. The 
UN had names, addresses and eve-
rything… It was dragged into making 
statements on child deaths.121
Over-optimism	in	relation	to	government	
intentions	has	been	a	prominent	feature	of	UN	
statements	in	many	crises	around	the	world,122	
121 Statements on child deaths during the final stages of the 
war and on conditions in the government-run camps seem to 
have contributed to the expulsion of UNICEF’s James Elder 
by the Sri Lankan government in September 2009 (Randeep 
Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who criticised camps,” 
Guardian, 6 September 2009).
122 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: 
Polity. 
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and	this	sometimes	extended	to	the	“safe	
zone”	in	Mullaitivu	district,	Sri	Lanka .	The	war	
in	the	former	Yugoslavia,	of	course,	suggests	
every	reason	to	be	sceptical	about	the	safety	of	
zones	that	are	declared	to	be	“safe .”	In	the	case	
of	Sri	Lanka,	the	concept	of	the	“safe	zone”	was	
often	used	rather	uncritically	by	aid	agencies	—	
and	without	inverted	commas .123	The	UN	Office	
of	the	Resident/Humanitarian	Coordinator	ob-
served	on	16	February	2009:	“While	the	desig-
nation	of	the	new	safe	zone	has	provided	some	
respite	for	the	tens	of	thousands	of	civilians	
trapped	for	weeks	by	heavy	fighting	which	has	
killed	and	injured	many	people,	reports	from	
yesterday	indicate	that	there	was	some	fight-
ing	inside	the	zone .”124	But	if	there	was	fighting	
inside	the	zone,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	it	was	
providing	“respite .”
Human	Rights	Watch	reported	in	February	
2009,	“Many	of	the	civilian	deaths	reported	in	
past	month	have	occurred	in	an	areas	that	the	
Sri	Lankan	government	has	declared	to	be	a	
‘safe	zone .’”125	The	International	Crisis	Group	re-
ported	on	9	March	2009	that	“government	forc-
es	were	shelling	civilian	areas,	including	in	the	
no-fire	zone	which	it	had	unilaterally	declared,	
without	any	significant	pause…	While	they	[an	
estimated	150,000	IDPs]	are	mostly	in	or	near	
the	government-declared	“no	fire	zone”	along	
the	coast,	the	government	itself	has	shelled	that	
zone	daily .”126	USAID	noted,	“Satellite	imagery	
taken	during	the	month	of	March	indicated	
extensive	shelling	occurring	in	and	around	the	
no-fire	zone .”127	
123 For example, a WFP press release noted on 27 February 
2009: “… most displaced persons are now concentrated in a 
new safe zone along the eastern coastline of Mullaitivu district 
(WFP News Release, “Sea route opened for WFP relief food 
deliveries to Sri Lanka,” 27 February 2009).
124 UN Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, Sri 
Lanka, “UN Sri Lanka statement,” 19 February 2009.
125 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February, p. 13.
126 ICG, “Conflict Risk Alert: Sri Lanka,” 9 March 2009.
127 USAID, “Complex Emergency Fact Sheet no. 4,” 10 
April 2009, in IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing 
severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 5.
By	mid-March,	the	UN	Office	of	the	High	
Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	was	saying	
that	a	range	of	credible	sources	indicated	more	
than	2,800	civilians	had	been	killed	since	20	
January,128	and	by	April	this	figure	had	risen	to	
6,432 .129	The	ICG’s	Gareth	Evans	noted	on	1	
May	2009:	
Despite the government’s April 2 an-
nouncement that the military had been 
ordered to cease using air attacks, artil-
lery, and other heavy weapons against 
remaining LTTE-held areas, such at-
tacks have carried on with increasing 
intensity…the government has default-
ed on its promises and paid mere lip 
service to calls for restraint, all the while 
pursuing its military onslaught.130
It	is	important	to	remember	the	context	
in	which	the	Sri	Lankan	government	was	trying	
(successfully)	to	prevent	condemnation	of	gov-
ernment	actions	in	both	the	UN	Security	Coun-
cil	and	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council .
If	the	“safe	zone”	was	not	safe,	another	dif-
ficulty	with	the	concept	of	a	safe	zone	—	and	a	
further	reason	not	to	adopt	the	term	uncritically	
—	is	that	the	concept	may	be	used	to	indicate	
or	imply	that	civilians	outside	this	zone	have	no	
right	to	safety .	A	Ministry	of	Defence	statement	
of	2	February	2009	is	revealing	here:	
While the Security Forces accept all 
responsibility to ensure the safety and 
protection of civilians in the Safety 
Zones, they are unable to give such 
an assurance to those who remain 
outside these zones. Therefore, the 
government, with full responsibil-
128 OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN), 13 March 2009, cited in IDMC (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians 
displaced by conflict facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 
2009, pp. 5-6.
129 AP, “UN says nearly 6,500 civilians killed in Sri Lanka,” 
24 April 2009, cited in IDMC (International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre), “Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict 
facing severe humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, pp. 5-6.
130 Gareth Evans, “Falling Down on the Job,” Foreign Policy 
(ForeignPolicy.com, 1 May 2009, on www.crisisgroup.org).
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ity, urges all civilians to come to the 
Safety Zones; and also states that as 
civilians who do not heed this call will 
be among LTTE cadres, the Security 
Forces will not be able to accept re-
sponsibility for their safety.131
Some	aid	workers	perceived	a	high	degree	
of	indifference	to	civilian	welfare	on	the	part	of	
the	government .	One	UN	worker	suggested:	
“In	Kilinochchi,	the	government	was	not	caring	
about	civilians	or	even	humanitarian	workers .	
Twice	our	office	was	bombed	because	LTTE	of-
fices	were	nearby .	If	they	kill	100	civilians	for	one	
LTTE,	they	will	say	it’s	a	success .”
Many	saw	advocacy	as	too	cautious .	An-
other	UN	worker	commented:
A figure of 2,500 civilian deaths in the 
no fire zone — we got Tamil press fig-
ures checked against health workers’ 
figures. But the humanitarian coordina-
tor, under pressure, said he can’t verify 
the figures. It’s probably over 4,000 
already a few months back. But a state-
ment about child recruitment came 
from UNICEF and it makes the govern-
ment happy.
Advocacy and “Counter-Advocacy”
Caution	on	publicising	casualty	figures	
seems	to	have	reflected,	in	part,	the	govern-
ment’s	determination	to	challenge	any	uncom-
fortable	data .	As	one	UN	worker	noted:	
Opportunities for leverage are very 
small. Data is seen as key, but you can 
always turn it round and question the 
sources. Sometimes data can backfire, 
as when a WFP guy said the situation 
was worse than Somalia.132 If you ex-
pose the casualty figures, it can raise 
131 Human Rights Watch, 2009, “War on the Displaced: Sri 
Lankan army and LTTE abuses against civilians in the Vanni,” 
February. 
132 It appears that a WFP representative in the north said 
on BBC Sinhala news service that the situation was as bad as 
Somalia; WFP later issued an apology.
the alarm but it can also backfire, un-
less you can back it up 100 per cent of 
the way. There’s a process of counter-
claim and counter-counterclaim and 
then people get bored of it — and 
that’s part of the strategy. 
In	general,	aid	agencies	—	whether	in	the	
UN	system	or	NGOs	—	appeared	very	much	
on	the	defensive	in	a	context	where	any	action	
could	easily	be	turned	against	them,	notably	in	
a	media	subject	to	extreme	government	con-
trol .	On	several	occasions,	humanitarian	organi-
sations	have	been	depicted	by	the	Sri	Lankan	
government	and	in	the	Sri	Lankan	media	as	un-
dermining	the	fight	against	terrorism	by	lending	
support	to	a	negotiated	settlement	or,	in	the	
case	of	several	aid	agencies,	as	lending	direct	
material	support	to	the	rebel	LTTE .	
Some	of	the	more	chaotic	elements	in	the	
aid	agencies’	response	to	the	Tsunami	seem	
to	have	contributed	to	the	deep	suspicion	of	
NGOs .133	Certainly,	there	was	a	sense	of	want-
ing	to	avoid	accusations	of	working	against	the	
government .	One	NGO	worker	commented:	
At the national level, we are working 
with IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Com-
mittee], now the humanitarian team, 
Vanni group, CHA [Consortium of Hu-
manitarian Agencies]. We coordinate 
with each other. It’s become very hard. 
We had what was called “the coffee 
club.” The reason it was called that was 
to demonstrate informality of NGOs 
working in the north. After the Tsunami, 
it was whittled away but then became 
quite important again. It makes its way 
to the media, seen as elitist, a “crème 
de la crème” international NGOs group 
scheming against the government.
In	a	context	where	many	international	
agencies	have	been	wary	of	being	seen	to	sup-
133 On the Tsunami response, see in particular Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition, 2006, “Joint Evaluation of the 
International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.” 
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port	a	long-term	resettlement	scheme,	some	
officials	were	able	to	make	accusations	of	pro-
viding	inadequate	assistance	or	preferring	tents	
to	more	solid	structures .	As	one	UN	worker	
noted:	“The	government	says	Manik	Farm,	this	
is	what	we’re	providing .	What	are	you	provid-
ing?	It’s	so	easy	to	turn	it	on	its	head .”
NGOs	have	been	publicly	taken	to	task,	
and	major	donors	have	not	been	spared	harsh	
criticisms	from	government	officials .	UNICEF	
was	accused	of	supplying	high-energy	biscuits	
to	LTTE	terrorists .	OCHA	came	under	some	
strong	pressure	from	the	government,	in	line	
with	patterns	elsewhere	(including	Darfur) .	One	
senior	aid	official	noted:	
The government has really taken on the 
NGOs, castigating them. It’s front-page 
news if any aid agency vehicle is found 
to be used by the LTTE, or equipment 
donated. NGOs have been browbeat-
en and scared and some were asked to 
leave. But the government is also quite 
ruthless with donors — the German 
ambassador, the Norwegian ambas-
sador, the [Sri Lankan] Foreign Ministry 
has done dressing down sessions.
One	diplomat	recalled:	
An underlying theme is the feeling 
that international NGOs in the north 
and east have been tools of the LTTE. 
The LTTE decided who could work 
where and there were LTTE people 
inside the NGOs, and this is partly cor-
rect because the international NGOs 
needed some kind of understanding 
with the LTTE. The government fright-
ens, singles out organisations and 
individuals — for example, UNICEF, 
Norway, the US — depending on the 
issue. It’s craftily and skilfully done and 
they avoid collective efforts on various 
issues. Another technique is to start 
with very extreme demands and shake 
up what’s possible. The proposed 
MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] 
agreement, for example, you shift your 
perception of what is possible. If you 
get a compromise, it can still be quite 
harsh and obstructive.
Some	defended	a	more	cautious	approach,	
but	at	the	same	time	still	stressed	the	govern-
ment’s	extreme	sensitivity	to	criticism .	For	ex-
ample,	a	senior	NGO	worker	said:
UNHCR has quite a lot of influence, 
from experience in the east. Negotia-
tions here can’t be done on the basis 
of demands. It was something UNHCR 
learned in the east, making demands 
for IDPs in the east and the government 
just shoots it down. These lessons are 
embodied in the aide memoire and 
guidance notes for the north. The gov-
ernment has genuine concerns around 
security… It’s about picking your battles. 
The government is incredibly sensi-
tive about being criticised and losing 
face. Any criticism and the government 
just turns it round and blames some-
one else… One helpful thing is the 
UNHCR scorecard, part of an ongoing 
evaluation. What’s good is it’s saying to 
government, “These are what we have 
achieved and this is the gap that still 
remains.” With protection, the space 
for negotiation is a lot slimmer. The 
most success in terms of negotiation is 
less formal and public. Anything that’s 
thrown out publicly, the government will 
react in a certain way. The JVP, JHU, NFF 
[National Freedom Front], the national-
ist groups, can criticise the government. 
The government had to rely on their 
support to win the last election… The 
government doesn’t like it when, in their 
words, we go running to our ambassa-
dors and chase up on issues… It’s about 
being sparing with your political capital, 
for example if the ambassador is running 
to the government every time there’s a 
problem, it becomes ineffective.
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A	strong	impulse	to	defend	national	sov-
ereignty	(and	in	particular	the	influence	of	vo-
ciferous	Sinhalese	nationalist	parties)	was	seen	
as	creating	particular	difficulties	when	exerting	
international	pressure .	As	one	diplomat	put	it:	
“Normal	restrictions	on	abuse	include	when	
officials	like	to	have	friends	abroad,	visas	to	
North	America	and	Europe .	But	here	it’s	the	
reverse .	The	more	you	bash	the	international	
community,	the	more	votes	you	get .”	Whilst	
most	interviewees	stressed	the	government’s	
sensitivity,	many	felt	there	was	still	significant	
leverage .	For	example,	one	academic	stressed	
to	me	the	value	placed	by	many	politicians	in	
Sri	Lanka	on	having	access	to	educational	and	
health	services	in	Europe .
The	NGO	worker	who	stressed	the	im-
portance	of	“picking	your	battles”	also	em-
phasised	the	importance	of	not	disrupting	the	
efforts	of	local	NGOs:
There are tensions between interna-
tional and national NGOs. There are 
some very well established entities in 
this country. Some local NGOs have 
very good connections to top leaders 
and in international organisations we 
tend to go like a bull in a china shop 
— and when national agencies are 
trying to negotiate, it becomes dif-
ficult for them when the internationals 
rush in. 
Advocacy and Interests/Incentives
If	prioritising	delivery	over	advocacy	was	
often	seen	as	contributing	to	the	shrinkage	of	
humanitarian	space,	we	need	also	to	consider	
the	possibility	that	this	priority	was	shaped	
not	just	by	a	concern	to	deliver	humanitarian	
aid	but	by	various	kinds	of	self-interest .	At	
the	individual	level,	these	include	concern	for	
personal	safety	and	for	one’s	career .	There	
are	important	organisational	interests .	These	
appears	to	have	had	some	influence	in	de-pri-
oritising	protection	in	many	crises	around	the	
world	(as	have	geopolitical	concerns,	consid-
ered	below);	Sri	Lanka	is	not	an	exception .	
Fear	is	a	major	reason	for	silence	on	key	
issues .	One	UN	worker	put	these	fears	very	
bluntly:	“Anyone	who	speaks	up	gets	a	bullet	in	
the	head .	Aid	workers	here,	there	are	49	dead	
and	two	more	unaccounted	for .	Sri	Lanka	is	the	
most	dangerous	place	in	the	world	for	aid	work-
ers .”	An	International	Displacement	Monitoring	
Centre	report	noted	that	“At	least	63	national	
staff	[of	humanitarian	agencies]	are	believed	to	
have	been	killed	between	2006	and	2008,	while	
other	forms	of	violence	have	included	staff	
abductions .”134	To	the	extent	that	keeping	quiet	
is	linked	to	concern	for	safety,	it	underlines	
the	need	for	the	international	community	to	
push	hard	on	the	investigation	of	violence	and	
threats	against	aid	workers .	The	use	of	paramili-
taries	makes	this	harder	but	does	not	take	away	
from	the	urgency	of	tracing	responsibility .
Part	of	the	climate	of	intimidation	in	Sri	Lan-
ka	has	been	a	fear	of	being	expelled	from	the	
country	as	a	persona non grata.	Such	expulsions	
can	inhibit	the	capacity	of	aid	agencies	and	may	
make	life	more	difficult	for	aid	staff	left	behind .	
One	senior	UN	worker	said,	“PNG	makes	it	
harder	for	the	agency	as	a	whole .”	Thus,	avoid-
ing	such	an	expulsion	can	be	defended	on	the	
grounds	of	prioritising	delivery .	However,	some	
interviewees	also	suggested	that	aid	staff	were	
worried	about	their	individual	careers,	and	that	
a	record	of	being	PNG’d	might	in	practice	hold	
them	back .	One	UN	worker	said,	“Fear	of	PNG	
should	not	be	driving	our	response,”	adding	
that	the	UN	should	be	making	clear	that	being	
PNG’d	in	Sri	Lanka	(or	similar	contexts)	would	
not	adversely	affect	one’s	career .	An	affinity	
for	Sri	Lanka	as	a	place	to	live	was	seen	as	an-
other	factor	that	had	sometimes	kept	advocacy	
within	certain	bounds .	One	diplomat	remarked:	
“International	NGO	staff	have	kids	at	schools,	
and	they	like	this	country .	They	get	money	from	
Western	donors	and	the	government	knows	
they	can	push	people	because	they	like	to	stay	
134 IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre), 
“Sri Lanka: Civilians displaced by conflict facing severe 
humanitarian crisis,” 1 May 2009, p. 11.
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here .”	In	September	2009,	the	Sri	Lankan	gov-
ernment	expelled	James	Elder,	head	of	com-
munications	for	UNICEF	in	the	country	after	he	
expressed	concerns	for	Tamils	in	the	govern-
ment-run	camps .	Elder	had	earlier	spoken	of	the	
“unimaginable	hell”	suffered	by	children	in	the	
last	stages	of	the	war .135
Organisational	incentives	are	important	
too .	For	aid	agencies,	there	may	also	be	signifi-
cant	financial	advantages	in	being	seen	to	be	
present	in	a	prominent	emergency	—	perhaps	
particularly	in	the	context	of	what	one	aid	work-
er	referred	to	wryly	as	the	current	“shortage”	
of	international	humanitarian	crises .	Aid	agen-
cies	may	argue	that	they	need	to	raise	funding	
if	they	are	to	be	in	a	position	to	do	any	good;	
while	this	argument	clearly	contains	a	degree	of	
truth,	it	also	runs	the	risk	of	inviting	the	pursuit	
of	access	at	any	cost .	
The	way	that	fear	and	more	mundane	mo-
tivations	could	feed	into	advocacy	failures	was	
summed	up	by	one	national	aid	worker:	
In many places [within Sri Lanka], the 
international community fails to raise 
their voices. One reason is working 
permits will be cancelled or they will be 
named a “white tiger” [that is, a white 
supporter of the LTTE rebels]. Plus, 
everyone is hunting for bread [money].
In	line	with	some	longstanding	criticisms	
of	humanitarian	aid,136	some	saw	the	incentives	
within	aid	organisations	as	geared	primarily	to-
135 Randeep Ramesh, “Sri Lanka expels UN official who 
criticised camps,” Guardian, September 6 2009.
136 Randolph Kent and Ken Wilson have both stressed how 
a concern with organisational health and growth can create a 
bias towards measurable and visible solutions to measurable 
and visible problems, including a bias towards shifting physical 
commodities to people once they have become thin in 
environments that can be easily monitored and publicised. 
See, for example, Randolph Kent, 1987, Anatomy of Disaster 
Relief: The International Network in Action. London: Pinter 
Publishers; Ken Wilson, 1992. “A State of the Art Review of 
Research on Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees 
from and in Mozambique.” Stockholm: Swedish International 
Development Authority; David Keen and Ken Wilson, 1994, 
“Engaging with violence,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi 
(eds.) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses 
to Complex Emergencies, London: Zed Books and Save the 
Children, UK.
wards	tangible	and	measurable	outputs	rather	
than	co-ordination	or	protection,	which	are	more	
difficult	to	measure	and	usually	more	politically	
sensitive .	For	example,	one	UN	worker	noted:	
The	incentive	is	to	keep	your	head	down,	
do	your	job,	put	your	tents	up,	deliver	your	
food .	Output-based	indicators	can	be	a	prob-
lem	here,	and	all	the	reporting	lines	are	up-
wards .	There	are	very	few	incentives	to	do	the	
coordinating	meetings .	It	becomes	an	“add	on”	
—	a	bit	like	training .
Some	felt	that	this	applied	strongly	to	WFP .	
One	senior	WFP	staff	member	said,	“There’s	
a	huge	problem	with	our	financing	practices .	
We’re	funded	through	a	percentage	of	the	
tonnage	we	deliver .	You	keep	the	sub-office	
open	through	a	certain	amount	of	tonnage	—	
whether	it’s	purchased	internationally,	locally,	or	
comes	in	kind .”	
Advocacy and the Geopolitical Context
As	for	the	geopolitical	context,	a	UN	
worker	said	of	the	military	campaign	from	2006,	
“There’s	never	been	a	serious	international	op-
position	to	the	war .”	One	UN	aid	suggested:	
The only leverage is much higher up. 
I don’t think we’ve been clever in ne-
gotiating… I don’t think anyone thinks 
Sri Lanka is important. You just have to 
compare injuries and deaths to Gaza. 
It’s been a forgotten catastrophe, 
partly because of the restrictions on 
journalism. But if it was seen as impor-
tant, the journalists would have been 
pressing to come and have access.
A	local	NGO	worker	commented	in	Sep-
tember	2009:	
We do not know what the WFP/UN 
policy is on these new camps… In 
terms of advocacy, I think the UN as a 
whole should take a tougher stand at 
Headquarters level and continue to 
express its displeasure over the contin-
ued detention of IDPs… This can’t go 
on — it’s against international law and 
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everything else. On your own, individual 
agencies can’t do much advocacy. The 
government is very strong and popular 
and controls the media… The sad real-
ity is that larger geo-political realities 
(China, India, Pakistan, Iran) give the 
government of Sri Lanka unprecedented 
freedom to act with impunity and disre-
gard international humanitarian law.
A	Local	UN	worker	commented:	
There is value in using the human rights 
framework, including the Supreme 
Court. UN agencies and the humanitar-
ian community need a common posi-
tion. There’s been no common position 
on when emergency funding should end 
or whether to support the centres hous-
ing ex-combatants… The problem is not 
having a coherent stand on an issue and 
not coordinating with the UN stance as a 
whole. If the state knows it can play one 
agency off against another, what’s the 
leverage?... Within agencies, I don’t think 
there is a push for a common stand.”
Somewhat	similarly,	a	local	NGO		
worker	said:	
The UN Resident Representative wasn’t 
able to get a common position on Manic 
Farm from a human rights framework. 
There has to be a lead from the UN 
Resident Representative and his team, 
supported by New York and Geneva… 
There’ve been a lot of missions — John 
Holmes, Walter Kaelin, but have they 
really made a difference?... Many do 
not realise that by funding internment 
camps, you are violating national laws.” 
It	was	stressed	to	us	that	the	UN	Country	
Team	brought	several	protection	concerns	to	
the	notice	of	the	government	both	in	writing	
and	orally	—	and	at	times	through	the	media .	
But	many	also	felt	these	efforts	were	weak .	The	
international	geopolitical	context	is	important	
in	shaping	what	actions	a	Country	Team	can	and	
cannot	take,	and	here	circumstances	were	par-
ticularly	unhelpful .	
When	Sri	Lanka	has	not	been	forgotten,	it	
has	often	been	seen	as	pursuing	a	useful	“war	
on	terror .”	Particularly	important	in	setting	the	
context	for	repeated	concessions	to	the	Sri	
Lankan	government	has	been	the	government’s	
success	in	positioning	the	war	against	the	LTTE	
within	a	more	general	framework	of	a	global	
“war	on	terror .”	Both	the	US	and	the	European	
Commission	have	declared	the	LTTE	a	terrorist	
group .	As	one	aid	worker	put	it,	“All	the	western	
countries	have	said	the	LTTE	is	a	terrorist	group,	
so	you	can’t	back	up	and	say	it’s	not	really	a	
terrorist	group .”	An	NGO	worker	commented:	
“The	government	has	played	as	much	as	it	can	
on	the	global	war	on	terror,	but	also	at	the	same	
time	they	use	the	defence	that	this	is	a	purely	
national	problem,	not	an	issue	that	has	interna-
tional	implications .”	
It	is	notable	that	while	the	“war	on	ter-
ror”	framework	plays	well	with	many	Western	
governments,	at	the	same	time	the	Sri	Lankan	
government	has	explicitly	aligned	itself	with	the	
Non-Aligned	Movement	(and	Russia	and	China)	
and	has	portrayed	itself	as	standing	up	for	na-
tional	sovereignty	and	standing	up	to	the	West	
and	the	declining	colonial	countries	of	Europe .	
Nor	has	acceptance	of	the	West’s	“war	on	ter-
ror”	been	unconditional .	Asked	about	media	
allegations	of	abuses	in	the	camps,	Sri	Lanka’s	
Permanent	Representative	to	the	UN	in	Geneva	
Dr	Daya	Jayatilleka	replied:	
… anyone who has read Noam Chom-
sky on Kosovo will know the pernicious 
role played by sections of the western 
media in artificially creating the im-
pression of a humanitarian crisis which 
provided the smokescreen for interven-
tion. These media you speak of are the 
very same that tried to convince the 
world that Iraq possessed weapons of 
mass destruction!137 
137 Dayan Jayatilleka, “Stand up for others, they stand 
up for you,” interview in Waani Operation, 3 June 2009 
[wannioperation.com].
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Whilst	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	
diplomatic	initiatives	have	not	been	a	primary	
focus	of	this	report,	some	of	those	consulted	
were	close	to	discussions	in	New	York,	and	they	
suggested	that	most	powerful	governments	
wanted	to	get	the	conflict	over	as	quickly	as	
possible .	This	seems	to	have	set	the	context	for	
statements	and	silences	from	UN	officials .	Also	
influential,	it	appears,	were	the	prospect	of	co-
operating	with	the	government	on	reconstruc-
tion	and	the	desire	to	avoid	being	ejected	from	
Sri	Lanka .	
When	it	came	to	the	leverage	of	WFP	in	
particular,	some	stressed	that	the	major	protec-
tion	responsibilities	traditionally	lie	with	UNHCR	
and	ICRC .	However,	one	major	donor	repre-
sentative	commented:	
It’s mainstream to say humanitarian 
actors have no leverage. I disagree. 
They are implementing operations and 
have advocacy tools and mandates. 
WFP is not known for its large advo-
cacy approach. But it’s part of the UN 
family. We see WFP not as a technical 
implementer of food on behalf of the 
government, which is taking credit for 
it and winning elections, but the PRRO 
[Protracted Relief and Recovery Opera-
tion], which is currently running for two 
years, is a non-adequate instrument to 
deal with the current humanitarian cri-
sis. We’ve told WFP this since October 
2007. You have a mandate, you’re part 
of a family. You cannot reduce your-
self to logistics! We understand the 
humanitarian imperative of bringing in 
the food now overrules. But from the 
beginning, there were problems of ac-
cess and insufficient attempts to moni-
tor and control distribution because 
the government said “We’ll take care 
of it.”… The system did not work before 
the influx [the mass influx into Vavu-
niya]. The system was not functioning 
before… The government continues to 
use the argument, “It’s under the PRRO 
and we distribute.” They’ve used this 
politically to say, “‘We did the distribu-
tion.”… We need to keep emergency 
at three months. WFP is raising money 
for 20 months for the emergency under 
the PRRO, saying it ensures the pipe-
line. But this is too long.
He	said	EMOP	would	be	a	more	appropri-
ate	vehicle	for	WFP	assistance	than	the		
PRRO .	One	experienced	UN	worker	disagreed	
with	this:	
If we had an EMOP [Emergency Op-
erations Programme], you would still 
have to work with the government. A 
PRRO allows you multi-year flexibility. 
You’re not confined to 12 months. If 
conflict re-escalates, you can switch to 
relief mode, you don’t have to go back 
for an EMOP.
The	donor	representative	who	stressed	that	
WFP	was	“part	of	a	family”	went	on	to	suggest	
that	advocacy	had	been	inadequate	over	a	pro-
longed	period:	
There is New York. There are other 
levels [of the UN]. We have reacted a 
bit late. In late 2008, the government 
didn’t want assistance in the Vanni. 
They saw it as interfering with the war 
operation. The humanitarian commu-
nity was ordered out of Vanni. WFP was 
allowed, not others… Then we asked, 
“Would you consider international 
monitors.” The first reaction was “no,” 
and then “yes.” Just before he left [that 
is before leaving his post as WFP coun-
try director], [Mohamed] Saleheen felt 
bold to push hard [in relation to  
the convoys].
A	perceived	lack	of	openness	about	the	in-
adequate	quantities	of	food	reaching	the	north	
was	seen	as	a	significant	problem .	One	UN	aid	
worker	said:	
The MOU [Memorandum of Under-
standing] with the government left 
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WFP in a difficult situation. WFP was 
not making a fuss about the fact that 
the food going into the Vanni was not 
sufficient. From February 2008 was 
probably the last time a full ration 
went in for the IDPs. It was probably 
around 50 per cent after that. It was 
kept a secret. It was felt that a better 
fuss might jeopardise the food that 
was going in.
Some	reports	did	note	security	obstacles	
to	relief	but	the	way	this	was	expressed	was	
usually	fairly	general .	Thus,	a	June	2007	WFP	
report	noted,	“Security	concerns,	logistical	
constraints	and	lack	of	access	have	restricted	
food	assistance	by	more	than	50	percent	over	
the	last	nine	months .”138	Not	uncommon	was	
the	attempt	to	preserve	an	image	of	govern-
mental	good	intentions	even	in	the	face	of	
evidence	to	the	contrary .	Thus	one	2007	WFP	
report	noted:	
Although the government is trying 
to maintain a normal level of health 
services in the conflict affected areas 
in the North and East, this can not be 
achieved due to the destruction of 
health facilities in a number of areas 
and the lack of qualified medical per-
sonnel. Virtually everyone in the Vanni 
area suffers form inadequate medical 
and educational services due to the 
conflict-imposed embargo.139 
According	to	Human	Rights	Watch:
At a December 10, 2008, Inter-Agen-
cies Standing Committee (IASC) meet-
ing, WFP officials estimated that the 
food deliveries into the Vanni since the 
September 2008 withdrawal had been 
38 percent below the minimum nutri-
138 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 38. 
139 WFP, 2007, Sri Lanka Food Security Assessment, based 
on the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification Approach, final report, June, p. 37.
tional requirements, but this estimate 
was based on an estimate of 200,000 
IDPs, which is lower than the 230,000 
number used by other UN agencies, 
and also uses the date of the first con-
voy, October 2, as the starting date for 
its needs assessment, ignoring the fact 
that no food deliveries were made in 
September. Because of this, the WFP 
figures underestimate the actual food 
shortcomings in the Vanni.140
An	October	2008	WFP	report	noted	
that,	“WFP’s	assessments…indicate	that	cur-
rent	WFP	activities	have	largely	achieved	the	
goals	of	maintaining	good	nutritional	intake	
and	preventing	malnutrition	rates	among	
beneficiaries .”141	However,	this	statement	sits	
oddly	with	a	statement	on	page	5	of	the	same	
report:	“Malnutrition	levels	among	children	
under	5	are	high,	especially	in	the	main	conflict	
areas	of	the	north	and	east,	where	40	percent	of	
children	are	underweight,	31	percent	are	stunt-
ed	and	28	percent	suffer	from	wasting .”	What	
reconciles	the	two	statements	is	the	reference	
in	the	more	optimistic	statement	to	malnutri-
tion	rates	“among beneficiaries” (that	is,	among	
those	who	have	received	food) .	On	page	9,	
this	is	explained	further:	“…	malnutrition	rates	
among	beneficiary	populations	have	remained	
stable,	while	they	increased	in	unassisted	con-
flict-affected	households .”
The	humanitarian	arms	of	major	donor	
bilateral	organisations	and	governments	fre-
quently	compete	with	other	arms	of	govern-
ment,	which	may	put	commercial	or	geopolitical	
aims	ahead	of	humanitarian	goals .	In	these	
circumstances,	a	greater	degree	of	openness	
within	the	UN	system	offers	the	prospect	of	
strengthening	the	arguments	and	the	persua-
140 Human Rights Watch, 2008, “Besieged, Displaced, and 
Detained: The Plight of Civilians in Sri Lanka’s Vanni Region,” 
December, p. 28. Human Rights Watch (p. 27) acknowledges 
some food stocks in the Vanni at the time the government 
ordered the humanitarian withdrawal. 
141 WFP, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, Sri Lanka 
10756.0, 2008, Projects for Executive Board Approval, agenda 
item 8, 27-30 October, p. 3.
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siveness	of	those	with	more	humanitarian	man-
dates	and	agendas .	In	line	with	other	emphases	
on	a	lack	of	openness	in	the	UN	system,	one	
representative	of	a	major	donor	commented:	
We need from our UN partners trans-
parency, admitting there are obstacles 
and problems. The system as pre-
sented on paper is not the reality. It’s 
not helpful if these elements remain 
hidden — the protection environment, 
problems of distribution. 
We	need	to	consider	the	possibility	that	in	
the	absence	of	a	political	will	to	counteract	the	
“end-game”	against	the	LTTE,	emphasising	the	
provision	of	humanitarian	aid	rather	than	the	
provision	of	protection	served	as	a	convenient	
way	of	demonstrating	(not	least	to	Western	
constituencies)	that	“something	was	being	
done .”	Certainly,	there	are	precedents	for	this,	
the	most	notorious	example	being	international	
inaction	over	the	1994	Rwandan	genocide	and	
the	subsequent	high-profile	humanitarian	as-
sistance	for	Rwandans	in	Zaire/DRC	and	Tanza-
nia .	in	his	book	on	war	in	the	former	Yugoslavia	
(with	the	ironic	title	of	Love	Thy	Neighbour),	
Peter	Maass	expressed	a	common	sense	of	be-
trayal	arising	from	the	neglect	of	fundamental	
security	issues:	
What, [the Bosnians] asked, was the 
point in feeding us but not protecting 
us? So we can die on a full stomach? 
There was much truth to this: the main 
humanitarian problem in Sarajevo was 
not a lack of decent food but a surplus 
of incoming shells.142 
Another	relevant	case	is	Sudan	—	over	a	
long	period .	As	early	as	the	1980s,	protection	
issues	were	consistently	neglected	in	favour	
of	a	focus	on	humanitarian	relief;143	in	2004	
142 Maass, Peter, 1996, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War, 
London and Basingstoke: Papermac, p. 30.
143 See, for example, David Keen, 2008, The Benefits 
of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in 
Southwestern Sudan, 1983-89, Oxford: James Currey (first 
published, 1994, Princeton University Press). 
the	International	Crisis	Group	noted,	“The	
U .S .	is	still	fixated	on	getting	humanitarian	
workers	into	Darfur,	a	worthy	but	insufficient	
objective .”144	In	the	case	of	Sierra	Leone,	
the	international	community	largely	turned	
a	“blind-eye”	to	abuses	by	Sierra	Leonean	
government	forces	in	the	early-	to	mid-1990s	
when	the	emphasis,	once	again,	was	on	inter-
vening	through	“humanitarian	aid”;	this	form	
of	intervention	seems	to	have	served	as	a	sub-
stitute	for	vigorous	diplomatic	intervention .	
More	generally,	Mark	Duffield	has	observed	
that	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	there	was	
a	drop	in	diplomatic	interest	in	many	parts	of	
the	world	and	humanitarian	agencies	were	
encouraged	to	step	into	the	vacuum	left	by	
this	diplomatic	withdrawal .	Some	aid	workers,	
for	example	in	Afghanistan,	saw	themselves	as	
legitimising	this	withdrawal .145
Whilst	most	of	those	interviewed	in	Sri	
Lanka	viewed	humanitarian	aid	as	a	sincere	
attempt	to	help	(rather	than	a	cynical	attempt	
to	show	that	“something	was	being	done”),	
many	nevertheless	adhered	to	the	view	that,	
for	complex	and	sometimes	self-interested	
reasons,	an	excessive	proportion	of	the	inter-
national	community’s	time	and	energy	was	put	
into	delivery	compared	to	protection .
There	is	little	doubt	that	the	relief	convoys	
from	October	2008	were	a	major	priority	within	
the	UN	system	and	among	the	diplomatic	
community .	One	aid	worker	with	experience	
on	the	relief	convoys	remembered,	“All	the	
convoys	were	very	important .	There	was	politi-
cal	pressure	from	the	[UN]	Secretary	General .”	
One	UN	worker	in	Colombo	said:	“There	was	
a	big	diplomatic	push	on	the	convoy,	a	huge	
energy	investment .”	I	suggested	that	this	was	
not	a	bad	thing	in	itself,	but	perhaps	there	was	
only	so	much	energy	to	go	round?	He	replied,	
“Yes,	and	competency	too .”	
144 ICG, 2004, “Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur,” p. 13. 
145 Mark Duffield, 2001, Global Governance and the New 
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: 
Zed Books. Michael Ignantieff noted this perception in 
Afghanistan in his 1998 book The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic 
War and the Modern Conscience, New York: Henry Holt.
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009 93
Obstructions	to	aid	delivery	and	abuses	
against	aid	staff	may	also	serve	a	function	in	ab-
sorbing	time	and	energy	that	might	otherwise	
be	devoted	to	advocacy	and	protection	more	
generally .	The	WFP	country	representative	in	
Sri	Lanka	was	having	to	put	a	good	deal	of	en-
ergy	into	pushing	for	the	relaxation	of	security	
measures	for	UN	staff	at	checkpoints	as	well	as	
for	the	early	release	of	UN	staff	and	depend-
ents	from	IDP	centres .146	A	similar	process	of	
absorbing	valuable	energies	has	been	notable	
elsewhere,	for	example	in	Sudan .147	
Advocacy	may	also	have	been	impeded	
by	“pipeline”	issues .	A	WFP	report	on	relief	in	
2008	noted,	“…	the	pipeline	faced	critical	short-
falls	in	early	2008	due	to	high	food	prices .”148	
When	WFP	did	not	have	enough	food	available	
for	relief,	this	complicated	the	attribution	of	
responsibility	for	lack	of	distributions,	provid-
ing	something	of	an	“alibi”	for	government-led	
obstruction .	Insofar	as	WFP’s	own	supply	prob-
lems	were	contributing	to	low	distributions,	
it	was	also	clearly	harder	for	WFP	to	point	the	
finger	at	the	government .	Insofar	as	supply	
shortages	encourage	more	“targeting”	to	the	
neediest	areas,	WFP	becomes	more	vulnerable	
to	government	accusations	of	“bias,”	for	exam-
ple	in	favour	of	the	north .
Advocacy and Leverage
When	it	came	to	advocacy	and	pushing	
for	improvements	in	protection,	one	source	of	
leverage	was	seen	to	lie	precisely	in	the	govern-
ment’s	extreme	sensitivity	to	critical	or	inconven-
ient	information .	As	one	UN	worker	noted:	“The	
state	is	concerned	about	its	international	repu-
tation .	Otherwise,	you	don’t	control	information	
and	journalists	to	the	extent	that	they	do .”
The	government	seems	to	have	had	a	sen-
sitivity	to	any	accusation	of	creating	hunger,	and	
certainly	in	neighbouring	India	any	suggestion	
146 WFP, Internal situation report, 27 March 2009, p. 1.
147 Aid workers in Darfur have stressed how bureaucratic 
obstructions took time and attention from a range of other 
issues, notably protection issues.
148 WFP, “Standard Project Report 2008, Sri Lanka, Project 
10067.1.”
of	a	“famine”	is	considered	a	major	political	
threat	to	incumbent	politicians .149	One	UN	aid	
worker	noted:	“From	A	to	Z,	the	government	
controls	all	the	logistics	of	WFP .	The	govern-
ment	is	a	bit	afraid	of	humanitarian	groups	
jumping	on	them	and	saying	‘You’re	making	
hunger .’”	One	senior	UN	worker	suggested:	
“The	government	realised	early	on	that	they	
didn’t	want	an	outright	food-based	humanitar-
ian	situation .	The	government	was	keen	food	
goes	into	Kilinochchi	and	Mullativu .”	The	fact	
that	the	government	organised	some	convoys	
of	its	own	also	suggests	a	degree	of	desire	to	
get	relief	through .	Food	on	government	con-
voys	was	sold	in	the	market	at	low	prices .	An	aid	
worker	who	travelled	with	some	of	the	convoys	
said:	“The	LTTE	wanted	convoys	because	it	
wanted	food	for	people	—	and	the	government	
doesn’t	want	to	be	the	villain .”150
Several	interviewees	stressed	that	WFP’s	
resources	were	valuable	to	the	Sri	Lankan	gov-
ernment,	and	that	this	implied	some	significant	
degree	of	leverage	(including	on	protection	
issues) .	One	UN	worker	commented:
From a protection perspective, WFP 
needs to be fully in the protection dia-
logue in Colombo. They do come to 
meetings, but we need more action on 
food from a rights perspective… Food, 
it’s been pushed very hard, with hours 
of negotiating, including senior diplo-
mats in Colombo. So it’s isolated from 
other humanitarian issues, and from 
protection issues in particular. There is 
scope to use the issue of food more in 
terms of pressuring the government. 
The government is entirely reliant on a 
149 See, for example, Alex de Waal, 1997, Famine Crimes: 
Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: 
James Currey.
150 While there does seem to have been a desire on the 
government’s part to use food to influence population 
movements, one senior UN worker felt there was an awareness 
that food was not the only factor here: “Yes, the military 
probably would say ‘Separate the civilians and use food aid’, 
and they put a lot of obstacles in our way. But there was also 
some recognition that civilian movements were also being 
shaped by the LTTE, so it was not all about food.”
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daily basis on the international food… 
They’ve needed WFP since day one.
Adopting	a	similar	emphasis	on	the	im-
portance	of	WFP	adopting	a	clear	protection	
role,	an	NGO	worker	suggested:	“WFP	can	play	
a	key	role	in	freedom	of	movement .	It	can	do	
more	than	NGOs,	maybe	going	for	timelines	—	
for	example,	in	relation	to	screening .”	A	local	
NGO	worker	said,	“WFP	could	lobby	for	more	
freedom	of	movement	if	it’s	done	in	a	sensitive	
way .”	Another	local	NGO	worker	cautioned:	
Protection is a very sensitive thing. It 
should be taken over by UNHCR, that’s 
their mandate. WFP is a service organi-
sation. They shouldn’t take protection 
as a main them, but as a cross-cutting 
issue. If WFP takes that as one theme, 
the government will listen and talk. If 
they [WFP] emphasise protection too 
much, the government can react.
In	line	with	the	view	that	the	government	
needed	WFP,	one	experienced	UN	worker	ob-
served,	“Economically,	the	government	wasn’t	
fit	to	respond	to	the	emergency	needs .”	When	
I	suggested	that	the	Sri	Lankan	government	
was	neither	particularly	poor	nor	particularly	
desperate	for	international	assistance,	one	
UN	worker	replied:	“In	a	way,	they	are	desper-
ate .	They	can’t	feed	them	[the	IDPs],	they	can’t	
house	them .”	Another	UN	worker	echoed	this	
analysis:	“Government	money	is	running	out .	
They	are	not	paying	salaries	in	certain	minis-
tries .	It’s	given	us	more	bargaining	power	in	
relation	to	the	government .	They	can’t	afford	to	
look	after	the	IDPs .”	Another	UN	worker,	a	Sri	
Lankan	national,	said:	“I	don’t	think	the	govern-
ment	would	say	go	away	completely,	because	
they	can’t	feed	hundreds	of	thousands	of	peo-
ple .	WFP	gives	70	per	cent	plus	of	the	food .	If	
that’s	not	leverage,	then	what	is?”	One	senior	
UN	worker	said:	
The food’s value to the government is 
substantial. It saves a lot of money for 
them… The economy has rapidly de-
teriorated over the last six months — a 
costly war and the international finan-
cial crisis and loss of tourism, and de-
mand for textiles and rubber is down, 
remittances are down (including Tamil). 
The government has decided to go to 
the IMF having shut off the IMF a few 
years ago. A 1.9 billion dollar bail-out 
package is wanted.
In	mid-May	2009	US	Secretary	of	State	Hil-
lary	Clinton	suggested	it	was	an	inappropriate	
time	for	the	loan;	but	talks	between	the	IMF	
and	the	Sri	Lankan	government	progressed	in	
any	case .151	
If	WFP	was	seen	as	having	at	least	some	
leverage,	so	too	was	the	international	commu-
nity	more	generally .	One	national	aid		
worker	commented:
I’m still having doubt why the interna-
tional community cannot make pres-
sure, like economic barriers [sanctions] 
for Sudan. We are not challenging the 
government calling it a “humanitarian 
war.” It’s actually not. Yesterday around 
400-500 people died in the no fire 
zone… They shoot and shell with multi-
barrage. Every day they killed at least 
200 people.
One	UN	worker	observed:	
It’s easy to place the argument at 
the end of the spectrum, saying “Is it 
about walking away?”… IDPs are still 
in camps, two high security camps 
in Mannar are around a year old. We 
failed them… Nothings changed. It’s 
just more people… When we had 
space to negotiate, we weren’t doing 
it. There were small numbers coming 
into Vavuniya last year [2008], Novem-
ber, December and January 2009. The 
151 See, for example, transcript of a press briefing by 
Caroline Atkinson, Director, External Relations, International 
Monetary Fund, 21 May 2009 (http://www.imf.org/external/
np/tr/2009/tr052109.htm).
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government could have met needs at 
that time if we’d withdrawn. Now they 
couldn’t afford to. It’s been played 
really nicely… We have to fill gaps at 
100,000 and didn’t have to at 20,000. 
It’s not a poor country.
Another	aid	worker	echoed	this	analysis:	
Pressure should have started much ear-
lier, at the time when we had to leave 
the Vanni. Pressure from the UN was 
not enough. Now if you say we stop the 
food today, it’s very hard to pressure. 
With this amount of people, it’s too 
late. In September 2008 or in February 
this year, more should have been done.
One	UN	worker	asked:	
Have there ever been consequences 
for the state in terms of how it be-
haved? They started to shell hospitals 
and health care locations, each shifting 
to makeshift facilities. Nothing in the 
vicinity was retuning fire. Plus, limit-
ing medical aid that did go in [to the 
Vanni]. It was fundamentally eroding 
the ability to meet health needs.
Another	senior	UN	worker	said	simply:		
“Nobody	backed	words	with	a	threat .”	A	diplo-
mat	noted:	
As long as the Security Council doesn’t 
see a threat to international security, 
as long as there’s no willingness to im-
pose sanctions, nothing will change… 
Short of serious sanctions, there’s noth-
ing we can do. The EU is playing with 
GSP plus [an updated Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences] trade concessions. 
But it has had no effect, in my view.  
The state says it’s willing to take the 
loss. The IMF loan is coming up. 
There’s a possibility of restrictions. It’s 
to be decided 10 May. There’s no sign 
of the state getting more accommodat-
ing, though there may be some con-
cessions in the two days before 10 May. 
If the EU or US want, they can block it. 
In	other	contexts,	including	Guatemala,	
loans	from	IFIs	have	helped	to	undermine	the	
efficacy	of	pressure	on	human	rights	exerted	by	
a	range	of	donors .152
One	UN	aid	worker	suggested:	“Unless	the	
government	faces	high	criticism	from	major	do-
nors,	India,	the	US,	the	Japanese,	economic	do-
nors,	the	donors	won’t	realise	international	influ-
ence .”	Other	analysts	have	pointed	to	a	marked	
lack	of	coherence	or	unity	among	donors	as	
something	that	helped	to	undermine	the	2002	
Ceasefire	Agreement .153	As	things	stand,	the	
government	seems	to	have	been	able	to	play	
actual	and	potential	donors	against	each	other .	
An	April	2009	report	in	the	Economist	noted	
that	Pakistan	had	become	Sri	Lanka’s	main	arms	
supplier,	with	Iran	providing	70	per	cent	of	Sri	
Lanka’s	oil	supply	on	credit	and	Libya	poised	to	
make	a	soft	loan	of	500	million	US	dollars .154	A	
senior	UN	worker	commented:	
If you don’t get assistance from the US, 
Iran can come in and offer an oil deal. 
If not the UK, then China is happy to 
provide. Japan is ever ready to help the 
country economically. Arab countries 
are ready to come in. India does scare 
Sri Lanka, but they have a strategy  
for India. 
China’s	role	was	seen	as	important .	As	
one	UN	worker	suggested,	“China	is	vetoing	
an	alternative	path .	They	have	their	separatist	
movement	in	Tibet,	and	are	supporting	the	gov-
ernment	[in	Sri	Lanka]	with	weapons .”	The	Sri	
Lankan	government	has	cultivated	Arab	states	
through	its	position	on	Palestine .	According	to	
the	“Wanni	Operation”	website	(waaniperation .
152 David Keen, 2008, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: 
Polity.
153 Georg Frerks and Bart Klem, 2006, Conditioning 
Peace among Protagonists: A Study into the use of Peace 
Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process. The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
154 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 200996
com)	(subtitle:	“Strengthening	the	hands	of	
brave	soldiers”):
… President Mahinda’s support for 
Palestine (He’s President of Palestine 
Association if Sri Lanka) has won the 
hearts of Arab Leaders (at the cost of 
Israel), resulting in all Arab Countries 
such as Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia voting for Sri Lanka  
at UNHRC. 
The	website	notes	that	in	addition	to	
cultivating	these	countries	and	China,	Russia,	
Pakistan	and	India,	the	President	has	also	made	
friends	with	President	Gaddafi	in	Libya	and	
President	Mahmoud	Ahmadinejad	in	Iran .
In	many	ways,	the	Sri	Lankan	government	
has	had	a	good	development	record,	and	the	
current	regime	emphasises	successful	devel-
opment	initiatives	as	part	of	its	legitimacy .	
Thus,	President	Mahinda	Rajapakse	stated	in	
April	2009:	
The government has launched a mas-
sive development drive while prosecut-
ing a war against the most ruthless and 
powerful terrorist outfit in the world. 
The government has not reduced wel-
fare programmes or subsidies. This is 
the only government that has launched 
five port development projects, four 
power generation projects, reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation of thousands of 
kilometres or rural and urban roads, 
four express ways and hundreds of 
other development projects simultane-
ously while in a war against terrorism.155
Mindful	of	certain	developmental	success-
es,	a	WFP	Concept	Paper	for	2008	noted	that	
“…	Sri	Lanka	is	on	course	to	reach	most	of	its	
Millenium	Development	Goal	targets,	though	
the	national	development	figures	hide	the	strik-
ing	regional	inequalities .”156	The	Economist	
155 Sandun Jayasekera, “President offers to rehabilitate 
Prabha,” Daily Mirror, 21 April 2009.
156 WFP PRRO Concept Paper for 2008.
noted	in	April	2009,	“Coinciding	with	a	period	
of	high	economic	growth	outside	the	war-zone,	
in	the	west	and	south,	the	conflict	has	come	
to	seem	an	increasingly	anachronistic	blot	on	
a	hopeful	country…	Mr	Rajapaksa	has	almost	
erased	this	stain .”157	It	is	worth	noting	that	other	
states	—	including	Uganda	and	Rwanda	—	have	
been	able	to	harness	a	relatively	good	develop-
mental	record	in	securing	“space”	for	abuses	
against	internal	and	external	enemies	(and	not	
least	for	military	interventions	in	the	DRC) .
The Future:
It	seems	quite	possible	that	controlling	ac-
cess	may	be	maintained	as	a	“card”	to	deter	
moves	towards	some	kind	of	war	crimes	tribu-
nal .	Scepticism	on	the	possibility	of	a	quick	re-
turn	of	displaced	people	to	the	Vanni	has	been	
noted	above .	It	does	appear	that	the	govern-
ment	does	not	want	these	people	further	south,	
so	this	may	feed	into	some	kind	of	return,	par-
ticularly	if	international	objections	to	internment	
are	strongly	and	continuously	expressed .
Whether	the	war	is	now	over	is	an	interest-
ing	question .	Military	victory	has	been	declared	
(and	there	may	be	significant	electoral	advan-
tages	in	being	seen	to	win	a	comprehensive	and	
decisive	military	victory) .	However,	there	seems	
to	be	a	degree	of	awareness	in	official	circles	
that	the	war	may	mutate	rather	than	end .	One	
government	minister	offered	the	view	that	the	
security	problem	will	be	similar	to	that	faced	by	
the	UK	or	the	US,	and	will	consist	of	terrorism .	
Several	of	those	interviewed	expressed	the	view	
that	some	kind	of	guerrilla	action	was	likely	to	
continue .	It	was	felt	that	many	LTTE	soldiers	and	
sympathisers	will	have	sought	to	avoid	almost	
certain	death	or	capture	within	the	narrow,	so-
called	“no	fire	zone”	on	the	north-east	coast,	
and	would	likely	have	slipped	away	southwards .	
One	diplomat	noted:	
The LTTE has lost a conventional war 
and probably will never come back and 
157 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
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have territorial control. But that does 
not mean they are out of the equation, 
for example as an exile movement with 
the diaspora controlling, and the ability 
to exercise terrorist attacks is unknown.
Several	aid	workers	and	some	government	
officials	mentioned	that	the	way	displaced	peo-
ple	are	treated	will	affect	the	likelihood	of	their	
supporting	some	kind	of	violence	in	the	future .	
Internment	may	give	huge	numbers	the	impres-
sion	that	they	are	being	treated	as	terrorists .158	
It	is	worth	noting	in	this	connection	that	in	early	
2002,	WFP	reported,	“The	residents	of	the	[gov-
ernment]	welfare	centers,	who	were	displaced	
by	fighting	in	the	north	and	east	of	the	island	
nation,	have	been	deprived	of	the	food	rations	
they	normally	get	from	WFP	because	donor	
support	has	fallen	off	sharply .”159	Residents	had	
received	very	little	food,	if	any,	for	the	previous	
three	months,	WFP’s	then	Country	Director	
noted .	I	have	not	seen	any	analysis	of	what	con-
tribution,	if	any,	this	shortcoming	made	to	the	
resurgence	of	violence	in	Sri	Lanka .	
Beyond	the	immediate	question	of	the	dis-
placed,	the	manner	in	which	governance	issues	
are	addressed	will	be	particularly	important .	
One	NGO	worker	observed:	
The LTTE is resurgent in Batticaloa 
and Ampara, different cells hiding and 
coming up. It’s far, far from over. In the 
east they can use Karuna… Now peo-
ple feel less secure than when the LTTE 
was there. There are lots of abductions, 
extortions, white vans — people feel 
very, very insecure in the east. We need 
pressure from the international com-
munity — what sort of governance is 
going to be put in place?
Many	were	pessimistic	here .	A	local	aid	
worker	observed:	
158 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
159 WFP Press Release, “WFP urges aid for forgotten victims 
of strife in Sri Lanka,” 28 February 2002.
The war won’t be over. If they give a 
political solution, it can be. But they 
didn’t give before. Do you think they 
will give it now? The [Tamil] bargain-
ing position is zero. Another group will 
come and the LTTE will also be strong. 
The way the government is treating the 
Tamils will make another  
liberation movement.
Another	local	aid	worker	commented	
voiced	his	scepticism	at	the	idea	of	a		
“military	solution”:	
We have not solved the problem. We 
have militarily defeated the armed 
group. But all the factors that led to 
this conflict are still there… Even the 
opportunities for reconciliation, the 
government is not using them. We are 
heading for a big disaster, not rebellion 
soon because the Tamils will be very 
passive and Tamil politicians will be 
compliant. But the government is still 
not sending any message to the Tamil 
community that they are equal citizens, 
especially confining them in camps. 
There has not been a significant move 
on the hearts and minds.
Progress	on	some	kind	of	autonomy	in	the	
east	was	also	seen	as	important .	As	one	senior	
aid	official	put	it:	“The	government	will	have	to	
deliver,	on	services	and	some	general	auton-
omy,	to	the	east,	or	Kurana	etc	will	take	some	
action .”	The	east	remains	prone	to	violence	and	
the	provincial	government	chief	minister	Sivane-
sathurai	Chandrakanthan	has	minimal	power .160	
A	recent	ICG	report	on	the	east	noted:	
Violence, political instability and the 
government’s reluctance to devolve 
power or resources to the fledgling 
provincial council are undermining am-
bitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province… Despite the pres-
160 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
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ence of tens of thousands of soldiers 
and police in the east, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have 
proven able to launch attacks on gov-
ernment forces and on their rivals in the 
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP). 
There have also been violent conflicts 
between different factions of the pro-
government TMVP, and impunity for kill-
ings and disappearances, many of them 
apparently committed by government 
security forces and/or their allies in the 
TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked 
to the TMVP also remain problems.161 
There	may	be	considerable	reluctance	to	
hold	an	election	in	northern	province	unless	
an	anti-LTTE	victory	can	be	assured .162	When	I	
raised	the	question	of	the	Tamils’	weak	bargain-
ing	position	with	one	diplomat,	he	replied:
Yes, there won’t be big concessions… 
The Tamil civilian population, in the first 
year you will have people back on their 
feet and back to their original place, with 
rehabilitation and gradual development 
of some kind of Tamil polity, trying to 
implement the thirteenth amendment 
[governing the powers of provincial coun-
cils]. If there’s a minimal interpretation of 
this, it’s almost useless… The pessimistic 
scenario is the government will do as 
they have done in the east, put in lead-
ers and ministers with almost no support 
from the Tamils, and disappearances, 
killings of those who raise their voices… 
The population is so fed up with war, no 
willingness to take up arms, so you don’t 
have to do much to avoid big problems 
in the next 5-10 years. Plus, the northern 
Tamils detest the LTTE. Colombo Tamils 
might be more positive, and have only 
161 ICG, 2009, Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, 16 April, Executive 
Summary, p. 1.
162 “Dark Victory,” Economist, 23 April 2009 (economist.
com).
the experience of suffering at the hands 
of the government, while the northern 
Tamils have suffered from the LTTE.
On	the	other	hand,	it	was	felt	that	a	period	
of	reconstruction	might	offer	a	better	chance	
for	outsiders	to	pressure	for	political	reform .	As	
this	diplomat	put	it:
The biggest lever we will have is to 
help Sri Lanka with reconstruction and 
we must demand a legitimate political 
process in the north and a restoration of 
democracy and a state where minorities 
have a rightful place. It’s appropriate to 
say, “Show us what you’re planning to do. 
If we do not like it, we cannot fund it.” 
The problem now is we are confronted 
with a humanitarian imperative, and the 
government is so fixed on winning the 
war that they don’t have resources for 
saving lives. There will be a better oppor-
tunity to exercise influence later on.
That	opportunity	might	even	be	increased	
if	the	“victory”	in	the	war	with	the	LTTE	weak-
ened	the	influence	of	parties	espousing	Sin-
halese	nationalism .	The	diplomat	suggested,	
“Who	is	President	depends	on	the	parliament,	
to	give	minorities	substantial	concessions,	then	
he	has	to	have	a	new	mandate	from	the	people	
with	less	presence	of	JVP	and	JHU .	That’s	the	
optimistic	scenario .”
Perhaps	the	grounds	for	pessimism	remain	
more	persuasive .	We	have	noted	that	some	kind	
of	anti-government	violence	remains	likely,	and	
there	would	seem	to	be	elements	on	the	gov-
ernment	“side”	that	have	an	interest	in	some	
kind	of	continued	conflict .	Suppression	of	free-
dom	of	speech	has	flourished	under	what	some	
local	analysts	(CPA)	have	presented	as	“A	State	
of	Permanent	Crisis”	(the	title	of	one	of	their	
publications),163	a	situation	where	“both	conflict	
as	well	as	the	assumption	of	extraordinary	pow-
163 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: 
Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States 
of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
Colombo.
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ers	and	measures	by	the	State	have	become	
normalised	as	a	part	of	everyday	life .”164	I	sug-
gested	to	several	military	officials	that	the	end	
of	the	war	would	soon	give	them	the	opportu-
nity	to	demobilise	many	of	their	soldiers,	they	
replied	without	hesitation	that	this	would	not	be	
possible	or	necessary	given	the	continuing	im-
portance	of	“prevention”	and	“anti-terrorism .”	
Several	other	interviewees	stressed	that	this	is	
a	highly	militarised	society	and	economy	and	
many	people,	particularly	in	poor	rural	areas,	
have	come	to	depend	on	income	from	the	mili-
tary	(including	the	home	guards) .	Development	
of	the	north	is	likely	to	be	highly	militarised	and	
with	“High	Security	Zones”	a	prominent	feature,	
one	local	UN	worker	stressed .	Certainly,	there	
has	been	a	huge	increase	in	military	spending	
in	recent	years .	The	government’s	military	ex-
penditure	rose	from	562	million	in	2003	to	856	
million	in	2008 .165	The	possibility	of	a	highly	mili-
tarised	peace	was	raised,	and	one	aid	worker	
commented:	“The	military	are	going	to	war .	
They	have	lost	a	lot	of	men .	They	will	want	their	
share,	their	fiefdoms	afterwards .”
Conclusion: Key Points
Number 1: Credit for Delivering Food in 
Extremely Difficult Circumstances
Those	we	interviewed	tended	to	give	WFP	
a	great	deal	of	credit	for	getting	large	quanti-
ties	of	food	to	the	Vanni	in	extremely	difficult	
circumstances,	particularly	when	the	war	in-
tensified	from	September	2008 .	WFP	was	seen	
has	having	reacted	flexibly	and	with	ingenuity	
in	its	logistical	operations,	including	on	the	
establishment	of	logistics	hubs,	the	use	of	local	
purchase,	the	practice	of	sealing	trucks,	and	the	
use	of	ships	as	an	alternative	to	trucks .	In	many	
164 Asanga Welikala, 2008, “A State of Permanent Crisis: 
Constitutional Government, Fundamental Rights and States 
of Emergency in Sri Lanka,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
Colombo, p. 237. Mark Duffield drawn attention to the 
paradoxical existence of “permanent emergencies.”
165 The Sipri Military Expenditure Database, 2009, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.
org/result.php4). These figures are adjusted to keep the value 
of the dollar constant, based on 2005 values.
ways,	this	represents	a	significant	practical	
contribution	in	a	context	where	many	agencies	
were	left	as	virtual	bystanders .
Number 2: Government Manipulation  
of Aid
Relief	operations	have	been	largely	subor-
dinated	to	the	government’s	military	and	politi-
cal	agendas .	Many	of	the	mechanisms	involved	
are	quite	familiar	from	past	emergencies .	
A	key	technique	has	been	using	relief	to	
weaken	populations	linked	to	rebel	groups	and	
ultimately	to	promote	the	depopulation	—	for	
an	unknown	period	—	of	areas	of	rebel	strength .	
Many	aid	workers	pointed	to	a	set	of	policies	
and	practices	on	the	part	of	government	actors	
that	have	had	the	predictable	effect	of	debilitat-
ing,	displacing	and	ultimately	interning	a	very	
substantial	portion	of	the	Tamil	population .	In	
practice,	the	Sri	Lankan	government	has	used	
the	broad	rubric	of	“security	issues”	to	impose	
very	far-reaching	restrictions	on	the	medical	
supplies,	water	and	sanitation	and	food	that	
have	been	directed	at	the	Vanni	region .	
A	second	technique	has	been	using	relief	
as	cover	for	military	manoeuvres,	notably	when	
it	came	to	the	aid	convoys	from	October	2008 .	
A	third	mechanism	has	been	to	use	visas,	
travel	permits,	compulsory	evacuations,	written	
agreements,	and	various	kinds	of	intimidation	
to	ensure	that	damaging	information	does	not	
leak	out	via	the	activities	of	aid	agencies .
A	fourth	mechanism	in	Sri	Lanka	(clearly	in	
some	kind	of	tension	with	the	previous	three)	
has	been	to	use	the	existence	of	humanitarian	
operations	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	gov-
ernment’s	good	intentions	and	“humanitarian	
credentials .”	This	has	provided	important	legiti-
macy	for	the	government	even	as	it	has	contrib-
uted	to	humanitarian	crisis	in	important	ways .	
A	fifth	mechanism	is	using	the	existence	of	
relief	operations	as	a	kind	of	“leverage”	over	
the	international	community	—	notably	to	en-
courage	quietude	over	protection	issues .166	
166 This might also extend to leverage over the question of 
“war crimes,” which has recently come to prominence.
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Number 3: Too Close for Comfort?
Whilst	assisting	food	deliveries	in	certain	
respects,	WFP’s	rather	close	relationship	with	
the	Sri	Lankan	government	has	carried	impor-
tant	risks .	Many	of	those	interviewed	expressed	
a	concern	that	WFP,	whilst	in	effect	assisting	
the	government’s	war/relief	strategy,	did	not	
do	enough	to	raise	the	alarm	on	protection	
issues	—	or	even	on	shortcomings	in	delivery .	
WFP	was	felt	to	have	significant	leverage	in	
relation	to	the	Sri	Lankan	government,	though	
this	also	had	its	limits	(particularly	given	the	
geopolitical	context	of	a	“green	light”	for	the	
government’s	“military	solution”) .	Several	in-
terviewees	stressed	that	WFP’s	resources	were	
extremely	valuable	to	the	Sri	Lankan	govern-
ment	(particularly	in	the	context	of	economic	
crisis	and	the	mass	influx	into	Vavuniya),	and	
that	this	implied	some	significant	degree	of	
leverage	(including	on	protection	issues) .	An-
other	source	of	leverage	(for	the	international	
community	in	general)	was	seen	to	lie	precisely	
in	the	government’s	extreme	sensitivity	to	criti-
cal	or	inconvenient	information .
Number 4: Emboldening the 
Government
When	it	came	to	advocacy,	exerting	early	
pressure	at an early stage was	seen	to	be	impor-
tant,	and	one	example	was	the	need	to	pressure	
for	IDPs’	rights	at	the	point	when	the	scale	of	
IDP	movements	was	relatively	small .	When	there	
is	a	mass	influx,	governments	may	be	unable	
to	provide	full	assistance	and	the	perception	
of	“humanitarian	imperative”	may	make	advo-
cacy	and	pressure	on	protection	issues	more	
difficult .	Many	interviewees	stressed	that	mak-
ing	concessions	to	the	government	on	various	
humanitarian	principles	had	had	the	effect	of	
emboldening	the	government	in	its	relation-
ship	with	the	humanitarian	community,	and	one	
source	said	the	humanitarian	community	had	
been	reduced	to	begging	rather	than	negotiat-
ing .	Official	untruths	need	to	be	challenged	at	
an	early	stage	—	or	the	international	community	
risks	“buying	into	them .”	Aid	agencies’	reluc-
tance	to	speak	publicly	on	sensitive	issues	has	
even	extended	to	withholding	the	results	of	nu-
tritional	surveys .	Also	criticised	by	aid	workers	in	
the	field	were	the	relatively	weak	protests	—	at	
least	in	public	—	at	the	ejection	of	aid	agencies	
from	the	Vanni	in	September	2008	and	at	the	
civilian	casualties	resulting	from	government	
shelling	and	aerial	bombardment	during	the	
intensified	military	push	from	around	that	time .	
Any	protests	were	seen	as	too	little	and	too	
late .	The	lack	of	protest	at	child	deaths	resulting	
from	these	military	actions	was	contrasted	by	
some	aid	workers	with	what	they	saw	as	a	much	
greater	degree	of	public	protest	of	child	recruit-
ment	(by	the	LTTE) .	In	general,	aid	agencies	
—	whether	in	the	UN	system	or	NGOs	—	ap-
pear	to	have	been	very	much	on	the	defensive	
in	a	context	where	any	action	could	easily	be	
turned	against	them,	notably	in	a	media	subject	
to	extreme	government	control .	Interviewees	
questioned	whether	the	Sri	Lankan	government	
had	ever	been	subject	to	any	significant	conse-
quences	for	its	various	attempts	to	restrict	hu-
manitarian	space .	The	government’s	abundant	
options	for	international	support	were	felt	to	
have	been	significant	here .
Number 5: Openness on Shortcomings 
in Protection and Assistance
It	is	important	for	WFP	and	other	agencies	
to	be	as	frank	as	possible	about	shortcomings	
in	protection	and	assistance .	This	can	strength-
en	the	hand	of	those	within	powerful	interna-
tional	governments	who	may	have	very	signifi-
cant	leverage	that	can	influence	the	Sri	Lankan	
government	in	particular .	The	humanitarian	
arms	of	major	donor	bilateral	organisations	and	
governments	frequently	compete	with	other	
arms	of	government,	which	may	put	commer-
cial	or	geopolitical	aims	ahead	of	humanitarian	
goals .	In	these	circumstances,	a	greater	degree	
of	openness	within	the	UN	system	offers	the	
prospect	of	strengthening	the	arguments	and	
the	persuasiveness	of	those	with	more	humani-
tarian	mandates	and	agendas .	Key	protection	
failures	in	Sri	Lanka	include:	civilian	casualties	
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resulting	from	the	war;	the	internment	of	hun-
dreds	of	thousands	of	displaced	people;	and	
the	lack	of	clear	timelines	for	screening	or	reset-
tlement .	In	terms	of	assistance,	a	perceived	lack	
of	openness	about	the	inadequate	quantities	
of	food	reaching	the	north	was	seen	as	a	signifi-
cant	problem .	Where	there	is	a	strong	desire	
to	show	that	relief	has	met	the	humanitarian	
needs,	there	may	be	a	dangerous	tendency	to	
minimise	the	numbers	in	need;	this	in	turn	can	
weaken	advocacy	and	protection	efforts .	In	
general,	WFP	and	other	UN	agencies	need	to	
be	mindful	of	the	dangers	in	giving	the	impres-
sion	that	key	protection	and	relief	gaps	are	be-
ing	met	when	in	reality	they	remain	extremely	
grave .	There	is	also	a	danger	that	the	UN	in	
general	serves	a	function	for	powerful	interna-
tional	governments	in	giving	this	impression .
Number 6: Advocacy as a Way to 
Enhance “Humanitarian Space”—  
and the Question of Incentives 
Whilst	some	aid	workers	expressed	the	
fear	that	their	ability	to	deliver	relief	would	be	
impeded	by	advocacy,	two	important	coun-
terarguments	emerged	powerfully	from	the	
research .
First,	several	of	those	interviewed	in	Sri	
Lanka	felt	strongly	that	a	prioritisation	of	deliv-
ery	over	advocacy	had	ultimately	had	very	ad-
verse	affects	for	the	protection	of	target	popu-
lations,	and	had	actually	done	little	to	enhance	
staff	security	or	even	the	ability	to	deliver	relief	
goods	and	services .	In	fact,	the	amount	of	“hu-
manitarian	space”	in	which	aid	agencies	could	
operate	was	perceived	as	having	shrunk	along-
side	a	series	of	concessions	to	the	Sri	Lankan	
government .	Even	the	delivery	of	food	relief	
often	fell	very	short	of	the	level	of	need .
Second,	in	practice	decision-making	has	
not	been	simply a	question	of	weighing	delivery	
against	advocacy .	Many	other	considerations	
have	come	into	play,	including	geopolitical	
concerns	and	organisational	or	bureaucratic	
interests .	These	considerations	underline	the	
possibility	that	the	balance	between	advocacy	
and	delivery	may	not	have	been	optimal	from	
the	point	of	view	of	the	target	population .	Par-
ticularly	important	in	setting	the	context	for	
repeated	concessions	to	the	Sri	Lankan	govern-
ment	has	been	the	government’s	success	in	po-
sitioning	the	war	against	the	LTTE	within	a	more	
general	framework	of,	first,	an	purely	internal	
struggle	where	sovereignty	is	under	threat,	and,	
second,	a	global	“war	on	terror .”
To	some	extent,	food	aid	has	been	used	—	
by	the	Sri	Lankan	government	and	by	interna-
tional	governments	—	to	show	that	“something	
is	being	done”	while	an	international	“green	
light”	has	been	given	to	the	government’s	
pursuit	of	military	victory .	Other	kinds	of	self-
interest	inhibiting	protection	have	included;	
the	fear	for	personal	safety	(which	is	distinct	
from	a	concern	with	delivery	and	implies	a	need	
for	strong	international	and	national	action	to	
improve	such	safety);	concern	for	individual	ca-
reers	(which	has	been	a	disincentive	to	risking	
ejection);	concern	for	organisational	health	and	
growth	(with	incentives	often	centring	on	deliv-
ering	measurable	outputs	rather	than	enhanc-
ing	protection) .	Each	of	these	appears	to	have	
had	some	influence	in	de-prioritising	protection	
in	many	crises	around	the	world,	and	Sri	Lanka	
is	not	an	exception .	
The	research	suggests	that	today’s	trade-off,	
even	when	it	appears	to	be	a	sensible	one,	may	
create	a	worse	situation	(and	a	smaller	humani-
tarian	space)	tomorrow	—	because	of	the	signals	
sent .	Speaking	out	is	not	simply	something	to	
be	balanced	against	delivery	(or	abandoned	in	
favour	of	delivery);	it	is	also	a	question	of	meet-
ing	agencies’	protection	mandates .	Insofar	as	aid	
agencies	are	actively	assisting	in	a	government	
plan	of	interning	large	elements	of	the	north-
ern	population,	speaking	out	becomes	a	clear	
responsibility .	As	one	UN	worker	put	it,	“It’s	our	
money	that	allows	them	to	support	this	plan .”
The	interviews	left	me	with	a	strange	im-
pression:	it	was	generally	someone else	that	
had	the	leverage .	It	seemed,	moreover,	that	
those	who	did	have	some	ability	to	pressure	the	
government	were	most	often	leaving	this	task	
102
to	those	who	either	did	not	have	the	leverage	or	
who	were	unwilling	to	use	it	because	of	a	per-
ceived	humanitarian	imperative .	
One	UN	worker	said	simply:	“We	are	not	
without	power,	we	are	without	a	will	to	use	it .”	
While	individual	agencies	may	have	significant	
leverage,	the	best	opportunities	to	pressure	for	
improved	protection	clearly	lie	with	coordinated	
action,	notably	through	the	country	office	and	
with	full	support	from	New	York .	Yet	pressures	
on	these	lines	seem	to	have	been	sporadic	at	
best,	and	came	mostly	from	April	2009	when	
the	Sri	Lankan	crisis	became	a	major	interna-
tional	media	story .	Again,	the	weak	international	
response	to	government	ejection	of	aid	agen-
cies	from	the	north	in	September	2008	was	a	
key	moment .	
Number 7: Who Learns the Lessons?
We	found	a	significant	concern	that	col-
lective	concessions	on	important	humanitarian	
may	send	a	signal	internationally	(as	well	as	lo-
cally),	that	emboldens	abusive	actors	elsewhere	
to	step	up	their	manipulation	of	aid	(and	a	
parallel	manipulation	of	truth) .	Whilst	the	inter-
national	community	often	talks	about	“lessons	
learned”	from	various	humanitarian	crises,	there	
is	a	need	to	be	sensitive	to	the	lessons	that	gov-
ernments	and	other	key	actors	within	particular	
crisis-affected	areas	may	be	learning	from	crises	
elsewhere	(and	indeed	from	the	crisis	in	Sri	
Lanka) .	This	underlines	the	importance	of	de-
fending	humanitarian	principles .	It	would	seem	
that	local	actors	may	be	learning	lessons	faster	
than	the	humanitarian	community .
Number 8: Advocacy and the Pipeline
Advocacy	may	also	have	been	impeded	
by	“pipeline”	issues .	When	WFP	did	not	have	
enough	food	available	for	relief,	this	compli-
cated	the	attribution	of	responsibility	for	lack	of	
distributions,	providing	something	of	an	“alibi”	
for	government-led	obstruction .	Insofar	as	
WFP’s	own	supply	problems	were	contributing	
to	low	distributions,	it	was	also	clearly	harder	for	
WFP	to	point	the	finger	at	the	government .	
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The limits of Humanitarian action: WfP, food assistance  
and International aid in DR Congo
James Darcy, Overseas Development Institute
Guillaume Foliot, World Food Programme
Preface
This	case	study	is	based	on	a	visit	to	DRC	
undertaken	by	the	authors	from	7th–16th	May	
2009 .	For	reasons	of	time	and	security,	the	visit	
was	confined	to	Kinshasa	and	to	Goma	town	in	
the	East	of	the	country .	The	report	is	based	on	
a	combination	of	interviews,	review	of	docu-
mentation	and	some	limited	programme	site	
visits,	followed	by	discussion	and	reflection .167
The	limitations	of	such	a	review	will	be	ap-
parent .	It	is	not	an	evaluation	of	performance	
(of	WFP	or	anyone	else),	nor	do	we	attempt	
to	make	detailed	recommendations	specific	
to	DRC,	since	we	are	not	in	a	position	to	do	
167 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP.
so .	Rather,	the	idea	was	to	consider	the	chal-
lenges	to	providing	food	and	other	forms	of	
humanitarian	assistance	in	DRC,	the	way	those	
challenges	were	understood	by	humanitar-
ian	actors,	what	approaches	had	been	tried	
to	overcome	them,	and	what	broader	lessons	
might	be	learned	from	this	for	working	in	con-
flict	situations .	We	have	at	times	expressed	our	
views	robustly	with	the	aim	of	provoking	dis-
cussion,	and	we	hope	this	will	be	taken	in	the	
positive	spirit	intended .168,	169
168 The ToR for the case study are included in an Appendix.
169 The authors would like to thank all those who gave their 
time to contribute to the study. In particular they would like 
to thank the staff of WFP in Rome, Kinshasa and Goma for 
organising and hosting the visit during such a busy period. We 
hope the result will be found useful and worthwhile.
Case study: DR Congo (Field visit, May 2009)
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009
The	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	(DRC)	has	a	population	of	around	60	million	uneven-
ly	distributed	over	2 .4	million	square	kilometres	(roughly	the	size	of	Western	Europe)	and	border-
ing	9	other	countries .	It	ranks	177th	of	179	countries	UNDP	Human	Development	Index .	Decades	
of	misrule	and	lack	of	investment,	exacerbated	by	conflicts,	have	destroyed	the	government’s	
capacity	to	administer	at	all	levels .	The	entire	territory	of	the	DRC,	including	the	conflict	zones,	is	
affected	by	the	dilapidated	state	of	the	infrastructure,	the	lack	of	roads	and	other	travel	links,	and	
the	weakness	of	basic	state	services .
Although	the	west	of	the	country	remains	in	a	state	of	relative	peace,	the	populations	are	
victims	of	acute	malnutrition,	epidemics,	violence	and	serious	violations	of	human	rights .	The	
dilapidation	of	road,	river,	lake	and	rail	infrastructures	and	the	lack	of	capacity	of	the	govern-
ment	make	access	to	affected	populations	difficult	and	costly .	It	is	estimated	that	only	20%	of	
the	country	can	be	accessed	by	road .	Less	than	2%	of	roads	are	paved .
A	needs	assessment	process	for	the	2009	Humanitarian	Action	Plan	was	conducted	in	Au-
gust	and	September	2008 .	At	that	time,	1,350,000	persons	remained	displaced	in	South	Kivu,	
North	Kivu	and	in	the	north	of	Province	Orientale;	193	out	of	515	health	zones	did	not	have	the	
necessary	capacities	to	respond	to	health	crises;	and	some	1,700,000	children	were	estimated	
to	be	suffering	from	acute	malnutrition,	of	which	almost	1,000,000	were	severe	cases .	Overall,	
a	third	of	children	under	5	suffer	from	chronic	malnutrition	(stunting),	and	13%	suffer	acute	mal-
nutrition	(WFP/FAO	2006) .
Levels	of	school	enrolment	fell	from	92	percent	in	1971–1992	to	64	percent	in	2001–2002	(PRSP) .
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Background and Context
The	history	of	the	Democratic	Republic	
of	Congo	(formerly	Zaire)	has	been	one	of	vio-
lence,	conflict	and	chronic	under-development	
stretching	back	to	the	colonial	period .170	More	
recently,	it	has	been	the	setting	for	what	has	
been	called	the	worst	emergency	to	unfold	
in	Africa	in	recent	decades,	measured	both	
in	terms	of	human	suffering	and	regional	in-
security .	Between	1998	and	2006	alone,	an	
estimated	three	to	four	million	“excess”	deaths	
are	estimated	to	have	occurred,	most	through	
indirect	effects	of	conflict:	disease	and	malnu-
trition .171	Despite	its	relative	wealth	in	terms	of	
natural	resources,	the	sheer	scale	of	the	coun-
try	and	the	struggle	to	control	its	territory	and	
resources	(minerals,	diamonds,	timber)	have	
led	to	a	state	that	is	fragmented,	anarchic,	
weakly	governed,	highly	unstable	in	parts	and	
with	some	of	the	worst	human	development	
indicators	in	the	world .172
In	1997	when	neighbouring	Rwanda	invad-
ed	the	country	to	flush	out	extremist	Hutu	mili-
tias	(the	ringleaders	of	the	Rwandan	genocide	
of	1994),	it	gave	a	boost	to	the	anti-Mobutu	
rebels .	These	quickly	captured	the	capital,	
Kinshasa,	installed	Laurent	Kabila	as	president	
and	renamed	the	country	the	Democratic	Re-
public	of	Congo .	A	rift	between	Kabila	and	his	
former	allies	sparked	a	new	rebellion,	backed	
by	Rwanda	and	Uganda .	Other	states	(Angola,	
Namibia	and	Zimbabwe)	took	Kabila’s	side,	
turning	the	country	—	especially	the	eastern	
provinces	of	Kivu	—	into	a	vast	battleground .	
The	fight	for	control	of	the	country’s	enormous	
mineral	wealth	and	large	scale	human	rights	
abuses	characterised	the	conflicts .	Following	
170 The country was known as “Belgian Congo” prior to 
independence in 1960
171 These figures and the basis on which they were derived 
are much debated. The primary source is the surveys 
conducted on behalf of IRC between […, Roberts, L. et al)]. 
For a recent review of the debate between the relevant 
experts, see the recent HNTS peer review paper which casts 
some doubt on the high mortality estimates from the IRC 
surveys.
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the	Lusaka	Ceasefire	Agreement	in	1999,	a	UN	
peacekeeping	mission	was	deployed	(MO-
NUC	—	see	below) .	But	this	second	Congo	war	
lasted	from	1998	through	to	2003,	with	devas-
tating	human	consequences .
After	continued	violence	following	the	
formation	of	the	Transitional	Government	in	
2003,	presidential	and	national	elections	—	
the	first	in	45	years	—	were	held	in	the	second	
half	of	2006 .	Political	progress	and	improved	
security	in	some	areas	allowed	internally	dis-
placed	persons	(IDPs)	and	refugees	to	return	
home,	especially	in	Province-Orientale	(except	
Ituri),	Équateur,	Katanga,	Maniema	and	some	
parts	of	Nord-Kivu	and	Sud-Kivu .	Some	east-
ern	regions	including	Ituri,	Katanga,	the	Kivus	
and	Maniema	nonetheless	remained	seriously	
insecure:	there	were	clashes	between	the	
Forces armées de la République démocratique 
du Congo (DRC	armed	forces)	(FARDC)	and	
troops	loyal	to	the	dissident	Laurent	Nkunda	
(Tutsi)	in	Nord-Kivu .	These	tensions	affected	
the	presidential	elections	in	August	2006 .	
The	behaviour	of	some	units	of	the	army	
and	of	militias	such	as	the	Front démocratique 
pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR;	Demo-
cratic	Front	for	the	Liberation	of	Rwanda	—	a	
“Hutu	power”	militia)	contributed	to	contin-
ued	insecurity	and	human	right	abuses .	Coup	
attempts	and	sporadic	violence	heralded	
renewed	fighting	in	the	eastern	part	of	the	
country	in	2008 .
In	an	attempt	to	bring	the	situation	un-
der	control,	the	government	in	January	2009	
invited	in	troops	from	Rwanda	to	help	mount	
a	joint	operation	against	the	Rwandan	rebel	
Hutu	militias	active	in	eastern	DR	Congo .	
Rwanda	also	moved	to	arrest	the	Hutu	militias’	
main	rival,	General	Nkunda,	a	Congolese	Tutsi	
hitherto	seen	as	its	main	ally	in	the	area .	
Beyond	the	Kivus,	a	further	crisis	has	arisen	
because	of	the	activities	of	the	Lord’s	Resistance	
Army	(LRA)	from	Uganda .	The	LRA	is	active	in	
the	North	of	Province	Orientale	(Haut	Uélé)	us-
ing	the	area	as	the	safe	haven	and	perpetrating	
atrocities	against	local	civilian	population .
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The	UN	peacekeeping	mission	in	DRC	
(MONUC)173	is	an	important	actor	on	the	
ground .	MONUC	was	established	by	United	Na-
tions	Security	Council	Resolutions	1279	(1999)	
and	1291	(2000)	to	monitor	the	peace	process	of	
the	“Second	Congo	War,”	though	in	fact	it	has	
been	actively	engaged	with	the	conflicts	in	Ituri	
and	the	Kivus .	
In	May	2007,	the	UN	Security	Council	unani-
mously	adopted	an	ambitious	new	mandate	for	
MONUC	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter,	au-
thorising	the	use	of	force	to	tackle	the	threats	to	
peace	and	security	posed	by	the	armed	groups	in	
Eastern	Congo,	and	specifically	to	protect	civilian	
population .	In	addition,	it	was	tasked	with	shor-
ing	up	the	democratic	institutions	in	the	country	
and	promoting	human	rights .	As	of	March	2009,	
MONUC	remains	under	strength	—	and	accord-
ing	to	many,	under-equipped	and	inadequately	
deployed	—	with	numbers	standing	at	18,430	
uniformed	personnel	and	3,700	civilian	staff .	
MONUC	and	the	Congolese	Army	are	joint-
ly	planning	operations	in	South	Kivu	to	elimi-
nate	the	FDLR	(operation	“Kimia	2”) .	At	the	time	
this	case	study	was	being	undertaken,	over	the	
weekend	of	9-10	May	2009,	FDLR	rebels	were	
blamed	for	attacks	on	the	villages	of	Ekingi	and	
Busurungi	in	South	Kivu	province .	More	than	90	
people	were	killed	at	Ekingi,	including	60	civil-
ians	and	30	government	troops,	and	“dozens	
more”	were	said	to	be	killed	at	Busurungi .	The	
FDLR	had	attacked	several	other	villages	in	the	
preceding	weeks	and	clashes	occurred	between	
FDLR	forces	and	the	Congolese	Army .	The	most	
recent	attacks	have	forced	a	significant	number	
of	people	from	their	homes .	
This	“peace	enforcement”	collaboration	
by	MONUC	with	the	FARDC	—	in	effect,	a	joint	
counter-insurgency	campaign	—	is	the	subject	
of	considerable	controversy .	Many	of	the	atroci-
ties	being	perpetrated	in	the	east	of	the	country	
are	attributed	to	government	troops	of	the	
FARDC .	Moreover,	in	the	eyes	of	some,	the	qua-
173 A French acronym for Mission de l’Organisation des 
Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo
si-belligerent	status	of	the	UN	forces	—	sym-
bolised	for	example	by	the	use	of	UN-badged	
attack	helicopters	against	rebel	forces	—	com-
promises	the	neutral	and	independent	status	of	
the	UN	humanitarian	and	development	agen-
cies,	potentially	jeopardising	their	safe	access	
to	affected	communities .	MONUC	is	blamed	by	
many	Congolese	in	the	East	for	failing	to	pro-
tect	the	civilian	population,	and	this	unpopular-
ity	appears	to	colour	opinion	of	UN	agencies	as	
well	(since	most	do	not	distinguish	the	agencies	
from	MONUC) .	Both	have	been	the	subject	of	
angry	demonstrations	by	local	populations .
WFP	started	to	operate	in	DRC	in	1973	and	
most	of	the	current	humanitarian	actors	have	
been	active	in	the	country	since	the	mid-1990s	
with	the	eruption	of	the	conflicts .	Until	2006,	
their	actions	were	limited	to	the	conflict	zones	
in	the	east	of	the	country .	Since	then,	the	hu-
manitarian	community	has	gradually	started	
enlarging	its	area	of	operation,	having	noted	
alarming	indicators	elsewhere	the	country .	
Funding	for	humanitarian	programmes	in	
DRC	has	risen	dramatically	from	$150	million	in	
2002	to	$650	in	2008 .	Levels	of	development	as-
sistance	have	fluctuated	over	the	same	period,	
but	have	consistently	been	5-10	times	greater	
than	humanitarian	assistance .174
Defining Vulnerability and Aid 
Priorities in DRC
Defining Vulnerability and Setting 
Response Priorities
It	is	important	in	a	context	like	DRC	to	
distinguish	acute	and	chronic	vulnerability,	and	
the	risk	factors	that	underlie	each .	Acute	vulner-
ability,	or	exposure	to	short-term	hazard,	tends	
to	be	linked	in	DRC	to	localized	violence,	mass	
displacement,	natural	hazards	and	epidemics .	
This	form	of	vulnerability	fluctuates	over	time	
and	between	different	areas	and	populations,	
though	people	in	the	East	have	been	repeat-
edly	exposed	in	this	way .	Chronic	vulnerability,	
174 Source: OECD DAC
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or	exposure	to	persistent	hazard,	relates	to	
multiple	interacting	factors,	including	general-
ised	insecurity,	poor	health	and	nutrition,	fragile	
livelihoods	and	long-term	displacement .	These	
are	factors	that,	rather	than	representing	a	criti-
cal	deviation	from	the	norm,	have	become	the	
prevailing	norm	for	many .
Both	kinds	of	vulnerability	are	in	large	part	
a	function	of	structural	factors:	weak	or	abusive	
governance,	corruption,	impunity	and	the	fail-
ure	of	basic	state	functions	(including	security	
and	rule	of	law),	combined	with	the	common	
features	of	under-development	and	poverty:	
gross	disparities	in	wealth	distribution,	weak	
infrastructure,	lack	of	access	to	services,	and	so	
on .	There	is	a	strong	social	dimension	to	both	
kinds	of	vulnerability	—	particularly	relating	to	
gender,	age	and	ethnicity	—	though	the	lack	of	
disaggregated	data	makes	it	hard	to	draw	many	
firm	conclusions	in	this	regard .
One	of	the	features	that	make	it	difficult	to	
design	appropriate	humanitarian	and	develop-
ment	responses	in	DRC	is	the	complex	overlay-
ing	of	acute	and	chronic	vulnerability .	The	use	
of	the	term	“crisis”	to	describe	the	situation	in	
the	whole	of	DRC,	or	even	the	situation	in	the	
eastern	provinces,	is	in	many	ways	misleading .	
It	implies	a	constant	state	of	acute	vulnerability .	
But	what	characterises	DRC	is	the	extraordinary	
extent	of	chronic	vulnerability,	evidenced	in	
chronically	high	levels	of	mortality,	morbidity	
and	acute	malnutrition .	This	coupled	with	(for	
many)	constant	exposure	to	violent	insecurity	
results	in	a	situation	where	crisis	—	in	the	sense	
of	a	dangerous	deviation	from	the	norm	—	is	
no	longer	an	adequate	term .	Pockets	of	crisis	
(or	“emergencies”)	can	be	identified	within	the	
prevailing	norm .	In	many	ways,	neither	humani-
tarian	nor	development	approaches	as	normally	
understood	are	well	adapted	to	this	kind	of	con-
text .	This	point	is	explored	further	below .
Five	cross-cutting	strategic	objectives	are	
identified	in	the	common	Humanitarian	Action	
Plan	for	DRC:
(i)	Protect	&	assist	IDPs,	returned/relocated/
repatriated	families	&	host	communities
(ii)	Strengthen	the	protection	of	civilian	
populations
(iii)	Reduce	mortality	and	morbidity
(iv)	Restore	livelihoods
(v)	Promote	near-term	community	recovery .
The	choice	of	these	categories	reflects	
judgements	about	prevailing	vulnerabilities	and	
threats .	It	also	recognises	the	(limited)	role	that	
humanitarian	action	can	play	in	the	reduction	of	
chronic	vulnerability	and	the	promotion	of	resil-
ience .	In	the	related	Needs	Analysis	Framework,	
five	“action	thresholds”	have	been	identified	in	
order	to	guide	responses .	These	are	based	on:	
•	 Mortality	and	morbidity	
•	 Acute	malnutrition	
•	 Incidence	of	violence
•	 Population	displacements	
•	 Population	returns	
In	each	case,	a	threshold	for	action	is	speci-
fied	(e .g .	U5MR	>2/10,000/day) .	These	thresh-
olds	correspond	to	the	identified	major	causes	
of	high	mortality	in	the	country,	and	have	thus	
been	agreed	as	triggers	for	humanitarian	re-
sponse	anywhere	in	the	country .	Resulting	
from	this	analysis,	the	“humanitarian	maps”	
presented	in	the	Humanitarian	Action	Plan	
(HAP)	in	2008	differed	from	those	of	previous	
years .	Rather	than	concentrating	on	the	zones	
of	active	conflict	in	the	eastern	provinces,	the	
humanitarian	community	in	the	DRC	was	asked	
to	respond	to	the	various	emergency	pockets	
identified	through	the	action	threshold,	wher-
ever	these	needs	may	be	present .	
To	some	extent,	this	“threshold”	approach	
avoids	the	problem	associated	with	distinguish-
ing	acute	and	chronic	vulnerability .	In	focus-
ing	on	symptoms	and	outcomes,	it	points	to	
interventions	that	tackle	the	proximate	rather	
than	structural	causes	of	vulnerability .	Given	the	
scale	of	the	development	needs	and	the	neces-
sary	limits	of	humanitarian	action,	this	may	be	
inevitable .	But	it	also	serves	to	highlight	the	im-
mense	(and	largely	unaddressed)	challenge	of	
tackling	structural	causes .	
Perhaps	the	most	important	feature	of	the	
HAP	is	that,	rather	than	taking	the	individual	
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sectors/clusters	as	the	basis	of	analysis	and	
planning	(as	in	most	CAPs),	it	focuses	on	
cross-cutting	outcomes	of	concern	(the	stra-
tegic	objectives) .	The	approach	of	each	of	
the	sectors/clusters	is	then	considered	ac-
cording	to	its	relevance	to	the	outcome/ob-
jective .	While	not	presenting	a	fully	worked	
out	analytical	framework	for	achieving	this,	
it	nevertheless	represents	a	considerable	
advance	on	sector-based	approaches .	Given	
the	very	limited	extent	of	impact	assessment	
in	DRC,	it	remains	to	be	demonstrated	that	
this	leads	in	practice	to	more	complementary	
programming	and	more	effective	multi-sec-
toral	interventions;	but	anecdotal	evidence,	
at	least,	suggests	that	it	leads	to	significantly	
more	effective	practice	than	previously .
The	effects	of	violence	and	political	in-
stability	remain	the	single	biggest	variable	
factor	affecting	both	the	general	popula-
tion	and	those	planning	aid	or	investment	
programmes .	The	uncertainty	this	creates	
affects	the	ability	to	plan	at	every	level,	and	
is	itself	a	form	of	vulnerability	and	insecurity .	
When	every	venture	(including	aid)	is	poten-
tially	high	risk,	the	business	of	intervention	
becomes	one	of	weighing	the	risk	of	action	
against	the	consequences	of	inaction .	It	fol-
lows	that	joint	risk	analysis	is	an	essential	
component	of	joint	planning .
Approaches to Food Security in DRC
DRC	faces	problems	with	all	three	dimen-
sions	of	food	security:	availability,	access	and	
utilisation .175	The	country	used	to	be	food	
self-sufficient,	but	it	last	exported	food	in	the	
1960s .	Some	areas	remain	productive,	but	
on	current	trends	it	will	take	until	2060	to	get	
back	to	the	level	of	the	1960s .	A	high	propor-
tion	of	people	(exact	figures	are	not	available)	
produce	their	own	food;	but	there	is	generally	
little	incentive	to	produce	surplus	given	lack	
of	access	to	markets .	Purchasing	power	has	
175 For a full “baseline” analysis of food security in 
DRC, see the WFP Comprehensive Food Security and 
Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) report of July 2008.
fallen	dramatically	over	the	past	18	months	with	
the	rise	in	food	prices;	particularly	since	labour-
ers	are	paid	in	francs	but	traders	deal	in	dollars .	
The	Congolese	franc	is	reported	to	have	lost	
some	40%	of	its	value	against	the	dollar .
The	2007	WFP	Protracted	Relief	and	Re-
covery	Operation,	drawing	on	the	Poverty	
Reduction	Strategy	for	DRC,	put	the	percent-
age	of	food	insecure	people	in	the	country	at	
70	percent	of	the	population .	The	same	source	
identifies	a	30–40	%	decrease	in	food	crop	
production	(it	does	not	say	over	what	period);	
a	fall	in	food	consumption,	which	is	now	put	at	
1,650	kcal	per	person	per	day	compared	with	
a	requirement	of	2,300	kcal/person/day;	and	
increased	malnutrition	levels	among	both	chil-
dren	and	adults .
The	2007	PRRO	document	states	that	“in	
the	absence	of	any	recent	exhaustive	survey,	
the	current	nutritional	situation	cannot	be	ac-
curately	assessed”	though	it	identifies	the	nu-
tritional	situation	as	being	particularly	serious	
in	the	conflict	zones:	Ituri,	Nord-Kivu	and	Sud-
Kivu,	Maniema	and	north	and	central	Katanga,	
where	“fighting	continues	to	cause	massive	
population	movements	affecting	household	
food	security .”	Since	the	PRRO	was	launched,	
numerous	surveys	indicate	levels	of	malnutri-
tion	in	other	(non-conflict)	areas	in	the	centre	
of	country	as	equally	serious .	The	2009	HAP	
records	that:
In the course of the 59 nutritional studies 
undertaken in the DRC between January 
and August [2008], 28 nutritional emergen-
cies were identified (acute malnutrition 
rate above 5%), including a majority in the 
western provinces. This distribution shows 
that while acute malnutrition in the conflict 
zones must be closely monitored, it is also 
important to take into account the zones af-
fected by chronic food insecurity in the west-
ern provinces. The results … [indicate] a 
similar level of vulnerability to acute [nu-
trition] crises in all parts of the country, 
including the capital. [emphasis	added]
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This	finding	is	perhaps	unsurprising	given	
the	level	of	resources	committed	to	food	as-
sistance	in	the	eastern	provinces .	To	accept	
this	as	the	explanation	as	to	why	the	non-
conflict	areas	appear	to	suffer	levels	of	acute	
food	insecurity	comparable	to	or	worse	than	
those	in	conflict	areas	is	to	assume	that	food	
assistance	(predominantly	food	aid)	has	made	
a	significant	impact	on	acute	malnutrition	
levels	in	the	East .	This	may	be	so,	though	the	
relative	lack	of	credible	impact	analysis	makes	
it	difficult	to	establish .	What	is	clear	is	that	the	
available	capacity	to	respond	to	(or	prevent/	
mitigate)	nutritional	crises	in	the	East	is	far	
greater	than	in	other	areas,	given	the	level	
of	resources,	number	of	agencies,	etc .	It	also	
seems	clear	that,	though	the	triggers	of	nutri-
tional	crises	may	be	rather	different	in	conflict	
and	non-conflict	areas,	the	same	underlying	
factors	behind	food	insecurity	(poverty,	isola-
tion,	etc .)	affect	all	areas .	
WFP PRRO (10608.0): Targeted Food 
Aid for Victims of Armed Conflict and 
Other Vulnerable Groups
Number	of	beneficiaries	
1st	year:	 1,120,690
2nd	year:	 2,159,950
3rd	year:	 1,765,980
Total	number	of	beneficiaries	(30	months)	
3,367,770	(66	percent	women)
Duration	of	project	30	months
(1	July	–	31	December	2009)
WFP	food	tonnage	210,084	mt
Cost (United States dollars)
WFP	food	cost	 71,830,601
Total	cost	to	WFP	 230,874,212
The	goal	of	PRRO	10608 .0	is	to	help	to	
reduce	hunger	and	poverty	in	a	conflict	
and	post-conflict	context	by	providing	food	
aid	for	3 .4	million	people	from	July	2007	to	
December	2009 .
As	appears	from	the	figures	in	the	PRRO	
description	above,	the	cost	of	food	aid	deliv-
ery	in	DRC	is	very	high .176	As	the	PRRO	puts	it	
“WFP’s logistics in DRC are complex and costly 
because of the size of the country, the poor 
state of roads, air, river and rail communica-
tions, the numerous supply corridors and the 
distances between them and the shortage of 
reliable transporters. WFP’s intervention areas 
are generally remote; the limited capacity of the 
commercial transport sector is likely to result in 
high costs.	Much	of	the	cost	relates	to	overland	
trucking	of	food	originating	in	neighbouring	
countries,	and	it	is	notable	that	there	is	a	neg-
ligible	amount	of	in-country	purchase .	WFP’s	
new	role	as	head	of	the	logistics	cluster	and	
lead	supplier	of	logistics	services	presumably	
allows	some	economies	of	scale,	and	it	has	
recently	introduced	an	air	transport	service	for	
aid	personnel .	
The	PRRO	document	records	the	main	con-
clusions	from	a	2006	process	of	joint	evaluation	
of	food	security	and	nutrition,	subsequent	dis-
cussion	and	field	verification	visits .	Four	major	
themes	were	highlighted:
i)	The impact of mass displacement on 
food security:	“Looting and chronic insecurity 
have caused major population movements and 
prevented those who stayed behind from pro-
ducing food. An optimistic scenario assumes that 
populations will return, but the situation is still 
precarious in the Ituri, Katanga and Maniema tri-
angle. The ratio of displaced people to returnees 
will depend on the level of security that the new 
authorities can guarantee.”	In	the	event,	new	dis-
placements	in	2008/9	have	seen	overall	estimat-
ed	numbers	of	displaced	people	rise	from	1 .1	to	
1 .35	million,	despite	a	significant	level	of	return	
of	those	previously	displaced .	The	“optimistic	
scenario”	in	the	PRRO	—	on	the	basis	of	which	it	
was	in	fact	planned	—	was	overtaken	by	events .
ii)	Food availability and access. Despite	
DRC’s	“enormous	agricultural	potential,”	crop	
176 Average internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) 
costs for the project are given as US$353.49/mt in the PRRO.
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production	is	estimated	to	have	fallen	30–40	
percent .	This	is	attributed	in	the	PRRO	to	a	vari-
ety	of	factors:	
•	 Continuous	population	movements
•	 Reduction	of	cultivated	areas	because	of	
insecurity
•	 Degradation	of	infrastructures	leading	to	
limited	access	to	markets
•	 Lack	of	technical	assistance	for	farmers
•	 Limited	access	to	farm	tools	and	inputs
•	 Low	crop	yields	and	the	spread	of	cassava	
mosaic	disease .	
•	 Looting	of	tools	and	food	stocks .
It	is	apparent	that	only	a	few	of	these	fac-
tors	are	amenable	to	aid	solutions .	Most	lie	be-
yond	the	capacity	of	aid	agencies	to	influence,	
at	least	in	the	short	term;	and	the	prevalence	of	
insecurity	and	looting	render	any	food	produc-
tion	inputs	potentially	futile,	at	least	in	the	East .	
In	other	words,	even	the	more	immediate	caus-
es	of	low	food	production	in	DRC	(and	certainly	
the	structural	causes)	are	currently	difficult	or	
impossible	to	tackle	through	aid	interventions .
iii)	Household access to food, lifestyles 
and survival strategies. The	PRRO	describes	
coping	strategies	as	tending	to	be	“highly 
improvised,”	particularly	by	IDPs	and	refugees	
with	limited	means	of	subsistence	compared	
with	host	populations .	“In most cases they lack 
access to land and subsist by selling labour or 
gathering wild foods. Displaced groups live in 
camps or host families and are entirely depend-
ent on them.”
With	a	shift	towards	support	for	host	fami-
lies	since	2007,	this	may	no	longer	be	true .	But	
as	in	most	such	contexts,	the	extent	and	nature	
of	the	burden	on	host	families	remains	little	
understood	and	hard	to	assess .	Levels	of	de-
pendence	on	aid	among	camp	populations	is	
variable,	but	the	fact	that	many	displaced	fami-
lies	are	only	partly	reliant	on	aid	is	evidenced	by	
widespread	(though	unquantified)	sale	of	food	
rations	and	the	apparently	non-critical	effect	
of	WFP	reducing	rations	from	100%	to	50%	for	
those	who	have	been	in	Mugunga	camp	more	
than	3	months .	
iv)	Nutrition, food and health. The	2006	
joint	mission	found	that	“at the national level, 
global acute malnutrition is 13 percent; stunting 
is 38 percent, but there are major differences 
between regions. The joint mission noted that 
extreme poverty restricts households’ access 
to food and is a major cause of the high rate of 
malnutrition. Access to food is limited in terms 
of quantity and quality: 30 percent of the popu-
lation eat one meal a day or less; 60 percent eat 
no more than two meals a day. Meals are gener-
ally the same and consist of cassava or corn.”
On	the	health	situation,	the	report	notes	
that	“The rate of maternal mortality is among the 
highest in the world — 1,000 deaths per 100,000 
live births. The main causes of morbidity and 
mortality are malaria, acute respiratory infections, 
tuberculosis (TB), diarrhoea and malnutrition.” 
In	addition	to	poor	general	public	health,	
the	report	notes	that	“women and children are 
regularly exposed to sexual abuse by soldiers. 
This contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
prevalence of which reaches 4.5 percent — 20 
percent among women subjected to sexual 
abuse; 400,000 people affected by HIV/AIDS 
need medical care and nutritional support. DRC 
currently has 3 million orphans and abandoned 
children, including 1 million AIDS orphans.” 
The	2007	PRRO	has	undergone	two	sub-
sequent	revisions	in	the	light	of	changing	cir-
cumstances .	It	is	a	very	ambitious	programme	
on	any	analysis	—	some	of	those	interviewed	
judged	it	overly	ambitious .	It	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	report	to	comment	further,	except	
to	note	that	a	programme	of	this	size	and	com-
plexity	places	great	strains	on	the	available	ca-
pacity	and	it	is	very	hard	to	gauge	its	continued	
effectiveness	and	appropriateness	in	the	light	
of	shifting	vulnerabilities .	
The International Humanitarian 
Response in DRC
“There are few places on earth where the 
gap between humanitarian needs and avail-
able resources is as large — or as lethal — as in 
Congo” (Jan Egeland, former UN ERC). 
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Although	levels	of	humanitarian	funding	
to	DRC	have	increased	dramatically	over	the	
past	5	years,	most	of	those	interviewed	con-
sidered	that	the	amounts	involved	remained	
grossly	inadequate	to	cover	the	needs	—	
though	many	construed	need	in	this	context	
as	extending	beyond	the	“humanitarian”	in	a	
restrictive	sense .177
As	the	Executive	Summary	to	the	2009	
HAP	makes	clear,	the	humanitarians	are	also	
concerned	about	the	question	of	“sustainabil-
ity”	of	aid .	After	a	review	of	interventions	since	
2006,	it	was	concluded	that:
Humanitarian action is effective when it 
responds to basic needs at the outset of a cri-
sis. However, it is not very appropriate during 
the prolongation of the crisis, particularly if the 
beneficiaries are displaced people living within 
a host community or in isolated sites. The 
humanitarian actors have noted an increasing 
need to:
a. Strengthen the traditional coping mecha-
nisms of the Congolese populations, par-
ticularly for host communities in charge of 
displaced people;
b. Limit the dependency on humanitarian aid 
and favour durable solutions by providing 
beneficiaries with the means to progres-
sively take charge of themselves.
This	analysis	is	fleshed	out	in	the	main	
text,	which	identifies	the	problem	of	continued	
vulnerability	to	“new	crises”	as	a	result	of	the	
failure	to	address	root	causes .	“To confront 
this situation, and eventually reduce humani-
tarian aid in the DRC, the actors hope:
a. To strengthen the capacities of the af-
fected communities to confront new crises 
through actions beyond emergency aid;
b. To establish, in collaboration with the 
development actors, an early warning 
mechanism facilitating the identification 
of communities likely to be affected by 
177 See for example “Sur quelle base? Document de 
reflexion, Oxfam RDC” 2009 which critiques current 
approaches as being based on criteria other than need, 
resulting in distortions and a failure to address urgent needs 
in areas other than those affected by conflict.
humanitarian crises, and humanitarian or 
development aid to prevent them;
c. Advocate with the Congolese government 
and the development actors in favour of 
reorienting the microeconomic devel-
opment programmes towards the crisis 
zones, which hamper sustainable develop-
ment.”
The	HAP	therefore	includes	two	new	
strategies	for	2009 .	“The first is the restoration 
of livelihoods of the populations and com-
munities in crisis situations, essentially through 
activities linked to food security, which allow 
the victims to take charge of themselves. The 
second is short term community recovery, 
including a multi sector strategy of post or 
pre crisis actions, complementing the micro-
economic development programmes. Without 
results with regard to these objectives, the 
humanitarian actors will have to remain indefi-
nitely in the DRC.”
There	are	a	number	of	propositions	here	
that	are	open	to	challenge .	This	line	of	think-
ing	reflects	the	dominant	paradigm	of	“linking	
relief	and	development”	and	the	more	recent	
formulation	of	“early	recovery .”	The	sentiments	
expressed	rest	on	highly	doubtful	propositions	
both	about	dependency	and	about	the	capac-
ity	of	people	to	“take	charge	of	themselves”	
(a	strangely	patronising	phrase	—	who	is	“in	
charge”	of	them	now?) .	The	reason	people	
in	DRC	do	not	recover	is	not	because	they	
have	become	dependent	on	humanitarian	
assistance	and	need	to	be	weaned	off	it .	The	
language	suggests	that	aid	is	a	kind	of	drug,	
peddled	by	humanitarians,	to	which	the	recipi-
ents	have	become	addicted	and	which	renders	
them	helpless .	This	line	of	thought	may	satisfy	
a	self-critical	impulse	on	the	part	of	aid	work-
ers	but	it	does	not	reflect	reality,	and	it	mis-
represents	the	part	that	aid	plays	in	people’s	
lives .178	Here	as	in	most	contexts,	aid	is	one	of	a	
variety	of	means	by	which	people	(even	those	
in	camps)	meet	their	basic	requirements .
178 See Harvey and Lind, 2006 — ODI
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The	phrase	take charge of themselves	
presumably	refers	to	economic	self-sufficien-
cy,	but	it	implies	an	upward	trajectory	in	peo-
ple’s	fortunes	(once	they	“come	off”	aid)	that	
is	not	indicated	by	the	current	economic	and	
political	trends	in	the	country .	Indeed	many	of	
the	assumptions	that	underlie	the	“early	re-
covery”	paradigm	appear	to	be	challenged	in	
the	DRC	context .	There	is	no	inexorable	path	
from	relief	through	recovery	to	development .	
The	expectation	that	people	will	recover	once	
a	greater	degree	of	“normality”	is	restored	
depends	on	that	normality	being	one	in	which	
safety	and	a	viable	livelihood	are	achiev-
able .	For	many	people,	in	many	parts	of	the	
country,	that	does	not	appear	to	be	the	case;	
indeed,	many	people	are	increasingly	impov-
erished	and	insecure .
It	is	doubtful	whether	“coping	mecha-
nisms”	is	the	appropriate	term	here .	But	
preventing	existing	survival	strategies	—	
including	asset	sale	and	debt	—	from	be-
coming	unduly	detrimental	to	the	medium	
and	longer-term	welfare	of	the	households	
concerned	is	clearly	a	priority .	At	the	most	
extreme	end,	many	“survival	strategies”	in	
DRC	look	like	an	accommodation	to	forms	of	
abuse	(sexual	violence,	looting)	perpetrated	
on	those	who	have	run	out	of	safe	options .	
Such	practices	clearly	fall	in	the	category	of	
things	from	which	people	need	protection .	
That	protection	may	consist	partly	of	provid-
ing	safer	alternatives,	including	safe	flight	
options	where	necessary;	and	it	lies	largely	in	
the	realm	of	law	enforcement	and	effective	
area	protection	by	government	forces	and	
MONUC .	Tackling	the	source	of	the	threat	
(e .g .	by	feeding	the	predatory	army	or	paying	
their	overdue	salaries)	may	be	an	unpalatable	
and	insufficient	but	necessary	step .
Underlying	the	sentiments	in	the	HAP	
is	a	stated	concern	with	“sustainability,”	and	
an	apparent	conviction	that	humanitarian	as-
sistance	is	itself	inherently	“unsustainable .”	It	
is	not	clear	why .	It	has	been	sustained	(more	
or	less)	for	the	past	15	years	in	the	East,	and	
indeed	has	increased	significantly	in	the	past	5	
years .	Over	that	time,	for	all	its	inadequacies,	
it	has	probably	saved	many	lives,	kept	many	
in	reasonable	health	and	prevented	liveli-
hoods	from	complete	collapse .	In	many	ways	
it	performs	(however	imperfectly)	the	role	of	a	
welfare	safety	net,	in	the	absence	of	any	such	
provision	by	the	government .	While	no-one	
would	argue	with	the	desire	(expressed	in	the	
same	text)	to	eventually reduce humanitarian 
aid in the DRC,	this	must	surely	be	premised	on	
the	need	for	such	assistance	itself	reducing .	It	
is	very	hard	to	defend	the	proposition	that	hu-
manitarian	aid	is	“not	very	appropriate	during	
the	prolongation	of	the	crisis”	in	the	absence	
of	an	effective	alternative .	If	what	is	meant	is	
that	it	does	not	get	at	“root	causes,”	few	would	
disagree;	but	that	does	make	it	inappropriate	
or	unsustainable .	On	the	contrary,	for	many	it	
has	proved	an	essential	lifeline .
Nevertheless,	the	failure	to	evolve	and	
adapt	humanitarian	approaches	over	time	
is	open	to	criticism .	It	was	pointed	out	by	
some	of	those	interviewed	that	agencies	
have	a	“vested	interest”	in	continuing	their	
programmes,	perhaps	exhibiting	a	form	of	
dependence	of	their	own .	At	any	rate,	in	DRC	
and	other	contexts	(including	Darfur	in	Sudan)	
where	humanitarian	assistance	is	provided	over	
long	periods,	there	appears	to	be	a	tendency	
to	replicate	approaches	year	on	year	without	
taking	due	account	of	changes	in	the	environ-
ment	and	the	potential	for	alternative	(prefera-
ble)	approaches .	It	was	not	possible	in	this	case	
study	to	assess	the	extent	of	this	tendency,	but	
it	was	acknowledged	by	many	of	the	agency	
staff	interviewed .	Part	of	the	problem	is	the	
limited	extent	to	which	staff	are	encouraged	
and	authorised	to	be	responsive	to	change	in	
the	environment	—	and	to	recognise	where	
assistance	of	a	particular	kind	may	be	becom-
ing	a	problem	rather	than	a	solution .	The	aid	
recipients	themselves	may	also	be	resistant	to	
change,	which	complicates	the	issue .	Aid	in	
these	contexts	becomes	part	of	the	environ-
ment	in	which	people	make	decisions .	
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Where	the	potential	exists	to	assist	people	
in	re-building	effective	livelihoods	and	attain-
ing	self-sufficiency,	most	of	those	interviewed	
agreed	that	it	would	be	irresponsible	not	to	
attempt	to	do	so,	and	this	was	an	appropriate	
goal	for	at	least	part	of	the	“expanded”	hu-
manitarian	agenda .	This	should	not	entail	sim-
ply	cutting	back	aid	entitlements,	although	it	
may	be	appropriate	to	change	the	aid	package	
in	conjunction	with	other	measures	to	boost	
self-sufficiency .	The	question	of	who	provides	
aid,	and	the	role	and	responsibility	of	the	gov-
ernment	in	that	regard,	was	felt	by	some	to	be	a	
significant	issue .	There	was	some	concern	that	
the	continued	expectation	that	the	international	
system	would	deliver	basic	services	would	un-
dermine	attempts	to	establish	the	role	of	the	
government	as	service	provider	—	and	in	a	wid-
er	sense,	therefore,	undermine	the	fragile	social	
contract .	There	were	dangers,	in	other	words,	
in	filling	the	vacuum	of	state	provision .	The	brief	
visit	on	which	this	study	is	based	was	enough	
to	show	how	far	removed	the	current	situation	
is	from	one	in	which	the	state	is	established	the	
main	service	provider .	There	seems	to	be	no	
prospect	of	this	changing	in	the	short	term	or	
even	the	medium	term .
All	of	those	interviewed	for	this	study	were	
asked	the	counterfactual	question:	what	would	
happen	if	you	(and	other	aid	agencies)	were	not	
here?	The	majority,	at	least	on	the	food	security	
side,	felt	that	the	result	would	not	be	cata-
strophic .	People	would	find	other	ways	of	meet-
ing	their	needs,	though	it	would	have	an	impact	
on	overall	poverty	levels .	This	perspective	on	
food	security	was	influenced	by	the	relative	
natural	abundance	of	most	of	the	areas	con-
cerned .	Only	in	the	health	sector	did	all	those	
interviewed	feel	that	the	impact	of	withdrawing	
international	services	would	be	catastrophic,	
particularly	in	relation	to	the	loss	of	vaccination	
coverage .	Some	felt	that	the	lack	on	interna-
tional	agency	presence	would	render	people	
even	more	vulnerable	to	violence	and	coercion	
(though	that	opinion	did	not	always	extend	to	
the	presence	of	MONUC) .	All	agreed	that	there	
would	in	any	case	be	a	major	downturn	in	the	
local	economy	and	in	levels	of	employment:	the	
aid	machine	is	good	for	business .
Strategic and Operational 
Challenges of Operating in DRC
Multiple Agendas and the Search for 
Strategic Coherence
In	common	with	other	“fragile”	states,	inter-
national	aid	policy	in	DRC	has	to	be	understood	
as	part	of	a	wider	spectrum	of	policy	concerns	
that,	in	the	case	of	DRC,	include	regional	secu-
rity	as	a	core	component .	The	potentially	desta-
bilising	effect	of	a	politically	volatile	DRC	has	
been	demonstrated	repeatedly	in	the	period	
since	the	mid-1990s .	The	fact	that	DRC’s	neigh-
bours	have	sometimes	exacerbated	that	instabil-
ity	and	chosen	to	exploit	the	resulting	chaos	for	
their	own	purposes	does	not	negate	this .	But	it	
points	to	a	key	factor	in	the	country’s	stability	—	
namely,	the	support	of	neighbouring	states,	no-
tably	Rwanda	and	Uganda,	for	the	mainstream	
political	“project”	of	the	Kinshasa	authorities,	
and	in	particular	for	the	counter-insurgency	pro-
gramme	designed	to	eliminate	the	violent	op-
position	(or	opportunism)	of	rebel	militia,	some	
of	whom	operate	across	international	borders .
A	central	aspect	of	the	current	“stabilisa-
tion”	agenda	(to	use	the	current	international	
jargon,	now	also	adopted	by	the	DRC	govern-
ment)	involves	MONUC	as	a	direct	ally	in	the	
government’s	counter-insurgency	campaign	in	
the	East .	Some	of	the	issues	associated	with	this	
relating	to	perceptions	of	neutrality	were	men-
tioned	above .	A	further	dimension	relates	to	the	
rationale	for	aid	programming .	It	is	clear	from	
interviews	conducted	with	donor	representa-
tives,	MONUC	and	agency	staff	that	concern	
with	winning	“hearts	and	minds”	represents	a	
significant	driver	for	international	donors	and	
government	alike .	While	it	was	not	possible	to	
judge	the	extent	to	which	this	had	in	practice	
“skewed”	the	delivery	of	assistance	(contrary	
to	the	principle	of	impartiality),	it	highlights	the	
challenges	of	trying	to	pursue	multiple	agendas	
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governed	by	potentially	contradictory	princi-
ples .	Anecdotal	evidence	ranged	from	WFP	
“being	told	by	MONUC	where	to	distribute	
food”179	to	agency	staff	being	de-prioritised	for	
available	places	on	transport	in	favour	of	mili-
tary	personnel .	While	the	humanitarian	agen-
cies	are	working	to	the	HAP	priorities,	MONUC	
is	working	to	other	(stabilisation)	priorities .
Arguably,	the	heavy	weighting	of	assistance	
towards	the	Eastern	(conflict-affected)	provinc-
es	represents	a	distortion	when	judged	against	
observed	needs	in	the	rest	of	the	country .180	But	
this	is	in	part	at	least	a	function	of	the	humani-
tarian	judgement	that	conflict-affected	and	dis-
placed	populations	face	more	acute	risks .	It	also	
reflects	the	mandates	of	the	agencies	involved,	
many	of	which	are	based	around	response	
to	conflict	and	displacement .	The	immediate	
causes	of	food	insecurity	and	other	threats	to	
well-being	are	easier	to	identify	and	respond	to	
in	the	East .	For	all	the	insecurity,	it	is	also	a	rela-
tively	easier	place	to	operate	in	logistical	terms	
than	some	other	areas .
The	stabilisation	agenda	itself	has	to	be	set	
in	the	wider	context	of	peace-building	and	the	
consolidation	of	the	process	that	brought	about	
a	new	administration	in	2006 .	This	is	largely	
beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	paper,	but	
thinking	about	peace	sets	the	context	for	much	
thinking	about	aid .	In	a	recent	paper,181	the	
Crisis	Group	identify	five	priorities	for	a	peace-
building	strategy	for	the	eastern	Congo:	
1)	 A	credible	and	comprehensive	disarma-
ment	strategy	for	dealing	with	Rwandan	
Hutu	rebels	in	both	North	and	South	Kivu;	
2)	 Resuming	security	system	reform	with	a	
new	focus	on	building	capacity	and	ac-
countability	in	the	Kivus	as	well	as	Orientale	
province;	
3)	 A	specific	plan	for	fostering	reconciliation	
and	human	security	that	concentrates	on	
179 Subsequent enquiries indicate that this is not general 
practice, and is not a policy endorsed by either MONUC or 
WFP. The comment cited should be read in this context.
180 See Oxfam paper “Sur quelle base?” cited above
181 May 2009, Crisis Group
judicial	accountability	and	the	require-
ments	of	refugee	and	IDP	return	and	re-
integration;	
4)	 Political	engagement	dedicated	to	im-
proving	governance	through	increased	
economic	transparency,	equitable	taxation,	
decentralisation	and	local	elections;	and	
5)	 Continuing	efforts	to	sustain	stable	region-
al	relations .	
The	Crisis	Group	does	not	see	any	immedi-
ate	lessening	of	the	requirement	for	internation-
al	engagement .	On	the	contrary,	“International 
engagement and support for peace-building 
in the Congo at least through the 2011 elec-
tions needs to be maintained… with a view to 
implementing a roadmap that defines precisely 
the role and responsibility of each partner and 
the benchmarks to be met so that the process 
becomes irreversible. Only then should the 
UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) begin its 
drawdown.”	What	seems	clear	is	that	this	tran-
sition	will	depend	in	part	on	the	government	
demonstrating	an	ability	to	assume	effective	
responsibility	for	the	provision	of	security	and	
the	delivery	of	basic	services .
The	2009	HAP	does	a	good	job	of	bring	
greater	coherence	to	the	humanitarian	agenda	
and	(to	a	limited	extent)	of	defining	the	interface	
between	this	and	the	development	agenda .	
Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	it	has	much	less	to	say	
about	the	interfaces	with	stabilisation,	peace-
building	and	related	policy	agendas .	It	does	not	
purport	to	be	an	overarching	policy	framework	
for	international	intervention,	and	indeed	it	is	
unlikely	that	consensus	could	be	found	for	such	
a	framework .	The	result	is	that	the	overall	strat-
egy	of	the	various	international	actors	has	to	
be	gleaned	from	a	variety	of	sources	(including	
Security	Council	resolutions)	while	the	job	of	
working	out	the	practical	implications	of	these	
multiple	strategies	and	related	plans	falls	largely	
to	the	actors	on	the	ground .	This	is	most	obvi-
ously	apparent	within	MONUC,	where	multiple	
agendas	(civil	and	military)	are	combined	in	ways	
which,	according	to	those	interviewed,	it	strug-
gles	to	make	sense	of	internally .	
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Beyond	the	security,	humanitarian	and	
development	agendas,	much	of	what	actually	
shapes	the	environment	in	DRC	are	the	compet-
ing	commercial	and	property	interests	and	the	
struggle	for	control	of	land .	In	DRC	more	than	
perhaps	any	other	country,	the	nature	of	the	
conflict	has	been	determined	by	the	desire	to	
control	natural	resources .	This	overlies	the	com-
petition	over	land	rights	amongst	indigenous	
groups,	whose	disputes	have	been	exploited	in	
the	war	to	control	resources . 
While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	
explore	this	topic	further,	the	role	of	China	as	a	
major	new	investor	and	speculator	in	DRC	should	
be	mentioned .	This	may	bring	much	needed	in-
vestment,	but	some	have	invoked	the	spectre	of	
imperial	land-grabs	in	the	“Scramble	for	Africa .”
The	International	Fund	for	Agricultural	De-
velopment	(IFAD)	noted	in	2002	that	the	Congo	
basin	was	subject	to	deforestation	caused	by	
uncontrolled	timber	logging	and	increasing	
demand	for	fuel-wood .	This	lack	of	regulation	
has	major	implications	for	DRC’s	future	devel-
opment	prospects,	and	some	immediate	im-
plications	for	what	constitutes	responsible	pro-
gramming .	WFP,	for	example,	has	a	programme	
supporting	reforestation	and	the	construction	
of	improved	stoves	in	all	primary	schools	ben-
efiting	from	its	school	feeding	programmes .	
“In collaboration with the Government and 
implementing partners, and principally under 
the food security cluster, WFP will develop strat-
egies to preserve forest cover while increasing 
production and managing soils and water sus-
tainably.”	(2007	PRRO)
Security, Protection and Rights
As	the	strategic	priorities	in	the	HAP	make	
clear,	the	protection	of	the	civilian	population	
from	violence	and	coercion	sits	at	the	top	of	
the	humanitarian	agenda .	This	concern	is	not	
confined	to	the	East,	though	here	at	its	most	
extreme,	in	the	form	of	killings,	sexual	violence,	
forced	displacement	and	looting .	Much	of	the	
requirement	for	relief	assistance	is	an	indirect	
result	of	the	violence	perpetrated	on	the	popu-
lation	by	the	various	armed	factions,	including	
the	government’s	own	troops .182	The	patterns	of	
violence	dictate	to	a	significant	degree	the	aid	
priorities,	though	they	also	dictate	the	extent	to	
which	areas	are	deemed	safe	to	access	for	aid	
workers	who	are	themselves	vulnerable	to	at-
tack .	This	leads	to	a	familiar	paradox:	that	those	
who	may	most	require	assistance	may	be	the	
least	able	to	access	it .	The	question	of	access	is	
considered	further	below .
While	this	paper	is	not	concerned	primarily	
with	protection,	it	is	central	to	the	humanitarian	
agenda	and	(as	noted	above)	there	are	impor-
tant	links	with	relief	assistance .	What	constitutes	
effective	protection	strategy	in	such	contexts	
is	largely	beyond	our	scope .	The	Crisis	Group	
paper	cited	above	makes	the	point	that	political	
action	as	much	as	(or	more	than)	armed	force	is	
essential	to	an	effective	international	strategy	
of	engagement	for	protection .	“During the 
October-November 2008 crisis in North Kivu, 
when a humanitarian catastrophe threatened in 
and around Goma, robust political engagement 
with national and regional actors did more than 
troops on the ground to protect civilians.” [op	cit] .	
Protection	of	civilians	occupies	an	ambigu-
ous	space	in	the	humanitarian	agenda .	On	the	
one	hand	it	is	agreed	to	be	a	central	concern;	
on	the	other,	there	is	considerable	doubt	as	to	
the	proper	response	by	humanitarian	agencies .	
There	are	strictly	limited	means	by	which	such	
agencies	can	provide	protection	in	any	direct	
sense .	The	way	in	which	assistance	is	provided	
can	certainly	affect	people’s	security,	but	to	a	
large	extent	security	lies	in	the	hands	of	oth-
ers .	This	question	of	who	can	protect	and	who	
is	responsible	is	a	difficult	one .	The	Protection	
Cluster	in	DRC,	for	example,	lobbies	MONUC	to	
protect	civilians	in	camps .	But	the	local	authori-
ties	and	the	FARDC	have	formal	responsibility	
for	security	in	camps	—	and	they	are	not	part	of	
the	Protection	Cluster .	More	importantly,	they	
182 Although the figures for excess mortality given by the 
IRC surveys (cited above) are disputed, most agree that large 
numbers of people have died as an indirect consequence of 
the war, principally through disease and malnutrition. 
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are	themselves	largely	held	responsible	for	the	
very	insecurity	from	which	people	need	protec-
tion,	and	impunity	for	abuse	is	rife .
It	is	clear	that	in	the	attempt	to	protect	
themselves,	people	are	forced	to	adopt	strat-
egies	that	are	harmful	and	dangerous .	They	
reach	an	accommodation	with	a	given	armed	
faction	—	e .g .	by	allowing	them	to	exact	pay-
ments	in	kind,	loot	fields,	etc .	—	reaching	a	kind	
of	equilibrium	that	involves	abuse	but	at	a	level	
that	is	containable .	Shifts	in	the	balance	of	pow-
er	and	control	of	territory	disturb	that	equilib-
rium	and	create	periods	of	heightened	danger,	
until	a	new	equilibrium	is	established	with	a	new	
faction .	The	same	is	true	of	businesses,	which	
regularly	pay	protection	money	to	the	factions .	
The	result	is	a	situation	of	perpetual	fear	and	
uncertainty .	Many	displacements	are	reported	
to	arise	on	the	back	of	rumours	rather	than	ac-
tual	attacks;	but	the	threats	from	“exactions”	
and	physical	attacks	are	certainly	real .
One	of	the	issues	contributing	to	insecu-
rity	is	conflict	over	land	rights .	Land	issues	are	
reported	by	WFP	and	others	to	be	“constantly	
raised”	by	beneficiaries .	Returnees	face	uncer-
tainty	about	being	able	to	return	to	their	land,	
particularly	since	they	often	lack	title	deeds	or	
formal	tenancies .	Formal	and	customary	land	
rights	may	conflict	here,	and	many	fear	eviction	
by	landlords	or	those	with	mineral	extraction	
rights .	Social	factors	are	also	at	play	here .	Wom-
en	are	unable	to	inherit	land,	and	what	land	is	
available	to	families	gets	split	into	ever	smaller	
parcels	as	sons	inherit	their	fathers’	land .
Planning and Needs Analysis
WFP’s	2007	PRRO	plan	is	explicitly	prem-
ised	on	a	set	of	predicted	scenarios,	expressed	
as	follows:
The international community expects 
that the situation will gradually stabilize 
and that returning populations will need 
assistance to resettle. The Government 
will have to enhance all available mecha-
nisms to consolidate the peace and pro-
mote sound governance and sustainable 
development. It will need to embark on 
reconstruction programmes to enable 
people to access social services such as 
health, education and transport and to 
resume their normal activities.
In the worst-case scenario, conflict 
would continue in the east, with the risk 
of entire regions being involved. Vol-
canic eruptions, drought and floods are 
also a source of concern …
The current PRRO is based on an op-
timistic scenario involving progressive 
improvement in institutional capacities. 
The worst-case scenario will be consid-
ered in re-examining the planning of 
emergency operations (EMOPs).
On	this	basis,	WFP	sees	its	basic	role	as	
being	to	respond to emergencies and organ-
ize recovery activities, giving priority support to 
internally displaced people and returnees…	The 
operation will focus on areas at risk of serious 
food insecurity, particularly in the east and Ka-
tanga. WFP has closed several of its sub-offices 
in the areas less affected by food insecurity and 
foresees a reduction in the level of aid in 2009.
This	raises	some	interesting	questions	
about	what	constitutes	a	realistic	and	respon-
sible	basis	for	projecting	future	needs	and	de-
signing	appropriate	strategies	in	such	volatile	
contexts .	The	2007	PRRO	clearly	reflects	the	
dominant	political	mood	at	the	time .	The	op-
timism	that	informs	it	proved	to	be	somewhat	
misplaced,	given	the	subsequent	outbreaks	of	
major	insecurity	in	the	Kivus	and	in	Haut	Uélé	
(an	EMOP	was	launched	in	response	to	the	
latter	situation) .	But	crucially,	it	also	assumes	
things	about	capacities	and	the	pace	of	govern-
ment-led	reform	that	now	(and	perhaps	at	the	
time)	look	highly	over-optimistic .	Perhaps	this	
is	what	WFP	thought	its	donors	wanted	to	hear,	
but	it	raises	serious	questions	about	the	kind	of	
consensus	that	allows	such	propositions	to	be-
come	the	basis	for	planning .183
183 Afghanistan is another notable example of this tendency 
towards unrealistic scenario planning.
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The	risk	assessment	for	the	PRRO	acknowl-
edges	the	potential	for	things	not	to	go	ac-
cording	to	plan .	The	operation	“will be imple-
mented after the new institutions arising out of 
the 2006 elections are established. Any political 
blockage would undermine national unity and 
lead to a resurgence of hostilities. Fresh popu-
lation movements would take place and ac-
cess to target populations would be reduced. 
Benefits stemming from WFP interventions 
would be jeopardized, especially the return 
and resettlement of IDPs and refugees.”	Fresh	
population	movements	did	indeed	occur,	but	
the	failure	of	state	institutions	to	develop	can-
not	be	attributed	to	political	blockages	or	the	
continuing	conflict .	
Allowing	for	the	unexpected,	the	PRRO	
makes	provision	for contingency planning	and	
situational	monitoring,	including	sentinel	sites	
established	with	FAO,	staff	training	in	emergen-
cy	preparedness,	provision	for	a	contingency	
plan	to	be	updated	regularly,	and	strategic	
food	stocks	set	up	in	Kampala,	Goma,	Lubum-
bashi	and	Kinshasa .	When	necessary,	priorities	
would	be	reassessed:	In the event of large-scale 
resumption of hostilities and consequent limita-
tion of humanitarian work, WFP will refocus its 
assistance on populations directly affected by 
the situation; vulnerable groups and malnour-
ished people will be treated in nutritional cen-
tres…In addition to life-saving interventions, the 
other components — FFW, emergency school 
feeding etc. — will be reviewed in the light of 
the situation.	
The	overall	process	of	needs	analysis	in	
DRC	is	based	on	a	common	needs	assessment	
framework	(NAF) .	Needs	assessment	in	a	con-
text	like	this	poses	some	obvious	challenges,	
particularly	for	survey-based	assessments .	
Population	figures	(including	numbers	of	IDPs)	
are	much	debated,	providing	an	uncertain	de-
nominator	for	calculation	of	aid	requirements .	
That	said,	while	there	are	major	reported	
gaps	in	the	available	data,	more	is	now	being	
invested	in	this	“diagnostic”	aspect	of	the	
international	programme,	including	the	estab-
lishment	of	sentinel	sites184	and	epidemiologi-
cal	surveillance	by	WHO .	Together	with	agreed	
action	“thresholds,”	these	are	beginning	to	pro-
vide	a	fuller	picture	of	needs	across	the	country .	
Capacities	and	resources	to	tackle	these	
needs	remain	inadequate,	though	the	Pooled	
Fund	has	allowed	the	HC	(who	oversees	alloca-
tion)	to	take	action	to	deal	with	some	of	the	
most	obvious	anomalies	between	areas .	Report-
ing	against	the	Pooled	Fund	allocations	now	
includes	a	breakdown	of	performance	against	
target	(numbers	of	beneficiaries	reached),	pro-
viding	a	potential	basis	for	impact assessment	
which	at	the	moment	is	largely	absent .	The	chal-
lenge	of	reporting	against	outputs	is	already	
considerable185;	the	challenge	of	reporting	
against outcomes	is	of	a	different	order	again .	
Determining	impact	involves	establishing	cor-
relations	and	causal	relationships	between	pro-
gramme	interventions	and	observed	outcomes .	
An	important	mid-way	step	is	identifying	cor-
relations	between	outcome	indicators	and	risk	
factors,	which	can	then	be	addressed	through	
programme	interventions	known	to	be	effective	
against	those	factors .	The	capacity	to	do	this	in	
DRC	is	still	rudimentary .
Ultimately,	for	both	needs	and	impact	as-
sessment,	a	combination	of	(reliable)	quantita-
tive	and	qualitative	data	is	required,	including	
feedback	from	aid	recipients	and	service	users;	
and	a	means	of	gathering	such	data	on	a	rolling	
basis .	But	data	alone	is	not	useful:	it	has	to	be	
processed	in	such	a	way	as	to	lead	to	action-
able	conclusions .	The	explanatory	models	for	
shifting	forms	of	chronic	vulnerability	are	felt	by	
many	to	be	weak	or	absent .	As	one	interviewee	
said	“we	are	getting	better	at	measuring,	but	
not	at	analysing .”
A	striking	feature	of	the	DRC	context	is	the	
extent	to	which	the	major	donors	engage	direct-
184 Serious concerns were raised in interviews about the 
quality of the data (about malnutrition, market prices, etc) 
being generated from these sites. One respondent described 
it as “very low quality data, very unreliable.”
185 One respondent said, “We are not honest enough about 
what we actually deliver.”
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ly	in	the	planning	and	priority-setting	process,	
as	well	as	in	oversight	of	programme	implemen-
tation .	The	consensus	represented	by	the	HAP	
could	arguably	not	have	been	reached	without	
this .	The	Government	of	DRC	is	part	of	this	
consensus,	though	many	of	those	interviewed	
reported	difficulties	and	frustrations	in	working	
with	government	departments	and	officials .	The	
donor	influence	(particularly	that	of	the	EU,	UK	
and	US)	is	widely	perceived	as	positive,	though	
perhaps	some	of	those	interviewed	were	being	
diplomatic	in	their	responses .	Certainly	it	has	
influenced	the	extent	of	coordination	among	
UN	agencies	and	NGOs,	which	is	greater	than	in	
most	comparable	contexts .	As	one	major	donor	
representative	put	it,	this	is	“multilateralism	with	
edge”	—	a	critically	engaged	but	essentially	
collaborative	mode	of	operating .	Judging	by	
the	(high)	level	to	which	appeals	are	currently	
funded,	this	level	of	engagement	has	evidently	
brought	with	it	increased	levels	of	donor	confi-
dence	in	the	whole	process .
There	is	perhaps	a	danger	of	“group	think”	
here .	The	smaller	donors	were	felt	by	one	in-
terviewee	to	be	“scared	of	going	against	the	
consensus	view .”	Whatever	the	merits	of	coor-
dinated	strategy,	it	is	clearly	essential	that	the	
analysis	on	which	it	is	based	remains	open	to	
challenge	in	the	face	of	contradictory	evidence .	
Related	to	the	point	above	is	the	question	
of	the	relative	independence	of	humanitarian	
NGOs	in	DRC .	Some	of	those	interviewed	felt	
that	funding	through	the	cluster	system	had	
led	to	a	loss	of	flexibility	and	independence	of	
thought	and	action	on	the	part	of	the	NGOs .	
They	had	become	“implementing	partners,”	
focused	on	delivery	but	not	necessarily	do-
ing	their	own	thinking	and	analysis .	It	was	also	
pointed	out	by	some	that	NGOs	tended	to	have	
a	“survival”	mentality,	needing	to	justify	and	
sustain	their	own	continued	presence	—	and	
therefore	perhaps	being	unwilling	to	think	too	
critically	about	the	role	they	were	actually	play-
ing	and	the	added	value	of	their	programmes .	
The	same	is	probably	also	true	of	UN	agencies .	
The	authors	noted	a	degree	of	tiredness	and	
resignation	in	the	attitude	of	some	of	those	
interviewed .	This	is	not	unusual	in	programmes	
that	have	continued	for	a	long	time,	but	it	tends	
to	lead	to	a	lack	of	fresh	thinking	and	perhaps	
also	some	carelessness	about	quality .	However,	
it	is	not	possible	to	generalise	about	this	and	it	
is	noted	here	as	an	impression	only .	It	is	an	im-
pression	shared	by	some	of	those	interviewed	
for	this	study .
The Challenge of Coordination
The	integrated mission	structure	of	MO-
NUC	allows	for	a	UN	Humanitarian	Coordinator	
who	is	also	Deputy	Special	Representative	of	
the	Secretary	General	(DSRSG) .	He	oversees	the	
design	and	implementation	of	the	humanitarian	
strategy	embodied	in	the	HAP	while	working	
with	his	colleagues	on	the	overall	UN	strategic	
priorities	for	DRC .	Whether	such	a	role	is	inher-
ently	compromised	as	between	political	and	
humanitarian	goals	has	been	much	debated,	
and	depends	on	one’s	view	as	to	the	relation-
ship	between	political	and	humanitarian	agen-
das .	It	does	at	least	ensure	a	greater	degree	of	
programme	coherence	than	might	otherwise	be	
the	case,	and	few	would	question	the	present	
HC’s	humanitarian	credentials	or	his	commit-
ment	to	the	humanitarian	cause .	If	the	position	
is	compromised	it	is	perhaps	most	obviously	in	
the	requirement	noted	above	to	work	to	scenar-
ios	and	priorities	that	are	politically	acceptable	
both	to	the	DRC	government	and	to	interna-
tional	donors .	The	HC	position	is	hardly	unique	
in	this	respect	within	the	UN	system .
The	presence	of	an	integrated	mission	has	
implications	for	WFP	and	for	other	humanitar-
ian	organisations .	One	OCHA	representative	
said	in	relation	to	MONUC	“we	co-exist	with	
them	rather	than	coordinate,”	and	stressed	the	
need	to	keep	at	arms	length	where	MONUC	
was	“fighting	a	war .”	As	the	joint	operation	of	
the	FARDC	and	MONUC	against	FDLR	in	the	
East	gathers	pace,	it	is	likely	that	“humanitar-
ian	space”	and	access	would	decrease .	The	
NGOs	were	concerned	not	to	be	seen	as	the	
aid	wing	of	MONUC	(let	alone	the	FARDC) .	
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Even	amongst	the	UN	agencies,	engagement	
with	the	blue	helmets	of	MONUC	was	guarded .	
OCHA,	UNICEF	and	WFP	do	not	take	part	in	
the	“joint	protection	teams .”	UNHCR	do,	but	
they	make	their	own	protection	assessment .	
And	while	the	UN	agencies	were	reliant	on	MO-
NUC	for	armed	escort	to	insecure	areas,	NGOs	
tended	to	make	their	own	arrangements .
This	distance	between	MONUC	and	the	aid	
agencies	was	also	perceived	as	one	of	differ-
ing	understanding	about	priorities .	As	one	aid	
agency	respondent	said	“MONUC	see	aid	as	a	
means	to	an	end .	They	don’t	“get”	humanitari-
anism .	They	think	we	and	they	have	the	same	
goals .”	MONUC	personnel,	for	their	part,	were	
reported	to	be	sceptical	about	the	added	value	
of	the	humanitarian	agencies .
DRC	has	acted	as	a	test-bed	for	many	of	
the	humanitarian reform	processes	of	the	past	
few	years	—	the	CERF,	the	enhanced	role	of	the	
HC,	the	use	of	pooled	funding	mechanisms	and	
the	coordination	of	sector-specific	work	through	
Clusters .	While	this	study	is	not	concerned	with	
the	reform	processes	per se,	most	of	those	
interviewed	felt	that	the	reforms,	taken	as	a	
whole,	had	had	a	beneficial	effect	on	the	effec-
tiveness	with	which	the	international	community	
engaged	in	the	country .	The	HAP	is	itself	a	
product	of	a	better	coordinated	approach .	In	
the	sphere	of	food	security,	WFP	and	FAO	had	
combined	to	form	a	food	“cluster”	and	this	was	
reported	to	be	working	well .	Some	pre-existing	
mechanisms,	notably	the	Rapid	Response	
Mechanism	led	by	UNICEF	(with	IRC	and	Soli-
darité	as	implementing	partners)	had	yet	to	be	
properly	reconciled	with	the	cluster	approach,	
but	continued	to	play	a	vital	role .
There	is	a	highly	structured	set	of	arrange-
ments	in	DRC	to	bring	the	various	humanitarian	
actors	together	at	national,	provincial	and	local	
level .	At	national	level	there	is	a	Humanitarian	
Advocacy	Group	chaired	by	the	HC	that	brings	
agencies	and	donors	together .	At	the	provincial	
level	is	the	CPIA	that	brings	the	IASC	agencies	
together	(UN,	Red	Cross,	NGOs) .	Then	there	
is	the	Inter-Cluster	mechanism	which	brings	
the	heads	of	the	various	clusters	together,	and	
below	that	the	Clusters	themselves .	The	work-
ings	and	effectiveness	of	these	mechanisms	is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper .	What	is	strik-
ing	is	that	they	add	up	to	a	system	for	sharing	
information	and	discussing	response	priorities	
between	different	levels,	bottom	up	and	top	
down .	Although	there	are	problems	at	each	
level	(“we	sometimes	have	to	prod	the	clusters	
to	draw	conclusions	rather	than	just	present	
data”),	it	nevertheless	represents	a	consider-
able	advance	on	previous	practice .	The	fact	that	
all	work	to	a	common	humanitarian	action	plan	
gives	meaning	to	a	process	that	might	other-
wise	be	simply	bureaucratic .	
Programme Approaches
“Pure”	humanitarian	response	represents	
a	minority	of	the	work	undertaken	in	DRC,	con-
fined	largely	to	emergent	nutritional	and	health	
crises	or	sudden	displacements .	As	one	inter-
viewee	put	it	“most	humanitarian	programming	
in	DRC	is	humanitarian	plus”;	that	is,	it	goes	
beyond	a	concern	with	life-saving	and	acute	
vulnerability,	aiming	to	ensure	people’s	access	
(at	least	in	the	short	term)	to	basic	subsistence	
and	the	conditions	for	good	health .	It	is	here	
that	the	disjuncture	between	humanitarian	and	
developmental	approaches	is	most	obvious,	the	
latter	tending	to	involve	forms	of	engagement	
for	which	the	conditions	(at	both	macro-	and	
micro-levels)	appear	not	yet	to	exist	in	many	
parts	of	DRC .	The	interface	between	humani-
tarian	and	development	approaches	remains	
unclear,	but	current	approaches	assume	a	tran-
sitional	phase	from	one	to	the	other .
The	concept	of	“early	recovery”	is	used	to	
describe	this	transition,	but	there	is	consider-
able	uncertainty	surrounding	the	meaning	of	
the	term .	Some	appear	to	use	it	interchange-
ably	with	“stabilisation,”	pointing	to	some	con-
ceptual	confusion	with	both	terms .	For	OCHA,	
it	represents	a	demarcation	point	at	which	the	
humanitarian	role	ceases .	In	the	words	of	an	
OCHA	official	in	Goma:	“For	us	it’s	our	exit	
strategy .	Where	the	indicators	fall	below	the	
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defined	thresholds	and	stay	there,	that’s	a	re-
covery	situation .”	The	Humanitarian	Coordina-
tor	Ross	Mountain	uses	the	phrase	“slip-back	
insurance”	to	describe	the	rationale	of	early	
recovery;	in	other	words,	it	aims	to	ensure	
that	people	do	not	fall	back	into	conditions	of	
complete	destitution .	In	that	sense	it	implies	a	
building	of	resilience	to	shocks .	Given	the	sig-
nificance	of	the	early	recovery	paradigm	in	both	
agency	and	donor	policy,	both	the	theory	and	
practice	of	early	recovery	efforts	deserve	closer	
attention .	The	main	question	seems	to	be	
whether	such	efforts	are	premised	on	valid	as-
sumptions	about	the	prevailing	conditions,	and	
whether	these	are	such	as	to	allow	“recovery”	in	
the	sense	implied .
In	this	context,	it	is	important	to	consider	
the	preventive	agenda	and	risk	reduction .	This	
forms	part	of	the	rationale	for	early	recovery,	
but	deserves	consideration	in	its	own	right .	
One	OCHA	staff	member	gave	the	example	
of	cholera	epidemics .	“Every	year	there	is	a	
cholera	outbreak	in	Maniema .	To	be	responsi-
ble	humanitarians,	we	have	to	work	to	prevent	
this,	to	work	“upstream”	of	the	potential	crisis .”	
Few	would	disagree	with	this	in	a	context	of	
repeated	exposure	to	acute	vulnerability .	But	
in	addition	to	emergency	response	prepared-
ness,	it	implies	a	willingness	to	take	action	to	
before	a	crisis	actually	materialises	and	there-
fore	to	tackle	the	key	risk	factors	involved .	This	
is	an	agenda	that	falls	somewhere	between	the	
humanitarian	and	developmental	agendas	as	
normally	understood .	It	does	not	“fit”	neatly,	
but	it	surely	deserves	to	be	given	priority .	The	
question	then	arises:	how	far	should	this	same	
logic	be	applied	to	other	kinds	of	threat?	It	is	
not	clear	where	the	boundaries	lie .
Of	all	the	many	programme	approach	is-
sues,	one	that	repeatedly	came	up	in	interviews	
was	the	question	of	whether	it	was	better	to	
give	in-kind	assistance	(particularly	food)	or	
cash/vouchers	to	beneficiaries .	One	WFP	man-
ager	said	“If	I	was	given	a	free	hand,	I’d	do	
much	more	cash	and	vouchers,”	but	said	he	was	
constrained	by	mandate	and	available	resourc-
es .	This	was	the	view	of	all	those	who	expressed	
an	opinion	on	the	subject .	There	does	appear	
to	be	considerable	scope	to	explore	alternative	
food	assistance	interventions .	Given	the	cost	
and	difficulty	of	delivering	food	in	DRC,	this	
surely	deserves	priority	attention .
Access and Operational Security
People’s	access	to	relief	assistance	in	East-
ern	DRC	has	been	consistently	hampered	by	
insecurity	since	the	“official”	end	of	hostilities	in	
2003 .	Agencies’	ability	to	access	affected	popu-
lations	has	fluctuated	over	that	period	and	con-
tinues	to	do	so .	All	provinces	are	currently	be-
tween	security	phases	2-4	on	the	UN	five	point	
scale,	with	the	Kivus	(beyond	Goma	and	Bukavu	
towns)	on	level	4 .	That	said,	the	overall	impres-
sion	gained	was	that	security	was	a	significant	
but	not	currently	a	dominating	factor	in	opera-
tions,	with	conditions	improving	somewhat	since	
early	2009	and	most	areas	reasonably	accessible .
Since	2006,	UNDSS	and	MONUC	have	run	
integrated	security	arrangement .	It	appears	that	
the	UN	and	NGOs	apply	rather	different	stand-
ards	with	regard	to	security .	One	interviewee	
said	that	“at	least	3	main	routes	in	Kivu	that	
NGOs	have	considered	safe	for	months	are	still	
off	limits	for	UN .”	However,	areas	that	were	pre-
viously	deemed	“out	of	bounds”	by	DSS	have	
now	opened,	though	travel	in	the	more	insecure	
areas	is	restricted	to	transport	with	a	MONUC	
escort .	NGOs	tend	to	rely	on	their	own	judg-
ment	about	security .	As	one	commented:	“We	
know	who	to	speak	to	in	the	Province .	Once	
a	particular	group	establishes	control	over	an	
area,	security	calms	down	and	we	can	negotiate	
directly .	We	employ	our	own	security	officers .”
There	is	no	doubt,	however,	that	DRC	
remains	a	highly	insecure	place	to	operate,	
particularly	in	the	East .	WFP’s	operations	have	
been	hampered	by	this	and	the	level	of	insecu-
rity	has	also	added	considerably	to	the	cost	of	
operating .	The	most	extreme	case	of	this	is	the	
Emergency	Operation	(EMOP)	in	Haut	Uélé	in	
Orientale	province,	where	WFP	has	been	forced	
to	mount	an	airlift	of	food .
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Conclusions and implications  
for WFP
The	scale	and	nature	of	needs	in	DRC	pose	
one	of	the	greatest	challenges	that	WFP	and	
other	agencies	face	anywhere	in	the	world .	
The	human	indicators	in	both	conflict	and	non-
conflict	areas	are	extremely	serious,	there	is	a	
country-wide	nutritional	and	health	crisis,	and	
around	1 .3	million	people	remain	displaced	by	
violent	insecurity .	The	hoped	for	“peace	divi-
dend”	following	elections	in	2006	has	not	ma-
terialised,	and	international	efforts	are	aimed	in	
large	part	at	consolidating	the	peace	and	pre-
venting	a	slide	back	into	generalised	conflict .	
To	this	end,	the	UN	through	MONUC	has	sided	
with	the	Government	in	its	attempts	to	bring	
stability	to	the	East .	But	the	institutions	of	gov-
ernment,	including	the	army	in	particular,	are	
weak	and	crippled	by	corruption .	This	provides	
a	highly	uncertain	platform	for	cooperation	
both	on	security	and	development .
The	particular	programmatic	challenge	
facing	WFP	is	to	respond	appropriately	to	both	
acute	and	chronic	forms	of	food	insecurity .	
As	with	other	forms	of	vulnerability,	these	are	
combined	in	complex	ways .	While	most	of	the	
means	available	to	WFP	—	in	particular	food	aid	
—	are	best	adapted	to	tackling	the	symptoms	
rather	than	the	causes	of	food	insecurity,	the	
aims	set	for	the	PRRO	demand	that	it	also	tack-
les	at	least	proximate	causes	and	attempts	to	
help	people	(re-)establish	resilient	livelihoods .	
There	is	little	doubt	that	it	is	chronic	vulner-
ability	that	poses	the	greater	challenge	—	a	
function	not	only	of	conflict	but	of	desperate	
poverty	following	years	of	under-development,	
isolation	and	misrule .	Here,	WFP’s	partnership	
with	FAO	is	potentially	crucial .	But	the	prevail-
ing	conditions	in	the	country,	as	well	as	the	
challenge	of	scale	and	resources,	set	the	limit	
on	what	is	possible .	Approaches	like	Purchase	
for	Progress	can	help,	though	it	is	striking	how	
little	of	the	food	WFP	distributes	is	sourced	lo-
cally .	But	unless	major	development	funding	is	
directed	at	creating	the	conditions	where	farm-
ers	can	profitably	bring	their	produce	to	market,	
efforts	to	build	resilient	livelihoods	will	always	
be	hampered .	
Given	the	scale	and	severity	of	the	prob-
lems,	WFP’s	programmes	represent	a	vital	
safety	net	for	vulnerable	groups	in	DRC,	wheth-
er	through	its	school	feeding	programmes	or	
through	its	targeted	assistance	to	displaced	
and	host	communities .	That	said,	it	is	not	clear	
exactly	what	role	that	assistance	plays	in	peo-
ple’s	lives .	It	was	apparent,	for	example,	that	
a	considerable	proportion	of	food	aid	is	sold	
in	local	markets .	Given	the	huge	cost	of	deliv-
ering	that	food,	it	is	essential	to	understand	
the	scale	of	this	and	the	reasons	for	it,	and	to	
explore	options	(such	as	cash	or	vouchers)	that	
might	represent	both	a	more	cost	effective	way	
of	transferring	value	and	giving	people	more	
choice .	While	the	implementation	of	the	WFP	
programme	in	the	face	of	massive	challenges	
is	impressive	and	commendable,	the	rationale	
for	the	programme	sometimes	appeared	to	be	
assumed	rather	than	tested	in	practice .	A	more	
general	critique	of	humanitarian	practice	in	DRC	
could	be	made	on	these	lines,	with	programme	
approaches	seemingly	not	always	adapted	to	
take	account	of	evolving	vulnerabilities	and	op-
portunities .	Some	programmes	seem	rather	to	
be	self-justifying	and	self-perpetuating .
Some	of	the	assumptions	on	which	current	
approaches	are	based	seem	hard	to	justify .	
Asked	the	counterfactual	question	What would 
happen if you (and other aid agencies) were not 
here?,	the	majority	of	those	interviewed	—	at	
least	on	the	food	security	side	—	felt	that	the	
result	would	not	be	catastrophic .	People	would	
find	other	ways	of	meeting	their	needs,	though	
it	would	have	an	impact	on	overall	poverty	
levels .	Only	in	the	health	sector	did	all	those	
interviewed	feel	that	the	impact	of	withdrawing	
international	services	would	be	catastrophic,	
particularly	in	relation	to	the	loss	of	vaccination	
coverage .	Others	felt	that	the	loss	of	interna-
tional	presence	would	render	people	considera-
bly	more	vulnerable	to	abuse .	Already	they	were	
forced	to	reach	a	dangerous	accommodation	to	
the	demands	of	the	military	factions,	though	ex-
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actions	and	otherwise .	This	would	only	increase	
without	international	presence .
General	assumptions	about	“sustainabil-
ity”	and	“dependence”	often	seem	misplaced,	
based	on	ideology	rather	than	evidence .	Per-
haps	most	significantly,	the	dominant	paradigm	
of	early recovery	deserves	much	more	careful	
attention .	The	crucial	question	seems	to	be	
whether	efforts	aimed	at	supporting	“early	re-
covery”	are	based	on	valid	assumptions	about	
the	prevailing	conditions,	and	whether	these	
are	such	as	to	allow	“recovery”	in	the	sense	
implied .	There	is	good	reason	to	think	that	in	
many	cases	they	are	not .	More	generally,	the	
relationship	between	humanitarian	and	de-
velopment	approaches	is	unclear .	While	the	
humanitarian	agenda	as	defined	in	the	2009	
Humanitarian	Action	Plan	has	a	strong	degree	
of	coherence,	it	leaves	open	the	question	of	
how	chronic	vulnerability	is	to	be	addressed	—	
and	how	the	(necessarily	limited)	humanitarian	
efforts	to	increase	resilience	relate	to	a	wider	
developmental	agenda .
There	are	many	constraints	to	effective	hu-
manitarian	programming	in	DRC,	not	least	the	
sheer	scale	of	needs	and	the	remoteness	and	
scattered	nature	of	many	of	the	communities	
who	need	assistance .	Security	is	a	continuing	
constraint	in	the	East,	though	this	fluctuates	
over	time .	The	patterns	of	violence	dictate	both	
aid	priorities	and	the	extent	to	which	areas	are	
deemed	safe	to	access	for	aid	workers,	lead-
ing	to	a	familiar	paradox:	that	those	who	may	
most	require	assistance	may	be	the	least	able	
to	access	it .	There	are	other	limits	set	by	the	
availability	of	resources,	though	the	scale	of	
humanitarian	funding	has	increased	dramati-
cally	in	the	past	5	years	and	there	is	arguably	
scope	for	working	in	more	cost-effective	ways .	
Implementing	capacity	is	certainly	a	constraint,	
one	that	was	repeatedly	expressed	by	those	
interviewed	for	this	study .	Skilled	and	experi-
enced	staff	(national	and	international)	appear	
to	be	hard	to	find,	and	the	agency	coverage	on	
the	ground	essentially	sets	the	scope	of	what	
is	currently	achievable .	OCHA’s	field	presence	
is	limited,	and	it	is	unclear	how	well	standby	ar-
rangements	with	UNDP	are	working .
The	presence	of	an	integrated	UN	Mission	
(MONUC)	has	significant	implications	for	the	
delivery	of	aid,	positive	and	negative .	On	the	
one	hand,	without	military	escort,	many	areas	
would	remain	inaccessible	in	the	conflict	zones .	
On	the	other	hand,	MONUC’s	unpopularity	(it	
is	perceived	by	local	populations,	particularly	in	
the	East,	as	having	failed	to	protect	them)	col-
ours	opinion	of	the	UN	in	general,	and	perhaps	
of	other	agencies	as	well .	With	the	stepping	up	
of	joint	counter-insurgency	operations	with	the	
Government	forces,	it	is	feared	that	a	UN-badged	
force	openly	waging	war	on	insurgents	will	further	
undermine	efforts	to	establish	the	UN	as	a	neutral	
and	impartial	actor .	The	policy	of	aid	agencies	ap-
pears	to	be	to	maintain	an	arms-length	relation-
ship	with	MONUC,	but	the	distinction	is	hard	to	
maintain	for	the	UN	agencies	in	particular .
Winning	“hearts	and	minds”	represents	a	
significant	driver	for	international	donors	and	
government	alike	under	the	stabilisation	agenda .	
While	it	is	not	clear	to	what	extent	this	has	in	
practice	“skewed”	the	delivery	of	assistance	
(contrary	to	the	principle	of	impartiality),	it	high-
lights	the	challenges	of	trying	to	pursue	multiple	
agendas	governed	by	potentially	contradictory	
principles .	The	prioritising	of	assistance	to	the	
Eastern	(conflict-affected)	areas	of	the	country	
when	comparable	levels	of	need	exist	elsewhere	
reflects	both	humanitarian	and	political	judge-
ments	about	the	significance	of	the	conflict	
areas .	At	the	more	operational	level,	priorities	
sometimes	clash:	while	the	humanitarian	agen-
cies	are	working	to	the	HAP	priorities,	MONUC	is	
working	to	other	(stabilisation)	priorities .
On	the	question	of	planning	assumptions	
and	needs	analysis,	it	seems	that	some	of	the	
scenarios	on	which	forward	plans	are	based	
are	considerably	over-optimistic .	This	probably	
reflects	the	question	of	what	is	a	politically	ac-
ceptable	narrative,	but	it	leads	to	some	false	as-
sumptions	and	unrealistic	expectations	of	what	
is	possible .	The	2007	PRRO	is	an	example	of	this,	
though	adaptation	and	contingency	plans	made	
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response	to	the	subsequent	more	acute	needs	
possible .	Again,	this	reflects	WFP’s	relatively	
greater	competence	in	responding	to	acute	
vulnerability	than	to	chronic	vulnerability .	
Needs	assessment	in	DRC	has	been	
strengthened	considerably	across	the	board	
in	the	past	2	year,	and	this	is	reflected	in	the	
2009	HAP	as	well	as	in	the	way	that	Pooled	
Fund	monies	are	allocated .	The	discovery	that	
acute	malnutrition	levels	were	as	high	in	parts	
of	Central	and	Western	DRC	as	in	the	East	led	
to	some	re-assessment	of	priorities .	But	despite	
investment	in	sentinel	sites	and	other	monitor-
ing	mechanisms,	there	remains	a	huge	“diag-
nostic”	challenge	in	DRC,	and	a	need	to	better	
correlate	outcome	indicators	with	risk	factors	
to	inform	interventions .	Crucially,	the	crisis	pre-
vention	agenda	lies	uncomfortably	between	
development	and	humanitarian	actors,	and	this	
ambiguity	needs	to	be	resolved .
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009
123
Review of WfP’s Responses to operational and 
Programming Challenges in Conflicts and Complex 
emergencies: a Case study of Haiti
Thomas Gurtner, Consultant 
Executive Summary
Of Haiti’s 9 million people 60 percent reside in towns, of whom half live in slums; 55 
percent live below the poverty line of US$1 per day. A severely degraded environ-
ment, frequent hurricanes, decades of poor governance, poor market infrastructure, 
small and fragmented landholdings and lack of health and agriculture extension ser-
vices are all factors that exacerbate poverty and vulnerability. Food security, health 
and nutrition are extremely precarious in many areas, and critical in some places.186 
186 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of WFP.
Haiti	is	a	fragile	state	with	very	limited	
national	capacities .	Five	previous	United	Na-
tions	missions	have	failed	to	make	a	differ-
ence;	the	current	mission	shows	little	sign	of	
sustainable	success .	There	is	an	urgent	need	
for	the	international	community	to	develop	
new	joint	working	methods	with	a	view	to	
pooling	humanitarian	and	development	re-
sources	in	a	more	unified	and	comprehensive	
approach	that	will	respond	with	urgency	and	
in	a	focused	manner	to	the	critical	problems	
in	Haiti .
WFP	is	known	as	a	credible	and	reliable	
partner .	Its	role	appears	to	be	recognized	by	
beneficiaries,	who	distinguish	between	it	and	
other	United	Nations	entities .	WFP’s	role	as	
lead	agency	of	the	logistics	cluster	is	particu-
larly	noteworthy .
WFP	is	in	the	process	of	reviewing	its	
overall	approaches .	It	is	willing	to	invest	in	
innovation	and	is	developing	programmatic	
approaches	that	are	humanitarian	and	devel-
opmental	in	nature .	Critical	factors	in	WFP’s	
success	will	be	its	capacity	to	engage	with	
civil	society	and	to	develop	a	more	flexible	
approach	in	which	outputs	can	be	rapidly	
adapted	on	the	basis	of	sound	understanding	
of	the	evolving	socio-economic,	climatic	and	
political	environment	of	Haiti .	
Case study: Haiti (Field visit, June 2009)
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Haiti	lies	in	the	path	of	tropical	storms	
and	hurricanes;	its	topography	combines	
steep	deforested	hills	and	flood-prone	areas:	
it	is	hence	extremely	vulnerable	to	climatic	
shocks .	Severe	degradation	of	the	landscape	
and	natural	resources,	especially	forest	cover,	
is	a	major	factor	in	vulnerability	to	disasters	
and	long-term	food	insecurity .	
The	current	political	situation	is	volatile,	
with	triggers	for	renewed	social	unrest .	In	the	
opinion	of	many,	this	justifies	the	continued	
peace-keeping	operation	led	by	the	United	
Nations .	The	coming	year	is	expected	to	be	
politically	delicate	because	presidential	elec-
tions	will	be	held	in	2011 .	
The	United	Nations	integrated	mission	is	
dominated	by	the	United	Nations	Stabiliza-
tion	Mission	in	Haiti,	which	disposes	of	a	se-
curity	force	of	9,000	and	is	also	in	charge		
of	government	capacity-development	
projects .	There	are	tensions	between	the	
United	Nations	Stabilization	Mission	in	Haiti	
and	the	United	Nations	country	team	that	
stem	from	the	absence	of	a	comprehensive	
framework	to	regulate	the	roles	and	respon-
sibilities	of	United	Nations	bodies	under	the	
“One	UN”	concept .
186 The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of 
WFP.
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Introduction 
Over	the	past	decade,	unprecedented	se-
curity	risks,	unforeseen	outcomes	of	the	“war	
on	terror”	and	converging	military,	diplomatic	
and	development	agendas	have	strained	the	
inventiveness	and	capacity	of	WFP	in	complex	
emergencies .	At	the	same	time,	new	thinking	on	
power	dynamics,	livelihoods	in	conflict,	fragile	
state	economies	and	state	building	are	shaping	
the	humanitarian	agenda .	
Haiti	is	not	at	war,	but	most	other	consid-
erations	apply	and	WFP’s	humanitarian	and	de-
velopment	interventions	continue	to	grow;	they	
are	in	the	process	of	shifting	in	response	to	the	
realities	on	the	ground .
This	case	study	examines	the	challenges	
faced	by	WFP,	its	responses	and	its	practices	—	
good	and	bad	—	in	delivering	assistance .
Objectives and Methods
Objectives
This	study	aims	to	identify	the	challenges	
and	dilemmas	faced	by	WFP,	its	operating	part-
ners	and	the	humanitarian	community	in	deliver-
ing	assistance	in	a	fragile	state	such	as	Haiti .	The	
country	is	experiencing	a	protracted	crisis	char-
acterized	by	urban	violence,	natural	disasters,	
extreme	levels	of	poverty	and	massive	exposure	
to	the	global	economic	downturn,	which	is	forc-
ing	many	more	Haitians	to	join	the	4 .4	million	
people	already	living	on	less	than	US$1	per	day .
It	will	consider	the	One	UN	concept,	which	
is	dominated	by	the	United	Nations	Stabiliza-
tion	Mission	in	Haiti	(MINUSTAH)	and	a	large	
military	stabilization	force;	MINUSTAH	also	has	
a	mandate	to	reform	the	police	and	the	judici-
ary .	The	study	will	also	assess	WFP’s	capacity	to	
be	a	neutral	and	impartial	humanitarian	actor	
in	the	United	Nations	integrated	mission	and	to	
be	perceived	and	accepted	as	such .
Methods
The	case	study	builds	on:
•	 	a	desk	review	of	internal	and	external	re-
ports	and	publications	on	Haiti;	
•	 	a	country	visit	to	allow	face-to-face	inter-
views	and	focus-group	discussions	with	
WFP	staff,	partners,	other	United	Nations	
agencies,	government	agencies,	military	
and	police	forces,	non-governmental	
organizations	(NGOs),	the	International	
Federation	of	Red	Cross	and	Red	Crescent	
Societies	(IFRC)	and	beneficiaries;	and	
•	 	additional	telephone	interviews	with	experts	
and	personnel	formerly	working	in	Haiti .
The Country and Context
Historical Background
Following	the	fall	of	the	Duvalier	dictator-
ship	in	1987,	a	new	constitution	was	ratified	
that	is	still	in	place	today .	In	December	1990,	
Jean-Bertrand	Aristide,	a	charismatic	Roman	
Catholic	priest,	won	67	percent	of	the	vote	in	
elections	that	international	observers	deemed	
largely	free	and	fair .	President	Aristide’s	radical	
populist	policies	alarmed	many	of	the	country’s	
elite,	and	in	September	1991	he	was	overthrown	
in	a	military	coup .	There	was	violent	resistance	
to	the	coup,	in	which	hundreds	were	killed,	and	
Aristide	was	forced	into	exile;	there	was	also	a	
major	exodus	of	refugees .
In	July	1994,	as	repression	mounted	in	
Haiti,	the	United	Nations	authorized	its	Member	
States	to	use	all	necessary	means	to	facilitate	
the	departure	of	the	military	leadership	and	to	
restore	Haiti’s	constitutionally	elected	govern-
ment	to	power .	With	United	States	troops	head-
ing	for	Haiti,	the	then	leaders	agreed	to	step	
down	and	President	Aristide	was	able	to	return	
in	October .	
The	initial	force	of	21,000	was	transformed	
into	a	United	Nations	peacekeeping	force	of	
6,000	troops	in	1995;	it	was	scaled	back	pro-
gressively	over	the	next	four	years	as	a	series	of	
United	Nations	technical	missions	succeeded	
it .	In	January	2000,	the	last	United	States	
troops	departed .
In	February	1996	René	Préval,	a	prominent	
Aristide	ally,	was	elected	President	with	88	per-
cent	of	the	vote .	But	in	late	1996,	Aristide	broke	
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with	Préval	and	formed	a	new	political	party .	He	
and	his	party	won	elections	in	April	1997,	but	
were	never	accepted	by	the	then	government .	
In	May	2000	elections	for	the	Chamber	of	
Deputies	and	two-thirds	of	the	Senate	finally	
took	place .	Voter	turnout	was	60	percent,	and	
Aristide’s	party	won	a	landslide	victory .	But	
the	elections	were	flawed	by	irregularities	and	
fraud:	as	a	result,	the	November	2000	elections	
were	boycotted	by	the	opposition .	This	political	
deadlock	between	Aristide	and	the	opposition	
continued	with	increasing	tension	until	a	rebel-
lion	in	2004	brought	Goinaives	and	Cap	Haitien	
under	rebel	control .
The Political and Security Situation
On	29	February	2004,	with	rebels	marching	
towards	Port-au-Prince,	Aristide	was	forced	to	
depart	from	Haiti	and	an	interim	government	
petitioned	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	
for	an	international	peacekeeping	force .	This	
was	immediately	granted,	and	a	military	force	
led	initially	by	the	United	States	arrived	in	Haiti	
the	same	day .	
In	spite	of	the	controversy	and	violence,	
however,	the	interim	government	planned	legis-
lative	and	executive	elections,	which	were	finally	
held	in	February	2006 .	The	elections	were	won	
by	René	Préval,	who	is	still	President .	
In	April	2008,	“food	riots”	broke	out;	
some	main	roads	were	blocked	and	the	air-
port	at	Port-au-Prince	was	closed .	As	a	result	
the	country	was	without	a	government	for	five	
months .	The	tense	and	fragile	situation	was	ex-
acerbated	as	Haiti	was	hit	by	the	worst	storms	
in	two	decades	in	August	and	September	of	
that	year:	65	percent	of	agricultural	production	
was	lost	and	a	further	1	million	Haitians	saw	
their	already	fragile	livelihoods	swept	away	by	
the	floods .	
The	country	is	worse	off	today	than	it	was	
before	the	food	riots;	six	successive	United	Na-
tions	missions	to	Haiti	have	not	managed	to	
create	a	sustainable	state .	The	élite,	mainly	rep-
resented	in	the	Senate	and	Parliament,	remains	
reluctant	to	support	the	Government,	which	still	
predominantly	represents	the	interests	of	the	
poor,	in	its	efforts	to	reform .	Elections	that	were	
deemed	crucial	were	held	in	April,	but	the	turn-
out	was	below	10	percent	and	many	voters	were	
“encouraged”	to	stay	at	home .
The Socio-Economic Context
Haiti	has	a	population	of	9	million,	with	
another	1	million	living	abroad;	60	percent	of	
the	resident	population	are	concentrated	in	
towns,	of	whom	half	live	in	slums .	More	than	
half	of	the	population	live	below	the	poverty	
line:	76	percent	live	on	less	than	US$2	per	day	
and	56	percent	live	on	less	than	US$1	per	day .	
About	1	million	Haitians	are	totally	dependent	
on	remittances	from	abroad;	another	2–3	million	
are	partially	dependent .	Remittances	in	2006	
accounted	for	20	percent	of	the	gross	national	
product	of	US$1 .65	billion .
Haiti	normally	produces	50	percent	of	its	
food	requirements,	but	the	floods	in	2008	re-
duced	this	capacity	as	60	percent	of	arable	land	
was	temporarily	lost .	Half	the	population	has	no	
access	to	potable	water;	72	percent	have	no	ac-
cess	to	any	form	of	healthcare .	Only	40	percent	
of	children	are	vaccinated;	one	in	four	appears	
to	be	chronically	malnourished	and	stunted .	HIV	
prevalence	is	the	highest	in	the	Caribbean,	esti-
mated	at	2 .2	percent	among	people	aged	15	to	
49 .	This	amounts	to	120,000	people	living	with	
HIV,	of	whom	58,000	are	women	and	6,800	are	
children .	It	is	estimated	that	fewer	than	half	of	
those	who	need	anti-retroviral	therapy	receive	
treatment .	Haiti’s	literacy	rate	is	53	percent;	
fewer	than	20	percent	of	school-age	children	
have	access	to	public	schools .
Tropical	storms	and	hurricanes	appear	to	
be	increasing	in	frequency	and	intensity .	Haiti’s	
forest	cover	has	almost	entirely	disappeared,	
but	firewood	and	charcoal	continue	to	be	used	
for	cooking	in	most	households .	
The	global	economic	downturn	has	re-
duced	the	flow	of	remittances	by	30	percent .	
The	political	stalemate	and	the	resulting	slow-
ness	of	government	reforms	are	further	un-
dermining	the	strained	coping	mechanisms	of	
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millions	of	Haitians .	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	
Millennium	Development	Goals	are	far	from	
being	reached;	progress	on	some	has	actually	
reversed,	particular	with	regard	to	mother-and-
child	mortality,	eradication	of	extreme	poverty	
and	environmental	sustainability .	
Future Prospects
The	Government,	supported	by	MINUS-
TAH,	is	embarking	on	various	reforms	to	re-build	
an	effective	police	force	and	judicial	system .	The	
United	Nations	country	team	(UNCT)	is	working	
under	the	United	Nations	Development	Assist-
ance	Framework	(UNDAF)187	to	develop	a	coor-
dinated	approach	to	enhance	government	ca-
pacities	in	the	areas	defined	in	the	2007	Poverty	
Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(PRSP) .	The	Govern-
ment	remains	extremely	weak,	and	its	credibility	
and	legitimacy	in	Haiti	are	currently	less	than	
they	were	before	the	food	riots	of	April	2008 .	
The	current	political	situation	is	volatile .	
Concerns	are	expressed	by	MINUSTAH,	the	
UNCT	and	the	international	community	that	so-
cial-unrest	could	flare	up	at	any	time .	The	com-
ing	year	is	expected	to	be	politically	delicate,	
with	presidential	elections	scheduled	for	2011 .	
There	is	consensus	among	the	UNCT	and	
NGOs	that	humanitarian	and	development	
agendas	must	work	hand-in-hand .	But	coor-
dination	among	stakeholder	groups	remains	
extremely	weak .	
The Humanitarian and 
Development Environment 
The Government of Haiti
The	Government’s	primary	challenge	is	to	
keep	Haiti	on	the	path	to	social	and	economic	
stability	and	improved	security	despite	increas-
ing	poverty .	The	Government	faces	a	daunting	
task:	it	has	few	capable	officers	and	delivers	
almost	no	services	such	as	health,	nutrition	
and	education .	Public	administration,	where	it	
exists,	is	carried	out	by	NGOs,	private	entre-
187 See Annex 4
preneurs	or	church	associations .	The	legitimacy	
of	the	Government	is	further	weakened	by	
opposition	from	different	and	often	influential	
segments	of	Haitian	society:	this	is	exempli-
fied	by	the	low	voter	turnout	—	estimated	by	
independent	observers	at	less	than	5	percent	—	
during	the	elections	in	April	2009 .	
The	PRSP	approved	by	the	Government	
at	the	end	of	2007	requires	US$3 .8	billion	over	
three	years .	It	serves	as	a	roadmap	for	improv-
ing	social	services,	expanding	infrastructure	
and	cultivating	growth	and	development	areas .	
Its	three	pillars	are:
•	 enhance	human	development	by	improving	
basic	services;
•	 	promote	growth	with	a	focus	on	agricul-
ture,	tourism,	infrastructure	and	labour-
intensive	construction;	and
•	 promote	democratic	governance,	focusing	
on	improved	justice	and	public	security .
The	PRSP	is	sometimes	perceived	as	insuf-
ficiently	focused,	but	it	nevertheless	identifies	
critical	areas	where	the	Government	needs	to	
scale	up	its	capacities	to	deliver	services	to	its	
population .
The	second	government	document	driving	
its	agenda	is	the	Post-Disaster	Needs	Assess-
ment	Report	(PDNA),	which	was	prepared	after	
the	catastrophic	floods	in	August	2008	with	
support	from	the	World	Bank,	the	UNCT,	the	
European	Union,	IFRC	and	other	stakeholders .	It	
highlights	the	need	for	urgent	action	to	develop	
an	adequate	disaster	risk	management	plan	for	
Haiti,	for	which	a	crucial	prerequisite	is	creation	
of	the	capacity	to	engage	in	reducing	risks	and	
to	move	the	development	and	poverty-reduction	
agenda	forward .	The	three	pillars	of	the	PDNA	
action	plan	—	food	security,	social	protection	
and	watershed	protection	—	require	urgent	
intervention	and	should	ideally	lead	to	adjust-
ments	in	the	sector	action	plans	in	the	PRSP .	
Although	progress	is	extremely	slow,	there	
are	signs	that	the	international	community	
is	willing	to	continue	to	support	the	Govern-
ment .	The	donor	conference	that	launched	the	
PRSP	in	April	2009	also	allocated	an	additional	
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US$320	million	in	funding,	though	this	amount	
was	well	below	the	US$3	billion	requested .
The	Government	is	willing	to	move	forward,	
but	in	view	of	its	lack	of	capacity	much	will	
depend	on	the	speed	and	effectiveness	with	
which	donors,	MINUSTAH	and	the	UNCT	can	
develop	a	joint	framework	for	capacity-develop-
ment .	It	is	revealing	in	this	context	that	during	
a	briefing	with	the	Deputy	Director	of	the	Civil	
Protection	Agency	of	Haiti	and	his	coordinator	
for	prevention	and	mitigation	measures,	the	dis-
cussion	was	mainly	led	by	representatives	from	
the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	
(UNDP)	and	the	United	States	Agency	for	Inter-
national	Development	(USAID) .
Government	representatives	interviewed	in	
Port-au-Prince	and	Gonaives	were	generally	sat-
isfied	with	WFP’s	response	to	last	year’s	flood-
ing,	though	they	mentioned	that	assistance	had	
been	slow	to	arrive .	They	applauded	WFP’s	will-
ingness	to	engage	with	them .	But	government	
and	NGO	representatives	and	donors	appeared	
to	be	concerned	by	what	they	described	as	le 
travail cloisonné des agences	—	the	agencies’	
compartmentalized	way	of	working:	it	tran-
spired	that	the	representatives	were	frustrated	
by	what	they	saw	as	lack	of	coordination	among	
United	Nations	agencies,	particularly	the	United	
Nations	Development	Programme	(UNDP)	and	
the	United	States	Agency	for	International	De-
velopment	(USAID) .	and	WFP,	and	sometimes	
UNDP .	All	three	are	essential	in	providing	con-
certed	support,	particularly	in	response	to	the	
planned	PDNA	initiatives .
Haitian Civil Society
The	background	of	past	slavery	and	cur-
rent	poverty,	manipulation	of	the	poorest	by	
élite	interest	groups,	lack	of	a	middle	class	and	
domination	of	the	slums	by	gangs	have	reduced	
solidarity	mechanisms	to	a	bare	minimum,	often	
the	immediate	family .	The	increase	in	evangeli-
cal	churches	has	reduced	the	proportion	of	
Catholics	from	the	80	percent	of	20	years	ago .	
NGOs	associated	with	Christian	groups	are	
usually	approached	to	partner	international	as-
sistance	agencies;	they	are	the	main	partners	of	
WFP	in	Haiti,	particularly	Caritas .	
It	has	to	be	understood	that	virtually	all	
Haitians	remain	faithful	to	the	other	official	na-
tional	religion	—	Voodoo .	This	does	not	receive	
enough	consideration:	few	members	of	the	
international	aid	community	engage	with	this	
movement	beyond	superficial	networking	with	
some	of	its	more	prominent	leaders .	Following	
the	disaster	in	Gonaives,	various	Voodoo	organ-
izations	that	had	previously	competed	against	
each	other	rallied	together	to	find	ways	to	help:	
it	was	striking	to	meet	young	Haitians	in	Gona-
ives	who	were	lobbying	agencies	for	support	for	
their	youth-mobilization	campaigns	to	address	
the	urgent	need	for	reforestation	in	the	region .
Voodoo	may	not	be	well	organized,	but	
can	be	seen	as	a	dynamic	grassroots	movement	
pressing	for	change .	This	aspect	of	Haitian	soci-
ety	unfortunately	remains	“below	the	radar”	of	
mainstream	agencies .	It	is	definitely	worth	en-
gaging	more	with	Haitian	society:	there	may	be	
a	hidden	potential	here	that	could	contribute	to	
improving	the	lives	of	Haitians	over	time .
The United Nations System and 
Integrated Mission
The Peace-Keeping and State-Building 
Mission of MINUSTAH
After	the	overthrow	of	President	Aristide,	
violence	in	Haiti	continued	despite	the	pres-
ence	of	peacekeepers .	Clashes	between	police	
and	Aristide	supporters	who	were	demanding	
for	his	return	were	common;	several	of	the	pro-
tests	resulted	in	violence	and	deaths .	Criminal-
ity	in	the	townships	was	at	its	peak .	
On	1	June	2004,	the	peacekeeping	mis-
sion	was	passed	to	MINUSTAH .	It	comprised	a	
7,000-strong	military	force	led	by	Brazil,	com-
plemented	by	a	United	Nations	police	contin-
gent	of	2,000;	it	was	supported	by	Latin	Ameri-
can	countries,	particularly	Argentina	and	Chile .	
It	received	a	strong	Chapter	VII	mandate	to	
ensure	security	and	stability,	support	the	politi-
cal	process	and	monitor	the	human	rights	situa-
tion .	On	15	October	2005,	Brazil	called	for	more	
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troops	to	deal	with	the	deteriorating	situation:	
they	intervened	in	several	townships,	which	led	
to	a	major	disarmament	operation,	the	arrest	of	
hundreds	of	gang	leaders	and	general	contain-
ment	of	the	violence .188	
The	Haitian	National	Police	(HNP)	is	cur-
rently	being	re-formed	with	support	from	MI-
NUSTAH;	the	riots	in	April	2008	showed	that	
HNP	was	unable	to	maintain	order	or	ensure	
stability .	HNP	will	have	a	force	of	9,500	by	mid-
2009,	on	its	way	to	a	target	of	14,000	by	2011 .	
But	with	only	US$150	million	allocated	to	HNP	
annually,	there	are	serious	doubts	as	to	whether	
they	will	be	able	to	address	the	violence	and	
crime	in	Haiti .	
Although	the	country	is	currently	calmer,	
the	continued	presence	of	troops	and	United	
Nations	police	seems	justified	as	the	United	
Nations	works	to	rebuild	HNP .	Many	observers,	
however,	question	the	large	military	deploy-
ments	because	the	violence	of	the	last	25	years	
has	largely	been	a	matter	of	the	mobilization	of	
poverty-stricken	crowds	for	political	interests .	
The	United	Nations	integrated	mission	is	
led	by	a	Special	Representative	of	the	Secre-
tary-General	(SRSG)	from	the	Department	of	
Peace	Keeping	Operations	who	is	closely	asso-
ciated	with	MINUSTAH .	The	SRSG	is	assisted	by	
a	force	commander	and	two	deputy	SRSGs,	one	
of	whom	is	from	UNDP	and	acts	as	the	United	
Nations	Resident	Coordinator .	
Humanitarian	agencies	are	wary	of	the	role	
of	the	military,	even	though	the	troops	gave	
valuable	assistance	in	providing	relief	for	flood-
affected	populations	and	the	WFP	country	
team	stressed	the	positive	cooperation	with	the	
military	during	the	initial	emergency	in	August	
and	September	2008 .	MINUSTAH’s	statement	
of	its	intention	to	take	over	the	coordination	of	
humanitarian	responses	during	the	next	crisis	
was	received	with	some	alarm,	but	it	is	hoped	
that	with	more	proactive	involvement	of	NGOs	
188 According to Médecins sans frontières (MSF), gunshot 
casualties referred to their hospital in Port-au-Prince fell from 
20–30 per night to 30 per month after the MINUSTAH clean-
up operation.
in	the	management	of	the	clusters,	particularly	
logistics,	problems	can	be	averted .	
MINUSTAH	has	large	military	and	police	as-
sets,	and	its	direct	programmatic	engagement	
with	the	Government	in	matters	of	policing,	
justice	reform	and	electoral	support	causes	it	to	
be	perceived	as	wanting	to	control	the	United	
Nations	agenda	rather	than	work	harmoniously	
in	an	agreed	framework	of	responsibilities .	
There	are,	therefore,	tensions	between	
MINUSTAH	and	the	UNCT	and	there	appears	to	
be	only	limited	mutual	understanding	of	roles	
in	helping	Haiti	to	become	a	more	viable	state .	
Dialogue	between	UNCT	and	the	SRSG	also	
remained	difficult	and	resulted	in	tensions	be-
tween	the	two	entities:	some	UNCT	members	
felt	sidelined	in	the	process	of	reconstructing	
state	institutions,	but	appeared	worried	that	
MINUSTAH	was	taking	on	tasks	in	sectors	where	
they	lacked	experience	and	that	could	have	
been	carried	out	better	under	the	leadership	of	
the	specialized	agencies .
There	is	further	unease	with	regard	to	the	
maintenance	of	the	strict	security	measures	
for	United	Nations	agencies,	which	according	
to	most	observers	are	out	of	proportion	to	
the	current	level	of	security	threats .	The	IFRC	
and	NGOs	have	largely	relaxed	their	security	
rules	and	can	move	freely	in	the	most	poverty-
stricken	areas,	whereas	UNCT	movements	
are	constrained	and	it	has	to	rely	on	a	strict	
notification	procedure	or	on	military	escorts	
when	entering	these	areas .	This	does	little	to	
enhance	its	acceptance	by	local	people	who	
are	unimpressed	by	the	presence	of	foreign	
troops	and	who	have	seen	little	progress,	even	
though	the	current	United	Nations	mission	to	
Haiti	is	the	sixth .	
The United Nations Country Team 
and the United Nations Development 
Assistance Framework
The	UNCT	involves	the	following	organiza-
tions:
•	 	FAO;
•	 	the	International	Fund	for	Agricultural	De-
velopment	(IFAD);
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•	 the	International	Organization	for	
Migration	(IOM);
•	 the	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humani-
tarian	Affairs	(OCHA);
•	 the	Joint	United	Nations	Programme	on	
HIV	and	AIDS	(UNAIDS);
•	 	UNDP;
•	 the	United	Nations	Environment	
Programme	(UNEP);
•	 the	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	
and	Cultural	Organization	(UNESCO);
•	 the	United	Nations	Children’s	Fund	
(UNICEF);
•	 	the	United	Nations	Development	Fund	for	
Women	(UNIFEM);	
•	 the	United	Nations	Population	Fund	(UN-
FPA);
•	 	the	United	Nations	Office	for	Project	
Services	(UNOPS);
•	 WFP;	and
•	 the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO) .
A	new	UNDAF	for	2009–2011	has	now	been	
released .	It	embodies	a	peace	consolidation	
and	a	short-term	transitional	stabilization	strat-
egy	to	be	implemented	before	the	2010	presi-
dential	elections	combined	with	longer-term	
recovery	and	development .	The	three	priority	
areas	are:	i)	democratic	governance;	ii)	sustaina-
ble	human	development;	and	iii)	environmental	
and	disaster	management .	The	UNDAF	also	in-
dicates	the	level	of	funding	necessary	to	ensure	
proper	programme	implementation .	But	in	an	
environment	such	as	Haiti,	where	donor	coor-
dination	is	sub-optimal,189	it	remains	to	be	seen	
whether	the	UNDAF	will	contribute	to	improved	
coordination	among	the	partners .
189 It has taken UNDP several years to produce a 
comprehensive framework that engages donors in a 
coordinated strategic approach. The Government’s leadership 
weakness and bilateral donor agendas have made this 
approach difficult. Today the ten top donors — the EU, 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, CIDA, USAID, Spanish 
Development Cooperation, French Development Cooperation 
and the ABC group — sit on a joint steering committee 
chaired by the Resident Coordinator; technical work is carried 
out through sector and sub-sector groups with a view to 
harmonizing donor strategies and adhering to the code of 
good donorship. 
OCHA,	which	has	faced	many	difficulties	in	
recent	years,	has	been	struggling	for	improved	
coordination	and	information-sharing	among	
United	Nations	and	other	partners .	It	has	been	
considerably	under-funded	and	only	now,	after	
lessons	learned	from	the	last	hurricane	season,	is	
there	a	willingness	in	the	UNCT	to	accept	a	larger	
OCHA	role .	
UNCT	member	agencies	appear	to	prefer	
to	engage	bilaterally	with	ministries	and	services	
of	direct	interest	to	them;	this	tendency	is	com-
pounded	by	the	lack	of	leadership	in	government	
and	the	nature	of	the	relationships	in	the	United	
Nations	integrated	mission .	UNCT	efforts	ap-
peared	to	be	based	on	a	theoretical	concept	in	
that	no	evidence	of	joint	planning	and	imple-
mentation	was	visible .	Stated	commitment	to	full	
coordination	and	consultation	was	rarely	followed	
up	with	joint	action .	WFP	was	involved	in	the	
UNDAF	exercise,	but	seemed	more	comfortable	
maintaining	its	relationship	with	UNCT	partners	at	
a	bilateral	level .	
WFP,	however,	was	willing	to	invest	resources	
for	coordination	in	areas	for	which	it	was	account-
able	such	as	re-activating	and	upgrading	the	logis-
tics	cluster	in	preparation	for	the	hurricane	season,	
engaging	proactively	with	all	stakeholders	and	
inviting	NGOs	to	join	in	the	management	of	this	
inter-agency	service .	This	approach	was	applaud-
ed	by	the	international	community	in	general .
Important	relationships	exist	with	UNICEF	
in	the	nutrition	and	cluster	sectors	and	with	
UNDP,	FAO	and	ILO	in	relation	to	early-recovery	
projects .	WFP	has	sometimes	been	frustrated	
by	the	slowness	of	partners’	responses;	some	
staff	feel	that	it	cannot	always	rely	on	its	United	
Nations	partners,	who	regularly	face	capacity	
or	cash-flow	problems	and	are	not	necessarily	
comfortable	with	the	sense	of	urgency	prevalent	
in	an	organization	that	is	more	humanitarian	than	
developmental	in	orientation .
International NGOs and the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red  
Crescent Societies
The	IFRC	and	the	International	Committee	
of	the	Red	Cross	(ICRC)	have	good	working	rela-
WfP: Humanitarian assistance in Conflict and Complex emergencies June 2009130
tionships;	IFRC	confirms	that	it	has	been	profit-
ing	considerably	from	the	services	provided	
through	the	logistics	cluster .
Interlocutors	from	the	Cooperative	for	As-
sistance	and	Relief	Everywhere	(CARE),	Action 
contre la faim	(ACF)	and	Médecins sans fron-
tières	(MSF)	emphasized	that	there	was	little	
sharing	of	information	or	coordination	between	
the	United	Nations	and	NGOs,	though	OCHA	
had	tried	to	facilitate	such	approaches .	NGOs	
also	felt	that	although	last	year’s	clusters	had	
helped	to	improve	coordination,	the	United	Na-
tions	organizations	focused	on	sectors	and	so	
ran	the	risk	of	not	covering	critical	assistance	
gaps	or	duplicating	efforts .	NGOs	were	propos-
ing	to	improve	inter-cluster	coordination	to	en-
sure	that	cross-sectoral	concerns	such	as	secu-
rity	were	addressed	more	fully .	They	welcomed	
the	Resident	Coordinator’s	invitation	to	engage	
more	actively	and	assume	joint	leadership	of	
selected	clusters	in	partnership	with	United	Na-
tions	agencies .	
CARE	in	particular	highlighted	its	concerns	
about	long-term	food	aid	approaches .	Like	
other	donors	such	as	European	Commission	
Humanitarian	Aid	(ECHO),	it	felt	that	mecha-
nisms	to	respond	to	longer-term	needs	were	in-
adequate .	CARE	had	reviewed	its	own	strategy,	
and	would	make	the	provision	of	food	a	means	
of	last	resort .	But	this	did	not	prevent	it	from	
maintaining	a	dialogue	with	WFP,	which	they	
saw	as	the	only	United	Nations	agency	capable	
of	engaging	in	sustained	dialogue	outside	its	
immediate	domain	of	intervention .	In	general,	
NGOs	felt	that	most	United	Nations	agencies	
in	Haiti	were	weak,	a	judgement	based	on	the	
perceived	limited	capacity	of	UNICEF	and	IOM	
to	manage	their	clusters	in	2008 .
Most	NGOs	felt	that	WFP	had	been	too	
slow	to	review	and	adapt	its	approaches:	many	
felt	that	better	engagement	with	communities	
and	a	more	differentiated	approach	to	large-
scale	food	distributions	were	required .	WFP	has	
recently	started	to	address	these	concerns .	But	
on	one	point	there	was	unanimous	agreement:	
WFP	is	the	only	United	Nations	Agency	that	is	
actually	seen	working	on	the	ground	and	rec-
ognized	as	such	by	the	people	of	Haiti;	by	and	
large	it	is	a	trusted	and	reliable	partner	with	a	
good	track	record,	willing	to	engage	with	exter-
nal	stake-holders	and	capable	of	adapting	to	a	
changing	environment .
WFP and Interactions with Partners
WFP	continues	to	deploy	its	entire	set	of	
tools	to	respond	to	the	needs	of	vulnerable	and	
disaster-affected	populations	in	Haiti .	Follow-
ing	the	April	2008	riots	caused	by	high	food	
prices,	WFP	scaled	up	its	operations	to	reach	an	
additional	1 .5	million	people;	this	was	comple-
mented	by	an	emergency	operation	to	assist	up	
to	800,000	people	for	six	months	in	response	to	
the	three	hurricanes	and	the	tropical	storm	that	
stuck	Haiti	in	rapid	succession	in	August	and	
September	2008 .	
These	shocks	weakened	an	already	vulner-
able	population .	Logistics	capacity	was	mas-
sively	increased:	in	two	special	operations	WFP	
reached	communities	that	had	been	cut	off	
from	food	supplies	because	roads	had	become	
impassable;	700	mt	of	high-energy	biscuits	and	
nutritious	foods	were	transported	by	air	and	
children,	malnourished	mothers	and	injured	
people	were	evacuated	to	health	centres .	WFP	
was	also	the	first	to	arrive	in	Gonaives	with	first	
aid	supplies	after	the	tropical	had	killed	125	
people	and	covered	the	town	with	2	million	m3	
of	mud .	In	recent	months,	WFP	has	shifted	its	
operations	towards	early	recovery	and	rehabili-
tation	interventions .	
During	the	2008	shocks,	many	schools	were	
damaged	and	others	were	used	as	shelters .	This	
delayed	the	start	of	the	2008–2009	school	year	
by	a	month	in	many	areas .	In	response,	WFP	
expanded	school	feeding	to	the	areas	worst	
affected,	reaching	480,000	children .	During	
the	2008	school	holidays,	the	food	needs	of	
200,000	schoolchildren	and	out-of-school	chil-
dren	were	met	in	summer	camps	organized	by	
WFP .	This	initiative	was	recognized	by	all	stake-
holders	as	an	innovation;	it	was	much	appreci-
ated	by	poor	parents .	
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The	country	office	is	planning	to	hold	work-
shops	in	the	four	WFP	sub-offices	that	will	focus	
on:	i)	improving	capacity	for	seasonal	analysis	
and	targeting	by	enhancing	understanding	of	
livelihood	mechanisms;	ii)	fostering	a	culture	of	
information-sharing	among	stakeholders;	and	
iii)	discussing	partnerships	and	ways	to	improve	
their	performance .
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
The	new	country	team	is	reviewing	its		
approaches	and	addressing	challenges	related	
to	deteriorating	coping	mechanisms	among	
the	poorest	and	the	increasing	risk	of		
natural	disasters .	
WFP	sometimes	feels	isolated	and	frus-
trated	by	limitations	imposed	on	its	operational	
capacity	by	the	constraints	inherent	in	a	United	
Nations	integrated	mission .	These	include	tight	
security	guidelines	—	which	are	not	followed	by	
non-United	Nations	entities	—	that	prevent	it	
from	moving	freely,	and	reliance	on	UNCT	part-
ners	who	may	be	reluctant	to	engage	or	who	
face	problems	in	meeting	commitments	when	
working	with	WFP	in	joint	programmes .	
As	in	many	other	places,	however,	WFP	
shows	considerable	capacity	for	adaptation:	
learning	from	the	lessons	of	the	flood	response	
barely	a	year	ago,	for	example,	it	has	champi-
oned	re-activation	of	the	logistics	cluster	in	a	
timely	and	effective	manner	and	is	encouraging	
NGOs	to	become	co-conveners .	By	sub-con-
tracting	its	vehicle	fleet	to	a	specialized	trans-
port	NGO,	WFP	has	accelerated	deliveries	of	
goods	for	the	humanitarian	community	without	
the	restriction	of	United	Nations	Department	of	
Safety	and	Security	(UNDSS)	requirements .
Most	partners	consulted	emphasized	that	
of	all	the	United	Nations	agencies	WFP	was	the	
most	responsive	and	that	it	was	seen	to	be	ac-
tive	and	operational .	Haitians	differentiate	be-
tween	WFP	and	other	United	Nations	entities,	
in	particular	MINUSTAH,	because	it	is	present	
in	the	field	and	seen	to	be	supporting	com-
munities	and	bring	assistance	when	needed .	
Haitians	may	be	somewhat	disenchanted	by	the	
performance	of	the	United	Nations,	but	WFP	
stands	out	as	capable	of	responding	to	humani-
tarian	needs	rapidly	and	impartially .
The Way Forward
A	case	study	such	as	this	aims	to	promote	
discussion	of	the	optimum	approaches	to	co-
ordinate	support	for	Haiti	with	a	view	to	lifting	
it	out	of	its	desperate	situation .	Observations	
on	the	issues	of	fragile	states,	protracted	cri-
ses	and	the	United	Nations	integrated	mission	
concept	will	feed	directly	into	a	conference	to	
be	convened	by	the	Institute	for	the	Study	of	
the	Americas .
Haiti	is	not	a	country	in	conflict,	nor	is	it	
experiencing	a	complex	emergency .	It	is	an	
extremely	poor	country	with	one	of	the	highest	
corruption	indices	in	the	world	and	wide	social	
disparity;	it	has	a	democratically	elected	gov-
ernment	that	faces	huge	legitimacy	problems	
and	lack	of	capacity	and	that	is	increasingly	
exposed	to	humanitarian	disasters	linked	to	
200	years	of	environmental	degradation .	Haiti	
is	regularly	supported	by	the	international	com-
munity,	led	by	the	United	States	and	Canada .	
Five	previous	high-profile	United	Nations	mis-
sions	have	failed	to	bring	change	for	the	better:	
how	will	this	one	succeed?
The	international	response	relies	princi-
pally	on	a	disproportionate	investment	in	a	
military	stabilization	force	that	has	also	been	
mandated	to	address	government	capacity	
deficits	in	judicial	reform,	security	and	the	con-
stitutional	and	political	processes,	and	to	foster	
principles	of	democratic	governance	and	insti-
tutional	development .
It	can	be	argued	that	the	daunting	tasks	
to	be	addressed	through	the	PSRP	and	PDNA	
require	donors	and	the	United	Nations	to	adopt	
a	focused,	balanced	and	comprehensive	strat-
egy	to	address	the	underlying	causes	of	Haiti’s	
fragility .	MINUSTAH	spends	US$500	million	per	
year,	mainly	on	peace-keeping	and	the	main-
tenance	of	9,000	security	personnel,	but	the	
development	agencies	receive	far	less	financial	
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support .	If	the	size	of	Haiti	and	the	issues	at	
stake	are	compared	with	the	Democratic	Re-
public	of	the	Congo,	it	must	be	asked	whether	
the	presence	of	such	a	large	peace-keeping	
force	can	be	justified .	The	resources	currently	
spent	on	troop	maintenance	in	Haiti	might	
better	used	for	direct	investment	in	recovery,	
reconstruction	and	capacity-development	in	
education,	health,	agriculture	and	environmen-
tal	rehabilitation .
Should	the	United	Nations	take	a	more	
principled	stance	in	advocating	for	a	different	
strategy?	This	may	be	an	argument	to	be	devel-
oped	further .	The	recent	humanitarian	disaster	
in	Haiti	triggered	the	release	of	additional	
humanitarian	funds	and	created	a	window	of	
opportunity	to	ensure	that	urgent	needs	were	
addressed	comprehensively	and	sustainably .	
Failure	to	invest	in	subsequent	major	recovery	
will	result	in	a	high	probability	that	natural	haz-
ards	such	as	the	ones	witnessed	in	2009	will	
shift	another	1	million	or	more	Haitians	from	
living	in	poverty	on	less	than	US$2	per	day	into	
abject	destitution .
In	such	an	environment,	where	the	post-
crisis	response	is	also	a	pre-crisis	preparedness	
phase,	the	traditional	separation	of	humanitar-
ian	and	development	agendas	into	two	distinct	
approaches	cannot	be	maintained .	Humanitar-
ian	and	development	agendas	need	to	become	
far	more	inter-linked;	the	humanitarian	and	aid	
communities	need	to	develop	working	modali-
ties	that	are	interchangeable	and	complemen-
tary	to	make	progress	in	addressing	Haiti’s	
diverse	ills	in	a	sustainable	way .
The	optimum	way	forward	can	therefore	
only	be	developed	through	reflection	on	the	
best	ways	to	harmonize	humanitarian	and	devel-
opment	practices	in	a	new	modular	approach	
to	address	complex	crises	in	a	fragile	state	such	
as	Haiti .	
WFP’s	interventions	to	protect	vulnerable	
and	food-insecure	populations	while	support-
ing	long-term	government	work	in	disaster	pre-
paredness,	risk	reduction	and	the	rebuilding	of	
economic	and	social	infrastructures	show	that	
it	is	already	embracing	a	comprehensive	relief/
development	approach	as	part	of	its	response	
to	the	chronic	crisis	in	Haiti .	
Because	it	is	recognized	by	most	stake-
holders	as	a	reliable	and	effective	humanitarian	
player,	WFP	could	take	on	a	broader	role	and	
engage	more	fully	with	civil	society,	using	its	
position	to	mobilize	other	agencies	to	engage	
in	a	process	that	will	ensure	a	more	focused,	
complementary	and	comprehensive	inter-
agency	approach	to	tackling	the	structural	and	
humanitarian	issues	in	Haiti .
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UNAIDS	 Joint	United	Nations	Programme	on	HIV	and	AIDS
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CARE	 Cooperative	for	Assistance	and	Relief	Everywhere
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ECHO	 European	Commission	Humanitarian	Aid
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M&E	 monitoring	and	evaluation
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Conference agenda
23Rd June Arrival Of Participants (All Day)
 Welcome drinks and snacks available at the Gazebo from 16:00 to 19:00
24Th June Day 1
08:30	–	09:00	 Registration and Welcome Coffee
 Venue: San Francesco Room & San Bernardo Room
09:00	–	09:15 Opening Address
 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Ramiro Lopes Da Silva (Conference Chair)
	 WFP	Deputy	Chief	Operating	Officer	and	Director	of	Emergencies
09:15	–	09 .30	 Introduction of the Conference Objectives and Programme
 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Nicholas Crawford and Thomas Gurtner
	 Overall	Conference	Facilitators
Part I: Overview on Theory and Trends
09:30	–	10:30  Conflict, Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Assistance:
Theory and Trends
 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Session	Chair:	 Mark Duffield (University of Bristol)
	 Panelists:	 James Darcy (ODI), David Keen (LSE),
  Fabrice Weissman (MSF)
10:30	–	11:15 Open Floor Discussion 
11:	15	–	11:30	 Coffee Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
11:30	–	12:15	 From Theory to Practice: Findings from the Field
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
 Session	Chair: Lauren Landis (WFP)
	 Panelists:	 Thomas Gurtner –	Findings	from	WFP	studies
   Abbas Gullet (KRCS) –	National	humanitarian	organisations	in	
conflict
  Dominik Stillhart	(ICRC) –	Principled	humanitarian	action
   Peter Goossens (WFP) – Complex	emergencies/protracted	crisis	
perspective
12:15	–	13:00 Open Floor Discussion
13:00	–	14:15 Lunch at the Gazebo
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Part II: Critical Areas of Engagement and Operational Effectiveness
14:15	–	14:30	 Introduction to the Plenary on Critical Areas of Engagement
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair: Ramiro Lopes Da Silva
14:30	–	16:00 Critical Areas of Engagement – Simultaneous Fora for Debate 
	  Forum 1 – States, UN/Integrated Missions and Impact on Humanitarian 
Space
	 Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side)
	 Facilitator:	 Jean-Luc Siblot (UNDOCO)
	 Presenters:	 David Harland (UNDPKO)
	 	 Antonio Donini (Tufts University)
 Rapporteur:	 Mohammed Haider Reza (UNMAC-Afghanistan)
	 Forum 2 – Non-State Actors, Security and Impact on Humanitarian Space
	 Venue: Bottegal Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Mustafa Darboe (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Hussein Halane (SCF), Khaled Mansour (UN)
 Rapporteur:	 Corinne Fleischer (WFP)
	  Forum 3 – Protection, the Rights Agenda, Principled Humanitarian Action, 
and Advocacy
	 Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side)
	 Facilitator:	 Gemmo Lodesani (WFP)
	 Presenters:		 Liam Mahony (Fieldview Solutions)
	 	 Christine Knudsen (UNICEF)
	 Rapporteur:	 Bruno Lemarquis (UNDP) 
16:00	–	16:30	 Tea Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
16:30	–	17:45 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion 
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
18:00	–	19:00 Welcome Reception at the Gardens and the Gazebo
25Th June Day 2
09:00	–	09:05 Introduction to Day 2 Programme
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Overall	Facilitators:	Nicholas Crawford/Thomas Gurtner
09:05	–	09:15 Introduction on the Plenary of Operational Effectiveness
	 Venue:	 San	Francesco	Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
09:15	–	10:30 Simultaneous Fora for Debate on Operational Effectiveness
	  Forum 1 – Understanding and Reaching Out Effectively to Local 
Communities
	 Venue: Beata Gabriella Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Zlatan Milisic (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Jemilah Mahmood (Mercy Malaysia)
	 	 Margaret Vogt (UNDPA)
	 Rapporteur:	 Claude Jibidar (WFP)
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	  Forum 2 – Challenges to Effective Programming (1): Planning, preparedness 
and rapid response
	 Venue: Bottegal Room
	 Facilitator:	 Myrta Kaulard (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Rashid Khalikov (OCHA), Carlos Veloso (WFP) 
 Rapporteur:	 Giancarlo Cirri (WFP)
	  Forum 3 – Challenges to Effective Programming (2): Protracted Crisis, 
Sustainability and Exit
	 Venue: Capella Room (Convent Side) 
	 Facilitator:	 Mohammed Diab (WFP)
	 Presenters:	 Luca Alinovi (FAO), Barbara Boyle-Saidi (ICRC)
	 Rapporteur:	 Al Kehler (WFP)
10:30	–	10:45		 Coffee Break 
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
10:45	–	11:30 Feedback to Plenary by Rapporteurs and Open Floor Discussion
	 Venue:	 San	Francesco	Room
11:30	—	12:15	 	Plenary Presentation: Drivers of Conflict and Future Challenges to 
Humanitarian Assistance
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Session	Chair:	 Laurent Thomas (FAO)
	 Panelists:	 Elisabeth Rasmusson (NRC)
	 	 Adil Najam (Boston University)
  Alexander Downes (Duke University)
12:15	–	13:15 Open Floor Discussion
13:15	–	14:45	 Lunchtime Dialogue with WFP Executive Director Ms Josette Sheeran
 At the Gazebo
Part III: Summary, Next Steps and Closing
14:45	–	16:00	 	Highlights of Findings: Brief thematic presentations drawn from the 
conference
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
16:00	–	16:15	 Tea Break
	 Venue: San Bernardo Room
16:15	–	17:15  Consolidation and Presentation of Key Recommendations for Moving 
Forward
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
	 Plenary	Chair:	 Ramiro Lopes da Silva
17:15	–	17:30	 Closing Remarks by the Conference Chair
	 Venue: San Francesco Room
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